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Constitutional Court of Korea

Coordinates: 37°34′41″N 126°59′05″E / 37.5780°N 126.9847°E

37°34′41″N 126°59′05″E / 37.5780°N 126.9847°E

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The Constitutional Court of Korea (Korean: 헌법재판소) is one of the highest courts – along with the Supreme Court – in South Korea’s judiciary that exercises constitutional review, seated in Jongno, Seoul. The South Korean constitution vests judicial power in courts composed of judges, which establishes the ordinary-court system, but also separates an independent constitutional court and grants it exclusive jurisdiction over matters of constitutionality. Specifically, Chapter VI Article 111 Clause 1 of the South Korean Constitution specifies the following cases to be exclusively reviewed by the Constitutional Court:[1]

1. Constitutionality of a law upon the request of the courts;

2. Impeachment;

3. Dissolution of a political party;

4. Competence disputes between State agencies, between State agencies and local governments, and between local governments; and

5. Constitutional complaints as prescribed by [the Constitutional Court] Act.

Article 111 Clause 2 states that the Constitutional Court shall consist of nine justices qualified to be court judges, all of whom shall be appointed by the president of South Korea. While all nine justices must be appointed by the president, Article 111 Clause 3 states that the National Assembly and the chief justice shall nominate three justices each, leaving the remaining three to be nominated by the president of South Korea. Article 111 Clause 4 states that the candidate for the president of the Constitutional Court must obtain the approval of the National Assembly before appointment by the president.

The constitution broadly delineates the roles of courts, both ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, and entrusts the National Assembly to legislate the specifics of their functions. After the tenth constitutional amendment in 1987, the National Assembly passed the Constitutional Court Act (헌법재판소법), which establishes the organizational structure of the court and the hierarchy of judicial officers and their roles within the court. It also specifies the procedural details for petitioning the court. Unlike other constitutional courts (most notably the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), a petitioner involved in a lawsuit may file a constitutional complaint directly with the court, without having to exhaust all other legal remedies, if he/she believes a particular statute has infringed upon his or her constitutional rights.

The Constitutional Court often clashes with the Supreme Court. While the two courts are considered co-equal (see Article 15 of the Constitutional Court Act[2]), they frequently disagree over which holds the ultimate authority to interpret the constitution. The Supreme Court, the court of last resort, has criticized the Constitutional Court for attempting to upend the “three-tiered trial” system (allowing appeals up to twice) and for placing itself above the Supreme Court. In 2022, the tensions between the two courts peaked when the Constitutional Court overturned a Supreme Court decision without declaring the relevant statute unconstitutional. Instead, it ruled that while the statute itself did not violate the constitution, its specific application did. The Supreme Court publicly denounced the ruling, arguing that it unacceptably implied that the ordinary court decisions fall under the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction, effectively subordinating the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court of Korea is the seat of the permanent secretariat for research and development of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions.

History

After regaining independence from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945, there were several attempts to establish an independent constitutional court to exercise judicial review. Prior to the First Republic, members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee debated whether Korea’s system of constitutional review should follow the American or continental Europe model. Kwon Seung-ryul proposed adopting the American system where only the Supreme Court interprets the constitution, while Yoo Jin-oh advocated for a European model, which features a constitutional court. The resulting Constitutional Committee (헌법위원회) of the First Republic was a compromise between the two proposals. Under the 1948 Constitution, the vice president chaired the committee, with five members appointed by the National Assembly. Following the 1952 constitutional amendment, these included three members from the House of Representatives and two from the House of Councillors. Additionally, the chief justice of the Supreme Court recommended five Supreme Court justices to serve on the committee.

Syngman Rhee‘s dictatorial rule undermined the committee’s normal operation, limiting it to adjudicating only six cases, two of which declared the statutes in question unconstitutional. The 1952 constitutional amendment established a bicameral legislature, but Rhee’s regime refused to enact the election law for the House of Councillors. Consequently, the upper house – required for the Constitutional Committee to function – was never formed, causing the committee to grind to a halt.[3]

Coup d’état of Park Chung Hee dissolved the Constitutional Court of the Second Republic of Korea

After Rhee’s overthrow during the April Revolution, the Second Republic was established through a constitutional amendment that shifted Korea from a presidential to a parliamentary system. As part of the amendment, the Constitutional Court (헌법재판소) was created to replace the now-defunct Constitutional Committee. Under the 1960 amendment, the president, House of Councillors and the Supreme Court each designated three Constitutional Court justices. Although legislation to establish the court was passed in April 1961, it never materialized. The following month, Park Chung Hee seized power through a military coup, suspending the constitution and halting the court’s formation.[4]

After the nominal dissolution of the military junta, President Park Chung Hee rammed the 1962 constitutional amendment through, which dissolved the Constitutional Court and transferred the power to review cases on constitutionality to the Supreme Court. In 1971, following its constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court ruled 11 to 5 and struck down Article 2 of the National Compensation Act (국가배상법), which restricted state liability for compensating soldiers injured while serving the country. Enraged by the decision, Park responded the following year by pushing through another constitutional amendment, enacting the Yushin Constitution – a notoriously oppressive document that gave the president sweeping executive and legislative powers. The Yushin Constitution included a provision that explicitly overturned the 1971 Supreme Court ruling on the National Compensation Act. Additionally, the Supreme Court justices involved in the decision were denied reappointment and forced into retirement.

The Yushin Constitution (and the successive constitution of the Fifth Republic) also re-established the Constitutional Committee, but required an ordinary court to submit a formal request for constitutional review before the committee could exercise its judicial power. Since the Supreme Court was wary of retaliation as in 1971, it forbade courts from making such requests, rendering the Constitutional Committee powerless.[5]

The June Struggle in 1987 led to the 1987 constitutional amendment, which democratized Korea and ushered in the Sixth Republic, continuing to this day. The 1987 Constitution established the modern Constitutional Court of Korea and granted it authority to review matters of constitutionality.[6] The court has delivered several landmark decisions in South Korea’s contemporary history, including the decriminalization of abortion and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye.[7]

In December 2024, the Constitutional Court became a political battleground once again following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol for declaring martial law. At the time, the court had three vacancies, prompting a debate in the National Assembly of Korea over whether acting presidents have the authority to fill such vacancies. The opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) argued that acting presidents could fill the positions, emphasizing that the presidential appointment of National Assembly-recommended nominees is largely procedural.[8] In contrast, Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) asserted that acting presidents could appoint justices only in cases of a presidential vacancy, not a suspension of duties.[9]

On December 26, the opposition parties unilaterally approved three Constitutional Court nominees, without PPP participation in the confirmation vote. Acting president Han Duck-soo refused to appoint the nominees, citing the need for a bipartisan consensus. In response, the DPK filed an impeachment motion against Han on the same day.[10] The motion passed on December 27, resulting in Han’s suspension from office.[11] On December 31, acting president Choi Sang-mok appointed Chung Kyesun and Cho Hanchang to the Constitutional Court while withholding the appointment of Ma Eun-hyuk.[12]

Status

The current judicial system of South Korea, particularly the Constitutional Court of Korea, was influenced by the Austrian judicial system.[13] While Austria has three apex courts, whose jurisdictions are defined in different chapters of the Austrian constitution,[14] the South Korean constitution[15] establishes only two apex courts. Ordinary courts, with the Supreme Court of Korea at the top, are established by Article 101 Clause 2 under Chapter 5, “Courts” (법원). Unlike the ordinary courts, the Constitutional Court of Korea is the only court established by Article 111 Clause 1 of Chapter 6, “Constitutional Court” (헌법재판소).

The drafters of the constitution tried to emphasize that the Constitutional Court does not belong to the ordinary-court system by using different but synonymous words. The term “jaepanso” (재판소; Korean pronunciation: [tɕɛpʰanso]) was used to describe the Constitutional Court, while “beopwon” (법원; Korean pronunciation: [pʌbwʌn]) was used to represent the ordinary courts. The equal status of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court is established by Article 15 of the Constitutional Court Act, which states that the president and the associate justices of the Constitutional Court should be treated the same as the chief justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court, respectively.[16]

Composition

Current justices

Main article: Justice of the Constitutional Court of Korea

Name

Born

Appointed by

Recommended by

Education

First day / Length of service

Moon Hyungbae

February 11, 1966 (age 59) in Hadong

Moon Jae-in

(Directly)

Seoul National University

April 19, 2019 / 5 years, 11 months

Lee Mison

January 18, 1970 (age 55) in Hwacheon

Moon Jae-in

(Directly)

Pusan National University

April 19, 2019 / 5 years, 11 months

Kim Hyungdu

October 17, 1965 (age 59) in Jeonju

Yoon Suk Yeol

Chief Justice (Kim Myeong-soo)

Seoul National University

March 31, 2023 / 2 years

Jeong Jeong-mi

May 24, 1969 (age 55) in Busan

Yoon Suk Yeol

Chief Justice (Kim Myeong-soo)

Seoul National University

April 17, 2023 / 1 year, 11 months

Jeong Hyeong-sik

September 2, 1961 (age 63) in Yanggu

Yoon Suk Yeol

(Directly)

Seoul National University

December 18, 2023 / 1 year, 3 months

Kim Bok-hyeong

May 5, 1968 (age 56) in Geoje

Yoon Suk Yeol

Chief Justice (Cho Hee-dae)

Seoul National University

September 21, 2024 / 6 months

Cho Hanchang

May 14, 1965 (age 59) in Suwon

Choi Sang-mok

National Assembly (People Power Party)

Seoul National University

January 1, 2025 / 3 months

Chung Kyesun

August 2, 1969 (age 55) in Yangyang

Choi Sang-mok

National Assembly (Democratic Party)

Seoul National University

January 1, 2025 / 3 months

Vacant

Vacant since October 2024

Justices

Article 111 of the South Korean constitution specifies the size of the Constitutional Court and the procedure for nominating and appointing justices.[15] The court comprises nine justices (헌법재판소 재판관), with each formally appointed by the president of South Korea.[15] However, Article 111 Clause 3 of the constitution divides the power to nominate candidates into equal thirds among the president, the National Assembly, and the chief justice of the Supreme Court.[15] Thus, the president nominates and appoints three of the nine justices, while the remaining six justices are appointed from candidates selected by the National Assembly or the chief justice of the Supreme Court. This appointment structure reflects the civil law tradition of viewing ordinary courts as the core of the conventional judiciary, as the president represents the executive branch, the National Assembly represents the legislative branch, and the chief justice of the Supreme Court represents the judicial branch of the South Korean government. However, it is clear that both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court generally regard the power of the Constitutional Court as a judicial authority.[17]

To be appointed as a Constitutional Court justice, Article 5 Clause 1 of the Constitutional Court Act requires that the person must be at least 40 years old, qualified as an attorney, and have more than 15 years of career experience in legal practice or legal academia.[16]

While the exact internal procedure for the nomination of Constitutional Court justices is not specified by statutes, the nomination of the three justices from the National Assembly is usually determined through political negotiations between the ruling party in the Assembly and the first opposition party. When the second opposition party has sufficient membership in the Assembly, it also plays a role in this process. If the second opposition party does not have enough seats in the Assembly to formally participate, the ruling party nominates one justice, and the first opposition party nominates another. The remaining nomination is usually shared between the two parties, determined by negotiation or, if negotiation fails, by election[citation needed]. For example, former justice Kang Il-won was nominated by the National Assembly through negotiations between the ruling Saenuri Party and the first opposition Democratic United Party in 2012. When the second opposition party is big enough, it nominates the third justice. For instance, in 2018, Justice Lee Young-jin was nominated by the second opposition party, the Bareunmirae Party.

Notably, Article 6 Clause 2 of the Constitutional Court Act mandates confirmation hearings of the National Assembly (국회 인사청문회) for all Constitutional Court justices before their appointment or nomination.[16] However, the confirmation hearing is considered a formality, because the verbiage of the relevant article in the Constitutional Court Act requires that a confirmation hearing take place, not that the candidate obtain the Assembly’s approval.[18] Therefore, the National Assembly cannot block nominations or appointments by disapproving candidates during these hearings.

Council of Constitutional Court Justices

The Council of Constitutional Court Justices (재판관회의) is established according to Article 16 Clause 1 of the Constitutional Court Act.[16] It comprises all nine justices, including the president of the Constitutional Court who serves as the permanent presiding chair. Decisions are made by a simple majority among a quorum of two-thirds of all justices, according to Article 16 Clause 2 and Clause 3 of the Constitutional Court Act.[16] The council primarily supervises the court administration power of the president of the Constitutional Court, such as the appointment of the secretary-general, the deputy secretary-general, rapporteur judges, and other high-ranking officers above Grade III. It also oversees other issues requiring supervisory functions, including making interior procedural rules and planning fiscal issues.

President of the Constitutional Court

Main article: President of the Constitutional Court of Korea

Article 111 Clause 4 empowers the president of South Korea to appoint the president of the Constitutional Court from among the nine Constitutional Court justices, subject to the National Assembly’s approval. According to Article 12 Clause 3 of the Constitutional Court Act, the president of the court represents the court and supervises court administration. Additionally, Article 16 Clause 1 states the president of the court chairs the Council of Constitutional Court Justices. Article 22 designates the president of the court as a presiding member of the full bench (전원재판부, en banc).

Tenure

Article 112 Clause 1 of the constitution and Article 7 of the Constitutional Court Act specify that the term of an associate justice is renewable for six years up to a mandatory retirement age of 70. However, only two justices have attempted to renew their term by reappointment,[19] as doing so can potentially harm the judicial independence of the Constitutional Court. During their term, according to Articles 112 Clause 1 and Clause 2 of the constitution, justices cannot be expelled from office except by impeachment or a sentence of imprisonment, and they are prohibited from joining any political party or participating in political activities to maintain the court’s political neutrality.

A sophisticated issue in the court’s tenure system is the term length of the court’s president, because neither the constitution nor the Constitutional Court Act specifies it. A newly appointed president of the court who is also serving as a justice can have a full six-year term as a justice. However, if the president is appointed during their term as a justice, they can only serve as president for the remainder of their term as a justice.

Organization

Rapporteur Judges

Main article: Rapporteur Judge § South Korea

Rapporteur judges (헌법연구관, formerly known as constitutional research officers) support the court’s nine justices by conducting investigations and research for case review and adjudication. They prepare memoranda and draft decisions, functioning similarly to judicial assistants such as conseillers référendaires[20] in the French Court of Cassation or Gerichtsschreiber[21] in the Swiss Bundesgericht. These roles typically last 5 to 10 years or more until retirement, unlike law clerks in the United States Supreme Court who serve as interns for 1 to 2 years.[22]

Rapporteur judges are appointed by the court’s president, with the consent of the Council of Justices, under Article 16 Clause 4 and Article 19 Clause 3 of the Constitutional Court Act. They serve renewable ten-year terms, the same tenure system as lower ordinary court judges (판사) in South Korea. Of note, rapporteur judges serve longer than justices and are paid at the same rate as lower ordinary court judges, ensuring continuity of constitutional adjudication in South Korea. Some positions for rapporteur judges are filled with lower ordinary court judges or prosecutors seconded from outside the Constitutional Court for one to two years, enhancing the court’s diversity and insight according to Article 19 Clause 9 of the Constitutional Court Act. In addition to rapporteur judges, the court also includes constitutional researchers (헌법연구원) and academic advisers (헌법연구위원), who work for two to five years assisting in research mainly on comparative law related to the court’s ongoing cases, under Article 19 Clause 3 of the Constitutional Court Act.

Department of Court Administration

The court’s administration is managed autonomously within the court by the Department of Court Administration (DCA, 헌법재판소사무처). The department is led by the secretary-general (사무처장), currently Park Jong Mun, under the direction of the court’s president, with consent of the Council of Justices on significant matters as outlined under Articles 16 and 17 of the Constitutional Court Act. The secretary-general is equivalent in rank to other ministers in the State Council of the executive branch, according to Article 18 Clause 1 of the Constitutional Court Act. The deputy secretary-general (사무차장) is typically appointed from senior rapporteur judges and holds the same rank as other vice ministers. The department implements decisions of the Council of Constitutional Court Justices and oversees various aspects of court administration, including fiscal and human resource issues as well as information technology services. It also has a professional team supporting the court’s international relations, including the Venice Commission and Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions.

Constitutional Research Institute

Constitutional Research Institute (헌법재판연구원) is the Constitutional Court’s own research institute, established under Article 19 Clause 4 of the Constitutional Court Act. It focuses on research in fundamental academic areas such as comparative law and original legal theories related to the constitution. The institute also provides training for newly appointed court officials and educates the public about the constitution. Professors at the institute are primarily recruited from PhD degree holders who have studied abroad, and their research and education programs are supervised by senior rapporteur judges seconded from the court. The institute is currently located in Gangnam, Seoul.[23]

Building

Side view of the Constitutional Court of Korea building

The Constitutional Court of Korea is located in Jae-dong, Jongno District, Seoul, near Anguk station on Seoul Subway Line 3. The court comprises the courthouse and an annex. The five-story main courthouse, completed in 1993, is designed in a Neoclassical style that blends Korean tradition with modern technology. It was awarded first place in the second Korean Architecture Award in October 1993.[24] The right pillar of the main gate bears the inscription 헌법재판소, meaning the Constitutional Court, while the left pillar gate is inscribed 헌법재판소 사무처, meaning the Department of Court Administration.

The main building houses the courtroom, offices, and deliberation chambers for justices, offices for rapporteur judges, academic advisers, and constitutional researchers, as well as workspace for the Department of Court Administration. The annex, completed in April 2020, is a three-story building designed to enhance public engagement and accessibility, including barrier-free features. It includes a law library, a permanent exhibition hall for visitors, and additional office space for the Department of Court Administration.[25] The court typically holds open hearings or verdict sessions on the second and last Thursday of each month. Visitors with ID cards or passports may attend these session. However, unaccompanied tours of the court are restricted for security reasons.[26]

Procedure

The review procedure in the Constitutional Court described in Chapter 3 of the Constitutional Court Act consists of two phases. In the first phase, the court examines whether the case meets the preliminary admissibility conditions. For example, if the petitioner missed the deadline for filing a request, the case is formally dismissed, regardless of the merits of the case. In the second phase, the court reviews and deliberates on the merits of the case. There is usually no oral hearings in the second phase, but the court may decide to have oral hearings if needed, under Article 30 of the Constitutional Court Act. If a petition is admissible but fails on its merits, it is formally rejected. If the court agrees with the petitioner, the petition is upheld, but there may be different forms of upheld decisions, as in the case of constitutionality review of statutes.

Review in the first phase is performed by one of the court’s three panels (지정재판부), each consisting of three justices. If the panel decides unanimously that the case fails to meet any of the admissibility conditions, the case is dismissed. Otherwise, the case proceeds to the second phase, where the full bench (전원재판부) reviews the case, according to Article 22 of the Constitutional Court Act. Even if a case passes the first review and has proceeded to the second phase, it can still be dismissed.

Votes and Quorum of Full Bench

According to Article 113 Clause 1 of the constitution and Article 23 Clause 2 of the Constitutional Court Act, a decision to uphold a petition or overturn a precedent requires the concurrence of at least six justices. For deliberation, a quorum of at least seven justices is required. The sole exception applies to competence disputes, which can be resolved with a simple majority to uphold a petition. A simple majority is also sufficient to dismiss or reject a petition. If no simple majority opinion is reached, the court’s decision is determined by sequentially counting votes, starting with the most favorable opinion for the petitioner and continuing toward the least favorable, until the count exceeds six votes. The least favorable opinion within this majority is regarded as the opinion of the court.[citation needed]

Presiding justice and justice in charge

In constitutional court proceedings, a presiding justice (재판장) and a justice in charge (주심) are designated for each case. The presiding justice serves as the official representative of the panel, while the justice in charge oversees hearings and drafts the judgment for the specific case. The role of the justice in charge is analogous to that of a judge-rapporteur in the European Court of Justice. To mitigate concerns about partiality, the justice in charge is typically selected by a computer program. In contrast, the presiding justice is determined by seniority.

It is important to note that in South Korean courts, the term “presiding judge” often refers to the administrative head of the panel, rather than the individual presiding over specific cases. For example, in the impeachment proceedings of former president Park Geun-hye, Justice Kang Il-won served as the justice in charge (주심재판관) and conducted much of the proceedings. However, Justice Lee Jung-mi, the acting president of the Constitutional Court at the time, was the official presiding justice of the full bench.[27]

Case naming

Constitutional-court case naming follows a specific convention. The first two or four digits represent the year the case was filed. This is followed by an alphabetic case code, which categorizes the case into one of eight types: Hun-Ka, Hun-Na, Hun-Da, Hun-Ra, Hun-Ma, Hun-Ba, Hun-Sa, and Hun-A, each corresponding to a specific jurisdiction of the court. Finally, a serial number is assigned based on the chronological order of case filings within the same year.[28]

Jurisdiction

Constitutional litigation structure of South Korea

The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is defined in Article 111 Clause 1 of the constitution and includes the following: adjudication on (1) constitutionality of statutes, (2) impeachment, (3) dissolution of a political party, (4) competence dispute, and (5) constitutional complaint.[29] While the Constitutional Court’s organizational structure was influenced by Austria, the scope of its jurisdiction follows the German model.

Judicial review of statutes

Further information: Judicial review and Judiciary of South Korea § Separation of powers inside Judicial branch

According to Article 111 Clause 1 Provision 1 of the constitution, the Constitutional Court may review the constitutionality of statutes at the request of ordinary courts – a power referred to as judicial review (사법심사) or officially Adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes (위헌법률심판) in Article 4 Clause 1 of the Constitutional Court Act. In a legal dispute, if the court’s decision depends on the constitutionality of laws relevant to the case, either party may request the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for review. However, the court has discretion on whether to grant the request. If the court decides not to refer the matter, the aggrieved party can file a “constitutional complaint” directly with the Constitutional Court and bypass the ordinary court. The procedural hurdles involved in requesting adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes imply that only parties directly involved in an ongoing legal case are eligible to request a referral from the court. This means that a person who may suffer abstract or potential injuries is not eligible for this legal resource. In other words, a party must have a concrete and specific interest in the outcome of the case to request a referral to the Constitutional Court.

Article 41 Clause 5 of the Constitutional Court Act establishes that once an ordinary court has requested the Constitutional Court to adjudicate on the constitutionality of statutes, no superior court, including the Supreme Court, may intervene. This restriction on the powers of the Supreme Court stems from its historical passivity in confronting other branches of government during periods of authoritarian rule.

The procedural requirement that an ordinary court must refer the case for Constitutional Court review was abused by President Park Chung Hee under the Yushin Constitution. He refused to re-appoint Supreme Court justices who challenged his authority, effectively preventing the ordinary courts from making any formal requests for constitutional review. This event laid bare the vulnerabilities of making constitutional review contingent upon a court’s request.

Decriminalizing abortion in South Korea (2017Hun-Ba127) in 2019 is one of the landmark decisions on constitutional complaints under Article 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Act

As a result, the 1987 tenth constitutional amendment introduced another avenue for an interested party to bypass the ordinary courts and directly ask the Constitutional Court to intervene in constitutional review. This alternative route, called constitutional complaint (헌법소원심판), is defined in Article 68 Clause 2 of the Constitutional Court Act.[30]

Types of decisions by the Constitutional Court

Decision

Description

Unconstitutional (위헌)

When the Constitutional Court declares a statute unconstitutional, the relevant law is nullified, and the decision takes effect immediately. In the case of criminal laws, the decision applies retroactively, unless a previous Constitutional Court decision upheld the same statute. In such instances, the decision is retroactively applied until the time of the previous relevant decision. This means that those who were previously convicted under the unconstitutional statute may have their convictions overturned or may be eligible for retrial.

Constitutional (합헌)

When the Constitutional Court declares a statute constitutional, the relevant law remains in effect. This means that the statute remains valid and enforceable, and the decision does not affect any ongoing or past legal proceedings related to the law.

Unconformable (헌법불합치)

When a statute is declared unconformable to the constitution, the law is deemed unconstitutional in essence but remains in effect until the National Assembly amends the law. In such decisions, the Constitutional Court sets a deadline after which the relevant law expires and becomes unenforceable. The National Assembly is responsible for amending the law to ensure that it conforms to the constitution, and failure to do so within the specified deadline can result in legal consequences.

Conditionally Unconstitutional (한정위헌), Conditionally Constitutional (한정합헌)

When a statute is declared conditionally constitutional by the Constitutional Court, it means that the law must be interpreted in a certain way to ensure that it is constitutional. Alternatively, the court may also declare a statute conditionally unconstitutional, meaning that the law is unconstitutional if interpreted in a certain way. These types of decisions are known as “derivative decisions” (변형결정) and are often a point of contention between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has argued that such derivative decisions encroach upon the court’s traditional role of interpreting statutes and could lead to confusion and inconsistency in the application of the law. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has justified its use of derivative decisions by stating that they are necessary to ensure that the law conforms to the constitution while respecting the legislative intent and separation of powers.

Impeachment

Further information: Impeachment

The impeachment of Park Geun-hye (Case No. 2016Hun-Na1) in 2017 is one of the landmark decisions on impeachment.

The Constitutional Court holding a hearing in the impeachment trial for President Yoon Suk Yeol, with Yoon in attendance (on the right) as the defendant, 21 January 2025.

Impeachment adjudication (탄핵심판) is another prominent power of the Constitutional Court. According to Article 65 Clause 1 of the constitution, if the president, prime minister, or other state council members violate the constitution or other laws of official duty, the National Assembly can propose an impeachment motion with the concurrence of at least one-third of the National Assembly members, or in the case of the president, of at least a majority. For passage, the motion must receive the support of a two-thirds majority if it concerns the president and a simple majority for any other office. Once the impeachment motion passes the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court adjudicates the impeachment, and until the Constitutional Court renders a decision, the impeached official is suspended from office and unable to exercise power.

Neither the constitution nor the Constitutional Court Act provides concrete criteria to be considered in an impeachment case. Therefore, previous Constitutional Court decisions play an important role in establishing standards of review for impeachment cases. There have been three presidential impeachment cases: the 2004 impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun, the 2017 impeachment of Park Geun-hye, and the impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol. In President Roh’s impeachment case, the court decided that a grave (중대한) violation of the law is required to remove a president from office. However, in the case of President Park Geun-hye, the Constitutional Court held that a violation of the constitution is sufficient for removal, even without a grave violation of the law or statutes.[31]

Dissolution of political parties

Further information: Defensive democracy

Under the constitution, the government may request the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if its objectives or activities are deemed to violate the liberal democratic basic order (민주적 기본질서). The party-dissolution provision was influenced by its German equivalent, Party Ban (German: Parteiverbot), designed to prevent events like the rise of the Nazis from recurring.[32] While the provision aims to prevent anti-democratic factions from destabilizing society, it also risks being abused by authoritarian leaders to dissolve political parties that challenge their authority and suppress dissent and free speech. Requiring approval by the Constitutional Court is intended to address such concerns.

The Constitutional Court rarely accepts dissolution petitions, and even less often rules in favor of dissolving a political party. As of April 2023, the Unified Progressive Party is the only political party dissolved through the provision.[33][34][35]

Competence disputes

The constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to adjudicate competence disputes (권한쟁의심판), which is derived from the German Organs Dispute (German: Organstreit).[36] Competence is legal jargon defined as the legal authority to deal with a particular matter; therefore, competence disputes are legal cases between government agencies (국가기관) or local governments (지방자치단체) asking the Constitutional Court to adjudicate which party does or does not have competence. In some instances, two separate agencies may have overlapping powers, which are defined in the relevant statutes that grant those powers. As a result, it may become necessary to distinctly establish the agency responsible for a particular matter. In some other cases, the existence of competence itself can be disputed. For example, the central government in Seoul may delegate certain government projects to local governments. Local governments may attempt to dodge the delegation by petitioning the Constitutional Court, claiming they lack the constitutional competence to undertake such tasks.

Constitutional complaints

Further information: Verfassungsbeschwerde

Article 111 Clause 1 Provision 5 of the constitution, along with Article 68 Clause 1 of the Constitutional Court Act, grants the court the authority to review whether a petitioner’s basic rights have been violated by an action or inaction of a public authority. The specification of the constitutional complaints system was influenced by the German equivalent, Verfassungsbeschwerde.[citation needed] Because constitutional complaints (헌법소원심판) are intended to serve as a last resort, they can only be filed after all other existing legal remedies have been exhausted.

Civil liability lawsuits are adjudicated by ordinary courts and therefore not subject to constitutional complaints. The court’s review is limited to determining whether the petitioner’s basic rights have been violated in the adjudication process. Claims for damages and compensation fall outside the court’s jurisdiction and are therefore dismissed.

According to Article 68 Clause 2 of the Constitutional Court Act, petitioners involved in an ongoing lawsuit can bypass the ordinary court and file a complaint directly with the Constitutional Court, provided that they have sought but were denied a referral for a review of a statute’s constitutionality (법령소원심판). Because Clause 2 of the article was historically established to counteract the Park Chung Hee regime’s suppression of ordinary courts, curtailing their willingness to grant referrals for constitutional reviews, it does not require that the petitioner exhaust all other legal remedies – only that the ordinary court has denied their request for a referral to the Constitutional Court.

Statistics

Below are the aggregated statistics as of 9 February 2021.[37]

Type

Total

Constitutionality of

statutes

Impeachment

Dissolution of

a political party

Competence

dispute

Constitutional complaint

Sub total

§68 I

§68 II

Filed

41,615

1,008

2

2

115

40,488

32,074

8,414

Settled

40,303

957

2

2

110

39,232

31,264

7,968

Dismissed by panel

24,476

24,476

19,915

4,561

Decided by

full bench

Unconstitutional

655

294

361

113

248

Nonconformity

262

82

180

75

105

Conditionally

unconstitutional

70

18

52

20

32

Conditionally

constitutional

28

7

21

21

Constitutional

2,843

359

2,484

4

2,480

Upholding

794

1

1

19

773

773

Rejected

7,998

1

27

7,970

7,970

Dismissed

2,115

73

1

45

1,996

1,611

385

Other

10

10

8

2

Withdrawn

1,052

124

19

909

775

134

Pending

1,312

51

5

1,256

810

446

International relations

- Venice Commission : South Korea is a member state of the Venice Commission and sends one of the associate justices in the Constitutional Court to the commission. Substitute members are conventionally designated for the following two positions: deputy secretary-general at the court’s Department of Court Administration and vice minister of justice. The current member is Justice Lee Suk-Tae.[38]

- Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions : South Korea is a founding member state of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions (AACC), and hosts its permanent secretariat. The president of the Constitutional Court represents South Korea on the AACC board.

Criticism and Issues

According to Article 113 Clause 1 of the constitution, the Constitutional Court is required to have at least six justices present in order to render a decision; however, the constitution is silent on how to overcome an unmet quorum.[39] Article 6 Clause 4 and Clause 5 of the Constitutional Court Act state that any vacancy must be filled within 30 days but lack an effective enforcement mechanism. This exposes the court to potential political instability or gridlock, particularly in cases of disagreement between the president and the National Assembly. For example, in October 2024, three Constitutional Court justices retired, but the ruling party and the opposition in the National Assembly failed to agree on how to fill the vacancies.[40] This deadlock persisted into December 2024, complicating the impeachment proceedings against President Yoon Suk Yeol and presenting legal and procedural challenges.[41] While the Supreme Court of Korea similarly lacks contingency measures for potential vacancies, the key difference is that a supermajority of six justices is needed to issue a ruling in the Constitutional Court, whereas only a simple majority is needed in the Supreme Court.

Relationship with Supreme Court

The relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court is a widely discussed topic among Korean jurists.[42][43][44][45] The constitution does not establish a clear hierarchy between the two highest courts, and the ranks of the respective chief justices are equal under the Constitutional Court Act. Since the co-equal relationship of the courts relies on a piece of legislation, the National Assembly could pass an amendment ranking the heads of the courts differently and resolve this issue. However, there currently is no legal resolution for disagreements between the two highest courts.

Points of contention include jurisdiction over executive orders and presidential decrees, and “unconstitutional as applied” decisions.

While Article 107 of the constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have the power to make a final review of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations or actions,” Article 111 of the constitution and the Constitutional Court Act together also grant the Constitutional Court overlapping jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality of government actions.

Moreover, the highest courts disagree heavily on the Constitutional Court’s power to declare a law unconstitutional as applied (한정위헌결정) – a decision stating that the law itself is constitutional but applied unconstitutionally. The Supreme Court interprets such rulings as upholding the law’s constitutionality and does not consider the decisions binding, allowing itself to disregard these rulings and proceed unhindered.

In response, according to the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court has the power to suspend “state powers” that may violate the constitution. The Constitutional Court interprets such “state powers” to include Supreme Court decisions. The Constitutional Court suspended Supreme Court trials once in 1997 and twice in 2022 because it interpreted the latter’s decisions as unconstitutional.[46]

Because there is no higher authority to resolve disputes between them, these conflicts lack legal recourse.

Symbols

- Emblem of the Constitutional Court of Korea (1988–2017)

- Flag of the Constitutional Court of Korea (1988–2017)

- Flag of the Constitutional Court of Korea (from 2017)

- Logo of the Constitutional Court of Korea (from 2009)

See also

Wikisource has several original texts related to Constitutional Court of Korea decisions.

- Constitution of South Korea

- Politics of South Korea

- Government of South Korea

- Judiciary of South Korea

- President of the Constitutional Court of Korea

- Rapporteur Judge

- Supreme Court of Korea

- Venice Commission

- Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions

References

External links

- Media related to Constitutional Court of Korea at Wikimedia Commons

- the Constitutional Court of Korea Official Website

- The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (translated into English), Korea Legislation Research Institute

- Constitutional Court Act (translated into English), Korea Legislation Research Institute

- Thirty Years of the Constitutional Court of Korea (1988-2018), published and downloadable by the Constitutional Court of Korea

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Constitutional_Court_of_Korea&oldid=1283605022”

Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol

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On 14 December 2024, Yoon Suk Yeol, the 13th president of South Korea, was impeached by the National Assembly. This action came in response to Yoon’s declaration of martial law on 3 December 2024, which was overturned by the National Assembly and officially withdrawn six hours later on 4 December 2024.

Prime Minister of South Korea Han Duck-soo assumed the role of acting president pending the Constitutional Court‘s decision on whether to accept the impeachment, except from his own impeachment on 27 December 2024 until his acquittal by the Constitutional Court on 24 March 2025, during which time first deputy prime minister Choi Sang-mok served as acting president.

The court upheld the impeachment of Yoon in a unanimous 8–0 decision on 4 April 2025, removing Yoon from office. Thus, Han will continue as acting president until the next presidential election is held, which must occur within 60 days.

The motion marks the third impeachment of a South Korean president: Roh Moo-hyun was impeached in 2004 but acquitted by the Constitutional Court, while Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2016 and subsequently convicted and removed from office in 2017, also by a unanimous 8–0 decision of the Constitutional Court.

An earlier impeachment motion was put to a parliamentary vote on 7 December 2024 but failed because the number of attending legislators did not meet the quorum required for its passage, as members of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) boycotted the vote.

Opinion polling on the Yoon Suk Yeol presidency throughout 2024 was increasingly negative. The declaration of martial law hardened these views, with many surveyed in South Korea believing Yoon should resign voluntarily or that he should be formally removed from office.[2][3] Hundreds of thousands attended protests against government actions throughout December.

Background

This article is part of

a series about

Yoon Suk Yeol

Political career

- President (2022–2025)[a]

- Prosecutor General (2019–2021)

Presidency

- Cabinet

- International trips

- Opinion polling

- Camp David Principles

- 2024 martial law crisis

- Impeachment

- Arrest

Elections

- 2022

a. ^ Suspended from 14 December 2024 to 4 April 2025

- v

- t

- e

Yoon Suk Yeol in 2022

South Korea has been governed as a presidential democracy under the 1987 constitution, which provides for a strong independent executive. As a result, presidents can only be removed by a difficult impeachment process, rather than a simple vote of no confidence. Only one Korean president, Park Geun-hye, has been removed from office through impeachment, which occurred in 2017.[4] Roh Moo-hyun was impeached in 2004 on accusations of illegal electioneering, incompetence, and economic mismanagement. However, the Constitutional Court cleared him of two infractions and deemed the remaining charge not serious enough to warrant removal, allowing him to remain in office.[5]

Impeachment procedure

The procedure for impeachment is set out in the 10th Constitution of South Korea in 1987. Article 65, Clause 1, specifies that the National Assembly may impeach the president, prime minister, or other state officials if they violate the constitution or other laws while performing official duties.[6][7]

For an impeachment motion against a sitting president to pass, a majority of the National Assembly must propose it, and a two-thirds supermajority – 200 out of 300 members – must vote in favor.[8] Once passed, the individual is immediately suspended from their duties pending a ruling by the Constitutional Court of Korea. The scope of impeachment is limited to removal from public office, with no further penalties imposed through this process.[9]

According to the Constitutional Court Act passed in 1988, the Constitutional Court must render a decision within 180 days after it receives any case for adjudication, including impeachment cases. If the respondent has already left office before the decision, the case is dismissed.[9] Formal removal of the president requires six of the nine justices voting in favor. Due to one vacancy,[10] President Yoon Suk Yeol’s removal needed six out of eight judges to vote to dismiss him. Article 23 of the Constitutional Court Act requires at least seven justices for deliberation.[8]

If the National Assembly impeaches the president, the president is immediately suspended from office, with the prime minister assuming the role of acting president. In the event of the president’s resignation or removal by the Constitutional Court, an early presidential election is required to be held within 60 days. During this interim period, the prime minister continues to serve as acting president until the election of a new president.[8]

Previous calls to impeach Yoon

See also: Yoon Suk Yeol § Calls for resignation

In July 2024, an online petition started on the National Assembly’s website calling for Yoon’s impeachment gathered over a million signatures, with all petitions with over 50,000 signatures required under law to be reviewed by a parliamentary committee. The website crashed, with over 22,000 people concurrently waiting to access the website with an estimated wait time of 30 minutes.[11][12] In November 2024, over 3,000 professors and researchers at various universities signed a letter asking Yoon to resign.[13][14] One interviewer speculated that the letter had received the highest number of signatures from academics since protests during the Park Geun-hye administration.[13] On 28 November, 1,466 South Korean Catholic priests also called for Yoon to be impeached, issuing a statement titled “How could a person be like this” (어째서 사람이 이 모양인가), which claimed that he is a puppet of private interests who has no idea what he does or who he is and who had handed over the authority entrusted to him by the people to his wife.[15]

Martial law declaration

Main article: 2024 South Korean martial law crisis

On 3 December, Yoon declared martial law in South Korea, stating that martial law was necessary to defend the country from anti-state forces. Military and police forces attempted to prevent legislators from entering the National Assembly Proceeding Hall, causing clashes between the security forces, protesters, and legislative aides. All 190 legislators who were present in the chamber unanimously voted to demand the lifting of martial law, forcing Yoon to lift martial law around 04:00 KST on 4 December.[4]

Impeachment

First motion

First motion to impeach Yoon

Choice

Votes

Yes

Not counted

195 (65%)

No

Abstentions

Invalid

Not voting

105 (35%)

Impeachment unsuccessful

Following the martial law declaration, all six opposition parties – the DPK, Rebuilding Korea Party, New Reform Party, Progressive Party, Basic Income Party, and Social Democratic Party – submitted the motion to impeach Yoon during a plenary session of the National Assembly on 4 December. The vote was set for 7 December.[16]

Following an emergency meeting of the PPP, its leader, Han Dong-hoon, initially announced the party’s unanimous opposition to the impeachment efforts.[17][18][19] However, on 6 December, Han revealed that the PPP had received evidence indicating that Yoon had ordered Defense Counterintelligence Commander Yeo In-hyung to arrest key politicians, including Han himself,[20] on “anti-state charges” during martial law and detain them in Gwacheon, prompting Han to call on Yoon to “suspend his duties soon” and warning that citizens could be in “great danger” if Yoon remained in office.[21][22][20]

Hours before the National Assembly convened on 7 December, Yoon apologized for declaring martial law, describing it as “desperate decision made by me, the president, as the final authority responsible for state affairs” and promising there would not be a second declaration of martial law.[23] He also pledged to delegate his political functions to the PPP.[24] DPK leader and main opposition leader Lee Jae-myung called the apology “disappointing” and insisted on Yoon’s resignation or impeachment.[25] He also criticized Yoon’s power-sharing arrangement with the PPP as “destroying the constitutional order”,[26] while DPK Floor Leader Park Chan-dae called the arrangement a “second coup”.[27] Prior to the impeachment vote, a motion was discussed on whether to launch a special counsel investigation on Yoon’s wife Kim Keon-hee but ultimately failed due to opposition by the PPP.[28]

Ahn Cheol-soo was the only PPP lawmaker to not leave the chamber before voting.

Kim Yea-ji [ko] was one of two PPP lawmakers who left the chamber but later returned.

Before voting began, all PPP lawmakers except one, Ahn Cheol-soo, left the voting chamber, meaning the bill would be unlikely to pass.[29] This came amid the possibility of PPP lawmakers deviating from the party’s position through the secret balloting process.[30] Kim Yea-ji [ko] left but later returned;[31][32] Kim Sang-wook [ko] returned to vote but said he voted against impeachment.[33] Protesters attempted to block the exits of the National Assembly Proceeding Hall as PPP lawmakers left, calling the leaving lawmakers “cowards” and encouraging them to vote.[34] Rebuilding Korea Party lawmaker Kim Joon-hyung said that he expected voting to go on until 00:00 KST on 8 December at the latest;[35] the deadline to vote was 00:48 KST, three days after the motion was introduced.[36]

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik closed voting early at 21:20 KST and initially announced the start of counting shortly after, but then announced that votes would not be counted due to failing to reach the quorum, with only 195 members present of the 200 needed.[37][38]

Between motions

Following the first impeachment motion, PPP Leader Han Dong-hoon said that the PPP would continue to “push for the president’s orderly retreat to minimize chaos”,[39] while PPP Floor Leader Choo Kyung-ho resigned, saying that he would take responsibility for “the third presidential impeachment vote in [South Korea’s] constitutional history”.[40] Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (Independent) said that he would “make all-out efforts to promptly stabilize the current situation”.[41] The DPK said that it would continue to file impeachment motions against Yoon on a weekly basis.[42]

On 8 December, former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun was arrested by prosecutors on suspicion of committing insurrection by advising President Yoon to declare martial law and sending troops into the National Assembly to seize the legislature.[43][44] That same day, Han Dong-hoon said that the PPP had “effectively obtained (Yoon’s) promise to step down” in exchange for the party blocking his impeachment.[45] A PPP special task force proposed that Yoon leave office in February or March 2025 and called for a snap presidential election to be held in April or May.[46]

On 10 December, the National Assembly passed a bill creating a permanent special counsel to investigate Yoon on charges of treason relating to his martial law declaration. The motion passed with 210 MPs, including 23 PPP members, in favor after the party allowed its members to vote according to their individual decision.[47] On 12 December, Yoon issued a statement vowing to “fight to the end”, resisting the push for his resignation.[48] Following Yoon’s statement, Han Dong-hoon called for Yoon’s impeachment and convened an ethics committee to discuss Yoon’s expulsion from the PPP.[49]

Second motion

Second motion to impeach Yoon

Choice

Votes

Yes

204 (68%)

No

85 (28.3%)

Abstentions

3 (1%)

Invalid

8 (2.7%)

Not voting

0

Impeachment successful

The DPK filed its second motion to impeach Yoon on 12 December, with the vote scheduled for 14 December 2024.[50]

Prior to the vote, seven PPP lawmakers expressed their intention to participate,[51] including Ahn Cheol-soo, Kim Yea-ji and Kim Sang-wook, who participated in the previous voting, as well as Bae Hyun-jin, who had not expressed her intentions in the next vote. On 10 December, Kim Sang-wook, who voted against the impeachment motion, announced that he would support impeachment and apologized for his previous decision.[52][53]

Before the vote began on 14 December, Han Dong-hoon announced that while his party opposed impeachment, it would engage in the vote, encouraging lawmakers to vote “according to their conscience and beliefs rather than following partisan interests”.[54] Shortly after 16:00 KST, with six PPP members present, speaker Woo Won-shik announced the beginning of the vote, saying “I hope every one of you will participate in the vote”.[55][56] BBC News described the second vote as “a stark contrast from last weekend”, citing the lack of a PPP boycott.[57]

Woo Won-shik signing resolution approving Yoon’s impeachment

Around 16:50 KST on 14 December, Woo announced that all 300 members had voted and vote counting had begun.[58] As votes were counted, protesters sang “March for the Beloved“, an anthem commemorating those killed during the Gwangju Uprising, and “Into the New World” by Girls’ Generation, which was also used during the impeachment of Park Geun-hye.[59]

The National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon, with 204 of 300 lawmakers supporting impeachment.[60] Among those who voted in favor were 12 members of the PPP, exceeding the seven who had previously stated their intention to do so. Eighty-five lawmakers voted against impeachment, while three others abstained. Eight votes were classified as invalid.[61] Shortly afterwards, Yoon’s suspension from the presidency went into effect at 19:24 KST,[62] after his office received a copy of the impeachment resolution.[63]

Aftermath

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo became acting president after Yoon’s impeachment; he would be impeached himself soon thereafter.

Following the passage of the second impeachment motion, Yoon addressed the nation, acknowledging his suspension while pledging to “do my best for the nation until the end”.[64] Five members of the PPP’s Supreme Council resigned to take responsibility for its approval, prompting the formation of an emergency response committee system to lead the party in accordance with its regulations.[65] On 16 December, PPP leader Han Dong-hoon also resigned, acknowledging that Yoon’s impeachment was “painful” while stating that he did not regret supporting it.[66] The DPK said that the motion’s success was “a historic victory for democracy” and pledged to continue investigating Yoon for declaring martial law.[67]

With Yoon’s suspension as president, his prime minister, Han Duck-soo became acting president. Amid Han being asked by police for questioning in its investigation of martial law, DPK leader Lee Jae-myung said that the party would not move to impeach Han for the time being to avoid “confusion in state affairs”. Lee also called for the formation of a consultative body between the National Assembly and the government to stabilize state affairs.[68] On 20 December, both the PPP and the DPK agreed to a proposal by Speaker Woo Won-shik creating a joint consultative body to discuss issues regarding national security and the economy.[69]

Related motions

Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun

Interior Minister Lee Sang-min

Aside from Yoon, several officials were either impeached or threatened with impeachment over their involvement in the declaration of martial law. These include Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun,[70] who resigned on 5 December,[71] and Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, whose impeachment motion was filed by the DPK on 7 December.[72] Lee resigned the next day on 8 December.[73][74] On 12 December, the National Assembly passed impeachment motions against Justice Minister Park Sung-jae and National Police Agency Commissioner Cho Ji-ho.[75]

After Yoon’s impeachment, the DPK announced that it would be taking legal action against Yoon’s chief legal adviser Seok Dong-hyun after he denied at a press conference on 19 December that Yoon intended to have politicians arrested during martial law and downplayed the incursion of soldiers into the National Assembly.[76]

On 24 December, the DPK said that it would seek to impeach acting president Han Duck-soo for vetoing two special counsel bills that sought to investigate President Yoon and his wife Kim Keon-hee over his martial law declaration and charges of corruption.[77] The DPK also cited Han blocking the appointment of three nominees to fill vacancies in the Constitutional Court that would hear Yoon’s impeachment.[78] The motion was filed on 26 December,[79] with the plenary vote scheduled on 27 December.[80] Prior to the vote on 27 December, Speaker Woo Won-shik determined that a simple majority would suffice to impeach Han, as opposed to a two-thirds majority to impeach a president. The impeachment motion passed, with 192 MPs voting in favor and Han accepting the outcome.[81] However, the Constitutional Court later rejected Han’s impeachment in a 7-1 ruling on 24 March 2025.[82][83]

On 21 March 2025, the DPK and four other opposition parties submitted a motion in the National Assembly to impeach then-acting president Choi Sang-mok, citing his refusal to appoint justices to the Constitutional Court.[84] The petitioners also charged Choi with abetting Yoon’s martial law declaration in December 2024, failing to appoint a National Assembly-backed independent prosecutor to look into possible insurrection by Yoon despite the legislature passing a resolution to do so,[85] and failing to act on the application of a nominee to the Supreme Court of Korea.[84] The motion reached the National Assembly plenary on 2 April, by which time Choi had reverted to his previous position as finance minister following Han Duck-soo’s reinstatement as acting president and prime minister by the Constitutional Court on 24 March.[86][87]

Constitutional Court trial

Preparations

The Constitutional Court of Korea has 180 days from the passage of the impeachment motion to review it. The court is currently composed of only eight justices, as three recently retired and one has not been replaced, the other two vacancies being filled by Choi Sang-mok.[88][89] It normally has nine members and is required by law to have at least seven to begin hearings.[90] In addition, two of the six justices have tenures ending within the mandated review period in April 2025, causing additional concerns over quorum.[91] Debates have arisen in the National Assembly on whether acting president Han Duck-soo is entitled to fill the vacant seats, with the DPK supporting it on the grounds that the president only serves to confirm parliamentary nominees[92] and the PPP opposing it on the grounds that an acting president can only appoint justices only in the event of a presidential vacancy, not a suspension of duties.[93] Yoon’s impeachment became the eighth impeachment case in 2024 alone received by the court – the highest number in a single year in South Korean history.[94]

The impeachment motion was submitted to the court on 14 December 2024, and proceedings began on 16 December,[95] with the court calling the case a “top priority”.[96] On 16 December 2024, the court announced that trial would proceed with six justices.[97] The identity of the presiding justice, typically undisclosed, was revealed to be Justice Jeong Hyeong-sik, a Yoon appointee, due to the gravity of the case.[88][98] Former Korea Communications Commission chair Kim Hong-il was announced as the head of Yoon’s legal defense team, while National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee Chair Jung Chung-rae will serve as the impeachment prosecutor.[99] On 26 December, the National Assembly approved a motion to fill the three vacancies in the Constitutional Court, with the PPP not participating in the confirmation vote. However, Acting President Han Duck-soo refused to appoint the nominees, citing the need for a bipartisan consensus. In response, the DPK filed an impeachment motion against Han that same day,[78] which passed in the plenary vote on 27 December, resulting in Han’s duty as acting president being suspended[81] until his acquittal by the Constitutional Court on 24 March 2025.[100] On 31 December, acting president Choi Sang-mok appointed Chung Kyesun and Cho Hanchang to the Constitutional Court as part of efforts to fill up the vacancies.[101] However, he withheld the appointment of a third nominee, Ma Eun-hyuk, which the Constitutional Court ruled was unconstitutional on 27 February 2025.[102]

The first preparatory hearing for the case was held 27 December 2024, with the next hearing occurring on 3 January 2025. The National Assembly was represented in the trial by DPK lawmaker Jung Chung-rae, who is the chair of the assembly’s legislation and judiciary committee.[103] Yoon’s defense team comprised Bae Bo-yoon, a former Constitutional Court scholar and spokesperson during the impeachment trial of former president Park Geun-hye; Yun Gap-geun, former head of the Daegu High Prosecutors’ Office; Bae Jin-han, a former judge and Yoon’s classmate at Seoul National University School of Law; and Kim Hong-il, former head of the Korea Communications Commission.[104]

Withdrawal of insurrection charge

On 3 January, the National Assembly petitioners removed insurrection charges from the grounds for impeachment to focus on constitutional violations related to the martial law declaration rather than pursuing criminal charges, in order to expedite the case. Park Chan-un, a law professor at Hanyang University, called this a logical move, as the impeachment trial is “fundamentally a ‘disciplinary trial’ focused on whether Yoon violated the constitution”. The PPP criticized the move, claiming “the move exposed legal flaws in the impeachment motion and thus the motion should be nullified”. However, the DPK defended the revision, asserting that since the impeachment trial is not a criminal proceeding, it should focus on violations of the constitution and that “the revision was necessary to expedite court proceedings”.[105]

Proceedings

During the 3 January hearing, Yoon’s defense team defended the declaration of martial law as a “national emergency situation” and said that its brief duration “did not restrict the people’s basic rights”. It also said Yoon had immunity from prosecution, citing the Supreme Court of the United States‘s 2024 ruling in Trump v. United States.[106] They also alleged media bias against Yoon but were reprimanded by Justice Cheong Hyung-sik. Meanwhile, the prosecution accused defense lawyers of distorting the nature of the trial and insulting the justices.[107]

Oral arguments for the trial began on 14 January, with another session on 16 January in the event that Yoon fails to appear.[108] A total of five sessions would be held until 4 February, including on 21 and 23 January.[109] On 12 January, Yoon’s lawyer said that his client would not attend the 14 January hearing, citing safety concerns[110] and the possibility of him being apprehended by investigators seeking to execute an arrest warrant against him on his way to court.[111] On 13 January, Yoon’s lawyers requested the exclusion of Justice Chung Kyesun from hearing the case, accusing her of progressive leanings and showing her “prediction” for the trials during her confirmation by the National Assembly in December 2024.[112] It also called for the first day of the trial to be moved from 14 January, saying that the impeachment of acting president Han Duck-soo needed to be heard first.[113]

The 14 January hearing lasted four minutes before being adjourned due to Yoon’s absence.[114] During the session, the court also dismissed the defense’s request to exclude Justice Chung Kyesun from hearing the case. It also rejected Yoon’s objection to the designated dates for hearings, saying the scheduling followed laws and regulations governing the Constitutional Court, not a criminal court.[89] The impeachment team called as its witnesses Hong Jang-won, the first deputy director of the National Intelligence Service; Cho Ji-ho, commissioner of the National Police Agency; Kwak Jong-geun, commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command; Lee Jin-woo, commander of the Capital Defense Command; and Yeo In-hyung, chief of the Defense Counterintelligence Command.[115]

At the 16 January hearing, the court added additional hearing dates scheduled for 6, 11, and 13 February. It also called for additional witnesses, including former defense minister Kim Yong-hyun and police commissioner Cho Ji-ho, to testify. The court decided to admit surveillance footage from the National Assembly, the National Election Commission (NEC), and the official residence of the National Assembly speaker as evidence and announced plans to fact-check Yoon’s claims of electoral fraud. During the hearing, Yoon’s defense team formally presented its position on the issues, while the plaintiff outlined its arguments for impeachment. Yoon did not attend the hearing in person.[116] His request to reschedule the hearing due to his arrest the previous day was rejected by the court.[117]

Yoon at the third hearing of impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court on 21 January 2025.

In the 21 January hearing, Yoon made his first physical appearance for his impeachment. He denied allegations that he had ordered the military to forcibly remove lawmakers from the National Assembly. Yoon stated that the soldiers deployed to the legislature were not intended to suspend the National Assembly or obstruct its efforts to lift martial law, acknowledging that such actions would have caused a crisis.[118]

On 22 January, acting president Choi Sang-mok ordered a 24-hour police presence at the Constitutional Court and other courts nationwide following the 2025 Seoul Western District Court riot and other incidents of political tension related to Yoon’s impeachment.[119]

On 23 January, Yoon appeared at the impeachment trial again, with Kim Yong-hyun present as a witness.[120] Kim denied allegations that Yoon had ordered the military to storm the National Assembly to prevent lawmakers from convening and passing a resolution nullifying martial law.[121] However, he admitted to recommending declaring martial law to Yoon and to writing a note to Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, instructing the establishment of an emergency legislative body during martial law.[122] Yoon defended his declaration of martial law, asserting that it did not fail but acknowledging that it ended “sooner than expected”.[123]

On 1 February, Yoon’s legal team formally requested the recusal of acting chief justice Moon Hyung-bae, Justice Lee Mi-seon, and Justice Chung Kyesun from the impeachment case, citing concerns about impartiality. The team alluded to Moon’s past social media interactions with DPK leader Lee Jae-myung, Justice Lee’s brother, who serves as a vice chairman of a committee at the Lawyers for a Democratic Society and had supported Yoon’s resignation, as well as Justice Chung’s husband, who had signed a public declaration supporting Yoon’s impeachment.[124]

Appearing again for the 4 February hearing, Yoon admitted to ordering soldiers to the NEC to check its systems operations, citing allegations of election fraud. He again denied accusations of him ordering the military to forcibly remove lawmakers from the National Assembly, saying that it could not have been done due to the presence of thousands of civilians outside the assembly compound. Lee Jin-woo testified that he had not received orders from Yoon or Kim Yong-hyun to obstruct the lifting of martial law by lawmakers but said he believed that the military deployment to the legislature was legitimate under the Martial Law Act. Yeo In-hyung also attended the hearing as a witness but refused to testify, citing the risk of self-incrimination in a parallel criminal investigation against him.[125]

On 8 February, police launched an investigation after reports of a planned mob attack, scheduled for 13 February, on the Constitutional Court trial emerged online. In response, more than 2,700 police personnel and 140 buses were deployed near the court on 11 February. Barricades and panels were set up to restrict access, and the court justices received armed protection.[126]

At the 11 February hearing, Yoon blamed opposition parties for his decision to declare martial law. Yoon claimed that the opposition parties had failed to give him due respect as president and described them as “malicious”. Yoon cited his addresses to the National Assembly, during which he said opposition lawmakers refused to attend or shake hands and turned away from him.[127] Former interior minister Lee Sang-min also testified before the court and denied that Yoon had ordered him to cut off electricity and water supplies to left-leaning media outlets critical of Yoon, specifically the Hankyoreh, the Kyunghyang Shinmun, MBC and JTBC, as well as the opinion polling agency Flower Research during martial law.[128]

At 13 February hearing, which Yoon attended,[129] former NIS first deputy director Hong Jang-won, who previously testified to compiling a list of politicians as instructed by Yoon to “clean them all up” during martial law, revealed that he had been contacted through text messages by first lady Kim Keon-hee on the night of martial law, but could not recall the exact details. His statement was disputed by NIS director Cho Tae-yong, who cited multiple discrepancies and accused Hong of links with opposition politicians.[130] Col. Cho Seong-hyun, commander of the 1st Security Group at the Capital Defense Command and the only witness directly requested by the court, also testified that his commanding officer Lee Jin-woo ordered him to support special forces soldiers at the National Assembly as they drag out lawmakers from the building.[131] The Constitutional Court also set an additional impeachment hearing to be held on 18 February.[132] On 14 February, it also set an additional hearing scheduled on 20 February and ordered Han Duck-soo to testify as a witness.[133]

Yoon arrived at the Constitutional Court for the 18 February hearing but left shortly before it began after it was determined following a meeting with his lawyers that his attendance was unnecessary. The hearing proceeded with the prosecution and defense summarizing their arguments. The court also rejected an appeal by Yoon’s lawyers to postpone the 20 February hearing due to a scheduling conflict with the first preliminary hearing of Yoon’s separate criminal trial on insurrection charges. However, the court agreed to push back the opening of the hearing by an hour.[134] The court also issued a subpoena for Cho Ji-ho, who refused to testify as a witness for the third time, citing health issues.[135]

Yoon arrived at the Constitutional Court for the 20 February hearing but left shortly after his lawyers determined that it would be inappropriate for him to watch Han Duck-soo testify, reentering once Han had finished. Han said that members of Yoon’s cabinet were concerned about his plans to declare martial law and tried to dissuade him from doing so, while denying claims from Kim Yong-hyun that some members were in support of the plan. He also said that the martial law declaration did not follow constitutional and legal procedures and questioned whether Yoon’s cabinet meeting on 3 December was a proper one. Cho Ji-ho, who finally appeared at the trial, refused to answer most questions presented at him, citing a related criminal trial.[136][137] Later, the court set the final impeachment hearing on 25 February.[138]

At the 25 February hearing, Yoon said he was “sorry and thankful to the people”.[139] He also pledged to push for political reforms and a constitutional revision to change the current presidential system if his impeachment is overturned,[140] adding that the fulfillment of such pledges might lead to him leaving office before the end of his term. At the same time, he continued to deny the accusations of insurrection against him and accusations that of him interfering with the National Assembly’s affairs.[141] He also continued to defend martial law, saying that it was intended to appeal to the public about the “imperial opposition party” and accused the latter of exploiting experiences from previous martial law declarations to “incite public fear”.[142] Lee Kwang-beom, one of the prosecution lawyers, compared Yoon to previous South Korean presidents including Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo-hwan, adding that Yoon’s declaration of martial law was “dictatorship”.[143] The trial ended with a total of 11 hearings held over 73 days and 16 people testifying as witnesses.[144]

On 12 March, the government imposed a no-fly zone within a radius of 1 nautical mile from the Constitutional Court that would last until 19 March.[145] The National Police Agency also said it would declare its highest-level security protocol on the day the court issues its verdict on Yoon’s impeachment.[146] On 16 March, PPP floor leader Kweon Seong-dong said the party would respect the Constitutional Court’s verdict on Yoon’s impeachment regardless of its outcome.[147]

On 1 April, the Constitutional Court announced that it would issue its verdict regarding Yoon’s impeachment at 11:00 KST on 4 April.[148][149] In response, multiple venues and events scheduled in Seoul on the said date were closed, cancelled or postponed.[150] Police also imposed a “vacuum zone” and sealed off the area within a 150-meter radius around the Constitutional Court with police buses.[151] About 96,370 people applied for 20 available spectator seats to attend the verdict at the court, making it the highest number of applicants to try and attend an impeachment proceeding in South Korea.[152]

On the day before the verdict (3 April), 14,000 police officers were deployed, with Level 2 emergency response status being issued. City buses were diverted, and additional police were sent to major political sites. On the day of the ruling, the emergency status was raised to level 1, allowing for 100% of the police to be deployed.[153]

Verdict

On 4 April, the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment in a unanimous 8–0 decision, which formally removed Yoon from office, effective at 11:22 a.m. KST. In the decision read out by acting Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Moon Hyung-bae, the court declared that Yoon did not follow procedures for declaring martial law. He further stated that Yoon “went against those he was supposed to protect” and “damaged people’s political rights.”[154] The verdict came 111 days after his impeachment by the National Assembly,[155] the longest of any South Korean presidential impeachment verdict. Yoon’s removal from office makes him the shortest-serving president under the democratic history of South Korea.[156]

Popular reactions

While the session for the first impeachment motion was underway, the crowd outside the National Assembly demanding Yoon’s removal and insisting that PPP lawmakers participate in the impeachment vote was estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands,[157] with some attempting to scale the walls and police barricades.[158] On 5 December, phone numbers of PPP lawmakers were released online, leading to a wave of text messages from the public urging them to support Yoon’s impeachment, which continued after the impeachment motion failed. One MP, Shin Sung-bum, said that he had received 10,501 messages by 9 December.[159] After the motion failed, several PPP lawmakers’ offices were vandalized, while others received funeral wreaths with messages such as “insurrection accomplices” written.[160] A box cutter was also found at the residence of lawmaker Kim Jae-sub. A petition filed at the National Assembly website calling for the PPP’s dissolution garnered more than 171,000 signatures,[161] exceeding the 50,000 needed to have the proposal submitted to the relevant standing committee.[162]

During the session for the second impeachment motion, at least 208,000 people gathered near the National Assembly in support of impeachment. Demonstrations in support of Yoon’s impeachment were also held in cities nationwide, with 10,000 attending rallies in Jeonju and 30,000 others participating in Daegu.[163] At the same time, a mass rally of around 40,000 people in support of Yoon was held at Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul.[164] Trains running on Line 9 of the Seoul Metropolitan Subway avoided stopping at the National Assembly station to prevent congestion-related accidents.[165] On 13 December, some 50 Korean Americans demonstrated outside the White House in Washington, D.C. calling for Yoon’s impeachment.[165]

Yoon’s supporters have rallied around slogans such as Make America Great Again and Stop the Steal inspired by U.S. President Trump.[166] However, this is rooted in a conspiracy theory about the defeat of the PPP in the April 2024 general election. Yoon’s claim has not been proven by the National Election Commission (NEC) or the judiciary. South Korea votes on paper, and the printed ballots are kept. Hans Schattle, a professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, said that Yoon’s supporters’ comparisons with Donald Trump are inappropriate.[167]

In support for Yoon’s impeachment, leading religious groups in South Korea have marched with their heads, arms, and legs on the ground.[168]

Analysis

The Korea Times drew comparisons between Yoon’s impeachment and that of President Park Geun-hye in 2017, suggesting Yoon survived the first impeachment attempt due to PPP fears that it would suffer a crushing defeat in any ensuing snap presidential election, similar to what happened to the Saenuri Party seven years earlier after Park was removed from the presidency.[169] While multiple opinion polls have shown DPK and opposition leader Lee Jae-myung maintaining a strong lead in any prospective matchup,[170] a 2025 poll by The Chosun Ilbo – a right-wing paper – showed a reversal.[171]

Opinion polling

Further information: Opinion polling on the Yoon Suk Yeol presidency

Support for Yoon’s impeachment or resignation by political ideology as of 12 December 2024[172]

Ideology

Impeachment

/immediate

resignation

Orderly

resignation

Total

Progressive

92%

6.9%

98.9%

“Moderate”

83%

11.6%

94.6%

Conservative

43%

33.3%

76.3%

Total

74.8%

16.2%

91%

Opinion polling carried out by Realmeter on 4 December 2024 found that 73.6% of respondents supported Yoon’s impeachment while 24% opposed it. It also found that 70% believed that Yoon’s actions constituted treason while 25% believed otherwise.[173] Another Realmeter poll released on 12 December found 74.8% of respondents supported either Yoon’s immediate resignation or impeachment, while 16.2% supported the PPP’s proposal of Yoon’s orderly resignation.[172]

A Gallup poll released on 13 December found that Yoon’s impeachment was supported by 75% of respondents and opposed by 21%. It also found that 27% of PPP supporters favored impeachment, compared to 66% opposed. Among DPK supporters, 97% supported impeachment, while 3% opposed.[174] The same poll also found Speaker Woo Won-shik emerging as the most trusted politician in South Korea for his actions during martial law and the impeachment, with a rating of 56%.[175]

After Yoon’s suspension, a Realmeter poll on 19 December found that 52.6% of respondents did not regard the PPP as the ruling party, compared to 41.6% who regarded it as such. Conversely, 59.4% considered the DPK as the ruling party while 39.1% did not.[176]

On 31 December, a poll released by The Korea Times and Hankook Research and conducted from 26 to 27 December found 69% of respondents supported the upholding of Yoon’s impeachment while 28% stated otherwise. It also found that support for the measure was highest among those aged 40 to 49 (90%), followed by people in their 20s (82%), 30s (77%) and 50s (70%). It also found opposition to Yoon’s impeachment to be high among 56% of respondents in their 70s and 45% of those in their 60s. Support for impeachment was also expressed by 93% of those identifying as liberals, 78% among centrists and 34% among conservatives.[177] In terms of party affiliation, support for impeachment was expressed by 98% of DPK supporters and 100% of Rebuilding Korea Party supporters, while 85% of PPP supporters believed otherwise.[178] Polling by the same entities also found that 65% of respondents believed that it was necessary for all nine seats in the Constitutional Court to be filled in order hear Yoon’s impeachment trial, while 31% believed otherwise.[91]

As the impeachment trial was underway, a poll released by Gallup on 14 February 2025 found that 57% supported Yoon’s impeachment while 38% were opposed. It also found that 52% of respondents said they trusted the Constitutional Court, while 40% said they did not.[179] A poll released by Realmeter on 24 February found that 52% supported Yoon’s impeachment while 45.1% were opposed. It also found that 50.7% of respondents regarded the impeachment trial as fair, while 45% said they did not.[180] After the trial concluded, a poll released by Gallup on 28 February showed that 59% supported Yoon’s impeachment while 35% were opposed. It also found support for impeachment strongest among DPK supporters and among people aged in their 20s and 50s, and opposition strongest among PPP supporters and people aged 70 and older.[181]

Aftermath

With his removal from office due to the impeachment, Yoon is disqualified from running for public office in South Korea for five years as per the constitution; in any case, presidents in South Korea can only serve a single term.[182] Additionally, with the exception of a continued security detail for five years, extendable to ten if deemed needed by the security chief and not applicable if he is detained again, Yoon loses all post-presidential benefits such as a pension (which could have been up to 95% of the presidential salary), free medical care, right to burial in a national cemetery (for example the Seoul National Cemetery), and the right to a support staff.[183]

See also

- Lee Myung-bak § Conviction and sentence

- BBK stock price manipulation incident

- Roh Moo-hyun § Bribery allegations

Notes

References

External links

- South Korean president impeached by nation’s parliament at Wikinews

- Korean Wikisource has original text related to this article: 대통령(윤석열) 탄핵소추안

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Impeachment_of_Yoon_Suk_Yeol&oldid=1283874863”

Yoon Suk Yeol

Checked

In this Korean name, the family name is Yoon.

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Yoon Suk Yeol (Korean: 윤석열;[b] born 18 December 1960) is a South Korean politician and former prosecutor who served as the 13th president of South Korea from 2022 to 2025, when he was removed from office by the Constitutional Court of South Korea following his impeachment by the National Assembly in 2024. Yoon was thus the shortest-serving president of South Korea in its democratic history.

Born in Seoul, Yoon received both a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in law from Seoul National University. In his capacity as chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office, he played a key role in convicting former presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak for abuse of power.[2][3][4] In 2019, then-president Moon Jae-in appointed Yoon as Prosecutor General of South Korea from 2019 to 2021. During Yoon’s leadership, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office conducted embattled investigations into Cho Kuk, an influential figure in the Moon administration, that led to Cho’s resignation as Minister of Justice.[5][6] Yoon’s clashes with the Moon administration prior to his resignation as prosecutor general in March 2021 led to his rise as a potential presidential candidate among conservative voters.

In June 2021, Yoon announced his candidacy in the 2022 South Korean presidential election. He joined the right-wing People Power Party (PPP) in July and won its nomination in November. Considered a conservative and economically liberal politician, Yoon ran on a platform promising economic deregulation and measures such as abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. He narrowly defeated Democratic Party nominee Lee Jae-myung by less than a percentage point on 9 March 2022 and assumed office as president on 10 May, becoming the first elected president to be born after the end to fighting in the Korean War. During his presidency, Yoon’s foreign policy has been described as both more hawkish toward North Korea and friendlier to Japan compared to previous South Korean presidents. His handling of the Seoul Halloween crowd crush in 2022[7] and the ongoing medical crisis has attracted criticism.[8] In the 2024 parliamentary midterm elections, Yoon’s party suffered an electoral defeat, which weakened his political power.[9][10] Under Yoon’s tenure, South Korea underwent democratic backsliding and a shift towards authoritarianism. He received mostly low approval ratings as president and had been described as a lame duck.[11]

On 3 December 2024, Yoon declared martial law in South Korea, the first time it had been declared since the military dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan in 1980, accusing members of the National Assembly of supporting North Korea; however, Yoon lifted it after the National Assembly passed an emergency motion nullifying the declaration several hours after Yoon’s speech.[12] Amid widespread criticism and mass protests, an impeachment motion was introduced against Yoon on 4 December,[13] though it fell short of the 200 votes needed to pass.[14][15][16] He was successfully impeached and suspended from his presidential powers in a second vote on 14 December 2024, with 204 voting in favor, including 12 members of his own party.[17]

On 31 December 2024, Yoon became the first sitting president in South Korean history to face an arrest warrant, and on 15 January 2025 became the first sitting president to be arrested and incarcerated.[18][19] Yoon is currently being investigated for heading an insurrection, and faces either life imprisonment or the death penalty if found guilty.[20] On 4 April 2025, the Constitutional Court of Korea confirmed the impeachment against him by the National Assembly and officially terminated Yoon’s presidency.

Early life and education

Yoon in 1976 at age 16

Yoon was born in Bomun-dong, Seongbuk District, Seoul, in 1960,[21] and raised in Yeonhui-dong, Seodaemun District.[22][23] His father, Yoon Ki-jung, was born in Nonsan,[24] and was a professor emeritus of economics at Yonsei University and a full member of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Korea.[22] His mother, Choi Seong-ja, was born in Gangneung, and was a lecturer at Ewha Womans University before leaving the position after getting married.[22]

This article is part of

a series about

Yoon Suk Yeol

Political career

- President (2022–2025)[a]

- Prosecutor General (2019–2021)

Presidency

- Cabinet

- International trips

- Opinion polling

- Camp David Principles

- 2024 martial law crisis

- Impeachment

- Arrest

Elections

- 2022

a. ^ Suspended from 14 December 2024 to 4 April 2025

- v

- t

- e

Yoon attended Daegwang Elementary School and Joongrang Middle School, transferring to Choongam Middle School after finishing eighth grade. After graduating from Choongam High School [ko],[25] he studied law at Seoul National University where he earned a Bachelor of Laws in 1983 and a Master of Laws in 1988.[26] Shortly after the Gwangju Uprising, Yoon and his colleagues held a mock trial where he acted as a prosecutor, demanding the death penalty for President Chun Doo-hwan.[22][27] Fearing imprisonment for his role in the mock trial, Yoon fled to Gangwon Province.[28][27]

Yoon was exempted in 1982 from national service due to anisometropia (a type of eyesight defect).[29] Yoon later stated that he was unable to obtain a driver’s license because of the condition.[29] After passing the first part of the bar exam in his fourth year of university, Yoon continued to attempt the second part over the next nine years.[22][27] He eventually passed the bar in 1991,[22][25][27][30][23] placing him in the same graduating class as Democratic Party Assemblyman and Minister of Justice Park Beom-kye.[22]

Prosecutorial career

Early career

Yoon started his career at Daegu Public Prosecutor’s Office in 1994.[22][25][27][30][23] He headed the Special Branch and Central Investigation Department, both of which investigate corruption-related cases.[22] In 1999, he arrested Assistant Commissioner Park Hui-won, who was corrupt[31][23] despite strong objections from bureaucrats in the Kim Dae-jung cabinet.[22]

In January 2002, Yoon worked briefly as a lawyer at Bae, Kim & Lee but left because he felt the position was unsuitable.[23] Upon his return as a prosecutor, he prosecuted pro-Roh Moo-hyun figures such as Ahn Hee-jung and Kang Keum-won.[22] In 2006, he apprehended Chung Mong-koo for his complicity in a slush fund case at Hyundai Motor Company.[22][23] In 2008, he worked for the independent counsel team resolving the BBK incident related to President Lee Myung-bak.[22]

In 2013, Yoon led a special investigation team that looked into the National Intelligence Service (NIS)‘s involvement in the 2012 NIS public opinion manipulation scandal. Yoon sought the prosecution of the former head of the NIS, Won Sei-hoon, for violating the Public Official Election Act. He also accused Justice Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn of influencing his investigation.[32] As a result, he was demoted from the Seoul prosecutors’ office to the Daegu and Daejeon High Prosecutors’ Office.[33][32]

Yoon later became head of investigations in the special prosecutor team of Park Young-soo, which investigated allegations of the 2016 Choi Soon-sil scandal involving Choi, Samsung vice-chairman Lee Jae-yong, and then-president Park Geun-hye, which led to the impeachment of the president in December 2016.[33]

On 19 May 2017, the newly elected president Moon Jae-in appointed Yoon as chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office.[30] The prosecution went on to indict two former presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, three former NIS chiefs, former chief justice Yang Sung-tae, and more than 100 other former officials and business executives under his tenure.[34] Yoon also led an investigation into accounting fraud at Samsung.[32]

Prosecutor general

Yoon as Prosecutor General, in 2019

On 17 June 2019, Yoon was nominated as prosecutor general, replacing Moon Moo-il.[27][23][35][unreliable source?] His nomination was welcomed by the ruling Democratic Party and the Party for Democracy and Peace but was opposed by the Liberty Korea Party and the Bareunmirae Party.[36] The minor party Justice Party remained neutral.[36] On 16 July, he was officially appointed as the new prosecutor general[37] and started his term nine days later.[38] President Moon ordered him to be neutral, adding that any kind of corruption must be strictly investigated in any and all areas of government.[38]

During Yoon’s leadership, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office launched investigations against Minister of Justice Cho Kuk, who was involved in various scandals.[39] His decision to investigate Cho was welcomed by the conservative opposition but condemned by the Democratic Party and its supporters.[39][40][41]

After Choo Mi-ae was appointed the new minister of justice, she took action against several prosecutors close to Yoon.[42][43] Choo attributed her decision to Yoon’s failure to submit a reorganization plan for his department, which she had requested, but this was seen as retaliation by the Blue House for Cho Kuk’s prosecution.[44]

In April 2020, Democratic Party lawmakers again attacked Yoon and called on him to resign after the prosecution had started investigations into election law violation cases involving both ruling and opposition politicians and suspected election rigging of the Ulsan mayoral race for Mayor Song Cheol-ho in 2018 by senior secretaries at the Blue House.[45][46][47]

Opposition politicians also accused Yoon of refusing to raid the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, which had been accused of spreading COVID-19 in South Korea, after he had received advice from a shaman.[48]

Suspension and reinstatement

On 24 November 2020, Minister of Justice Choo Mi-ae suspended Yoon from his position, citing alleged ethical violations, abuse of power, and interference in investigations of his associates and family members.[49] Yoon then filed an injunction against the minister’s suspension order, which was approved by the Seoul Administrative Court on 1 December, temporarily halting the suspension.[50][51] On 16 December, the Ministry of Justice imposed a two-month suspension on Yoon, accepting four of six major charges for disciplinary action. The decision was subsequently approved by President Moon.[52] However, on 24 December, following an injunction filed at the Seoul Administrative Court, the suspension was overturned as the court accepted Yoon’s claim that the process to suspend him had been unfair.[53]

2022 presidential election

Main article: 2022 South Korean presidential election

Yoon had been considered a potential presidential candidate for the 2022 presidential election ever since the aftermath of the Cho Kuk controversies, appearing as a significant candidate in general election opinion polls since at least January 2020.[54][55] In a January 2021 poll including all possible presidential candidates, Yoon led as the most favored with 30.4 percent of the vote, more than the individual supports for the ruling Democratic Party frontrunners Lee Jae-myung and Lee Nak-yon.[56]

On 4 March 2021, Yoon tendered his resignation as the prosecutor general, which was accepted by President Moon.[57] On 29 June 2021, Yoon officially announced his candidacy in the 2022 presidential election.[58] On 12 July, he registered with the National Election Commission as an independent candidate.[59]

Yoon Suk Yeol leaving the People Power Party (PPP) headquarters shortly after joining the party on 30 July 2021

On 30 July 2021, Yoon officially joined the conservative People Power Party (PPP), which was the main opposition party in South Korea.[59] Prior to this, Yoon had been a political independent, although his popular support came primarily from conservatives. Yoon was welcomed into the PPP by Choi Jae-hyung, a fellow 2022 presidential candidate, in a small public ceremony at the PPP headquarters located in Yeouido, Seoul. Choi was the former head of the Board of Audit and Inspection and had also just recently joined the PPP, officially having become a member on 15 July. Yoon’s welcoming ceremony into the People Power Party notably did not include recently elected party leader Lee Jun-seok, who had been outside of Seoul at the time.[59]

During the primary election period, Yoon came under criticism for several perceived gaffes and controversial statements. In July, Yoon advocated for a 120-hour work week while critiquing President Moon’s policy of the 52-hour maximum work week.[60] Yoon also advocated for deregulating food safety standards because, in his opinion, “poor people should be allowed to eat substandard food for lower prices”, citing economist Milton Friedman‘s 1980 book Free to Choose: A Personal Statement as the inspiration for the idea.[61][62] In August, Yoon stated that South Korea’s recent feminist movement was a significant contributing factor to the issue of the nation’s low birth rates.[61] Later that same week, Yoon claimed during an interview with Busan Ilbo that there was “basically no radiation leak” from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster because “the reactors themselves didn’t collapse”.[63]

On 2 September 2021, news website Newsverse reported that during his time as prosecutor general, Yoon had allegedly ordered a senior prosecutor Son Jun-sung and politician Kim Woong to file politically motivated criminal complaints against Democratic Party politicians ahead of the 2020 legislative elections in an attempt to sway the elections.[64][65] In response to the allegations, an internal investigatory probe was launched by the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, and an investigation was launched by the recently formed Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO).[64][66] Yoon denied the allegations and reported informant Cho Sung-eun and Director of the National Intelligence Service Park Jie-won to the CIO.[65]

In early September, support for PPP primary contender Hong Joon-pyo, who had been the nominee for PPP predecessor Liberty Korea Party in the 2017 presidential election, rose sharply in polls, making Hong the most significant contender to Yoon since the beginning of the campaign cycle. A 6 September poll of contenders across all parties showed support for Hong at 13.6%, up from 4.2% a week earlier, behind Yoon who had support at 26.4%.[67]

Yoon with then-Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Chung Jin-suk in November 2021

During primary debates amongst PPP presidential candidates, Yoon appeared to have the hanja character for “king” written on his left palm, a shamanist talisman for good luck.[68][69][70] Yoon’s primary opponents, including Hong Joon-pyo and Yoo Seong-min, criticized Yoon for using shamanist practices and made comparisons to the Choi Soon-sil scandal.[69] In response to the criticism, Yoon stated that “a supporter drew that as a message of support, encouraging me to be confident like a ‘king’ during the debate” and that he had forgotten to wash the mark off.[71]

In October 2021, Yoon made complimentary remarks about the former authoritarian military dictator of South Korea, Chun Doo-hwan. The remarks came during a meeting with People Power Party officials in Busan, during which Yoon said that “many people still consider Chun as having done well in politics, except the military coup and the Gwangju Uprising”, later adding that he believed even people in Honam, the geographic area including Gwangju, felt the same way.[72] Chun Doo-hwan, a widely maligned figure in South Korea, was responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including the torture and killings of innocent civilians. Yoon apologized for these remarks.[73] However, news media and members of the Democratic Party speculated that a picture he posted on Instagram and later deleted indicated that the apology was insincere. The photo was of him feeding an apple to his dog, and some observed that the Korean words for “apple” and “apology” (사과) are homonyms; however, Yoon later denied the alleged symbolism of the photo.[74] Yoon again apologized for his remarks when he visited the May 18th National Cemetery in Gwangju on 10 November, although his visit was met by protesters.[75][76]

On 5 November 2021, Yoon officially won the nomination of the People Power Party for the 2022 presidential election.[77][78] The win came after Yoon fought off a surge in support for rival candidate Hong Joon-pyo in the latter weeks of the primary. The nomination resulted from a four-day period of voting by party members and the general public. Yoon Suk Yeol won 47.85% of the votes, a total of 347,963 votes, and of the remaining candidates Hong Joon-pyo won 41.50% of the votes, Yoo Seong-min won 7.47% of the votes, and Won Hee-ryong won 3.17% of the votes.[79]

On 7 November 2021, Yoon stated that if he were elected president, he would pardon former presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, both of whom were serving lengthy prison sentences for corruption (Park Geun-hye was later pardoned by President Moon Jae-in on 24 December of that same year).[80][81]

Yoon narrowly won the 2022 presidential election that took place on 9 March 2022. Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung conceded defeat in the early hours of the following day.[82][83][84] Yoon won 48.56% of the votes, while Lee Jae-Myung won 47.83% of the vote.[85] Yoon’s presidential election victory was by the closest margin in South Korean history.[86]

Presidency (2022–2025)

See also: Cabinet of Yoon Suk Yeol

Domestic policy

Relocation of presidential office

Yoon takes the presidential oath of office outside the National Assembly, 10 May 2022.

On 20 March 2022, Yoon announced that he would establish his presidential office in the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan District, Seoul, instead of the Blue House, which opened to the public as a park on 10 May 2022.[87][88] He would take office that day.[88] Newspaper The Hankyoreh accused Yoon of being frequently late to work, while sending decoy vehicles near 9:00 a.m., when work starts for governmental workers.[89]

Economic policy

In 2023, Yoon attempted to raise South Korea’s maximum weekly working hours from 52 to 69. However, widespread backlash, especially from the youth, led him to order government agencies to reconsider the plan.[90]

The minimum wage for 2025 was set at 10,030 won per hour. Some labor representatives walked out in protest, saying the increase rate was too low, but most management and public interest representatives voted to adopt the minimum wage at 10,030 won.[91]

Energy policy

Responding to widespread public concerns after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, President Moon Jae-in decided to gradually phase out nuclear power in South Korea. However, the nuclear policy was again reversed in 2023 by President Yoon Suk Yeol, resuming construction of nuclear reactors and expanding nuclear output to 34.6% share of South Korea’s electricity generation by 2036.[92] Yoon pledged to boost nuclear energy use and reduce carbon emissions by 40% from 2018 levels by 2030.[93]

On 17 July 2024, the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power won the tender for the construction of two new units at Dukovany Nuclear Power Station in the Czech Republic.[94] Yoon said: “We will use the Czech nuclear project as a stepping stone to further expand export opportunities for our nuclear industry.”[95]

Gender equality policy

Further information: Women in South Korea

Following an anti-feminist backlash in 2022, Yoon has acted in opposition to feminism in order to appeal to young men.[96] Yoon has also said that structural sexism no longer exists in South Korea.[97] He entered office with a pledge to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.[98][99] Political conflict related to issues of gender was intense in South Korea in 2022. He announced that the new government would not address gender as a collective issue but rather focus on and respond to specific individual issues.[98]

As of May 2022, there were only three women among the State Councilors of the Yoon Suk Yeol government and only two women among the vice-ministerial level officials. This was criticized as a lack of women’s representation in the government.[100] In response to these criticisms, Yoon appointed Park Soon-ae as the Minister of Education and Kim Seung-hee as the Minister of Welfare, increasing the ratio of female-to-male ministers in the cabinet to 30%.[101] However, Park Soon-ae resigned on 5 August, just 34 days into her tenure, and Yoon’s approval rating had fallen from 30% to 24%, largely due to public backlash against Park’s school reform plans.[102]

2022 police bureau proposal

In late July 2022, Yoon proposed the creation of a “police bureau” in order to ensure greater government oversight of the police force. In response, several police officers protested, claiming the measure was a dictatorial measure to compromise the political neutrality of the police.[103]

In response to the protests, Lee Sang-min, Yoon’s Interior Minister, compared them to the 1979 Coup d’état of December Twelfth, though he later walked back the remarks. Yoon himself also criticized the protests, saying, “Like many, I am also deeply concerned about the collective protest of the police chiefs”, and calling it a “serious breach” of police discipline.[103]

Following the protests, the presidential office threatened to punish police officers. Additional remarks by Yoon Hee-keun, President Yoon’s choice as Commissioner General of the National Police Agency, further inflamed tensions by suggesting that police should focus on wages rather than the establishment of a police bureau.[104]

2022 Seoul crowd crush

Main article: Seoul Halloween crowd crush

On 29 October 2022, at least 158 people were crushed to death when a crowd surged in an alleyway during Halloween festivities in Seoul’s Itaewon district. Yoon declared a state of official national mourning.[105]

Medical crisis

Main article: 2024 South Korean medical crisis

On 6 February 2024, Yoon announced that the enrollment quota for medical students would be increased from 3,058 to 5,058 students per academic year from 2025 onward.[106] The quota had last been fixed in 2006.[106] The announcement was met with opposition from the medical community, with the Korea Medical Association and Korea Intern Resident Association organizing intern and resident doctor strikes and resignations since 20 February 2024.[107] They argued that the planned increase would not resolve the issues of inadequate manpower in rural areas but would increase the inequality of medical care between rural and urban areas.[108]

Yoon gave an hour-long nation address to reaffirm the quota increase and appeal to the public.[109] The government labeled the collective criticism and social advocacy of medical students, residents, and doctors as “doctors’ illegal collective actions” and declared a national healthcare crisis of the highest risk level. The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters for Doctors’ Collective Actions, led by the Prime Minister, was then established. The Emergency Response Headquarters conducted daily public briefings. Pro-government advertisements featured the president’s commitment and included promotional videos in movie theater displays on public buses and subways, while screens inside apartment elevators criticized “emergency room ping-pong” and “pediatric clinic open run”. Doctors and the medical community were portrayed as a self-serving cartel, a characterization cemented by the president in a national address.[110][111]

2024 parliamentary elections

The opposition’s landslide victory in the 2024 parliamentary elections put Yoon in an even weaker position. The PPP obtained 108 seats, 36% of the National Assembly, while the main opposition party, the DPK, won 175 seats in total. The remaining 17 seats are held by the other members of the 22nd Assembly.[112]

Some have spoken of Yoon as a “lame duck” following the major defeat.[9][10][11] He is the first president to see an assembly unfavorable to him during a whole presidency and especially an opposition that is growing in relation to the first part of the mandate. The Chairman of the PPP Emergency Committee, Han Dong-hoon,[113] resigned following the defeat; several other major government figures also presented their resignation, including Yoon’s Prime Minister Han Duck-soo.[114]

Yoon boycotted the opening of the inaugural session of the new National Assembly on 2 September, making him the first South Korean leader not to attend the ceremony since the restoration of democracy in 1988. His office said that he did not attend saying that the chamber “overissues demands for special prosecutor investigations and impeachments”.[115]

Foreign policy

Main articles: Foreign policy of the Yoon Suk Yeol government and List of international presidential trips made by Yoon Suk Yeol

See also: Foreign relations of South Korea and Indo-Pacific Strategy of South Korea

Yoon at the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania

In December 2022, the Yoon administration announced the Indo-Pacific Strategy, a comprehensive strategy that encompasses the economic and security spheres of Indo-Pacific countries: “We (South Korea) will work [towards] a regional order that enables a different set of countries to cooperate and procedures together.”[116] On 25 July 2023, Yoon visited Ukraine after visiting Lithuania and Poland for the NATO summit. He visited Bucha and Irpin, cities near the capital city of Kyiv.[117] He also held the 2023 South Korea-Pacific Islands Summit and the 2024 South Korea-Africa Summit for the first time and has also been promoting the Korea-Central Asia Summit.[118]

Additionally, Yoon has visited the United States and considered sending weapons to Ukraine following the invasion by Russia.[119]

Yoon at the seventh Global Fund meeting in New York City

In October 2023, Yoon condemned the Hamas-led attack on Israel.[120] He sought to strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia and supported the participation of South Korean companies in Saudi Arabia‘s Neom smart city project.[121] In February 2024, South Korea and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding to expand defense cooperation.[122]

As of December 2023, during his tenure so far, Yoon has made trips to twenty-six countries. He has met with fellow leaders, such as during the NATO Summit Madrid 2022, APEC Summit, G20, and G7.[123]

Yoon later attended the NATO summit in Lithuania the following year.[124] He also attended the United Nations General Assembly and Global Fund’s Seventh Replenishment Conference in New York City; he additionally met with U.S. President Joe Biden.[125]

G7

President Yoon attended the G7 in May 2023.

Although South Korea is not a member of the G7, it is being considered as a potential next member if the G7 expands; it has also been promoting the G7 Plus initiative.[126] At the G7 summit in May 2023, Yoon met with the leaders of the Quad nations and called for addressing regional challenges and providing infrastructure and development assistance. In his speech to G7 members, Yoon stressed South Korea’s continued commitment to maintaining the international rule of law and the need to protect Ukraine’s freedom and peace.[127]

United States

See also: South Korea-United States relations

Yoon with President Biden in the Oval Office, April 2023

During U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi‘s visit to South Korea on 4 August 2022, which was part of a larger tour of Asia, Yoon snubbed a meeting with her, stating that he wanted to enjoy his vacation.[128][129][130]

In April 2023, Yoon and First Lady Kim Keon-hee were invited to the U.S. by politicians Kevin McCarthy and Chuck Schumer.[131] On 25 April, Yoon and Kim arrived in Washington D.C. to mark 70 years of the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States.[132] In a speech to the U.S. Congress on 27 April, Yoon proclaimed “we know that no matter where you sit, you stand with Korea”, adding that the South Korea-U.S. relationship is “stronger than ever”.[133]

Yoon with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 27 April 2023

According to a Yonhap article published on 7 November 2024, Yoon had a 12-minute phone call with the 45th president and the 47th president-elect of the U.S., Donald Trump, where they talked about trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, as well as the North Korean situation involving Ukraine.[134]

Despite U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s declaration that he will end the war in Ukraine, one analyst argued that President Yoon is making a mistake by leaving open the possibility of providing defense weapons to Ukraine. Some have opined that if the United States completely stops supporting Ukraine, South Korea could be left alone in the war in Ukraine with Russia as its enemy. In addition, some have claimed that if Donald Trump sets out to improve relations with North Korea, the South Korean government’s position could be extremely limited in a situation where inter-Korea relations have weakened to the point where North Korea has declared two hostile countries.[135]

Japan

See also: South Korea-Japan relations

Yoon met with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan on 16 March 2023.

Yoon has been accused of having a pro-Japanese stance on historical issues and colonialism by liberals and some conservative[136][137] politicians in South Korea. In particular, some have criticized Yoon’s government close relationship with the “far-right”[138] Japanophilic New Right movement.[139][140][141]

Yoon’s government has not sought direct compensation or apology from the Japanese government and companies for victims of forced labor, a war crime committed by the Empire of Japan government and Japanese companies during World War II. Instead, Yoon’s government has expressed its stance to receive voluntary donations from South Korean companies through a third-party foundation as a solution to the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court ruling which demanded compensation from the Japanese government and companies for past war crimes against victims who were forcibly recruited by the Japanese Empire during World War II. The DPK criticized this, stating “It tramples on the victims and represents Japan’s companies interests”.[142] The Justice Party (JP) also joined the DPK in “declarations of the state of affairs” (시국선언) to criticize Yoon’s government.[143] As of March 2023, 11 of the 15 surviving victims opposed Yoon’s government’s solution and demanded direct compensation from the Japanese government and companies.[144]

Yoon, Fumio Kishida and Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the 2024 China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit on 27 May 2024

Yoon’s remarks at a commemorative event related to the Samiljeol [ko] (3.1 절 or 삼일절), 1 March 2023 caused a great controversy in South Korea. Samiljeol is a national holiday that celebrates Koreans’ spirit of resistance to regain their identity from colonial Japan. Yoon said, “Korea lost its national sovereignty and suffered because it was not properly prepared for historical changes in the world at the time, and we should reflect on this past.” The remarks drew criticism from the opposition parties in the South Korea as “Chinil” (친일),[145] “colonialist historical perspective” (식민사관),[146] and “pro-Japanese highly submissive diplomacy” (친일 굴종외교); Yoon was compared to Lee Wan-yong.[147] The DPK and the JP also strongly criticized his remarks.[148]

On 16 March 2023, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held a summit with Yoon in Tokyo to settle wartime labor disputes among other issues.[149][150] Yoon also met with Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) leader Kenta Izumi who discussed several bilateral disputes between the countries with Yoon including the Statue of Peace, which Izumi asked Yoon to remove.[151]

Yoon with Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in November 2024

On 7 May 2023, Kishida visited Seoul in a historic trip to further deepen ties.[152] Yoon emphasized that historical issues had to be “completely settled”.[153] Kishida also expressed sympathy to Korean victims of colonial Japan.[154] However, Kishida was criticized by many South Korean media because he did not “apologize” for forced labor victims during World War II and did not mention Japan’s responsibility for war crimes.[155][unreliable source?][156] Some South Korean politicians also expressed strong dissatisfaction that Kishida did not apologize.[157]

Yoon and Kishida met with Biden on 18 August 2023 at Camp David in the United States. The three announced the Camp David Principles, a set of strategies to counter the influence of China, North Korea, and Russia as well as limit the risk of economic disruptions in the future.[158]

Some sources criticized the compromise between the Japanese LDP and Yoon governments to list Sado mine as a World Heritage Site, which distorted history by removing direct references to “forced labor” by Koreans.[159][160]

Ukraine

Main article: 2023 visit by Yoon Suk Yeol to Ukraine

See also: Russian invasion of Ukraine and South Korea–Ukraine relations

Yoon and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., 11 July 2024

In a Reuters interview on 19 April 2023, Yoon hinted at supplying lethal aid to Ukraine, stating that “If there is a situation the international community cannot condone, such as any large-scale attack on civilians, massacre or serious violation of the laws of war, it might be difficult for us to insist only on humanitarian or financial support.” Previously, South Korea had only provided humanitarian and economic aid to Ukraine. Yoon linked the struggle in Ukraine to the Korean War when the international community supported South Korea. He added, “I believe there won’t be limitations to the extent of the support to defend and restore a country that’s been illegally invaded both under international and domestic law. However, considering our relationship with the parties engaged in the war and developments in the battlefield, we will take the most appropriate measures.”

In response, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Russia could supply North Korea on a “quid pro quo” basis.[161][162] The DPK,[163] JP,[164][165] and Progressive Party,[166] along with other liberal and progressive parties, opposed the Yoon administration’s policy toward Ukraine, fearing that his pro-Ukraine diplomacy would lead to Russia supporting North Korea’s weapons and South Korean companies being penalized by Russia’s economic sanctions.[163][164]

In July 2023, Yoon visited Ukraine after visiting Lithuania and Poland for the NATO summit. Specifically, he visited Bucha and Irpin.[117] In August 2023, Yoon announced that South Korea would provide $394 million in financial aid to Ukraine for 2024, an eightfold increase from 2023.[167]

On 7 November 2024, Yoon suggested that South Korea could provide weapons to Ukraine.[168] However, the South Korean public was widely opposed to direct arms supplies to Ukraine.[169]

Africa

See also: Africa-South Korea relations and 2024 South Korea–Africa Summit

In his welcoming speech to the Africa Night held in Seoul in November 2022, President Yoon said that “Africa is a land of new opportunity”, indicating his intention to strengthen cooperation with Africa. The event was attended by African ambassadors and nominees from 31 countries, and President William Ruto of Kenya.[170]

Yoon also held summit with the leaders of the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Gabon, and Kenya in 2022. To accelerate the push for a South Korea-Africa FTA, Yoon said he would invite African leaders to a special summit in South Korea in 2024. “The existing ministerial-level Korea-Africa Forum will be upgraded to the head of state”, he added.[171]

North Korea

See also: South Korea–North Korea relations

In November 2023, Yoon’s government suspended South Korea’s participation in the Comprehensive Agreement Pact – a pact aimed at lowering tensions between South and North Korea – after North Korea launched a satellite into space.[172]

Since Yoon’s inauguration in 2022, Yoon’s administration has continued to make strong statements and take hard-line policies against North Korea. Therefore, there is criticism directed at both the regime of South Korea and the regime of North Korea that the Korean Peninsula is facing the greatest war crisis since the Korean War.[173]

Controversies

MBC lawsuit

MBC logo

The PPP sued four senior executives of local broadcaster Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, including MBC TV head Park Sung-je, on grounds of defamation after news outlets initially reported that Yoon insulted the U.S. Congress.[174][175] On 21 September 2022, after chatting with U.S. President Joe Biden outside the seventh Global Fund meeting in New York City, Yoon was filmed telling his aides and top diplomats, “Wouldn’t [inaudible] lose face if these saekki do not pass it in the legislature?”[176] Although the audio is hard to discern, MBC, which broke the story on air, determined in its subtitles that he said “Biden” in an apparent reference to the latter’s bid to increase the American contribution to the Global Fund by $6 billion, an act that would require congressional approval. Yoon’s office denies that he was talking about Biden or the U.S. Congress; instead, it claims that he was expressing concern that his country’s opposition-controlled parliament would reject his plans for a $100 million contribution to the same fund, and his press secretary Kim Eun-hye suggested that the word he uttered was not “Biden”, but “nallimyeon“, a similar-sounding word that means “to blow or waste”.[177] The video swiftly went viral, having been viewed repeatedly by millions. The controversy has also brought press freedom in South Korea to the public eye over the PPP’s civil conduct involving MBC,[178] with some press freedom groups, including the International Federation of Journalists,[179] criticizing the lawsuit as politically motivated. A poll of 1,002 adult Koreans found his approval rating falling to 27.7 percent, a 3.7 percent drop from three weeks before, and that the majority (61.2 percent) believed Yoon said “Biden” compared to the 26.9 percent who thought he said “nallimyeon“; another poll of 1,000 adult Koreans found an even greater majority (70.8 percent) who said that he should directly apologize for his profanity versus the 27.9 percent who said he did not need to apologize.[180] The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs sued MBC “to restore trust in diplomacy”; this has been likened to the oppression of journalists by the Lee Myung-bak government in the past.[181]

R&D budget cut

The decision by the Yoon administration to reduce South Korea’s research and development (R&D) budget by 15% for 2024 compared to the previous year has caused significant uproar among researchers. There are growing concerns that this cutback might undermine South Korea’s competitiveness in the global technology sector.[182]

The move faced strong opposition, highlighted by an event at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). A student protested the budget reduction during a graduation ceremony while Yoon was giving his speech but was immediately restrained by bodyguards who were disguised as students.[182]

Soldier deaths

Yoon was accused of covering up for senior military officials over the deaths of one South Korean marine in 2023 and two more soldiers in 2024 by blocking bills seeking to investigate the matter. His exercise of veto power, one of the highest among South Korean presidents, led to increased confrontation with the opposition in the parliament.[183][184][185]

Allegations of favoring the New Right

Yoon has appointed people affiliated with the controversial South Korean New Right movement to prominent positions in government and public life. According to a report by Kyunghyang Shinmun, at least 21 New Right figures were holding 25 key positions in eight public institutions and committees related to Korean history under Yoon’s administration.[186]

The New Right reportedly has more favorable views of the 1910–1945 Japanese colonial period. In 2024, Yoon’s administration appointed people described as New Right members to the positions of director and chairman of the Independence Hall of Korea, an organization that commemorates the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. The Korea Liberation Association, an organization commemorating Korean independence, protested these decisions.[187][188] In November 2024, an event by the Korea Liberation Association was scheduled to be held at Seoul National Cemetery, but the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs blocked the event from being held. Critics alleged that the Yoon administration was retaliating against the association for criticizing the administration’s New Right tendencies.[189]

First Lady political scandal

Main articles: Myung Tae-kyun and Kim Keon-hee

Yoon vetoed a special prosecutor bill on investigating allegations of corruption related to himself and his wife Kim Keon-hee. He has received criticism for this.[190]

Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral

See also: Death and state funeral of Elizabeth II

While in London for the funeral of Queen Elizabeth II, Yoon’s opponents accused him of disrespect when he missed the chance to view the queen’s coffin lying in state, which he blamed on traffic.[174]

Democratic backsliding and media suppression

In 2024, the Swedish V-Dem Institute reported that under Yoon’s administration, South Korea was dropping in its liberal democracy index (LDI). They described Yoon as “South Korea’s Donald Trump”.[191] Specifically, they wrote:[192]

[The 2021 elections] brought the right-wing and conservative Yoon Suk-yeol to power. His recent professional history already showed abuse of power. The change of president set South Korea back on a downward slope. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s coercive measures to punish members of the former Moon administration, along with attacks on gender equality, set South Korea to decrease its LDI levels, forming a bell-turn. Although South Korea remains a liberal democracy at the end of 2023, Moon’s efforts have been virtually neutralized.

South Korea’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders dropped from 47th place to 62nd place from 2023 to May 2024. This was reportedly influenced by the Yoon administration’s excessive use of sanctions against media outlets and journalists that were critical of the government, such as MBC.[193] In a particular, a hot mic incident reported on by an MBC journalist resulted in a police raid on the journalist’s house and a retaliatory banning of MBC from access to Yoon. Other similar raids on the homes of journalists have been conducted, with the justification of criminal defamation against Yoon. Outlets that have aligned with Yoon have reportedly received preferential treatment.[99]

An MBC report alleged that Yoon was influencing investigations conducted by the police. Critics alleged that the police, under Yoon, were quick to investigate labor unions and the media but cautious when investigating issues related to Yoon. For example, an order related to First Lady Kim Keon-hee that was issued by the National Assembly was subsequently blocked by the police.[194] In November 2024, critics alleged that police, under orders of the Yoon administration, were being used to suppress anti-government protests. According to MBC, police unsuccessfully applied for four arrest warrants for protestors.[195] Some argued that these actions contradicted a 2021 Supreme Court of Korea ruling.[196]

The frequency of government officials not attending National Assembly sessions has increased under Yoon’s administration. Over a period of one year and four months from May 2022 to August 2023, there were 29 non-attendances by heads of government departments, vice ministers, and heads of affiliated organizations.[197] President Yoon has been heavily criticised for overusing the right to veto bills.[198]

In November 2024, over 3,000 professors and researchers at various universities signed a declaration asking Yoon to resign.[199][200] One interviewer speculated that the declaration was the largest such action from academics since protests during the Park Geun-hye administration.[199] On 28 November, 1,466 South Korean Catholic priests called for Yoon to be impeached. They issued a declaration titled “How can a person be like this” (어째서 사람이 이 모양인가).[201]

2024 martial law

Main article: 2024 South Korean martial law crisis

On 3 December 2024, Yoon declared martial law[202] and vowed to “rebuild a democratic and free Korea” after accusing other South Korean politicians of being “communist”.[203] As part of this, Yoon allegedly ordered the flying of drones into North Korea to provoke an armed conflict between the two countries, without the knowledge of the Ministry of National Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[204] The decree was soon declared invalid by the National Assembly in a unanimous vote of 190–0;[205][206] however, the military command stated that it would remain in place until the president lifted it.[207] Hours after the National Assembly voted to rescind martial law, Yoon complied and lifted the declaration after his cabinet convened.[208][12]

On 7 December 2024, Yoon issued an apology in a televised address following widespread criticism over his declaration of martial law. He expressed regret for the decision and assured the public that such actions would not be repeated. The incident has led to political turmoil, with opposition leaders and some ruling party members calling for his resignation.[209]

Subsequent investigations revealed that President Yoon ordered Commander Kwak, and Capital Defense Commander Lee Jin-woo to break through the plenary chamber doors to drag the lawmakers out at 00:40 to 00:50 hours, which was too late as the lawmakers had begun the session to end martial law at that time.[210] In the indictment of Kim Yong-hyun on 27 December by the special prosecution team, it also revealed Yoon told Commander Lee, “break down the doors, even if it means shooting” and “even if martial law is lifted, I just have to declare martial law two or three times, so keep going.” Minister Kim also prioritized the arrests and detention of Lee Jae-myung, Woo Won-shik, and Han Dong-hoon from the National Assembly.[211]

On 9 December 2024, the Ministry of Justice issued an overseas travel ban against Yoon following an investigation into allegations of rebellion linked to his brief imposition of martial law. A senior officer from the National Police Agency stated that Yoon could have faced detention if specific conditions were met. Although sitting South Korean presidents are generally immune from prosecution while in office, this immunity does not extend to accusations of rebellion or treason, leaving Yoon vulnerable to legal action over these serious charges.[212]

On 11 December 2024, South Korean police attempted to search Yoon’s office as part of an investigation into his controversial declaration of martial law. The search was blocked as investigators failed to reach an agreement with the presidential security service.[213]

Despite being suspended from public duties, Yoon will receive a 3 percent increase of about 7.5 million won to his salary compared to the previous year, according to the Ministry of Personnel Management.[214]

Calls for resignation

On the morning of 4 December 2024, following the end of martial law, a large number of Yoon’s staff immediately resigned, including his Chief of Staff, Jeong Jin-seok, his Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun, and many other presidential secretaries. Additional staff also offered to resign.[215][216] On 8 December 2024, PPP leader Han Dong-hoon stated that Yoon would resign as early as February 2025 if he remained in office.[16] A PPP special task force proposed that Yoon leave office in February or March 2025 and called for elections to replace him to be held in April or May.[217] However, on 12 December, Yoon issued a statement vowing to “fight to the end”, resisting the push for his resignation,[218] and claiming the martial law declaration was a legitimate “act of governance” against “forces and criminal groups that have been responsible for paralysing the country’s government”.[219]

Impeachment

Speaker of the National Assembly Woo Won-shik signing the motion for impeachment

Main article: Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol

On 4 December, approximately 190 members of the National Assembly across six opposition parties submitted a motion for impeachment, with the intent to discuss it in the Assembly the following day and vote on the motion on 7 December.[220] Police opened an investigation after cases of treason were also filed against Yoon for his declaration of martial law.[221] The Democratic Party also proposed appointing a permanent special counsel to investigate Yoon for treason.[222]

On 7 December, Yoon apologized for declaring martial law, describing it as a “desperate decision made by me, the president, as the final authority responsible for state affairs” and saying that it would not be repeated.[223] He also pledged to delegate his political functions to the PPP.[224] Later that day, the impeachment vote failed after only 195 lawmakers present of the 200 needed to impeach attended the National Assembly following a boycott by all but three MPs from the PPP.[225][226]

On 9 December, the Ministry of Justice legally barred Yoon from traveling abroad.[227]

On 14 December, a second impeachment motion filed against him passed in the National Assembly after 204 lawmakers, including 12 from the PPP, voted in favor. His powers and duties were suspended and taken over temporarily by Prime Minister Han Duck-soo pending a final decision by the Constitutional Court of Korea.[228] On 27 December, Han was also impeached on charges that included obstructing investigations against Yoon and his wife, colluding with Yoon on martial law and blocking the appointment of justices to fill vacancies in the Constitutional Court.[229][230][231]

On 7 January 2025, it was reported that the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) was investigating Yoon for treason based on evidence that he had attempted to manufacture a conflict with North Korea by launching a drone from Baengnyeongdo.[232]

On 14 January 2025, the impeachment proceedings against Yoon were abruptly suspended after a brief period, as he failed to attend the session at the Constitutional Court.[233] Subsequent hearings were held until 25 February 2025.[234] Yoon attended the proceedings for the first time on 21 January, during which he denied ordering soldiers to interfere with the proceedings of the National Assembly against the martial law declaration.[235] On 25 February, he issued an apology on the last day of the impeachment trial,[236] but continued to defend his actions.[237] The trial concluded with a total of 11 hearings held over 73 days and 16 people testifying as witnesses.[238]

On 4 April 2025, the South Korean Constitutional Court announced that Yoon’s impeachment was unanimously upheld.”[239] [240]

Arrest warrant, political standoff and arrest

Main article: Arrest of Yoon Suk Yeol

Yoon was summoned thrice by the CIO for questioning on 18, 25, and 29 December over his declaration of martial law. He refused to attend any of the summons.[241]

On 31 December, the Seoul Western District Court issued an arrest warrant for Yoon with charges relating to abuse of power and orchestration of the 2024 South Korean martial law crisis.[242] Yoon holed himself up in the presidential residence where hundreds of his supporters gathered and engaged in clashes with police and opponents of Yoon.[243] On 1 January 2025, he released a statement to his supporters pledging to “fight alongside you to the very end to protect this nation”.[244] On 3 January, authorities tried to carry out the warrant at the presidential compound but abandoned the attempt after being physically blocked by the Presidential Security Service.[245] After the warrant expired on 6 January, the Seoul Western District Court extended the warrant the next day.[246]

On 15 January, Yoon was arrested by the police and the CIO,[18][247][248] making him the first sitting South Korean president to be arrested.[249] On 17 January, Yoon’s criminal defense team petitioned the Seoul Central District Court for a habeas corpus review, but the court rejected it the next day.[250] He was detained at the Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, Gyeonggi Province, and was placed in solitary confinement.[251] On 18 January, the Seoul Western District Court issued a formal arrest warrant on the grounds that Yoon posed a risk of destroying evidence, extending Yoon’s detainment to 20 days pending the prosecutors’ decision on indictment.[252] On 26 January, Yoon was indicted on charges of being the “ringleader of an insurrection”.[253] On 7 March, the Seoul Central District Court [ko] canceled Yoon’s arrest warrant, citing procedural flaws.[254] He was released the next day.[255]

Removal from office

On 4 April 2025, by an unanimous decision, an eight-judge Constitutional Court upheld Yoon’s impeachment, formally removing him from office.[256][257] This made him the shortest-serving president in South Korea’s democratic history.[258] An election to determine his successor must now take place within 60 days following his removal.[256]

Public approval

See also: Opinion polling on the Yoon Suk Yeol presidency

Local regression curve of the opinion polling

Less than three months into his presidency, Yoon’s approval rating dropped to less than 30 percent amidst the 2021–2023 inflation surge, a controversial education policy rollout (including a proposal to lower the starting elementary school age from six to five), controversies over nepotism in personnel appointments, the police bureau proposal, and conflicts within the PPP.[259][260] His popularity fell further to 19% in August.[261] In December, Yoon’s approval rating rose back to above 40% for the first time in five months.[262] By April 2023, it dropped back to 30% largely due to widespread disapproval of Yoon’s Japanese policy.[263] In May 2024, Yoon recorded the lowest approval rating since he took office at a rate of 21%, with his economic and foreign policy, as well as his lack of communication, being cited as the main reasons for the low approval rating.[264]

In June and July 2024, over a million people signed a petition calling for Yoon to be impeached.[185][265]

Following his brief attempt to declare martial law, a poll by Gallup held from 3 to 5 December 2024 found that Yoon’s approval rating had fallen to 13% in part due to the declaration of martial law.[266] A week later, Gallup found that his approval rating fell further to 11%.[267]

Political positions

Further information: Conservatism in South Korea

Yoon Suk Yeol (left) with PPP party leader Lee Jun-seok (right)

This article is part of a series on

Conservatism

in South Korea

Schools

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- Social

- Traditional

- Hongik Ingan

- neo-Confucian

Principles

- Anti-communism

- Anti-North sentiment

- Asian values

- Confucianism

- Communitarianism

- Economic interventionism

- Elitism

- Meritocracy

- Familialism

- Free trade

- Hierarchy

- Japanophilia

- “New Right”

- Japanophobia

- “Old Right”

- Moral absolutism

- Pro-Americanism

- Protectionism

- Tradition

History

- Four Major Rivers Project

- Korean War

- Bukjin Tongil

- Mutual Defense Treaty

- Republic

- First

- Third

- Fourth

- Fifth

- October Restoration

- Supreme Council for National Reconstruction

- Taegukgi rallies

Intellectuals

- Choe Nam-seon

- Kim Seong-su

- Park Heong-joon

- Yi Munyeol

- Yoo Seong-min

Politicians

- Chun Doo-hwan

- Chung Mong-joon

- Choung Byoung-gug

- Hwang Kyo-ahn

- Kim Du-han

- Lee Beom-seok

- Lee Hoi-chang

- Lee Jun-seok

- Lee Myung-bak

- Kim Chong-in

- Kim Gu

- Kim Kyu-sik

- Kim Jin-pyo

- Kim Jong-pil

- Kim Kyu-sik

- Kim Moo-sung

- Kim Young-sam

- Na Kyung-won

- Oh Se-hoon

- Park Chung Hee

- Park Geun-hye

- Roh Tae-woo

- Syngman Rhee

- Suh Chung-won

- Yoon Suk Yeol

Activists

- Ha Tae-keung

- Park Sang-hak

Parties (mainstream)

- Bareun Party

- Bareunmirae Party

- Democratic Republican Party

- Democratic Justice Party

- Future Korea Party

- Democratic Liberal Party

- Grand National Party

- Korea Nationalist Party

- Liberal Party

- Liberty Korea Party

- National Association

- New Conservative Party

- New Korea Party

- New Reform Party

- People’s Future Party

- People Power Party (present)

- Saenuri Party (2012–2017)

- United Future Party

Parties (minor)

- Dawn of Liberty Party (present)

- Free Korea 21

- Korea Democratic Party (de facto)

- Korea Independence Party

- Korean National Party

- National Youth

- New National Participation Party

- Our Republican Party (2017)

- Our Republican Party (2020) (present)

- People First Party

- People Party

- Saenuri Party

- Unification National Party

- United Liberal Democrats

Media

- The Chosun Ilbo

- TV Chosun

- The Dong-A Ilbo

- Channel A

- JoongAng Ilbo

- JTBC

- The Korea Economic Daily

- Kukmin Ilbo

- Maeil Business Newspaper

- MBN

- Munhwa Ilbo

- Segye Ilbo

Other organizations

Active

- Center for Free Enterprise

- Christian Council of Korea

- FFNK

- Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations

- NKnet

- Unification Church

Defunct

- Hanahoe

- North-West Youth Association

- White Shirts Society

Related topics

- Anti-Chinese sentiment

- Chaebol

- Chojoongdong

- Controversy over National Foundation Day

- Ilbe Storehouse

- National Security Act

- Liberalism in South Korea

- template

- Politics of South Korea

- Conservatism portal

- South Korea portal

- v

- t

- e

Yoon identifies himself as “conservative”.[268] Chung Doo-un, a former conservative member of parliament, has considered Yoon a conservative.[269] Political commentator Chin Jung-kwon called his political inclination “libertarianism” (자유지상주의).[270][271] He has also been described as a social conservative.[272] His critical attitude toward feminism, his nationalist nature, and his hostile attitude toward the opposition and the liberal media have led the media and experts to call him and his policies “K-Trumpism” (한국판 트럼프 or K-트럼프) and “far-right” (극우), allegations denied by him and his supporters.[273][274][275]

Economics

Further information: Economy of South Korea

Yoon opposes economic interventionism by the government and is generally regarded as pro-business,[90] and as a fiscal conservative.[276] He has cited economist Milton Friedman and Friedman’s 1980 book Free to Choose: A Personal Statement as a major influence on his belief in economic liberalism.[277] According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Yoon has intended to reduce dependence on China and promote supply chain resilience.[278]

Military

Yoon has expressed active support for the possibility of South Korea having indigenous nuclear weapons. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace referred to his policy as “nuclear populism.” Some research shows that nationalist attitudes and anti-American sentiment are prevalent among supporters of an indigenous nuclear arsenal.[279]

On 22 September 2021, Yoon stated that he would ask that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea if there is a threat from North Korea.[280] Nuclear weapons have not been deployed by the U.S. in South Korea since the early 1990s after an agreement with Russia and in an effort to ease tensions between North and South Korea.[281] Speaking for the United States, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japan and Korea Mark Lambert rejected Yoon’s call for the re-nuclearization of South Korea and said the proposal was against U.S. policy.[281]

On 12 November 2021, Yoon indicated that he would be open to more U.S. THAAD missile deployments in South Korea.[282]

Electoral history

2022 South Korean presidential election—People Power Party primary

Party

Candidate

Votes

%

People Power

Yoon Suk Yeol

347,963

47.85

People Power

Hong Jun-pyo

301,786

41.50

People Power

Yoo Seong-min

54,304

7.47

People Power

Won Hee-ryong

23,085

3.17

Total votes

727,138

100.00

2022 South Korean presidential election

Party

Candidate

Votes

%

People Power

Yoon Suk Yeol

16,394,815

48.56

Democratic

Lee Jae-myung

16,147,738

47.83

Justice

Sim Sang-jung

803,358

2.38

National Revolutionary

Huh Kyung-young

281,481

0.83

Progressive

Kim Jae-yeon

37,366

0.11

Our Republican

Cho Won-jin

25,972

0.08

Basic Income

Oh Jun-ho

18,105

0.05

Korean Wave Alliance

Kim Min-chan

17,305

0.05

Korean Unification

Lee Gyeong-hee

11,708

0.03

Labor

Lee Baek-yun

9,176

0.03

New Liberal Democratic Union

Kim Gyeong-jae

8,317

0.02

Saenuri

Ok Un-ho

4,970

0.01

Total votes

33,760,311

100.00

People Power gain from Democratic

Personal life

Yoon has been married to Kim Keon-hee since 2012.[283] His wife said that she prefers the term “first spouse” instead of the “first lady”.[284][285]

Kim is the president of Covana Contents, a company that focuses on art exhibitions.[286] Kim has faced an investigation that alleged she had taken kickbacks for hosting art exhibitions, in addition to reports that circulated in the South Korean media that she inflated her resume with connections to New York University Stern School of Business. She responded by offering a public apology.[287]

Yoon is the fourth South Korean president who is a Catholic, after Moon Jae-in, Roh Moo-hyun (a lapsed Catholic), Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Tae-woo.[288] He was baptized with the Christian name “Ambrose“.[288][289] Yoon and his wife were accused of having a close relationship with Korean shamans who allegedly advised them on administrative decisions.[290]

Honours

- Poland: Knight of the Order of the White Eagle (13 July 2023)[291]

- Italy: Knight Grand Cross with Collar of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (7 October 2023)[292]

- Profile in Courage Award (29 October 2023)[293]

Notes

References

External links

- Media related to Yoon Suk-yeol at Wikimedia Commons

- Quotations related to Yoon Suk Yeol at Wikiquote

- Appearances on C-SPAN

Legal offices

Preceded by
Moon Moo-il

Prosecutor General of South Korea

25 July 2019 – 4 March 2021

Succeeded by
Kim Oh-soo

Party political offices

New political party

People Power nominee for President of South Korea

2022

Most recent

Political offices

Preceded by
Moon Jae-in

President of South Korea

10 May 2022 – 4 April 2025

Powers and duties suspended from 14 December 2024

Succeeded by
Han Duck-soo (acting)

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yoon_Suk_Yeol&oldid=1283873972”

President of South Korea

For a list of presidents, see List of presidents of South Korea.

This article is part of a series on

Politics of South Korea

Government

- Constitution of South Korea

- Law

- Human rights

Legislature

- National Assembly

- Speaker Woo Won-shik (I)

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- Members

Executive

- President of South Korea

- Choi Sang-mok (I, Acting)

- Prime Minister of South Korea

- Choi Sang-mok (I, Acting)

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Judiciary

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Elections

- Presidential elections

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Political parties

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Korean conflict

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The president of the Republic of Korea (Korean: 대한민국 대통령; Hanja: 大韓民國大統領; RR: Daehanminguk daetongnyeong), also known as the president of South Korea (Korean: 한국 대통령), is both the head of state and head of government of the Republic of Korea. The president is directly elected by the citizens of the Republic of Korea and pledges to execute the duties of their office, chief among others “to defend the State, (and to) pursue peaceful unification of the homeland.” The president leads the State Council, is the chief of the executive branch of the national government and the commander-in-chief of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

The Constitution of South Korea and the amended Presidential Election Act of 1987 provide for election of the president by direct, secret ballot, ending sixteen years of indirect presidential elections under the preceding two authoritarian governments. The president is directly elected to a five-year term, with no possibility of re-election.[2] If a presidential vacancy should occur, a successor must be elected within sixty days, during which time presidential duties are to be performed by the prime minister or other senior cabinet members in the order of priority as determined by law. The president is exempt from criminal liability (except for insurrection or treason).

The impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol on 14 December 2024 suspended then-incumbent president Yoon Suk Yeol, making Prime Minister Han Duck-soo acting president. Han himself was briefly suspended after his own impeachment on 27 December 2024, leading Deputy Prime Minister Choi Sang-mok to assume the role of acting president; however, Han was reinstated by the Constitutional Court of Korea on 24 March 2025.[3][4] Yoon was subsequently removed from office on 4 April 2025, when the Constitutional Court upheld his impeachment; the presidency is thus vacant until the 2025 South Korean presidential election, and in the meantime Han will continue as acting president.

History

Syng-man Rhee, the first President of South Korea

Prior to the establishment of the First Republic in 1948, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea established in Shanghai in September 1919 as the continuation of several governments proclaimed in the aftermath of March First Movement earlier that year coordinated resistance against Japanese rule. The legitimacy of the Provisional Government has been recognized and succeeded by South Korea in the latter’s original Constitution of 1948 and the current Constitution of 1987.

The presidential term has been set at five years since 1988. It was previously set at four years from 1948 to 1972, six years from 1972 to 1981, and seven years from 1981 to 1988. Since 1981, the president has been barred from re-election.

Powers and duties of the president

Chapter 3 of the South Korean constitution states the duties and the powers of the president. The president is required to:

- uphold the Constitution

- preserve the safety and homeland of South Korea

- work for the peaceful reunification of Korea, typically act as the Chairperson of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council

Also, the president is given the powers:

- as the head of the executive branch of government

- as the commander-in-chief of the South Korean military

- to declare war

- to hold referendums regarding issues of national importance

- to issue executive orders

- to issue medals in honor of service for the nation

- to issue pardons

- to declare a state of emergency suspending all laws or enacting a state of martial law

- to veto bills (subject to a two thirds majority veto override by the National Assembly)[5]

If the National Assembly votes against a presidential decision, it will be declared void immediately.

The president may refer important policy matters to a national referendum, declare war, conclude peace and other treaties, appoint senior public officials, and grant amnesty (with the concurrence of the National Assembly). In times of serious internal or external turmoil or threat, or economic or financial crises, the president may assume emergency powers “for the maintenance of national security or public peace and order.” Emergency measures may be taken only when the National Assembly is not in session and when there is no time for it to convene. The measures are limited to the “minimum necessary”.

The 1987 Constitution removed the 1980 Constitution’s explicit provisions that empowered the government to temporarily suspend the freedoms and rights of the people. However, the president is permitted to take other measures that could amend or abolish existing laws for the duration of a crisis. It is unclear whether such emergency measures could temporarily suspend portions of the Constitution itself. Emergency measures must be referred to the National Assembly for concurrence. If not endorsed by the assembly, the emergency measures can be revoked; any laws that had been overridden by presidential order regain their original effect. In this respect, the power of the legislature is more vigorously asserted than in cases of ratification of treaties or declarations of war, in which the Constitution simply states that the National Assembly “has the right to consent” to the president’s actions. In a change from the 1980 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution stated that the president is not permitted to dissolve the National Assembly.

Election

Further information: Presidential elections in South Korea

The presidential election rules are defined by the South Korean Constitution and the Public Official Election Act. The president is elected by direct popular vote, conducted using first-past-the-post.

Latest election

Main article: 2022 South Korean presidential election

Candidate

Party

Votes

%

Yoon Suk Yeol

People Power Party

16,394,815

48.56

Lee Jae-myung

Democratic Party

16,147,738

47.83

Sim Sang-jung

Justice Party

803,358

2.38

Huh Kyung-young

National Revolutionary Party

281,481

0.83

Kim Jae-yeon

Progressive Party

37,366

0.11

Cho Won-jin

Our Republican Party

25,972

0.08

Oh Jun-ho

Basic Income Party

18,105

0.05

Kim Min-chan

Korean Wave Alliance

17,305

0.05

Lee Gyeong-hee

Korean Unification

11,708

0.03

Lee Baek-yun

Labor Party

9,176

0.03

Kim Gyeong-jae

New Liberal Democratic Union

8,317

0.02

Ok Un-ho

Saenuri Party

4,970

0.01

Total

33,760,311

100.00

Valid votes

33,760,311

99.10

Invalid/blank votes

307,542

0.90

Total votes

34,067,853

100.00

Registered voters/turnout

44,197,692

77.08

Source: Election results

By region

Major candidates

Breakdown of votes by region for candidates with at least 1% of the total votes.

Region

Yoon Suk Yeol

Lee Jae-myung

Sim Sang-jung

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Seoul

3,255,747

50.6

2,944,981

45.7

180,324

2.8

Busan

1,270,072

58.3

831,896

38.1

47,541

2.2

Daegu

1,199,888

75.1

345,045

21.6

31,131

1.9

Incheon

878,560

47.1

913,320

48.9

51,852

2.8

Gwangju

124,511

12.7

830,058

84.8

14,865

1.5

Daejeon

464,060

49.6

434,950

46.4

25,445

2.7

Ulsan

396,321

54.4

297,134

40.8

21,292

2.9

Sejong

101,491

44.1

119,349

51.9

6,780

2.9

Gyeonggi

3,965,341

45.6

4,428,151

50.9

205,709

2.4

Gangwon

544,980

54.2

419,644

41.7

25,031

2.5

North Chungcheong

511,921

50.7

455,853

45.1

26,557

2.6

South Chungcheong

670,283

51.1

589,991

45.0

31,789

2.4

North Jeolla

176,809

14.4

1,016,863

83.0

19,451

1.6

South Jeolla

145,549

11.4

1,094,872

86.1

16,279

1.3

North Gyeongsang

1,278,922

72.8

418,371

23.8

33,123

1.9

South Gyeongsang

1,237,346

58.2

794,130

37.4

52,591

2.5

Jeju

173,014

42.7

213,130

52.6

13,598

3.4

Total

16,394,815

48.6

16,147,738

47.8

803,358

2.4

Source: National Election Commission

Minor candidates

Breakdown of votes by region for candidates with less than 1% of the total votes.

Region

Huh

Kyung-young

Kim

Jae-yeon

Cho

Won-jin

Oh

Jun-ho

Kim

Min-chan

Lee

Gyeong-hee

Lee

Baek-yun

Kim

Gyeong-jae

Ok

Un-ho

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Seoul

36,540

0.6

5,615

0.1

4,657

0.1

3,829

0.1

1,907

0.0

1,333

0.0

1,571

0.0

1,791

0.0

844

0.0

Busan

21,990

1.0

2,799

0.1

1,867

0.1

1,071

0.0

942

0.0

575

0.0

546

0.0

527

0.0

352

0.0

Daegu

13,941

0.9

938

0.1

2,824

0.2

892

0.1

619

0.0

472

0.0

344

0.0

451

0.0

261

0.0

Incheon

16,733

0.9

1,593

0.1

1,378

0.1

1,116

0.1

758

0.0

511

0.0

508

0.0

449

0.0

276

0.0

Gwangju

6,138

0.6

1,366

0.1

112

0.0

434

0.0

455

0.0

188

0.0

242

0.0

140

0.0

92

0.0

Daejeon

8,593

0.9

958

0.1

588

0.1

566

0.1

395

0.0

258

0.0

223

0.0

227

0.0

138

0.0

Ulsan

9,234

1.3

2,180

0.3

685

0.1

375

0.1

333

0.0

234

0.0

308

0.0

185

0.0

109

0.0

Sejong

1,594

0.7

181

0.1

121

0.1

100

0.0

88

0.0

66

0.0

50

0.0

48

0.0

23

0.0

Gyeonggi

63,207

0.7

8,768

0.1

5,897

0.1

4,151

0.0

3,192

0.0

1,927

0.0

1,919

0.0

1,990

0.0

1,124

0.0

Gangwon

11,668

1.2

1,260

0.1

824

0.1

582

0.1

560

0.1

525

0.1

323

0.0

262

0.0

181

0.0

North Chungcheong

11,165

1.1

1,083

0.1

779

0.1

614

0.1

653

0.1

698

0.1

385

0.0

288

0.0

213

0.0

South Chungcheong

14,169

1.1

1,586

0.1

899

0.1

750

0.1

864

0.1

791

0.1

477

0.0

314

0.0

200

0.0

North Jeolla

7,975

0.7

896

0.1

299

0.0

542

0.0

1,464

0.1

409

0.0

377

0.0

199

0.0

135

0.0

South Jeolla

8,322

0.7

1,917

0.2

296

0.0

672

0.1

2,246

0.2

507

0.0

473

0.0

304

0.0

179

0.0

North Gyeongsang

18,028

1.0

1,763

0.1

2,431

0.1

964

0.1

1,046

0.1

1,607

0.1

535

0.0

550

0.0

356

0.0

South Gyeongsang

28,645

1.3

3,892

0.2

2,044

0.1

1,180

0.1

1,473

0.1

1,379

0.1

749

0.0

491

0.0

424

0.0

Jeju

3,539

0.9

571

0.1

271

0.1

267

0.1

310

0.1

228

0.1

146

0.0

101

0.0

63

0.0

Total

281.481

0.8

37,366

0.1

25,972

0.1

18,105

0.1

17,305

0.1

11,708

0.0

9,176

0.0

8,317

0.0

4,970

0.0

Source: National Election Commission

Related constitutional organs

The president is assisted by the staff of the Presidential Secretariat, headed by a cabinet-rank secretary general. Apart from the State Council, or cabinet, the chief executive relies on several constitutional organs.

These constitutional organs included the National Security Council, which provided advice concerning the foreign, military, and domestic policies bearing on national security. Chaired by the president, the council in 1990 had as its statutory members the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers for foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and national defense, the director of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) which was known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) until December 1980, and others designated by the president. Another important body is the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, inaugurated in June 1981 under the chairmanship of the president. From its inception, this body had no policy role, but rather appeared to serve as a government sounding board and as a means to disburse political rewards by providing large numbers of dignitaries and others with titles and opportunities to meet periodically with the president and other senior officials.

The president also was assisted in 1990 by the Audit and Inspection Board. In addition to auditing the accounts of all public institutions, the board scrutinized the administrative performance of government agencies and public officials. Its findings were reported to the president and the National Assembly, which itself had broad powers to inspect the work of the bureaucracy under the provisions of the Constitution. Board members were appointed by the president.

One controversial constitutional organ was the Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen, which replaced a smaller body in February 1988, just before Roh Tae Woo was sworn in as president. This body was supposed to be chaired by the immediate former president; its expansion to eighty members, broadened functions, and elevation to cabinet rank made it appear to have been designed, as one Seoul newspaper said, to “preserve the status and position of a certain individual.” The government announced plans to reduce the size and functions of this body immediately after Roh’s inauguration. Public suspicions that the council might provide former President Chun with a power base within the Sixth Republic were rendered moot when Chun withdrew to an isolated Buddhist temple in self-imposed exile in November 1988.

Removal

See also: Impeachment of Park Geun-hye, Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol, and Impeachment of Han Duck-soo

English Translation: Impeachment of the President (Park Geun-hye), Case No. 2016Hun-Na1

The procedure for impeachment is set out in the Constitution. According to Article 65 Clause 1, if the President, Prime Minister, or other state council members violate the Constitution or other laws of official duty, the National Assembly can impeach them.

Clause 2 states the impeachment bill must be proposed by one third and approved by a majority of members of the National Assembly for passage. In the case of the President, the motion must be proposed by a majority and approved by a supermajority of two thirds or more of the total members of the National Assembly, meaning that 200 of 300 members of the National Assembly must approve the bill. This article also states that any person against whom a motion for impeachment has been passed shall be suspended from exercising power until the impeachment has been adjudicated, and a decision on impeachment shall not extend further than removal from public office. However, impeachment shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal liability for such violations.[6]

By the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court must make a final decision within 180 days after it receives any case for adjudication, including impeachment cases. If the respondent has already left office before the pronouncement of the decision, the case is dismissed.[7]

Four presidents have been impeached since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 was impeached by the National Assembly, but the impeachment was overturned by the Constitutional Court. Park Geun-hye was impeached by the National Assembly in 2016, and the impeachment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on March 10, 2017.[8][9] Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached by the National Assembly on 14 December 2024, and the impeachment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on April 4, 2025. [10] Han Duck-soo became the first acting president to be impeached on 27 December 2024. Although Han held presidential powers, the National Assembly considered him a cabinet minister, allowing him to be removed by a simple majority rather than the two-thirds required of previous presidents.[11]

Presidential office

The Cheong Wa Dae (Korean: 청와대; Hanja: 靑瓦臺) or Blue House was built upon a Joseon-era royal garden. It is a complex of multiple buildings built largely in the traditional Korean architectural style with some modern architectural elements and facilities. Cheong Wa Dae consists of the Main Office Hall Bon-gwan,[a] the Presidential Residence, the State Reception House Yeongbin-gwan,[b] and several other buildings and structures. The entire complex covers approximately 250,000 square metres or 62 acres. While the Blue House served as an executive office, it was one of the most protected official residences in Asia.[12]

Upon the inauguration of President Yoon Suk Yeol in May 2022, Cheong Wa Dae was relieved of its duties as the official residence and executive office of the president and fully converted to a public park. The president’s office and residence was moved to the Office of the President of South Korea (formerly the Ministry of National Defense building) in the Yongsan District of Seoul.[13]

Compensation and privileges of office

As of 2021, the president receives a salary of ₩240,648,000[1] along with an undisclosed expense account to cover travel, goods and services while in office.

In addition, the presidency of the republic maintains the Chongri Gonggwan (“Official Residence of the Prime Minister”) and the Prime Ministers Office in Seoul. The Chongri Gonggwan is the prime minister’s official residence and official workplace. The prime minister is allowed use of all other official government offices and residences.

The president also has many regional offices especially in the major cities ready to receive the president at any time. Although not residences, they are owned by the national government and are used when the president is in the region or city.

A Code One Boeing 747-8i flying in South Korean government’s colors.

For ground travel the president uses a highly modified Hyundai Nexo SUV to serve as the presidential state vehicle.[14] For air travel the president uses a highly modified plane which is a military version of the Boeing 747-8 with the call sign Code One and a highly modified helicopter which is a military version of the Sikorsky S-92 that serves as the presidential helicopter.

Post-presidency

All former presidents receive a lifelong pension and Presidential Security Service detail. Unlike the prime minister, a former president cannot decline PSS protection. In recent years, South Korean presidents tend to have controversial post-presidencies; four of the last six have served time in prison.[15][16][17]

Impeached presidents are stripped of their post-presidential benefits such as pension, free medical services, state funding for post-retirement offices, personal assistants and a chauffeur, and right to burial at the Seoul National Cemetery after death. However, such individuals are still entitled to retain security protection under the Presidential Security Act.[18]

Order of succession

See also: Cabinet of South Korea

Part of a series on

Orders of succession

Presidencies

- Argentina

- Austria

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- Colombia

- China

- Dominican Republic

- DR Congo

- Egypt

- Finland

- France

- Germany

- India

- Indonesia

- Israel

- Italy

- Ireland

- South Korea

- Mexico

- Nigeria

- Pakistan

- Peru

- Philippines

- Poland

- Portugal

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- v

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Article 71 of the Constitution of South Korea states, ‘In the event of the president not being able to discharge the duties of his/her office, the Prime Minister and ministers in line of the order of succession shall be the acting president.’ Article 68 of the Constitution requires the acting president to hold new elections within 60 days if the presidency is vacant or the president is permanently incapacitated.[19]

Timeline of presidents

Main article: List of presidents of South Korea

Ideology

#

Time in office

Name(s)

Conservative

9

21765 days[c]

Choi Kyu-hah, Chun Doo-hwan, Kim Young-sam, Lee Myung-bak, Park Chung Hee, Park Geun-hye, Roh Tae-woo, Syngman Rhee, and Yoon Suk Yeol

Liberal

4

6067 days

Kim Dae-jung, Moon Jae-in, Roh Moo-hyun, and Yun Po-sun

- 1st: Syngman Rhee

1st, 2nd & 3rd terms

(served: 1948–1960)

- 2nd: Yun Po-sun

4th term

(served: 1960–1963)

- 3rd: Park Chung Hee

5th, 6th, 7th, 8th & 9th terms

(served: 1963–1979)

- 4th: Choi Kyu-hah

10th term

(served: 1979–1980)

- 5th: Chun Doo-hwan

11th & 12th terms

(served: 1980–1988)

- 6th: Roh Tae-woo

13th term

(served: 1988–1993)

- 7th: Kim Young-sam

14th term

(served: 1993–1998)

- 8th: Kim Dae-jung

15th term

(served: 1998–2003)

- 9th: Roh Moo-hyun

16th term

(served: 2003–2008[d])

- 10th: Lee Myung-bak

17th term

(served: 2008–2013)

- 11th: Park Geun-hye

18th term

(served: 2013–2017)[e])

- 12th: Moon Jae-in

19th term

(served: 2017–2022)

- 13th: Yoon Suk Yeol

20th term

(serving: 2022–2025[f])

See also

- Biography portal

- South Korea portal

- First Lady of South Korea

- List of international trips made by presidents of South Korea

- List of leaders of North Korea

- List of official vehicles of the president of South Korea

- List of presidents of South Korea

- List of presidents of South Korea by time in office

- Presidential elections in South Korea

- Transportation of the president of South Korea

- Vice President of South Korea

Notes

References

- U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Presidents of South Korea.

- Official website (in English)

- Official website (in Korean)

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=President_of_South_Korea&oldid=1283874340”

2024 South Korean martial law crisis

(Redirected from 2024 South Korean martial law)

It has been suggested that this article be split into a new article titled 2024–2025 South Korean political crisis. (Discuss) (January 2025)

On 3 December 2024, at 22:27 Korea Standard Time (KST), Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, declared martial law during a televised address. In his declaration, Yoon accused the Democratic Party (DPK), which has a majority in the National Assembly, of conducting “anti-state activities” and collaborating with “North Korean communists” to destroy the country, thereby creating a “legislative dictatorship”. The order prohibited political activities, including gatherings of the National Assembly and local legislatures, and suspended the free press. Separately, Yoon reportedly ordered the arrest of various political opponents, including the leaders of the DPK and his own People Power Party. This event was widely characterized by Korean politicians and news organizations, both international and domestic, as an attempted self-coup.

The declaration was opposed by both parties and resulted in protests. At 01:02 on 4 December, 190 legislators who had arrived at the National Assembly Proceeding Hall unanimously passed a motion to lift martial law,[3] despite attempts by the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command to prevent the vote. At 04:30, Yoon and his cabinet lifted martial law and soon disbanded the Martial Law Command. The opposition subsequently began impeachment proceedings against Yoon and said it would continue to do so if he did not resign. Uproar over the declaration has led to the resignation of several officials in Yoon’s administration, including Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, and investigations into Yoon, other officials of his administration, and military officers for their role in the implementation of the decree.

On 7 December, Yoon issued an apology for declaring martial law and said that he would not do it again. On 12 December, he stated that he would “fight to the end” and that the martial law declaration was an “act of governance” to protect against anti-state forces. It is more widely believed the declaration was motivated by political issues with the DPK-controlled Assembly over repeated impeachment attempts against officials, opposition to his budget, and various scandals involving him and his wife Kim Keon-hee.[4]

Yoon was impeached on 14 December by the National Assembly and suspended from office pending a final ruling by the Constitutional Court on whether to confirm his removal from the presidency. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo served as acting president until he was also impeached on 27 December, making Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Choi Sang-mok acting president. However, Han’s impeachment was overturned by the Constitutional Court on 24 March 2025, reinstating him as acting president.[5]

Yoon was arrested on 15 January 2025. On 26 January 2025, he was indicted for leading an insurrection, becoming the first sitting president to be arrested and indicted in South Korean history. On April 4, the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld Yoon’s impeachment from the presidency over the martial law declaration.

Background

President Yoon Suk Yeol in 2022

Opinion polling on the Yoon Suk Yeol presidency

South Korea has been governed as a presidential democracy under the 1987 constitution, which provides for a strong executive independent of the legislature. Yoon Suk Yeol, a member of the conservative People Power Party and former prosecutor general, took office as President of South Korea following his victory in the 2022 election.[6]

Yoon has been criticized for far-right political views.[7][8] His administration had low approval ratings, reaching as low as 17%, with 58% of the population in a November 2024 survey supporting either Yoon’s resignation or impeachment.[9] He has struggled to achieve his agenda due to opposition from the National Assembly, controlled by the opposition Democratic Party (DPK) since 2020. In the April 2024 legislative election, the opposition retained its majority but still lacked the two-thirds majority (200 out of 300) required under the constitution to impeach the president.[10]

Yoon boycotted the opening of the National Assembly, even though it is customary for the president to deliver a speech at the event.[11] Yoon has also opposed investigations into scandals involving his wife Kim Keon-hee and top officials,[12] vetoing three separate bills that called for a special counsel investigation into his wife, the third occurring on 26 November 2024.[13] On 2 December 2024, the opposition-controlled parliament moved to impeach Board of Audit and Inspection Chair Choe Jae-hae and three prosecutors involved in two scandals surrounding Kim[14] and rejected the government’s 2025 budget proposal.[15]

Early planning of martial law

During prosecution questioning, former Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC) commander Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung testified that President Yoon first mentioned “taking emergency action” to address “difficult social issues” in late December 2023, which Yeo interpreted as referring to the failed martial law. At the end of March 2024, President Yoon invited the then-Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong, and Presidential Security Service Director Kim Yong-hyun for dinner and reportedly expressed his intention to “declare martial law soon.” At the dinner, Minister Shin and Director Cho expressed their opposition. Minister Shin, concerned about the implementation of martial law, called Director Kim and the then DCC commander Yeo in private right after the dinner to discuss blocking of any such moves.[16] Yeo added that Yoon started mentioning martial law more often following the PPP’s defeat in the April 2024 legislative election.[17] Eventually, Shin was shuffled out of the role of Defense Minister to become Director of the Office of National Security, while Kim Yong-hyun was selected to replace Shin in September 2024.

The 27 December 2024 unsealed indictment of Kim Yong-hyun revealed that President Yoon met with former Minister Kim, Commander Yeo, and others about 10 times since March 2024 to discuss the imposition of martial law.[18]

Warnings of a plot to declare martial law

Rep. Kim Min-seok of the opposition’s Democratic Party predicted months in advance that Yoon would declare martial law.

In September 2024, three months prior to the martial law declaration, some DPK politicians began suggesting that Yoon was preparing martial law. Party leader Lee Jae-myung alluded to “speculation about martial law preparations” in his remark.[19] Kim Min-seok, member of the party’s Supreme Council, stated “I have well-founded reasons to believe that the conservative Yoon administration is drawing up a contingency plan to declare martial law”.[20][21] The Presidential Office dismissed this claim as “groundless”.[22] People Power Party floor leader Choo Kyung-ho also denied the possibility of martial law, saying “Such theories … are no more than scare tactics and propaganda based purely on imagination”.[19]

Kim Min-seok justified his prediction of a martial law declaration by Yoon, by adding, he was “one of the people who obtained information and reported that the government was preparing to invoke martial law during the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye” in 2016, despite denials by the Park government at the time. A document was produced in secret by the Defense Security Command (now the DCC) in February 2017 that considered invoking martial law in anticipation of continued street protests if Park Geun-hye was not removed by the Constitutional Court. The 67-page document titled “Wartime Martial Law and Joint Action Plan”,[23] contained specific plans including mobilizing tanks to suppress candlelight protests in Gwanghwamun in the event that the impeachment of Park was dismissed, and arresting and detaining lawmakers to prevent the National Assembly from reaching the quorum required to lift martial law if lawmakers attempted to do so (similar to the martial law plans of 2024).[24]

Kim Yong-hyun, during his confirmation hearing for Minister of National Defense at the National Assembly on 2 September 2024, was asked by members of the opposition as to whether he would declare martial law. He dismissed this, saying “I think talk about martial law is out of date; if it is declared, who would accept it? Do you think the military would even follow the order?” Over the following three months, he allegedly planned military rule under martial law.[25]

Following the botched martial law implementation, Kim Min-seok cited the Yoon administration’s usage of the term “anti-state forces”, and Yoon appointing his fellow Choongam High School [ko] alumni as ministers of defense, the interior and other high-ranking figures in his administration and the military, as indications of Yoon’s ulterior motive for martial law. He added Yoon’s government “are so bad at governance that they have no way of preventing their replacement other than martial law, terrorism, and mobilizing the legal system against their opponents”.[26]

Documents obtained by DPK lawmaker Choo Mi-ae showed that the DCC had prepared documents and other related material on declaring martial law following orders from its commander, Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung, in November 2024.[27] Police investigators also found that Defense Intelligence Command chief Major General Moon Sang-ho, his predecessor, Noh Sang-won and two colonels also met at a Lotteria fast food restaurant in Ansan on 1 December to discuss preparations for the declaration.[28]

The “Choongam faction” who Yoon appointed to high ranking positions and cited as having a role in the martial law declaration were:[26][29]

- Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun

- Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung, commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command

- Major General Park Jong-seon, commander of the Defense Security Agency (known as 777th Intelligence Command) of Defense Intelligence Agency

- Lieutenant General Lee Jin-woo, commander of the Capital Defense Command

- Minister of the Interior and Safety Lee Sang-min

The Choongam faction has been compared to the Hanahoe faction of former dictator Chun Doo-hwan and his successor Roh Tae-woo.[30]

Attempts to provoke North Korean crisis to justify martial law

In May 2024, North Korea began sending balloons loaded with trash into South Korea.[31] In October, North Korea accused the South Korean military of flying propaganda leaflet-scattering drones over Pyongyang, which the South Korean military said they were unable to confirm.[32]

In December, citing a source from within the military, Park Beom-kye, a member of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly, claimed Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun orchestrated the drone incident to stoke tension with the North[33][34][unreliable source?] and that the DCC took a hands-on role in the incident.[35][full citation needed][36] Lee Ki-heon of the Intelligence Committee said he had confirmed a report that Kim Yong-hyun instructed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Kim Myung-soo to “fire warning shots and then strike the origin of sewage balloons flying from the North”, though a spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied this.[37] Lee said Yoon and Defense Minister Kim were trying to provoke a “local war” in order to justify martial law.[38] Admiral Kim refused the order and was verbally abused by Defense Minister Kim. Lee suspected this led Defense Minister Kim to select Army Chief of Staff Park An-su for martial law commander instead, as Admiral Kim would have been the default choice.[37]

On 1 December, two days before martial law was declared, colonel-level commanders were called to be on guard for an imminent provocation by North Korea, with DCC Commander Yeo In-hyung giving orders to prepare for a “serious North Korean filth balloon situation”.[39]

During police investigations into the martial law declaration, a memo was recovered from a notebook owned by former Army Maj. Gen. Noh Sang-won, former chief of the Defense Intelligence Command, in his residence in Ansan. The memo reportedly contained details of a plot to provoke North Korea by generating an incident along the Northern Limit Line.[40] On 14 February 2025, the Hankyoreh reported that the notebook included, in addition to the North Korean plans, plans for detaining about 500 public figures and abolishing term limits to allow Yoon to potentially serve 3 terms.[41]

Martial law powers and past occurrences

Martial law was a recurring tool used by military leaders to suppress dissent and consolidate power in South Korea’s authoritarian, dictatorship past until the end of the Fifth Republic of Korea with the June Democratic Struggle of 1987, when South Korea transitioned to democracy under the Sixth Republic.

This was the first time martial law had been declared in South Korea since the 1980 military coup d’état after the assassination of dictator Park Chung Hee, and the restoration of civil liberties in 1987.[42] This was the 17th since the foundation of the republic in 1948.[43]

According to the Martial Law Act, the declaration of martial law or alteration in its nature by the President shall undergo deliberation by the State Council. The Minister of National Defense or the Minister of the Interior and Safety may suggest the declaration of martial law to the President through the Prime Minister.[44]

Under Article 77 of the constitution, the president must immediately notify the National Assembly when declaring martial law. This enables special measures to be taken, including reducing the need for arrest warrants and restricting freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association. The National Assembly can force the president to lift martial law by a simple majority vote.[45][46] The president has no authority to suspend the Assembly by any means, and “during the enforcement of martial law, no member of the Assembly shall be arrested or detained unless he/she is caught in the act of committing a crime“.[44]

Events

Events on 3 December prior to martial law declaration

On the morning of 3 December, former Army Maj. Gen. Noh Sang-won, former chief of the Defense Intelligence Command met with Defense Minister Kim at his official residence, for a meeting lasting 20 to 30 minutes. In the afternoon, Minister Kim instructed Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Park An-su, and five other military officials to report to his office at 21:30.[47]

At 17:00 KST, units of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command, including the 707th Special Mission Group, 1st Special Forces Brigade, and the 13th Special Mission Brigade received orders to prepare for operations at an isolated area. The 707th SMG received a message to prepare for conduct of a real-world operation by helicopter, and deployment on orders of Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun. They were told “The situation related to North Korea is serious”, though an anonymous official reported there had been no movements by the North Korean military.[48][49]

At 18:20, Korean National Police Commissioner Cho Ji-ho reportedly received an order from the Presidential Office to “be on standby”. At a subsequent committee inquiry by the National Assembly, Cho claimed he had no knowledge of the martial law plan until its announcement.[50] However, subsequent investigations revealed that Cho, and Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency Commissioner General Kim Bong-sik met with Minister Kim and President Yoon at 19:00, and the two police officials were given a list of about 10 people to be arrested along with plans to occupy the National Assembly and National Election Commission via a martial law declaration at 22:00.[47]

At 21:50, broadcasting networks received a message saying, “There will be an emergency government announcement, please connect to the live broadcast”. However, journalists covering the Presidential Office were barred from entering the briefing room, where such broadcasts are normally made.[51]

Just before declaring martial law, Yoon reportedly told his cabinet members; “Even my wife doesn’t know about this. Otherwise, she’d be furious.”[52]

Declaration of martial law

At 22:23 on 3 December, Yoon Suk Yeol began making his emergency address to the nation, and at 22:27, declared martial law. He accused the opposition of being an “anti-state…den of criminals”[53] and “trying to overthrow the free democracy” by impeaching members of his cabinet and blocking his budget plans. He asked citizens to believe in him and tolerate “some inconveniences”,[54][55] and also claimed that there was a North Korean conspiracy against the South Korean government.[56]

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo was allegedly sidelined in the decision-making process leading up to the martial law declaration, and discussions were kept private between Yoon and Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun.[57] Kim is a member of the “Choongam faction”, a group within Yoon’s inner circle made up of graduates from his alma mater, Choongam High School in Seoul.[58] Kim urged Yoon to enact martial law during a cabinet meeting[59][60] shortly before the official declaration that ran from 22:17 to 22:22,[61] in which a majority of the 19 cabinet members were “strongly against” the decision.[62] Yoon also reportedly ordered finance minister Choi Sang-mok to draft a budget for an emergency legislative body which was to have been created during the martial law declaration.[63] and ordered interior minister Lee Sang-min to cut off electricity and water supplies to left-leaning media outlets critical of Yoon, specifically the Hankyoreh, the Kyunghyang Shinmun, MBC and JTBC, as well as the opinion polling agency Flower Research.[64]

At 22:30, Minister Kim addressed a video conference of all military commanders above the corps commander level and threatened officers with punishment for insubordination if they did not follow their deployment orders.[47] Yoon appointed Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army Park An-su as his martial law commander.[65]

A defense ministry report obtained by DPK representative Bak Seung-a stated that around 1,580 troops, 107 military vehicles, 12 Black Hawk helicopters and more than 9,000 rounds of live ammunition were deployed for the implementation of martial law.[66] MBC also reported that the military brought 4,980 blank ammunition rounds and 100 cartridges for stun guns throughout its mobilization for martial law, while 5,000 live ammunition rounds and some 3,000 blanks were deployed at the National Assembly alone.[67]

Election Commission raids

CCTV images of soldiers in the National Election Commission headquarters server room.

After martial law was declared, armed troops raided the National Election Commission (NEC) headquarters in Gwacheon, Gyeonggi Province (10 troops), one of its training centers in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province (130 troops) and the National Election Survey Deliberation Commission in Gwanak District in southern Seoul (47 troops).[68] NEC officials allegedly had their phones confiscated.[69]

Several operatives from the Intelligence Protection Group of the DCC[70][full citation needed] with firearms and uniforms that were missing unit insignias and patches[71] raided the server room located on the second floor of the NEC headquarters[72][73] while the Special Warfare Command troops[74] and National Police officers from Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police Agency provided perimeter security at the building. Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung, head of the DCC and another member of the Choongam faction who was criticized for admiring Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, were behind the raid.[75] Commander Yeo made a call to KNP Commissioner Cho Ji-ho about the NEC headquarters raid and Cho started supplying police forces for the troops.[76]

Kim Yong-hyun stated he deployed troops to determine the need for an investigation into the NEC’s alleged “election fraud” in the April 2024 National Assembly election, which was echoed by far-right YouTubers.[77] However, these allegations by right-wing conspiracy theorists have been repeatedly debunked by authorities.[78] Rep. Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party, mentioned that President Yoon repeatedly talked about election fraud while Lee was meeting him in his capacity as the leader of Yoon’s PPP party, accusing Yoon of “being crazy” about conspiracy theories, and alleged that Yoon was surrounded by individuals who believed in conspiracy theories.[78][79]

DCC martial law troops assigned to raid the NEC training center in Suwon questioned their deployment orders, and delayed their arrival by slowing their pace or pulling off at rest stops.[80] On 9 December, Rep. Lee released a report stating that a DCC brigadier general assaulted a major for questioning deployment orders and forced him on a bus to seize the NEC servers. Rep. Lee also highlighted that some troops wasted time after arriving at the NEC, by eating ramyeon at a nearby convenience store, after judging their deployment orders to be illegal.[81] Later the brigadier general was identified as Kim Dae-woo, close associate of DCC Commander Yeo.[82][83][84]

On 12 December, Yoon alleged, in a national address, that the NEC’s network system was vulnerable to cyberattacks and hacking, resulting in election fraud. The president accused the NEC of invoking constitutional immunity as an excuse to avoid inspection of its internal system in 2023 and claimed that the National Intelligence Service discovered a North Korean hacking attack on the system.[85] The NEC released a statement calling Yoon’s allegation “baseless” and said Yoon’s “raising suspicions of electoral fraud due to strong doubts amounts to self-denial of the electoral management system through which he was elected president”.[79][86] The NEC statement added that election fraud would require organized action from NEC aides, a breakdown of the security management system, and switching out identical amounts of actual voting papers, and called it “almost impossible”.[85] On 13 December, NEC Chairman Rho Tae-ak said in a National Assembly hearing that sending martial-law troops to take over the NEC was inexcusably illegal and unconstitutional.[87] On 19 December, the NIS also confirmed, in a report to the National Assembly, that there was no evidence of election rigging.[88]

The unsealed indictment of former Minister Kim on 27 December revealed, Commander of the Intelligence Command, Moon Sang-ho and his predecessor Noh Sang-won intended for 30 troops to detain NEC staff and tie them up with ropes and put masks on their faces, to be sent to the Water Defense Command Bunker due to election fraud. Evidence was found of awls, ropes, hammers, cable ties and baseball bats belonging to the arrest team to be used when carrying out the arrests.[18]

Plans for mass detention of political and public figures

At 22:28, Defense Minister Kim instructed DCC Commander Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung to go ahead with the arrest of politicians on a target list.[47]

According to testimony by National Intelligence Service (NIS) Deputy Director Hong Jang-won to the National Assembly on 6 December, Yoon called him at 22:53 on 3 December and ordered him to help the DCC arrest his political opponents and that Yoon wanted to “use this chance to arrest them and wipe them out”.[89][90][91][full citation needed][92][full citation needed]

Hong testified that DCC Commander Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyung later gave him a list of individuals targeted for arrest which Hong could not recall completely:[90]

- Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung

- National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik

- People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon

- Democratic Party Rep. Kim Min-seok

- Democratic Party floor leader Park Chan-dae

- National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee Chair Jung Chung-rae

- Rebuilding Korea Party leader Cho Kuk

- Liberal journalist Kim Ou-joon

- Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su

- Kim Min-woong [ko], brother of Rep. Kim Min-seok and leader of the Candlelight Movement

- Former National Election Commission (NEC) Chairman Kwon Soon-il [ko]

Hong also mentioned that there were others on the list, including another NEC member whose name he could not recall and the head of a major labor union, either the Federation of Korean Trade Unions or the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions.

Han Dong-hoon, the leader of Yoon’s own People Power Party, confirmed that he was on the list of targets and that Yoon had planned to jail arrested politicians in a detention center in Gwacheon, south of Seoul.[89] Upon receiving Yeo’s instructions, Hong said he thought the president had lost his mind. He refused to comply, citing the NIS’s lack of resources and means to carry out such an order. Yeo reportedly outlined plans to arrest first and second-tier targets in phases, detain them at DCC facilities, and conduct investigations.[90] It was later reported that a bunker designated as an operations center for potential North Korean attacks and a military police compound, both operated by the Capital Defense Command in Seoul’s Gwanak District, were also considered as detention sites.[93]

Yoon then fired Hong. The report alleged Hong was given the orders because NIS Director Cho Tae-yong had previously refused to act on Yoon’s arrest list.[94]

Troops were seen deployed in front of a building where Kim Ou-joon, the YouTuber and liberal journalist on the list of targets, created his videos.[95] Kim, who went into hiding, said that soldiers were also deployed at his residence and posted footage showing about 20 armed soldiers standing outside his office in central Seoul.[96][97]

On 9 December, Police Commissioner Cho testified before the Judiciary Committee of the National Assembly that he had received a call from DCC Commander Yeo sometime between 22:30 and 22:40 on 3 December, asking him to track the locations of politicians and others to carry out their arrests. The list of targets was consistent with what NIS Deputy Director Hong had revealed the previous week, except PPP leader Han Dong-hoon was added to the list later. Commissioner Cho stated that he ignored the orders, on grounds that location tracking itself was illegal and that court-issued arrest warrants were required to carry out arrests.[98]

On 13 December, a lawyer representing Commissioner Cho said that Yoon had also ordered the arrest of Seoul Central District Court Judge Kim Dong-hyun, who had acquitted Lee Jae-myung of perjury charges in November 2024.[99]

On 14 February 2025, the Hankyoreh revealed that former Defense Intelligence Command leader Roh Sang-won’s personal notebook contained specific action plans to arrest “500-or-so people”, but were not carried out on the night of 3 December. Other figures and alleged “leftist” judges and celebrities were included, while the notebook highlighted how the individuals would be “collected” and sent to detention centers. In addition to the names above as instructed by DCC commander Yeo, the following individuals were listed in the notebook for arrests:[100][101]

- Former President Moon Jae-in

- Reform Party leader Lee Jun-seok

- DPK legislators Seo Young-kyo, Ko Min-jung, Youn Kun-young, Choo Mi-ae and Park Beom-kye

- Former Chiefs of Staff to the President under President Moon, Noh Young-min and Im Jong-seok

- Judge Yoo Chang-hun, who rejected prosecutors’ request to arrest Lee Jae-myung in September 2023

- Comedian Kim Je-dong

- Former football star Cha Bum-kun - for pleading leniency for Cho Kuk

- Political commentator Rhyu Si-min

- Former Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan

Decree

At 23:25, on 3 December, Martial Law Commander Army General Park An-su issued the following decree which retroactively took effect at 23:00:[102][103][104]

Martial Law Command proclaims the following as of 23:00 on 3 December 2024, in order to protect liberal democracy from anti-state forces active within the free Republic of Korea and their threats to subvert the state, and to ensure public safety.

1. All political activities, including activities of the National Assembly, local councils, political parties, and political association, rallies and demonstrations, are prohibited.

2. All acts that deny or attempt to overthrow the free democratic system are prohibited. The dissemination of fake news, manipulation of public opinion, and false propaganda are prohibited.

3. All media and publications are subject to the control of Martial Law Command.

4. Strikes, work stoppages, and rallies that incite social chaos are prohibited.

5. Trainee doctors and all other medical personnel, who are on strike or have left their worksites, must return to their positions within 48 hours and work faithfully. Those who violate the order will face punishment in accordance with the Martial Law Act.

6. Innocent ordinary citizens, excluding anti-state forces and other subversive forces, will be subject to measures to minimize inconvenience in their daily lives.

Violators of the proclamation may be arrested, detained and searched without a warrant in accordance with Article 9 of the Martial Law Act (Special Measures Authority of the Martial Law Commander), and will be punished in accordance with Article 14 of the Martial Law Act (Penalties).

— Martial Law Commander, Army General Park An-su

Yoon’s martial law decree went further than those of previous military dictators by suspending the National Assembly. However, Yoon’s decree stopped short of ordering curfews or the closure of universities.[105]

The unsealed indictment of Defense Minister Kim on 27 December revealed that he had begun drafting the martial law decree on 24 November, by using reference to the martial law documents drafted under the leadership of the Defense Security Command during the Park Geun-hye impeachment in March 2017 and past martial law proclamations. President Yoon ordered a nighttime curfew reference to be dropped from the decree.[18]

Impact

The announcement of martial law was met by surprise and panic amongst the South Korean public.[106] Following the declaration, the government said that activities in educational institutions and transport services would continue to operate normally.[107][108] Panic-buying occurred in convenience stores nationwide.[109] Demand for Telegram and VPNs increased after disruptions to internet portal Naver prompted fears of government censorship, although Naver and Kakao attributed this to an increase in user traffic. The Ministry of Science and ICT said it had not received any requests related to martial law.[110]

Following the announcement, the Korean won fell to 1,444 against the US dollar, its weakest level in 25 months. It later rose to around 1,420, still weaker than the previous day’s rate of 1,403.[111][112] The iShares MSCI South Korea ETF decreased by 5%. Franklin FTSE South Korea ETF declined by 4.4% and Matthews Korea Active ETF fell 4.5%.[113] A central bank official said it was preparing measures to stabilize the market if needed. Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Choi Sang-mok convened an emergency meeting among top economic officials.[15]

Immediate reaction of politicians

Lee Jae-myung climbing the National Assembly building fence at around 23:00 KST[114]

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik announced he would convene a plenary session immediately to revoke the martial law order and called for all lawmakers to gather at the National Assembly.[10]

All main parties, including the ruling People Power Party, opposed Yoon’s martial law declaration. PPP leader Han Dong-hoon said: “The president’s martial law declaration is wrong. We will stop it along with the people”.[115] Seoul mayor Oh Se-hoon, a member of the PPP, also opposed the declaration.[116] PPP floor leader Choo Kyung-ho said he only found out about the decree from the news.[117] Controversially, Choo made an announcement to PPP legislators to report at party headquarters for a meeting instead of the National Assembly to vote down the martial law contrary to Han Dong-hoon and his faction,[118] which led to allegations that he was colluding with Yoon’s martial law plot. The special counsel bill passed by the National Assembly a week later to investigate key figures of the martial law declaration included Choo as a subject for investigation.[119]

Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the DPK, urged citizens to gather at the National Assembly and declared that Yoon “is no longer the president of South Korea”. Lee began live streaming on his YouTube channel around 22:50 as he traveled to the Assembly, telling 70,000 live viewers “There’s no justification for declaring martial law. We cannot let the military rule the country”.[114] The Incheon branch of the DPK criticized the declaration as the beginning of an “era of Yoon dictatorship”. Rebuilding Korea Party leader Cho Kuk called the declaration of martial law “illegal” and said it met conditions for the impeachment of Yoon and Defense Minister Kim.[120] Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party, called for Yoon to be expelled from the PPP, while Gyeonggi Province governor Kim Dong-yeon called for Yoon’s arrest.[121] The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the largest trade union group in the country, called for a general strike to reverse the declaration of martial law and impeach the president.[122]

Former President Moon Jae-in addressed the military as a former commander-in-chief in a Facebook post, urging them to respect the will of the people, not to act against the National Assembly, and to adhere strictly to constitutional principles. He called on the military to focus on its legitimate duties, safeguarding national security without compromising democratic institutions.[123][124]

A handful of conservative figures did support the decree, such as former prime minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, who called for the arrest of both Woo Won-shik and Han Dong-hoon. The mayor of Daegu, Hong Joon-pyo, did not explicitly take sides, but said he understood “Yoon’s loyalty” while describing his actions as reckless and “making a scene”.[125]

National Assembly vote

Military helicopters approaching the National Assembly carrying troops

National Assembly staff and aides barricade the main assembly entrance with furniture against approaching troops

Martial law forces clashing with National Assembly staff at the main entrance of the National Assembly

Civilians blocking military vehicles from entering Yeouido

Military helicopter flying over the National Assembly

Speaker Woo Won-shik announcing the National Assembly voted 190–0 to end martial law

National Assembly vote summary of lifting martial law

Yes

Not present

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Resolution to Demand Lifting of Martial Law

National Assembly Minutes on Dec 4

From 22:48, martial law forces initially requested permission from the Capital Defense Command several times to allow helicopters to fly over restricted airspace to seize the National Assembly. However, approval was repeatedly rejected on the grounds that the purpose of the flights was unknown. Permission for the helicopter flights was only approved at 23:31. Twenty-four helicopter flights carried 240 troops to the National Assembly, until 01:18 the next morning.[47]

The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency blocked all entrances to the National Assembly by 23:04 and prevented lawmakers from reaching the plenary session to overturn the martial law declaration.[49] Lawmakers instead maneuvered around police barricades to enter the Assembly, with some assistance from civilians. At around 23:00, Lee Jae-myung live streamed himself climbing over a 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) fence to gain access,[114][126][127][128] and Speaker Woo also had to climb a fence to enter the Assembly premises.[129] Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party, was seen confronting police officers for obstructing lawmakers,[130] but recounted later that some police officers appeared not to know what to do.[131]

At 23:50, UH-60P Black Hawk[132] military helicopters were seen approaching the grounds, prompting lawmakers and aides to build furniture barricades inside.[49] Around 23:57, the 707th SMG appeared in front of the National Assembly Proceeding Hall, attempting to enter the building, leading to scuffles with aides and legislative staff who tried to prevent their entry. DPK spokeswoman Ahn Gwi-ryeong was seen trying to seize a rifle from a soldier before the soldier pointed it at her briefly, prompting her to berate the soldier saying “Aren’t you ashamed?” as the soldier walked away.[133] The video of the incident was captured on a livestream by OhmyNews and viewed millions of times on Twitter.[134] She later told BBC Korean Service that “I didn’t think… I just knew we had to stop this”.[135]

At 00:45,[49] around 300[60] military personnel entered the National Assembly building, broke windows and attempted to enter the main hall, where Speaker Woo was about to begin the plenary session to revoke the martial law decree. In response, staff sprayed them with fire extinguishers and successfully stopped their entry. Some soldiers attempted to enter through the fourth floor, but were stopped by employees.[136]

Soldiers broke the windows of several MPs’ offices, while injuries occurred during confrontations inside the building.[137] Ultimately, the soldiers were unable to access the main session hall, whose entrances were barricaded using furniture installed by staff.[135][138] At least three helicopters also landed on the Assembly grounds while two others were seen hovering above.[10] Armored military vehicles were seen on the streets,[139] while the martial law command also ordered the eviction of the Presidential Office press corps from its building in Seoul.[140]

The National Assembly commenced the emergency session at 00:48 on 4 December.[141] At 01:02,[142][143] with 190 of 300 lawmakers present, they voted unanimously to lift martial law.[56] Those who voted included 172 opposition MPs and 18 members of a PPP[144] faction supporting Han Dong-hoon.[145] Following the vote, Speaker Woo Won-shik called for the military and police to leave the Assembly as “declaration of extraordinary martial law is now void” while reiterating that the president did not notify the National Assembly on implementing martial law as prescribed in the Constitution. Lee Jae-myung said that the DPK would remain in the Assembly until the president lifted martial law. Lee called for police and soldiers to return to their positions and not abide with Yoon’s “illegal act”.[146][147] They were also joined by members of the PPP.[141] The plenary session was only adjourned at 05:54 upon confirmation from the State Council that martial law had been withdrawn.

The Korea Times and opposition parties identified units of the security forces involved in the incursion at the Assembly as the 1st Airborne Special Forces Brigade of the Army Special Warfare Command and the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, with the National Police Agency believed to have been bypassed by the declaration.[57] The National Police Agency declared a Level B Emergency.[148] The Kyunghyang Shinmun published images of soldiers next to boxes of what appeared to be live bullets and ammunition at the Assembly.[149] Protests against martial law were also organized in Gwangju, where memories of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising and subsequent crackdown remain fresh.[150]

On 5 December, an anonymous special forces soldier told the media that the soldiers sent to the National Assembly only learned of the martial law declaration from the news.[151] Other soldiers have said they were kept in the dark to varying degrees; most were not even told their destination until en route, and only given a specific mission after arrival. One said he felt betrayed by his superiors. Many were reluctant and deliberately slow in carrying out orders.[152]

On 6 December, Lieutenant General Kwak Jong-keun, Chief of the Army Special Warfare Command, revealed during an interview by DPK legislators Kim Byung-joo and Park Sun-won, that the defense minister gave orders for troops to drag out the legislators, corroborating the earlier reports. Kwak said he prohibited giving live ammunition to individual soldiers as he witnessed “unjustified scenes” during the deployment, and added that “based on my judgment, dragging lawmakers out was clearly an illegal act” and he defied the orders, ordering the troops not to enter the plenary hall.[153] In addition, Brigadier General Lee Sang-hyun, commander of the 1st Special Forces Brigade confirmed that they were deployed to the National Assembly, with deployment of two battalions, consisting of about 250 soldiers in total. He confirmed that orders were given to remove the lawmakers using means such as breaking down doors or cutting electricity, while confirming that Kwak gave orders not to give live ammunition.[154] On a subsequent inquiry by the National Assembly on 10 December with a huge delegation of military officers summoned for questioning by legislators, Kwak revealed that the president personally called him to demand “break[ing] open the door, and drag the lawmakers out” and further added that he was made aware of plans for martial law on 1 December, two days before the announcement. Kwak suggested that prosecutors in charge of investigating Yoon’s martial law declaration were framing their questions in a way that held former Defense Minister Kim accountable, and shift the blame away from President Yoon.[155]

Subsequent investigations revealed that President Yoon ordered Commander Kwak, and Capital Defense Commander Lee Jin-woo to break through the plenary chamber doors to drag the lawmakers out at 00:40 to 00:50 hours, which was too late as the lawmakers had begun the session to end martial law at that time.[47] Yoon also called Police Commissioner General Cho Ji-ho several times and instructed him to arrest all the lawmakers trying to enter the National Assembly, stating “Bring them in. It’s illegal. All the lawmakers are violating the proclamation. Arrest them.” In the indictment of Kim Yong-hyun on 27 December by the special prosecution team, it also revealed Yoon told Commander Lee, “Break down the doors, even if it means shooting.” When he was notified the lawmakers had begun the session to end martial law, Yoon ordered Special Warfare Commander Kwak Jong-geun to “break the door with an axe and go in and get them all out.” Former Minister Kim also ordered, “Stop the number of National Assembly members so that it is less than 150. Bring the National Assembly members out.” Minister Kim also prioritized the arrests and detention of Lee Jae-myung, Woo Won-sik, and Han Dong-hoon from the National Assembly. Upon finding out about the National Assembly vote being passed, Yoon denied it was legitimate at first, and told Commander Lee, “It’s not even confirmed that 190 people came in. Even if martial law was lifted, I just have to declare martial law two or three more times, so keep going.”[18]

The group messenger chat-room of the counter-intelligence arrest team made public by the prosecution, contained the following message: “Cancel all existing detention quotas. All teams should first arrest Woo Won-sik, Lee Jae-myung, and Han Dong-hoon, whichever team you see, and then move them to the Subangsa detention facility.” There was also a message saying, “Secure new recruits through the operational unit on site, then take them over and detain them at the Subangsa. Use ropes and handcuffs.”[18]

Confrontations took place at the complex’s main gate between security forces and civilians.[156] Crowds gathered as soon as martial law was declared, chanting slogans such as “lift martial law”, “take down the dictatorship”, “no violence” and “impeach Yoon”.[49]

Aftermath

Citizens erupt in applause and cheers as martial law forces leave the National Assembly

Troops preparing to leave the National Assembly after the vote to end martial law.

After the vote, soldiers began withdrawing,[10] with the Speaker’s office later saying that they had left altogether by 01:18.[157][158] Others began pushing back the crowd of protesters who gathered there,[159] which numbered around 2,000.[136] Several soldiers were seen bowing in apology to the public over the incursion, while others consoled civilians who had engaged in confrontations.[160] Protesters also began calling for Yoon’s arrest and impeachment.[159][161] Lee Jae-myung said the declaration of martial law was done without cabinet approval[162] and that members of the security forces who continued to follow Yoon’s martial law orders were committing “an illegal act”.[163] The Defense Ministry stated that martial law would remain in effect until ended by the president.[164][165]

After martial law was lifted, the president’s office told foreign media 38 hours after refusing all interviews with South Korean media that “emergency martial law was strictly enforced within the framework of the constitution and took place late at night to minimize damage to the national economy and citizens’ daily lives”.[166] DPK leader Park Chan-dae then told CNN that Yoon “cannot avoid the charge of treason” and that he “must step down immediately.”[167]

Lifting of martial law

During a televised briefing at 04:27, Yoon announced that he would lift martial law as soon as a quorum could be obtained for a cabinet meeting, and that he had withdrawn military personnel from the National Assembly.[168] At approximately 04:30, the cabinet approved the motion to lift martial law.[169] The Martial Law Command was also disbanded.[170][171] The military said it had not observed unusual activity in North Korea while martial law was in place.[172]

Following the lifting of martial law, the DPK held an emergency meeting at the Assembly, announcing that they would commence impeachment proceedings if Yoon did not step down. In a resolution, it said “Yoon’s declaration of martial law is a clear violation of the Constitution”, adding that it was “a serious act of rebellion and a perfect reason for impeachment”.[173] Protests continued to be held in the Assembly and in Gwanghwamun Square,[174] as well as outside the Presidential Residence.[175] Candlelight rallies and related activities were held in cities across South Korea.[176] Smaller rallies were also held in support of Yoon.[177]

Protests against Yoon Suk Yeol

Speaker Woo Won-shik inspects an Assembly window damaged from the previous night, on the morning of 4 December.

South Korean protesters demanding the resignation of Yoon in Vienna, Austria, 13 December

Inspector General of the Ministry of Justice Ryu Hyuk resigned in protest shortly after attending a meeting convened on martial law by Justice Minister Park Sung-jae.[180][181] Shortly after Yoon backed down and lifted martial law, the opposition began to consider his impeachment.[182][183] Some South Korean analysts described the episode as a self-coup attempt to seize power.[46] In the early hours of 4 December, dozens of Yoon’s aides resigned en masse following the martial law declaration and recantation.[184] That same day, the Supreme Court announced it would investigate whether the declaration was illegal, given that he had failed to abide by mandatory provisions such as notifying both the cabinet and the legislature beforehand.[185] On 6 December, the Constitutional Court also opened an investigation into the legality of Yoon’s martial law declaration.[186]

The leadership of the PPP discussed expelling Yoon from the party during a meeting.[187] Han Dong-hoon urged Yoon to immediately fire Defense Minister Kim for proposing the idea[188] and later said he asked Yoon to leave the PPP through the prime minister and presidential officials.[189] The DPK also confirmed they would initiate impeachment proceedings against Yoon, along with Kim and Interior Minister Lee Sang-min on 5 December if Yoon did not resign.[190] Kim later apologized and took responsibility for the soldiers’ actions. He also offered his resignation,[191] which was accepted by Yoon.[192] In a separate interview, Kim said that the deployment of soldiers to the National Election Commission was aimed at assessing the “necessity of an investigation into alleged election fraud”.[193] In response, the commission denounced the incursion as a violation of the Constitution and pledged to take legal action.[194] At noon on 4 December, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo held a meeting with Yoon’s remaining cabinet members, and party leaders to discuss the fallout of the martial law declaration.[195] He subsequently apologized and took full responsibility for what had happened.[196]

Later on 4 December, all of the major newspapers in South Korea and the National Union of Media Workers unanimously condemned Yoon and called for his arrest, saying the martial law was illegal and an attempted repeat of the brutal coups of the 1980s.[197] At the same time, multiple South Korean celebrities also heavily condemned Yoon.[198] The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea, the Korean Methodist Church, the National Council of Churches in Korea, and the Korean Church Human Rights Center criticized the declaration of martial law,[199] while the national association of Won Buddhist clerics called for Yoon’s impeachment.[200] A joint declaration was signed by 370 professors and researchers at Korea University calling for Yoon’s impeachment.[201] The emergency medical professors of Seoul National University and Seoul National University Hospital also criticized martial law and its attempt to halt the ongoing doctors’ strike and supported Yoon’s impeachment.[202] Especially, the term ‘cheodan’ (처단) in Article 5 of the decree on martial law has sparked strong reactions from both medical professionals and the general public in Korea.[203][204] Although it was translated as ‘punishment’ in this document, its real-world usage aligns more closely with ‘execution’, fueling significant controversy.[205] The chair of the Choongam High School Foundation called Yoon and Kim Yong-hyun “shameful graduates”.[206] The school also suspended its uniform policy for students amid concerns over harassment, adding that some of its school bus drivers had been harassed by passersby and that it had received hundreds of protest calls.[207] Its student council also issued a statement supporting Yoon’s impeachment.[208] Five MPs of the PPP from Han Dong-hoon’s faction expressed support for amending the constitution to shorten Yoon’s term from 2027 to 2026.[209] Some PPP legislators also called for amendments shifting power from the president to the prime minister and allowing for power-sharing between parties under a coalition government.[210]

On 5 December, Kim Min-seok, who had previously warned of a possible declaration of martial law in August, said that he was “100 percent certain” that Yoon would try and declare martial law again, attributing Yoon’s motivations as to protect himself and his wife from ongoing investigations. He also attributed the failure of the 3 December declaration to popular resistance and the incompetence of Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun.[211] The Center for Military Human Rights Korea also warned of such a possibility, citing the Army restricting leave for some officers and implementing stringent regulations effective until 8 December, which coincided with the period that proposals to impeach Yoon are being discussed in the National Assembly.[212] On 6 December, the Defense Ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied the allegations and said that they would not comply with a second declaration of martial law,[213] while the DPK said all 170 of its lawmakers will remain on emergency standby within the National Assembly premises to vote down future declarations of martial law.[214] The National Assembly Secretariat barred officials from the Defense Ministry, police and the NIS from entering its buildings “for the time being”.[215]

On the afternoon of 6 December, rumors that Yoon would visit the Assembly for a meeting with the PPP prompted opposition lawmakers and staff to gather at the building’s main rotunda to block his entry, while additional entry restrictions were imposed on other visitors and the complex’s day care center was advised to send children home early. The Presidential Office later said that Yoon had no plans to visit the legislature.[216]

On 3 January 2025, the city government of Gwangju raised the state flag of Virginia, which contains the inscription Sic semper tyrannis, in front of the city hall, with mayor Kang Ki-jung denouncing Yoon for abuse of power. The mayor claimed to have received it from the state’s governor alongside a letter of appreciation.[217]

Impeachment

Main article: Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol

Korean Wikisource has original text related to this article:

대통령(윤석열) 탄핵소추안

On 4 December, 190[b] legislators across six opposition parties submitted a motion for impeachment, intending to discuss the bill the following day;[219] the DPK later planned a vote on 7 December.[220] At a meeting with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and PPP party leader Han Dong-hoon, Yoon stated that he would not resign and said there was “no wrongdoing” in his declaration, adding that he had done so as a “warning” to the opposition and to prevent the DPK’s “reckless impeachment actions”. Yoon also defended plans to arrest Han Dong-hoon for going to the National Assembly.[221][222] On 5 December, the PPP announced they would oppose impeachment, following an emergency meeting the previous evening.[223] However, at an emergency meeting on 6 December, Han Dong-hoon said it was necessary to “promptly suspend [Yoon] from his duties to protect the Republic of Korea”, citing that Yoon ordered the arrest and detention of key politicians during martial law, including Han himself.[224][225] That same day, Cho Kyoung-tae voiced his support for Yoon’s impeachment, becoming the first MP from the PPP to do so.[225]

During an investigation by the National Assembly on 5 December, Army Chief Park An-su said he had been handed the text of the martial law notice only on the night of its declaration and was unaware of soldiers being deployed to the Assembly. Deputy Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho said he had only learned about the declaration on the news and that Kim Yong-hyun ordered soldiers to enter the Assembly and prevent lawmakers from gathering. He also apologized for failing to prevent the troop deployment, saying that he opposed it. Separately, the National Police Agency announced that Yoon was under investigation for insurrection following a complaint from the opposition.[226][177] Park also submitted his resignation to Yoon, which was rejected.[227] On 6 December, Special Forces Commander Kwak Jong-guen said he had ordered soldiers present at the Assembly on 3 December not to enter the session hall and ruled out the provision of live ammunition and harm against civilians. He also said that he would not follow such orders in the event of martial law being declared again.[228] Later that day, the Defense Ministry suspended Kwak, Yeo In-hyung and Capital Defense Command Commander Lee Jin-woo for their involvement in martial law.[229] They, along with Park An-su, were also subjected to a ban on overseas travel.[230] Hong Jang-won, the deputy director of the NIS, also said that he was ordered by Yoon to arrest politicians during martial law during a series of phone calls. However this was denied by Director Cho Tae-yong, who said the NIS had no such powers.[231] The National Archives of Korea issued notices to the Presidential Office, the Defense Ministry and other relevant agencies for the preservation of documents, video footage and other records relating to the declaration of martial law amid concerns over their discarding.[232] The Presidential Office later said it did not possess the detailed minutes of the cabinet meeting that preceded the declaration.[233]

On 7 December, Yoon apologized for declaring martial law, describing it as a product of desperation as the head of state and pledging that there would not be a second martial law declaration.[234] He also pledged to entrust measures related to his term in office to the PPP.[235] Lee Jae-myung called the apology “disappointing” and insisted on Yoon’s resignation or impeachment.[236] He also criticized Yoon’s power-sharing arrangement with the PPP as “destroying the constitutional order”,[237] while DPK Floor Leader Park Chan-dae called the arrangement a “second coup”.[238] Later that day, the impeachment vote failed after only 195 lawmakers present of the 200 needed to impeach attended following a boycott by all but three MPs from the PPP.[239][240] The decision led to massive public anger against the PPP, with a petition filed at the National Assembly website calling for the PPP’s dissolution obtaining more than 171,000 supporters,[241] exceeding the 50,000 needed to have the proposal submitted to the standing committee.[242]

Following the vote, Han Dong-hoon said that the PPP would continue to “push for the president’s orderly retreat to minimize chaos”, and said Yoon would be “effectively stripped of his duties until he retreats” while Prime Minister Han Duck-soo managed state affairs “in consultation with the party”;[243] a party special task force proposed that Yoon leave office in February or March 2025 and elections to replace him held in April or May.[244] The DPK said that it would continue to file impeachment motions against Yoon on a weekly basis in response.[245] That same day, the DPK filed an impeachment motion against Interior Minister Lee Sang-min for mishandling the martial law situation.[246] Facing mounting pressure, Lee resigned on 8 December.[247]

On 8 December, Han Dong-hoon said that the PPP had “effectively obtained [Yoon’s] promise to step down” in exchange for the party blocking his impeachment, and said Yoon would “not interfere in state affairs, including foreign affairs”, even before his “orderly early resignation”.[248]

On 12 December, Yoon issued a statement vowing to “fight to the end”, resisting the push for his resignation[249] and claiming the martial law declaration was a legitimate “act of governance” against “forces and criminal groups that have been responsible for paralysing the country’s government”.[250] Yoon accused the opposition of disrupting the constitution instead through obstructionism, arguing “The opposition parties are currently dancing a frenzied sword dance, saying that the declaration of emergency martial law was a crime of insurrection, but is that really so? Who are the forces currently paralyzing the government and disrupting the constitution of Korea?”, while further claiming that the opposition majority National Assembly had taken North Korea’s side in disputes, and that it was “a monster that destroys the constitutional order of liberal democracy”.[251]

Following Yoon’s statement, Han Dong-hoon called for Yoon’s impeachment and convened an ethics committee to discuss Yoon’s expulsion from the PPP.[252] Later that day, the DPK filed its second motion to impeach Yoon,[253] and the National Assembly passed impeachment motions against Justice Minister Park Sung-jae and KNP Commissioner Cho Ji-ho.[254] By the end of the same day, seven PPP lawmakers,[255] four PPP metropolitan and provincial executives, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, South Chungcheong Province Governor Kim Tae-heum, North Chungcheong Province Governor Kim Young-hwan, and Incheon Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok, publicly declared their support for Yoon’s impeachment.[256]

On 14 December, the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon, with 204 lawmakers, including 12 from the PPP, supporting impeachment.[257] Yoon’s presidential powers were suspended immediately upon the delivery of the impeachment resolution to the Presidential Office. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo stepped in as acting president,[258] and the impeachment motion proceeded to the Constitutional Court.[259][260]

On 27 December, 192 MPs in the National Assembly voted to impeach Han Duck-soo for blocking investigations against Yoon and his wife, colluding with Yoon on martial law and blocking the appointment of justices to fill vacancies in the Constitutional Court.[261][262][263] Despite being boycotted by the PPP, Han’s impeachment was made possible with a simple majority because Han was Prime Minister rather than the elected president, as announced by National Assembly speaker Woo Won-shik.[261][264] This made Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok the new acting president.[261][264]

On 24 March 2025, the Constitutional Court overturned Han’s impeachment, reinstating him as acting president.[5]

Legal investigations

See also: Arrest of Yoon Suk Yeol

The DPK sought then Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun’s impeachment for proposing martial law to Yoon, and intended to file a criminal complaint against him. The party’s chief spokesperson, Jo Seoung-lae, issued a statement saying “The DPK will punish the unconstitutional and illegal emergency martial law of the Yoon administration […] We urge law enforcement agencies to immediately launch an investigation into the treason case that the entire nation is now aware of and bring the perpetrators to justice”.[25] On 5 December, the police investigated Yoon and other key officials for alleged insurrection[265] in response to a case filed by minor opposition parties and 59 activists accusing them of treason.[266] Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun resigned the same day.[267] The DPK planned to appoint a permanent special counsel to investigate Yoon for treason[268] and considered filing charges against PPP Floor Leader Cho Kyung-ho, who urged PPP lawmakers to assemble at the party’s headquarters rather than the Assembly.[269]

On 8 December, Kim Yong-hyun was arrested on suspicion of committing insurrection by advising Yoon to declare martial law and sending troops into the National Assembly to seize the legislature.[270][271] He was banned from leaving the country as a result,[272] and could potentially be sentenced to life in prison, or the death penalty if found guilty.[273]

On 9 December, the Ministry of Justice issued an overseas travel ban against Yoon following an investigation into allegations of rebellion linked to his brief imposition of martial law, marking the first instance of a sitting president facing such restrictions.[273][274] That same day, Lee Jae-myung issued a statement exonerating lower-ranking soldiers who participated in the martial law exercises and expressed gratitude for their restraint, saying that they had been “exploited” by their commanders.[275] An overseas travel ban was placed on KNP Commissioner Cho Ji-ho, Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency Chief Kim Bong-sik and Mok Hyun-tae, head of the National Assembly Police Guards, as part of the martial law investigation.[276][230]

On 10 December, the National Assembly passed a bill creating a permanent special counsel to investigate Yoon on charges of treason related to his martial law declaration. The motion passed with 210 MPs, including 23 PPP members, in favor after the party allowed its members to vote according to their individual decision.[277] That same day, Army Maj. Gen. Moon Sang-ho, chief of the Defense Intelligence Command, was suspended over his role in the incursion into the National Election Commission’s office in Gwacheon.[278]

On 11 December, KNP Commissioner Cho Ji-ho and Seoul Metropolitan Police Chief Kim Bong-sik were arrested without a warrant on charges of insurrection.[279] On 12 December, Park An-su was suspended as Army Chief of Staff.[280]

On 12 December, in a plenary session, the National Assembly passed a bill calling for a special counsel probe into the insurrection charges against Yoon.[281] On the same day, a special police investigation team and the Defense Ministry’s investigation unit jointly raided the Defense Ministry and the Capital Defense Command, securing a “secret phone” of Kim Yong-hyun and the phone’s server data.[282]

On 13 December, a court formally issued arrest warrants for KNP Commissioner Cho and Seoul Metropolitan Police Chief Kim, citing concerns over evidence tampering.[283] That same day, Capital Defense Command head Lee Jin-woo was also arrested.[284]

On 14 December, prosecutors arrested DCC chief, Lt Gen. Yeo In-hyung.[285]

On 16 December, police arrested Defense Intelligence Command chief Maj. Gen. Moon Sang-ho over his role in the NEC raid. His predecessor, Noh Sang-won was also arrested on suspicion of helping Yoon draft his martial law plans in a civilian capacity.[286] That same day, a military court ordered the arrests of Lt. Gen. Kwak Jong-geun, former chief of the Special Warfare Command and Lt. Gen. Lee Jin-woo, former head of the Capital Defense Command.[287]

On 17 December, Park An-su was arrested following a warrant.[288]

On 26 December, the defense ministry suspended Brig. Gen. Koo Sam-hoe, commander of the Army’s 2nd Armored Brigade, and Brig. Gen. Bang Jeong-hwan, head of the ministry’s operational control transition task force, for their role in the planning of martial law and Koo’s attempts to mobilize a tank unit.[289]

On 27 December, the National Assembly voted 191–71 to create a special committee to investigate insurrection charges against Yoon, with a tenure lasting until 13 February 2025. The committee was formally opened on 31 December and was composed of 18 lawmakers, including 10 opposition and seven PPP lawmakers and one independent lawmaker. It was chaired by DPK MP Ahn Gyu-back, with Kim Sung-won as committee secretary for the PPP. Among the agencies to be called for questioning were the presidential office, the Office of National Security, the Presidential Security Service, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Supreme Prosecutors Office, the defense, interior and justice ministries, the National Police Agency, the National Intelligence Service and the Defense Counterintelligence Command.[290][291]

On 5 February 2025, the National Assembly planned an on-site questioning session at the Seoul Dongbu Detention Center, aimed to directly question key figures involved in the martial law declaration, but it was cancelled after Kim Yong-hyun refused to cooperate.[292]

On 6 February, the defense ministry placed Yeo In-hyung, Lee Jin-woo, Kwak Jong-keun, and Moon Sang-ho on compulsory leave of absence following an ongoing criminal investigation against them over martial law.[293]

On 17 February, a criminal investigation into first lady Kim Keon-hee was called for alleged involvement in the martial law declaration to cover up election interference.[52]

Arrest warrant and political standoff

Yoon Suk Yeol was summoned three times by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) for questioning on 18 December, 25 December, and 29 December over his declaration of martial law. He ignored all three summonses.[294] In response, on 30 December, the CIO filed an arrest warrant for Yoon at the Seoul Western District Court.[295] On 31 December, the court issued the warrant,[296] valid until 6 January 2025.[297] After the impeachment, Yoon sequestered himself in the presidential residence.[298] On 1 January, he released a statement to his supporters pledging to “fight alongside you to the very end to protect this nation”.[299] On 3 January, authorities tried to serve the warrant at the presidential residence but halted the attempt after being physically blocked by the Presidential Security Service.[300][301] After the warrant expired on 6 January, the Seoul Western District Court extended the warrant the next day.[302]

Police raids and Kim Yong-hyun suicide attempt

On 11 December 2024, police raided the Presidential Office, with investigators presenting a search warrant that specified Yoon as the suspect.[303][304] However, the Presidential Security Service refused to cooperate, resulting in a “very limited” number of documents and materials being submitted by Yoon’s office.[305] Raids were also conducted on the Defense Counterintelligence Command, the Army Special Warfare Command,[306] the National Police Agency, the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, and the National Assembly Security Service.[307] On the same day, the former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun attempted to commit suicide with his underwear at the detention facility while in custody.[303][304][308]

On 12 December, police raided the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters adjacent to the presidential compound,[309] as well as the Capital Defense Command headquarters.[310] On 13 December, police raided the Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police headquarters to investigate the unit’s role during martial law. Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police had dispatched police forces to the NEC after the martial law declaration.[311]

On 17 December, a joint investigation team launched a raid on the offices of the Presidential Security Service.[312] The head of the Presidential Security Service, Park Jong-jun, resigned on 10 January 2025. He was then summoned to the National Investigation Headquarters of the National Police Agency for questioning on charges of obstruction of official duties by preventing the arrest of Yoon.[313]

On 27 December, police raided a presidential safehouse in Samcheong-dong believed to have hosted preparatory meetings for martial law and unsuccessfully tried to enter the Presidential Security Service.[314]

Impeachment hearing and arrest of Yoon Suk Yeol

On 14 January 2025, South Korea’s constitutional court held the first hearing to determine if Yoon will be formally removed from office. The hearing was adjourned as it could not proceed without Yoon’s presence.[315]

On the morning of 15 January, Yoon was arrested at his residence where he had been since the impeachment. Police used wire-cutters and ladders to enter Yoon’s residence in order to bypass barricades and barbed wire fortifications. After his arrest Yoon was brought to the CIO, where he agreed to an interrogation.[316][317] Yoon was the country’s first sitting president to be arrested.[317][318][319]

On 18 January, supporters of Yoon clashed with police outside the Seoul Western District Court before storming the courthouse after his detention was extended.[320]

On 21 January, Yoon attended the impeachment trial for the first time, during which he denied ordering soldiers to interfere with the proceedings of the National Assembly against the martial law declaration.[321]

On 23 January, the CIO recommended that Yoon be charged with “leading an insurrection and abuse of power”.[322] He was indicted on the said charges on 26 January.[323] His case was assigned by the Seoul Central District Court to its criminal collegiate division 25, which also handles martial law-related criminal charges against Kim Yong-hyun, Cho Ji-ho, and Kim Bong-sik.[324]

On 4 February, Yoon’s defense team requested the court to cancel his arrest.[325]

On 20 February, Yoon’s criminal trial began, making him the first incumbent president of South Korea to stand trial in a criminal case.[326]

On 21 February, Kim Yong-hyun applied for a suspension of execution in protest of the prosecution’s sending of his prosecution’s investigation records to the Constitutional Court, but it was rejected by the court.[327][unreliable source?]

On 25 February, Yoon issued an apology on the last day of the impeachment trial,[328] but continued to defend his actions.[329] The trial concluded with a total of 11 hearings held over 73 days and 16 people testifying as witnesses.[330]

On 9 March, Kim Yong-hyun criticized students at Ewha Womans University that were in favor of Yoon’s impeachment in a letter he wrote in his prison cell, calling them “a group of evil.”[331][unreliable source?]

Opinion polling

Opinion polling carried out by Realmeter on 4 December found that 73.4% of respondents supported Yoon’s impeachment while 24% opposed it. It also found that 70% believed that Yoon’s actions constituted treason while 25% believed otherwise.[332] Another poll by Gallup conducted from 3 December to 5 December found that Yoon’s approval rating had fallen by six percentage points to 13% since the martial law declaration, while the PPP’s approval rating had fallen by five percentage points to 27%. Conversely, the DPK’s approval rating had increased by four percentage points to 37%.[333][334]

A Realmeter poll, released a week later on 12 December, found 74.8% of respondents supported either Yoon’s immediate resignation or impeachment, while 16.2% supported the PPP’s proposal of Yoon’s orderly resignation. The poll also found that 66.2% of respondents had experienced trauma since the martial law declaration, 26.2% had experienced trauma but recovered, and 40.0% continued to experience trauma.[335] A Gallup poll released on 13 December found that Yoon’s approval rating had fallen further to 11%, with 49% of respondents citing his declaration of martial law as a reason to assess him negatively. 75% of respondents supported Yoon’s impeachment, while 21% opposed. It also found that the PPP’s approval rating had fallen by three percentage points to 24%, while the DPK’s approval rating had increased by three percentage points to 40%.[336] The same poll also found Speaker Woo Won-shik emerging as the most trusted politician in South Korea for his actions during martial law and the subsequent impeachment, with a rating of 56%.[337]

On 31 December, a poll conducted by The Korea Times and Hankook Research found 98% of DPK supporters believed that Yoon committed treason in declaring martial law, while 81% of PPP supporters believed otherwise, with only 12% agreeing with the treason charges.[338] The same entities also found that 56% were in favor of amending the constitutional provisions on presidential power, while 39% were opposed. The same poll also found that 45% wanted constitutional reforms to address the shortcomings of the single, five-year term system, while 35% wanted to limit presidential powers to ensure better checks and balances, of which 64% specifically cited the presidential veto power. Another 17% wanted to overhaul the presidential election system.[339]

Impact on South Korean military personnel

Concerns have been raised about morale and combat readiness in the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, following reported distrust in their own military leaders by rank-and-file troops after being sent to execute orders, and suspensions of senior military officials implicated or under investigations for their roles in the martial law declaration, potentially leading to leadership vacuums and low morale.[340]

On 18 December, the Ministry of National Defense found “at least several dozen soldiers” were at high risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and required special care, after conducting psychological evaluations on all personnel dispatched during the martial law incident. The Ministry also reported that many were likely reluctant to seek counseling due to fear of being identified for their roles in the martial law operations. In response, the ministry introduced a civilian psychological counseling program to ensure anonymous support for affected troops.[341] A report by JTBC on 27 February 2025 found that the ministry deemed 71 soldiers as in need of treatment for mental health issues following a psychological evaluation, with two of them in a dangerous category.[342]

Court hearings

Yoon present at the 6th hearing of impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court on February 7, 2025

The court held its first preparatory hearing on Yoon’s case on 20 February, which lasted only 13 minutes. There was heavy security around the court building, following the Seoul Western District Court riot. Yoon’s lawyer, Kim Hong-il, condemned the arrest against Yoon, stating the declaration of martial law was “not intended to paralyse the state” and it had meant to “alert the public to the national crisis caused by the legislative dictatorship of the dominant opposition party.” The court’s acting chief justice, Moon Hyung-bae, said the next court hearing would be held on 25 February, and another is scheduled for 24 March.[343]

Han Duck-soo also had a court hearing the same day. “I am deeply burdened by the despair that each and every one of our people felt due to such extreme politics that took place before, during and after emergency martial law,” Han stated in court. “All procedures dealing with the emergency martial law must be carried out fairly and reasonably so that there is no further spark of the national division.”[343]

On the 25 February hearing, Lee Kwang-beom, one of the lawyers for parliament, compared Yoon to previous South Korean presidents including Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Lee claimed Yoon’s declaration of martial law was “dictatorship.” Yoon stated that he never meant to impose full martial rule, instead arguing he intended to “warn the nation of the opposition Democratic Party’s abuse of its parliamentary majority.” He also denied having acted out of personal interest, saying it would have been “easier to just wait out the rest of his term.”[344]

Release

Yoon was released from the Seoul Detention Center on 8 March after the prosecutor-general chose not to appeal court orders canceling his detention. The DPK subsequently chided the prosecution as “one of Yoon’s henchmen.”[345] The party then requested the resignation of Prosecutor General Shim Woo-jung for waiving the right to appeal the district court’s decision to a higher court, calling the decision an “unacceptable display of leniency.” However, the request was later rejected.[346]

Reception and analysis

A short recap film of the incident created by Democratic party leader Lee Jae-myung

Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, compared it to the January 6 United States Capitol attack and the 2023 Brazilian Congress attack, saying the effects of the declaration of martial law on South Korean politics and its reputation would be far worse than what happened in the United States.[347]

Youngshik Bong, an adviser to the Ministry of Unification and visiting professor at Yonsei University, said that declaring martial law should be reserved for the most serious situations, such as war. He added that this will backfire on the president as “his impeachment is really in the cards now”.[348]

Park Sung-min, a political consultant in Seoul, said “I don’t know what his end goal was here, because I think this was political suicide […] It seems clear that President Yoon is now more likely to step down in the middle of his term rather than seeing his term through to completion”.[60]

Shim Young-sub, an adjunct professor of media video promotion at Kyung Hee Cyber University, noted that the martial law decree only mentioned regulations on legacy media but did not include the internet. Shim said attempting to suppress free speech “using a martial law document reminiscent of the 1980s […] was a pipe dream”.[349]

Yang Sang-hoon, editor-in-chief of the conservative The Chosun Ilbo newspaper, called Yoon’s martial law the “most foolish self-destructive incident in the history of Korean presidents” and apologized for doubting earlier predictions that Yoon would make such a move.[350]

During a press conference in Stockholm on 6 December before delivering her Nobel lecture, 2024 Nobel Prize in Literature laureate, South Korea’s Han Kang, who wrote the novel Human Acts inspired by the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, called the martial law declaration a shock, but described sensing the “truthfulness and courage” of “unarmed citizens attempting to stop armed soldiers”, “young police and soldiers who moved reluctantly, as if sensing some inner conflict” and “striving to do the least amount of harm as possible”.[349][351]

The declaration of martial law was said to trigger memories in older Koreans of past military dictatorships and the authoritarian era, while younger Koreans, educated and exposed to elders sharing their experiences about abuses under past military rule, reacted with alarm and disbelief while recalling lessons about torture, imprisoned opposition leaders and deadly crackdowns on pro-democracy protests in the past. Unlike past military coups which had the endorsement of the United States, this was mainly a domestic political issue that was handled swiftly and decisively by South Korean citizens without external interference. Combined with troops refusing to abide by unjust orders, these were cited as reasons to believe that South Korean democracy and society has evolved in the last 4 decades to the point that a return to military rule or dictatorship would not be accepted.[352]

On 12 December, 510 psychiatrists issued a statement that “since Dec. 3, the whole nation has been suffering psychologically”. They said in the statement “many people who remember the history of military dictatorship and state violence were forced to relive the trauma and experience a serious level of fear”.[353]

In the days following the botched martial law order, the 2023 film 12.12: The Day, a depiction of the coup organized by Chun Doo-hwan in 1979 became the No. 1 South Korean film on the streaming platform Netflix,[354] while memes appeared online of main character Chun Doo-kwang’s (based on Chun Doo-hwan, portrayed by Hwang Jung-min) face replaced with President Yoon, and posts comparing scenes from the film with the footage of the recent events. There were calls for a theatrical re-release of the film.[355] Additionally, a letter signed by 3,000 members of South Korea’s film industry, including Parasite director Bong Joon-ho, said the martial law declaration threatened to send the Korean wave “into the abyss”.[356]

International analysis

In the United States, Foreign Policy magazine,[46] the Associated Press,[357] political scientists Sidney Tarrow[358] and Benjamin Engel,[359] and coup historians Joe Wright and John J. Chin[360] described the events as an attempted self-coup. The subsequent impeachment motion in the National Assembly also described Yoon’s actions as a self-coup.[361] The New Yorker characterized it as “a coup, almost” and an “intended coup”.[362]

In the United Kingdom, The Economist described the event as an attempted coup.[363] The Economist Intelligence Unit also cited the declaration as its reason to downgrade South Korea from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy” in its 2024 Democracy Index.[364] BBC News reported one resident comparing it to the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état.[365]

Reporters Without Borders criticized the declaration of martial law and its provisions allowing for military control of the press, noting that it would have led to the South Korean presidency gaining “total control over the media for the first time since the country’s democratization”.[366]

The martial law declaration was cited by Freedom House in its decision to give South Korea a score of 81 out of 100 in its Freedom in the World 2025 index, a reduction of two points from the previous year. The organization said that the “move highlighted one of the biggest threats faced by democracies around the world: elected leaders who attack democratic institutions”.[367]

International diplomatic statements

Multiple countries have issued advisories urging caution, advising their citizens in South Korea to be vigilant and avoid public demonstrations.[368] The White House and the United States Department of State said they were not given notice ahead of time of Yoon’s intention to declare martial law,[369] while South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul refused to take calls from US ambassador Philip Goldberg for the duration of martial law.[370] State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel expressed “grave concern” for the ongoing developments while reiterating the United States’ “iron-clad” alliance with South Korea.[371] Deputy Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell called Yoon’s decision to impose martial law “badly-misjudged”.[372] The White House later expressed relief at the lifting of martial law,[373] as did United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.[374]

Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said that NATO has warned North Korea not to take advantage of the situation.[375] The United States Department of Defense said it had not received a request for military assistance from South Korea during the declaration of martial law,[376] adding that there was no force posture change in the United States Forces Korea (USFK).[377] USFK Commander General Paul LaCamera urged personnel and their families to “exercise individual vigilance”.[378]

Kyrgyzstan‘s President Sadyr Japarov was on a state visit in South Korea when martial law was declared.[379] The Kyrgyz government issued a statement confirming the safety of the president and his delegation.[380] Japarov concluded the state visit and returned to Kyrgyzstan on 4 December.[381] Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson cancelled his scheduled visit to South Korea and summit with Yoon.[382] Meetings of the Nuclear Consultative Group and related military exercises were also postponed indefinitely by the United States,[383] along with a visit by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[384] Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani postponed a scheduled visit in late December.[385] Kazakhstan also cancelled defense meetings with its South Korean counterparts and a visit by Defense Minister Ruslan Jaqsylyqov on 5 December, while a visit by Japanese MPs from the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union led by former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga was also cancelled. Likewise, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul cancelled his scheduled address at the World Emerging Security Forum in Seoul on 5 December, while Deputy Foreign Ministers Kim Hong-kyun and Kang In-sun respectively cut short and cancelled their attendance at diplomatic meetings in Europe and the United Arab Emirates. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued diplomatic notes to all embassies inside South Korea emphasizing the stabilization of the domestic situation following martial law.[386][387]

In Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party Legislative Caucus posted an article on Threads, claiming that the declaration of martial law was a legitimate effort to protect free constitutional democracy in South Korea and criticizing Taiwanese opposition parties for obstructing national security proposals, allegedly “unconstitutionally expand[ing]” their powers, and reducing the defense budget.[388][389] While the post was deleted shortly afterwards, it sparked criticism from major opposition parties, including the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party, who interpreted the post as a threat to take similar measures in Taiwan.[388][390]

Coverage in North Korea

Despite having previously reported negatively on the Yoon administration on a regular basis, the state-controlled North Korean press initially refrained from reporting on the martial law declaration and its aftermath. Some South Korean analysts believed this was to avoid provoking cross-border tensions and encouraging resistance against the North Korean government.[391][392] On 11 December 2024, North Korean state media released its first statements on the martial law declaration through an article published in the newspaper Rodong Sinmun,[393] describing it as an “insane act” that was “akin to the coup d’état of the decades-ago military dictatorship era”.[394] It also described the incident “revealed the weakness in South Korean society” and hinted at the end of Yoon’s political career. The newspaper also published images of anti-Yoon protests in Seoul.[394][393][395] On the same day, North Korea’s state TV described the incident as “chaos” and called the South a “fascist dictatorship”.[396] On 3 January 2025, North Korean state media said that South Korea was in “political chaos” amid ongoing attempts to arrest Yoon.[397]

See also

- Law portal

- Politics portal

- South Korea portal

- 16 May coup – 1961 military coup in South Korea

- October Restoration – 1972 self-coup by South Korean President Park Chung-hee

- Coup d’état of December Twelfth – 1979 coup d’état in South Korea that brought Chun Doo-hwan to power

- 2019 South Korean National Assembly attack – an incident where supporters of the Liberty Korea Party, a predecessor of the People Power Party, illegally invaded the National Assembly and violently attacked lawmakers of other parties.

- Impeachment of Park Geun-hye § Plans for a potential military response to protests – 2016 South Korean presidential impeachment. Defense Security Command plan in 2017 to declare martial law in the event South Korean president Park Geun-hye was not impeached by the Constitutional Court

- Korea Passing – Due to 2024 South Korean martial law crisis, there are concerns about South Korea’s diplomatic isolation and the so-called “Korea Passing”.

Notes

References

External links

Wikinews has related news:

- President of South Korea declares and lifts martial law

- Media related to 2024 South Korean martial law at Wikimedia Commons

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2024_South_Korean_martial_law_crisis&oldid=1283865629#Declaration_of_martial_law”

Donald Trump

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Donald John Trump (born June 14, 1946) is an American politician, media personality, and businessman who is the 47th president of the United States. A member of the Republican Party, he served as the 45th president from 2017 to 2021.

Born in New York City, Trump graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1968 with a bachelor’s degree in economics. He became the president of his family’s real estate business in 1971, renamed it the Trump Organization, and began acquiring and building skyscrapers, hotels, casinos, and golf courses. He filed for six business bankruptcies in the 1990s and 2000s, became a billionaire, and began side ventures, many licensing the Trump name. From 2004 to 2015, he hosted the reality television show The Apprentice. A political outsider, Trump won the 2016 presidential election against Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton.

During his first term, Trump imposed a travel ban on citizens from six Muslim-majority countries, expanded the U.S.–Mexico border wall, and implemented a family separation policy. He rolled back environmental and business regulations, signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and appointed three Supreme Court justices. In foreign policy, Trump withdrew the U.S. from agreements on climate, trade, and Iran’s nuclear program, began a trade war with China, and met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without reaching a deal on denuclearization. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, he downplayed its severity, contradicted health officials, and signed the CARES Act stimulus. After losing the 2020 presidential election to Joe Biden, Trump attempted to overturn the outcome, culminating in the January 6 Capitol attack in 2021. Trump was impeached in 2019 for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress, and in 2021 for incitement of insurrection; the Senate acquitted him in both cases. After his first term, scholars and historians ranked him as one of the worst presidents in American history.

Trump is the central figure of Trumpism, and his faction is dominant within the Republican Party. Many of his comments and actions have been characterized as racist or misogynistic, and he has made false and misleading statements and promoted conspiracy theories to a degree unprecedented in American politics. Trump’s actions, especially in his second term, have been described as authoritarian and contributing to democratic backsliding. In 2023, Trump was found liable in civil cases for sexual abuse and defamation and for business fraud, and in 2024, he was found guilty of falsifying business records, making him the first U.S. president convicted of a felony. After winning the 2024 presidential election against Kamala Harris, Trump was sentenced to a penalty-free discharge, and two felony indictments against him were dismissed.

Trump began his second term by pardoning around 1,500 January 6 rioters and initiating mass layoffs of federal workers. His use of executive orders has drawn numerous lawsuits challenging their legality. In April 2025, Trump imposed tariffs on nearly all countries, raising them to their highest levels since World War II.

Early life and education

Trump at New York Military Academy, 1964

Donald John Trump was born on June 14, 1946, at Jamaica Hospital in the New York City borough of Queens, the fourth child of Fred Trump and Mary Anne MacLeod Trump.[1] He is of German and Scottish descent.[2] He grew up with his older siblings, Maryanne, Fred Jr., and Elizabeth, and his younger brother, Robert, in a mansion in the Jamaica Estates neighborhood of Queens.[3] Fred Trump paid his children each about $20,000 a year, equivalent to $265,000 a year in 2024. Trump was a millionaire at age eight by contemporary standards.[a][4]

Trump attended the private Kew-Forest School through seventh grade. He was a difficult child and showed an early interest in his father’s business. His father enrolled him in New York Military Academy, a private boarding school, to complete secondary school.[5] Trump considered a show business career but instead in 1964 enrolled at Fordham University.[6] Two years later, he transferred to the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, graduating in May 1968 with a Bachelor of Science in economics.[7][8] He was exempted from the draft during the Vietnam War due to a claim of bone spurs in his heels.[9]

Business career

Main article: Business career of Donald Trump

Further information: Business projects of Donald Trump in Russia and Tax returns of Donald Trump

Real estate

Starting in 1968, Trump was employed at his father’s real estate company, Trump Management, which owned racially segregated middle-class rental housing in New York City’s outer boroughs.[10][11] In 1971, his father made him president of the company and he began using the Trump Organization as an umbrella brand.[12] Roy Cohn was Trump’s fixer, lawyer, and mentor[13] for 13 years in the 1970s and 1980s.[14] In 1973, Cohn helped Trump countersue the U.S. government for $100 million (equivalent to $708 million in 2024)[15] over its charges that Trump’s properties had racially discriminatory practices. Trump’s counterclaims were dismissed, and the government’s case was settled with the Trumps signing a consent decree agreeing to desegregate; four years later, Trumps again faced the courts when they were found in contempt of the decree.[16] Before age thirty, he showed his propensity for litigation, no matter the outcome and cost; even when he lost, he described the case as a win.[17] Helping Trump projects,[18] Cohn was a consigliere whose Mafia connections controlled construction unions.[19] Cohn introduced political consultant Roger Stone to Trump, who enlisted Stone’s services to deal with the federal government.[20] Between 1991 and 2009, he filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection for six of his businesses: the Plaza Hotel in Manhattan, the casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts company.[21][22]

In 1992, Trump, his siblings Maryanne, Elizabeth, and Robert, and his cousin John W. Walter, each with a 20 percent share, formed All County Building Supply & Maintenance Corp. The company had no offices and is alleged to have been a shell company for paying the vendors providing services and supplies for Trump’s rental units, then billing those services and supplies to Trump Management with markups of 20–50 percent and more. The owners shared the proceeds generated by the markups. The increased costs were used to get state approval for increasing the rents of his rent-stabilized units.[23]

Manhattan and Chicago developments

Trump in 1985 with a model of one of his aborted Manhattan development projects[24]

Trump attracted public attention in 1978 with the launch of his family’s first Manhattan venture: the renovation of the derelict Commodore Hotel, adjacent to Grand Central Terminal.[25] The financing was facilitated by a $400 million city property tax abatement arranged for him by his father who also, jointly with Hyatt, guaranteed a $70 million bank construction loan.[11][26] The hotel reopened in 1980 as the Grand Hyatt Hotel,[27] and that same year, he obtained rights to develop Trump Tower, a mixed-use skyscraper in Midtown Manhattan.[28] The building houses the headquarters of the Trump Corporation and Trump’s PAC and was his primary residence until 2019.[29] In 1988, Trump acquired the Plaza Hotel with a loan from a consortium of 16 banks.[30] The hotel filed for bankruptcy protection in 1992, and a reorganization plan was approved a month later, with the banks taking control of the property.[31]

In 1995, he defaulted on over $3 billion of bank loans, and the lenders seized the Plaza Hotel along with most of his other properties in a “vast and humiliating restructuring” that allowed him to avoid personal bankruptcy.[32][33] The lead bank’s attorney said of the banks’ decision that they “all agreed that he’d be better alive than dead”.[32] In 1996, Trump acquired and renovated the mostly vacant 71-story skyscraper at 40 Wall Street, later rebranded as the Trump Building.[34] In the early 1990s, he won the right to develop a 70-acre (28 ha) tract in the Lincoln Square neighborhood near the Hudson River. Struggling with debt from other ventures in 1994, he sold most of his interest in the project to Asian investors, who financed the project’s completion, Riverside South.[35] Trump’s last major construction project was the 92-story mixed-use Trump International Hotel and Tower in Chicago which opened in 2008. In 2024, The New York Times and ProPublica reported that the Internal Revenue Service was investigating whether he had twice written off losses incurred through construction cost overruns and lagging sales of residential units in the building he had declared to be worthless on his 2008 tax return.[36]

Atlantic City casinos

Entrance of the Trump Taj Mahal in Atlantic City

In 1984, Trump opened Harrah’s at Trump Plaza, a hotel and casino, with financing and management help from the Holiday Corporation.[37] It was unprofitable, and he paid Holiday $70 million in May 1986 to take sole control.[38] In 1985, he bought the unopened Atlantic City Hilton Hotel and renamed it Trump Castle.[39] Both casinos filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1992.[40] Trump bought a third Atlantic City venue in 1988, the Trump Taj Mahal. It was financed with $675 million in junk bonds and completed for $1.1 billion, opening in April 1990.[37] He filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1991. Under the provisions of the restructuring agreement, he gave up half his initial stake and personally guaranteed future performance.[41] To reduce his $900 million of personal debt, he sold the Trump Shuttle airline; his megayacht, the Trump Princess, which had been leased to his casinos and kept docked; and other businesses.[42] In 1995, Trump founded Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts (THCR), which assumed ownership of the Trump Plaza.[43] THCR purchased the Taj Mahal and the Trump Castle in 1996 and went bankrupt in 2004 and 2009, leaving him with 10 percent ownership.[37] He remained chairman until 2009.[44]

Clubs

In 1985, Trump acquired the Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Florida.[45] In 1995, he converted the estate into a private club with an initiation fee and annual dues. He continued to use a wing of the house as a private residence.[46] He declared the club his primary residence in 2019.[29] He began building and buying golf courses in 1999, owning 17 golf courses by 2016.[47]

Licensing the Trump name

See also: List of things named after Donald Trump

The Trump Organization often licensed the Trump name for consumer products and services, including foodstuffs, apparel, learning courses, and home furnishings.[48] Over 50 licensing or management deals involved Trump’s name, generating at least $59 million for his companies.[49] By 2018, only two consumer goods companies continued to license his name.[48] During the 2000s, Trump licensed his name to residential property developments worldwide, 40 of which were never built.[50]

Side ventures

Trump and New Jersey Generals quarterback Doug Flutie at a 1985 press conference in Trump Tower

In 1970, Trump invested $70,000 to receive billing as coproducer of a Broadway comedy.[51] In September 1983, he purchased the New Jersey Generals, a team in the United States Football League. After the 1985 season, the league folded, largely due to his attempt to move to a fall schedule (when it would have competed with the National Football League [NFL] for audience) and trying to force a merger with the NFL by bringing an antitrust suit.[52] Trump and his Plaza Hotel hosted several boxing matches at the Atlantic City Convention Hall.[37][53] In 1989 and 1990, he lent his name to the Tour de Trump cycling stage race, an attempt to create an American equivalent of European races such as the Tour de France or the Giro d’Italia.[54] From 1986 to 1988, he purchased significant blocks of shares in various public companies while suggesting that he intended to take over the company and then sold his shares for a profit,[55] leading some observers to think he was engaged in greenmail.[56] The New York Times found that he initially made millions of dollars in such stock transactions, but “lost most, if not all, of those gains after investors stopped taking his takeover talk seriously”.[55]

Trump’s star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame

In 1988, Trump purchased the Eastern Air Lines Shuttle, financing the purchase with $380 million (equivalent to $1010 million in 2024)[15] in loans from a syndicate of 22 banks. He renamed the airline Trump Shuttle and operated it until 1992.[57] He defaulted on his loans in 1991, and ownership passed to the banks.[58] In 1996, he purchased the Miss Universe pageants, including Miss USA and Miss Teen USA.[59] Due to disagreements with CBS about scheduling, he took both pageants to NBC in 2002.[60][61] In 2007, he received a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame for his work as producer of Miss Universe.[62] NBC and Univision dropped the pageants in June 2015 in reaction to his comments about Mexican immigrants.[63]

In 2005, Trump cofounded Trump University, a company that sold real estate seminars for up to $35,000. After New York State authorities notified the company that its use of “university” violated state law (as it was not an academic institution), its name was changed to the Trump Entrepreneur Initiative in 2010.[64] In 2013, the State of New York filed a $40 million civil suit against Trump University, alleging that the company made false statements and defrauded consumers. Additionally, two class actions were filed in federal court against Trump and his companies. Internal documents revealed that employees were instructed to use a hard-sell approach, and former employees testified that Trump University had defrauded or lied to its students.[65] Shortly after he won the 2016 presidential election, he agreed to pay a total of $25 million to settle the three cases.[66]

Foundation

Main article: Donald J. Trump Foundation

The Donald J. Trump Foundation was a private foundation established in 1988.[67] From 1987 to 2006, Trump gave his foundation $5.4 million which had been spent by the end of 2006. After donating a total of $65,000 in 2007–2008, he stopped donating any personal funds to the charity,[68] which received millions from other donors, including $5 million from Vince McMahon.[69] The foundation gave to health- and sports-related charities, conservative groups,[70] and charities that held events at Trump properties.[68] In 2016, The Washington Post reported that the charity had committed several potential legal and ethical violations, including self-dealing and tax evasion.[71] Also in 2016, the New York attorney general said the foundation had violated state law by soliciting donations without submitting to required annual external audits and ordered it to cease its fundraising activities in New York immediately.[72] Trump’s team announced in December 2016 that the foundation would be dissolved.[73] In June 2018, the New York attorney general’s office filed a civil suit against the foundation, Trump, and his adult children, seeking $2.8 million in restitution and additional penalties.[74] In December 2018, the foundation ceased operation and disbursed its assets to other charities.[75] In November 2019, a New York state judge ordered Trump to pay $2 million to a group of charities for misusing the foundation’s funds, in part to finance his presidential campaign.[76]

Legal affairs and bankruptcies

Main article: Personal and business legal affairs of Donald Trump

According to a review of state and federal court files conducted by USA Today in 2018, Trump and his businesses had been involved in more than 4,000 state and federal legal actions.[77] While he has not filed for personal bankruptcy, his over-leveraged hotel and casino businesses in Atlantic City and New York filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection six times between 1991 and 2009.[78] They continued to operate while the banks restructured debt and reduced his shares in the properties.[78] During the 1980s, more than 70 banks had lent Trump $4 billion.[79] After his corporate bankruptcies of the early 1990s, most major banks, with the exception of Deutsche Bank, declined to lend to him.[80] After the January 6 Capitol attack, the bank decided not to do business with him or his company in the future.[81]

Wealth

Main article: Wealth of Donald Trump

Trump (rightmost) and wife Ivana at a 1985 state dinner for King Fahd of Saudi Arabia with President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan

Trump has said he began his career with “a small loan of a million dollars” from his father and that he had to pay it back with interest.[82] He borrowed at least $60 million from his father, largely did not repay the loans, and received another $413 million (2018 equivalent, adjusted for inflation) from his father’s company.[83][23] Posing as a Trump Organization official named “John Barron“, Trump called journalist Jonathan Greenberg in 1984, trying to get a higher ranking on the Forbes 400 list of wealthy Americans.[84] Trump self-reported his net worth over a wide range: from a low of minus $900 million in 1990,[b] to a high of $10 billion in 2015.[87] In 2015, Forbes estimated his net worth at $4.5 billion, as based on interviews with more than 80 sources.[88] In 2025, the magazine estimated his net worth at $5.1 billion and ranked him the 700th wealthiest person in the world.[89]

Media career

Main article: Media career of Donald Trump

See also: Bibliography of Donald Trump

Trump has published 19 books under his name, most written or cowritten by ghostwriters.[90] His first book, The Art of the Deal (1987), was a New York Times Best Seller, and was credited by The New Yorker with making Trump famous as an “emblem of the successful tycoon”.[91] The book was ghostwritten by Tony Schwartz, who is credited as a coauthor. Trump had cameos in many films and television shows from 1985 to 2001.[92] Trump acquired his style of politics from professional wrestling—with its staged fights and name-calling.[93] He sporadically appeared for the professional wrestling company WWE from the late 1980s including Wrestlemania 23 in 2007.[94][95] Starting in the 1990s, Trump appeared 24 times as a guest on the nationally syndicated Howard Stern Show.[96] He had his own short-form talk radio program, Trumped!, from 2004 to 2008.[97] From 2011 until 2015, he was a guest commentator on Fox & Friends.[98] In 2021, Trump, who had been a member since 1989, resigned from SAG-AFTRA to avoid a disciplinary hearing regarding the January 6 attack.[99] Two days later, the union permanently barred him.[100]

The Apprentice and The Celebrity Apprentice

Main articles: The Apprentice (American TV series) and The Celebrity Apprentice

Producer Mark Burnett made Trump a television star[101] when he created The Apprentice, which Trump hosted from 2004 to 2015 (including variant The Celebrity Apprentice). On the shows, he was a superrich chief executive who eliminated contestants with the catchphrase “you’re fired”. The New York Times called his portrayal “a highly flattering, highly fictionalized version” of himself.[102] The shows remade Trump’s image for millions of viewers nationwide.[102][103] With the related licensing agreements, they earned him more than $400 million.[104]

Early political aspirations

Further information: Political career of Donald Trump

Trump registered as a Republican in 1987; a member of the Independence Party, the New York state affiliate of the Reform Party, in 1999; a Democrat in 2001; a Republican in 2009; unaffiliated in 2011; and a Republican in 2012.[105]

Trump speaking at CPAC, 2011

In 1987, Trump placed full-page advertisements in major newspapers[106] expressing his views on foreign policy and how to eliminate the federal budget deficit.[107] In 1988, he approached Lee Atwater, asking to be put into consideration to be Republican nominee George H. W. Bush‘s running mate. Bush found the request “strange and unbelievable”.[108][109] Trump was a candidate in the 2000 Reform Party presidential primaries for three months before he withdrew in February 2000.[110][111][112] In 2011, Trump considered challenging President Barack Obama in the 2012 election. He spoke at the Conservative Political Action Conference in February and gave speeches in states with early primaries.[113][114] In May 2011, he announced that he would not run.[113]

2016 presidential election

Main article: Donald Trump 2016 presidential campaign

Further information: 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries, 2016 United States presidential election, and First presidential transition of Donald Trump

Trump announced his candidacy for the 2016 election in June 2015.[115][116] He became the Republican front-runner in March 2016[117] and was declared the presumptive Republican nominee in May.[118] His campaign statements were often opaque and suggestive,[119] and a record number were false.[120][121][122] He was highly critical of media coverage and frequently made claims of media bias.[123][124] Hillary Clinton led Trump in national polling averages throughout the campaign, but her lead narrowed in early July.[125] In mid-July, he selected Indiana governor Mike Pence as his running mate,[126] and the two were officially nominated at the 2016 Republican National Convention.[127] Trump and Clinton participated in three presidential debates in September and October 2016. He twice refused to say whether he would accept the result of the election.[128]

Trump campaigning in Arizona, March 2016

Trump described NATO as “obsolete”[129][130] and espoused views that were described as noninterventionist and protectionist.[131] His campaign platform emphasized renegotiating U.S.–China relations and free trade agreements such as NAFTA and strongly enforcing immigration laws. Other campaign positions included pursuing energy independence while opposing climate change regulations, modernizing services for veterans, repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act, abolishing Common Core education standards, investing in infrastructure, simplifying the tax code while reducing taxes, and imposing tariffs on imports by companies that offshore jobs. He advocated increasing military spending and extreme vetting or banning of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.[132] Trump’s proposed immigration policies were a topic of bitter debate during the 2016 campaign. He promised to build a wall on the Mexico–U.S. border to restrict illegal movement and vowed that Mexico would pay for it.[133] He pledged to deport millions of illegal immigrants residing in the U.S.,[134] and criticized birthright citizenship for incentivizing “anchor babies“.[135] According to an analysis in Political Science Quarterly, Trump made “explicitly racist and sexist appeals to win over white voters” during his 2016 presidential campaign.[136] In particular, his campaign launch speech drew criticism for claiming Mexican immigrants were “bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists”;[137] in response, NBC fired him from Celebrity Apprentice.[138]

Trump’s FEC-required reports listed assets above $1.4 billion and outstanding debts of at least $315 million.[139][140] He did not release his tax returns, contrary to the practice of every major candidate since 1976 and his promises in 2014 and 2015 to do so if he ran for office.[141][142] He said his tax returns were being audited, and that his lawyers had advised him against releasing them.[143] After a lengthy court battle to block release of his tax returns and other records to the Manhattan district attorney for a criminal investigation, including two appeals by Trump to the U.S. Supreme Court, in February 2021 the high court allowed the records to be released to the prosecutor for review by a grand jury.[144][145] In October 2016, portions of Trump’s state filings for 1995 were leaked to a reporter from The New York Times. They show that he had declared a loss of $916 million that year, which could have let him avoid taxes for up to 18 years.[146]

On November 8, 2016, Trump received 306 pledged electoral votes versus 232 for Clinton. After elector defections on both sides, the official count was 304 to 227.[147] The fifth person to be elected president despite losing the popular vote,[c] he received nearly 2.9 million fewer votes than Clinton, 46.3% to her 48.25%.[148] He was the only president who neither served in the military nor held any government office prior to becoming president.[149] His victory marked the return of an undivided Republican government—a Republican president combined with Republican control of both chambers of Congress.[150] Trump’s victory sparked protests in major U.S. cities.[151][152]

First presidency (2017–2021)

Main article: First presidency of Donald Trump

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Donald Trump presidencies.

Trump taking the oath of office, administered by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., on January 20, 2017

Official portrait, 2017

Early actions

See also: First presidential transition of Donald Trump and First 100 days of the first Donald Trump presidency

Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2017. The day after his inauguration, an estimated 2.6 million people worldwide, including 500,000 in Washington, D.C., protested against him in the Women’s Marches.[153] During his first week in office, Trump signed six executive orders, including authorizing procedures for repealing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, advancement of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipeline projects, and planning for a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico.[154]

Conflicts of interest

See also: First presidency of Donald Trump § Ethics

Before being inaugurated, Trump moved his businesses into a revocable trust,[155][156] rather than a blind trust or equivalent arrangement “to cleanly sever himself from his business interests”.[157] He continued to profit from his businesses and knew how his administration’s policies affected them.[156][158] Although he said he would eschew “new foreign deals”, the Trump Organization pursued operational expansions in Scotland, Dubai, and the Dominican Republic.[156][158] Lobbyists, foreign government officials, and Trump donors and allies generated hundreds of millions of dollars for his resorts and hotels.[159] Trump was sued for violating the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the first time that the clauses had been substantively litigated.[160] One case was dismissed in lower court.[161] Two were dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court as moot after his term.[162]

Domestic policy

Main articles: Economic policy of the first Donald Trump administration, Environmental policy of the first Donald Trump administration, and Social policy of the first Donald Trump administration

Trump took office at the height of the longest economic expansion in American history,[163] which began in 2009 and continued until February 2020, when the COVID-19 recession began.[164] In December 2017, he signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. It reduced tax rates for businesses and individuals and eliminated the penalty associated with the Affordable Care Act‘s individual mandate.[165][166] The Trump administration claimed that the act would not decrease government revenue, but 2018 revenues were 7.6 percent lower than projected.[167] Under Trump, the federal budget deficit increased by almost 50 percent, to nearly $1 trillion in 2019.[168] By the end of his term, the U.S. national debt increased by 39 percent, reaching $27.75 trillion, and the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio hit a post-World War II high.[169] Trump also failed to deliver the $1 trillion infrastructure spending plan on which he had campaigned.[170]

Trump is the only modern U.S. president to leave office with a smaller workforce than when he took office, by three million people.[163][171] He rejects the scientific consensus on climate change.[172][173][174][175] He reduced the budget for renewable energy research by 40 percent and reversed Obama-era policies directed at curbing climate change.[176] He withdrew from the Paris Agreement, making the U.S. the only nation to not ratify it.[177] He aimed to boost the production and exports of fossil fuels.[178][179] Natural gas expanded under Trump, but coal continued to decline.[180][181] He rolled back more than 100 federal environmental regulations, including those that curbed greenhouse gas emissions, air and water pollution, and the use of toxic substances. He weakened protections for animals and environmental standards for federal infrastructure projects, and expanded permitted areas for drilling and resource extraction, such as allowing drilling in the Arctic Refuge.[182]

Trump dismantled federal regulations on health,[183][184] labor,[184] the environment,[185][184] and other areas, including a bill that made it easier for severely mentally ill persons to buy guns.[186] During his first six weeks in office, he delayed, suspended, or reversed ninety federal regulations,[187] often “after requests by the regulated industries”.[188] The Institute for Policy Integrity found that 78 percent of his proposals were blocked by courts or did not prevail over litigation.[189] During his campaign, Trump vowed to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act.[190] In office, he scaled back the Act’s implementation through executive orders.[191][192] He expressed a desire to “let Obamacare fail”; his administration halved the enrollment period and drastically reduced funding for enrollment promotion.[193][194] In June 2018, the Trump administration joined 18 Republican-led states in arguing before the Supreme Court that the elimination of the financial penalties associated with the individual mandate had rendered the Act unconstitutional.[195][196] Their pleading would have eliminated health insurance coverage for up to 23 million Americans, but was unsuccessful.[195] During the 2016 campaign, Trump promised to protect funding for Medicare and other social safety-net programs. In January 2020, he expressed willingness to consider cuts to them.[197]

In response to the opioid epidemic, Trump signed legislation in 2018 to increase funding for drug treatments, but was widely criticized for failing to make a concrete strategy.[198] He barred organizations that provide abortions or abortion referrals from receiving federal funds.[199] He said he supported “traditional marriage”, but considered the nationwide legality of same-sex marriage “settled”.[200] His administration rolled back key components of the Obama administration’s workplace protections against discrimination of LGBTQ people.[201] His attempted rollback of anti-discrimination protections for transgender patients in August 2020 was halted by a federal judge after a Supreme Court ruling extended employees’ civil rights protections to gender identity and sexual orientation.[202] Trump has said he is opposed to gun control, although his views have shifted over time.[203] His administration took an anti-marijuana position, revoking Obama-era policies that provided protections for states that legalized marijuana.[204] He is a long-time advocate of capital punishment,[205][206] and his administration oversaw the federal government execute 13 prisoners, more than in the previous 56 years combined, ending a 17-year moratorium.[207] In 2016, he said he supported the use of interrogation torture methods such as waterboarding.[208][209]

Race relations

Trump’s comments on the 2017 Unite the Right rally, condemning “this egregious display of hatred, bigotry and violence on many sides” and stating that there were “very fine people on both sides”, were criticized as implying a moral equivalence between the white supremacist demonstrators and the counter-protesters.[210] In a January 2018 discussion of immigration legislation, he reportedly referred to El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and African nations as “shithole countries”.[211] His remarks were condemned as racist.[212]

Trump and group of officials and advisors on the way from the White House to St. John’s Church

In July 2019, Trump tweeted that four Democratic congresswomen—all minorities, three of whom are native-born Americans—should “go back” to the countries they “came from”.[213] Two days later the House of Representatives voted 240–187, mostly along party lines, to condemn his “racist comments”.[214] White nationalist publications and social media praised his remarks, which continued over the following days.[215] He continued to make similar remarks during his 2020 campaign.[216] In June 2020, during the George Floyd protests, federal law-enforcement officials controversially removed a largely peaceful crowd of lawful protesters from Lafayette Square, outside the White House.[217][218] Trump then posed with a Bible for a photo-op at the nearby St. John’s Episcopal Church,[217][219][220] with religious leaders condemning both the treatment of protesters and the photo opportunity itself.[221] Many retired military leaders and defense officials condemned his proposal to use the U.S. military against anti-police-brutality protesters.[222]

Pardons and commutations

Further information: List of people granted executive clemency by Donald Trump

Trump granted 237 requests for clemency, fewer than all presidents since 1900 with the exception of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.[223] Only 25 of them had been vetted by the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney; the others were granted to people with personal or political connections to him, his family, and his allies, or recommended by celebrities.[224][225] In his last full day in office, he granted 73 pardons and commuted 70 sentences.[226] Several Trump allies were not eligible for pardons under Justice Department rules, and in other cases the department had opposed clemency.[224] The pardons of three military service members convicted of or charged with violent crimes were opposed by military leaders.[227]

Immigration

Main articles: Immigration policy of the first Donald Trump administration and Mexico–United States border crisis § First Trump administration (2017–2021)

Further information: Trump travel ban, Trump administration family separation policy, and Mexico–United States border wall § First Trump administration (2017–2021)

Trump examines border wall prototypes in Otay Mesa, California.

As president, Trump described illegal immigration as an “invasion” of the United States[228] and drastically escalated immigration enforcement.[229][230] He implemented harsh policies against asylum seekers[230] and deployed nearly 6,000 troops the U.S.–Mexico border to stop illegal crossings.[231] He reduced the number of refugees admitted to record lows, from an annual limit of 110,000 before he took office to 15,000 in 2021.[232][233][234] Trump also increased restrictions on granting permanent residency to immigrants needing public benefits.[235] One of his central campaign promises was to build a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border;[236] during his first term, the U.S. built 73 miles (117 km) of wall in areas without barriers and 365 miles (587 km) to replace older barriers.[237] In 2018, Trump’s refusal to sign any spending bill unless it allocated funding for the border wall[238] resulted in the longest-ever federal government shutdown, for 35 days from December 2018 to January 2019.[239][240] The shutdown ended after he agreed to fund the government without any funds for the wall.[239] To avoid another shutdown, Congress passed a funding bill with $1.4 billion for border fencing in February.[241] Trump later declared a national emergency on the southern border to divert $6.1 billion of funding to the border wall[241] despite congressional disagreement.[242]

In January 2017, Trump signed an executive order that temporarily denied entry to citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries.[243][244] The order caused many protests and legal challenges that resulted in nationwide injunctions.[243][244][245] A revised order giving some exceptions was also blocked by courts,[246][247] but the Supreme Court ruled in June that the ban could be enforced on those lacking “a bona fide relationship with a person or entity” in the U.S.[248] Trump replaced the ban in September with a presidential proclamation extending travel bans to North Koreans, Chadians, and some Venezuelan officials, but excluded Iraq and Sudan.[249] The Supreme Court allowed that version to go into effect in December 2017,[250] and ultimately upheld the ban in 2019.[251] From 2017 to 2018, the Trump administration had a policy of family separation that separated over 4,400 children of migrant families from their parents at the U.S.–Mexico border,[252][253] an unprecedented[254] policy sparked public outrage in the country.[255] Despite Trump initially blaming Democrats[256][257] and insisting he could not stop the policy with an executive order, he acceded to public pressure in June 2018 and mandated that migrant families be detained together unless “there is a concern” of risk for the child.[258][259] A judge later ordered that the families be reunited and further separations stopped except in limited circumstances,[260][261] though over 1,000 additional children were separated from their families after the order.[253]

Foreign policy

Main articles: Foreign policy of the first Donald Trump administration and Tariffs in the first Trump administration

Further information: Russia–United States relations § First Trump administration (2017–2021), China–United States relations § First Trump administration (2017–2021), 2017–2018 North Korea crisis, and 2018–19 Korean peace process

See also: List of international presidential trips made by Donald Trump § First presidency (2017–2021)

Trump with the other G7 leaders at the 45th summit in France, 2019

Trump described himself as a “nationalist”[262] and his foreign policy as “America First“.[263] He supported populist, neo-nationalist, and authoritarian governments.[264] Unpredictability, uncertainty, and inconsistency characterized foreign relations during his tenure.[263][265] Relations between the U.S. and its European allies were strained under Trump.[266] He criticized NATO allies and privately suggested that the U.S. should withdraw from NATO.[267][268] Trump supported many of the policies of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[269] In 2020, Trump hosted the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to normalize their foreign relations.[270]

Trump began a trade war with China in 2018 after imposing tariffs and other trade barriers he said would force China to end longstanding unfair trade practice and intellectual property infringement.[271] Trump weakened the toughest U.S. sanctions imposed after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea.[272][273] Trump praised and, according to some critics, rarely criticized Russian president Vladimir Putin,[274][275] though he opposed some actions of Russia’s government.[276] He withdrew the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, citing alleged Russian noncompliance,[277] and supported Russia’s possible return to the G7.[278] As North Korea’s nuclear weapons were increasingly seen as a serious threat,[279] Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to meet a North Korean leader, meeting Kim Jong Un three times: in Singapore in June 2018, in Hanoi in February 2019, and in the Korean Demilitarized Zone in June 2019.[280] Talks in October 2019 broke down[281] and no denuclearization agreement was reached.[282]

Personnel

Main articles: Political appointments of the first Trump administration and First cabinet of Donald Trump

By the end of Trump’s first year in office, 34 percent of his original staff had resigned, been fired, or been reassigned.[283] As of early July 2018, 61 percent of his senior aides had left[284] and 141 staffers had left in the previous year.[285] Both figures set a record for recent presidents.[286] Close personal aides to Trump quit or were forced out.[287] He publicly disparaged several of his former top officials.[288]

Trump had four White House chiefs of staff, marginalizing or pushing out several.[289] In May 2017, he dismissed FBI director James Comey, saying a few days later that he was concerned about Comey’s role in the Trump–Russia investigations.[290][291] Three of Trump’s 15 original cabinet members left or were forced to resign within his first year.[292][287] Trump was slow to appoint second-tier officials in the executive branch, saying many of the positions are unnecessary. In October 2017, there were hundreds of sub-cabinet positions without a nominee.[293] By January 8, 2019, of 706 key positions, 433 had been filled and he had no nominee for 264.[294]

Judiciary

Further information: List of federal judges appointed by Donald Trump and Donald Trump judicial appointment controversies

Trump appointed 226 federal judges, including 54 to the courts of appeals and three to the Supreme Court: Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.[295] His Supreme Court appointments politically shifted the Court to the right.[296][297][298] In the 2016 campaign, he pledged that Roe v. Wade would be overturned “automatically” if he were elected and given the opportunity to appoint two or three anti-abortion justices. He later took credit when Roe was overturned by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization in 2022; all three of his Supreme Court nominees voted with the majority.[299][300] Trump disparaged courts and judges he disagreed with, often in personal terms, and questioned the judiciary’s constitutional authority. His attacks on courts drew rebukes from observers, including sitting federal judges, concerned about the effect of his statements on the judicial independence and public confidence in the judiciary.[301][302]

COVID-19 pandemic

Main article: COVID-19 pandemic in the United States

Further information: U.S. federal government response to the COVID-19 pandemic and Communication of the Trump administration during the COVID-19 pandemic

See also: Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States

Trump conducts a COVID-19 press briefing with members of the White House Coronavirus Task Force on March 15, 2020.

Trump initially ignored public health warnings and calls for action from health officials within his administration.[303] Trump established the White House Coronavirus Task Force on January 29.[304] On March 27, he signed into law the CARES Act—a $2.2 trillion bipartisan economic stimulus bill—the largest stimulus in U.S. history.[305][306] After weeks of attacks to draw attention away from his slow response, Trump halted funding of the World Health Organization in April.[307] In April 2020, Republican-connected groups organized anti-lockdown protests against the measures state governments were taking to combat the pandemic;[308][309] Trump encouraged the protests on Twitter,[310] although the targeted states did not meet his administration’s guidelines for reopening.[311] He repeatedly pressured federal health agencies to take actions he favored,[312] such as approving unproven treatments.[313][314] In October, Trump was hospitalized at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for three days with a severe case of COVID-19.[315]

Investigations

Further information: Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, Mueller special counsel investigation, and Mueller report

After he assumed office, Trump was the subject of increasing Justice Department and congressional scrutiny, with investigations covering his election campaign, transition, and inauguration, actions taken during his presidency, his private businesses, personal taxes, and charitable foundation.[316] There were ten federal criminal investigations, eight state and local investigations, and twelve congressional investigations.[317]

In July 2016, the FBI launched Crossfire Hurricane, an investigation into possible links between Russia and Trump’s 2016 campaign.[318] After Trump fired Comey in May 2017, the FBI opened a second investigation into Trump’s personal and business dealings with Russia.[319] In January 2017, three U.S. intelligence agencies jointly stated with “high confidence” that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election to favor Trump.[320][321] Many suspicious[322] links between Trump associates and Russian officials were discovered.[323][324][325] Trump told Russian officials he was unconcerned about Russia’s election interference.[326] Crossfire Hurricane was later transferred to Robert Mueller‘s special counsel investigation;[327] the investigation into Trump’s ties to Russia was ended by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein after he told the FBI that Mueller would pursue the matter.[328][329] At the request of Rosenstein, the Mueller investigation examined criminal matters “in connection with Russia’s 2016 election interference”.[328] Mueller submitted his final report in March 2019.[330] The report found that Russia did interfere in 2016 to favor Trump[331] and that Trump and his campaign welcomed and encouraged the effort,[332][333][334] but that the evidence “did not establish” that Trump campaign members conspired or coordinated with Russia.[335][336] Trump claimed the report exonerated him despite Mueller writing that it did not.[337] The report also detailed potential obstruction of justice by Trump but “did not draw ultimate conclusions”[338][339] and left the decision to charge the laws to Congress.[340]

In April 2019, the House Oversight Committee issued subpoenas seeking financial details from Trump’s banks, Deutsche Bank and Capital One, and his accounting firm, Mazars USA. He sued the banks, Mazars, and committee chair Elijah Cummings to prevent the disclosures.[341] In May, two judges ruled that both Mazars and the banks must comply with the subpoenas;[342][343][344] Trump’s attorneys appealed.[345] In September 2022, Trump and the committee agreed to a settlement regarding Mazars, and the firm began turning over documents.[346]

Impeachments

Main articles: First impeachment of Donald Trump and Second impeachment of Donald Trump

Trump displaying the headline “Trump acquitted” in 2020

Trump was impeached twice by the House of Representatives during his first presidential term, though acquitted by the Senate on both occasions. The first impeachment arose from a whistleblower complaint that in 2019 Trump had pressured Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy to investigate Joe and Hunter Biden,[347] in an attempt to gain an advantage in the 2020 presidential election.[348] In December 2019, the House voted to impeach Trump for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress,[349] and the Senate acquitted him in February 2020.[350]

The second impeachment came after the January 6 attack, for which the House charged Trump with incitement of insurrection on January 13, 2021.[351] Trump left office on January 20 and was acquitted on February 13. Seven Republican senators voted for conviction.[352]

2020 presidential election

Further information: 2020 United States presidential election and Donald Trump 2020 presidential campaign

Trump filed to run for reelection only a few hours after becoming president in 2017.[353] He held his first reelection rally less than a month after taking office[354] and officially became the Republican nominee in August 2020.[355] Trump’s campaign focused on crime, claiming that cities would descend into lawlessness if Democratic nominee Joe Biden won.[356] He repeatedly misrepresented Biden’s positions[357][358] and appealed to racism.[359] Starting in early 2020, Trump sowed doubts about the election, claiming without evidence that it would be rigged and that widespread use of mail balloting would produce massive election fraud.[360][361] He blocked funding for the U.S. Postal Service, saying he wanted to prevent any increase in voting by mail.[362] He repeatedly refused to say whether he would accept the results if he lost and commit to a peaceful transition of power.[363][364]

Loss to Biden and rejection of outcome

Further information: Attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election and 2020–21 United States election protests

Biden won the November 2020 election, receiving 81.3 million votes (51.3 percent) to Trump’s 74.2 million (46.8 percent)[365][366] and 306 electoral votes to Trump’s 232.[367] The Electoral College formalized Biden’s victory on December 14.[367] Even before the results were known on the morning after the election, Trump declared victory.[368] Days later, when Biden was projected the winner, Trump baselessly alleged election fraud.[369] As part of an effort to overturn the results, Trump and his allies filed many legal challenges to the results, which were rejected by at least 86 judges in both state and federal courts for having no factual or legal basis.[370][371]

Trump’s allegations were also refuted by state election officials,[372] and the Supreme Court declined to hear a case asking it to overturn the results in four states won by Biden.[373] Trump repeatedly sought help to overturn the results, personally pressuring Republican local and state office-holders,[374] Republican legislators,[375] the Justice Department,[376] and Vice President Pence,[377] urging various actions such as replacing presidential electors, or requesting that Georgia officials “find” votes and announce a “recalculated” result.[375] In the weeks after the election, Trump withdrew from public activities.[378] He initially blocked government officials from cooperating in Biden’s presidential transition.[379][380] After three weeks, the administrator of the General Services Administration declared Biden the “apparent winner” of the election, allowing the disbursement of transition resources to his team.[381] While Trump said he recommended that the GSA begin transition protocols, he still did not formally concede.[382][383] Trump did not attend Biden’s inauguration on January 20.[384]

January 6 Capitol attack

Main article: January 6 United States Capitol attack

In December 2020, reports emerged that the U.S. military was on “red alert”, and ranking officers had discussed what to do if Trump declared martial law.[385] CIA director Gina Haspel and Army general Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, grew concerned that Trump might attempt a coup or military action against China or Iran.[386][387] Milley insisted that he be consulted about any military orders from Trump, including the use of nuclear weapons.[388][389]

A crowd of Trump supporters during the attack

At noon on January 6, 2021, while Congress was certifying the presidential election results in the U.S. Capitol, Trump held a rally at the nearby Ellipse. Speaking from behind a glass barrier,[390] he called for the election to be overturned and urged his supporters to “fight like hell” and “take back our country” by marching to the Capitol.[391] His supporters then formed a mob that broke into the building, disrupting certification and causing the evacuation of Congress.[392] During the attack, Trump posted on social media but did not ask the rioters to disperse. In a tweet at 6 p.m., he told them to “go home with love & in peace”, called them “great patriots”, and restated that he had won the election.[393] Congress later reconvened and confirmed Biden’s victory in the early hours of January 7.[394]

More than 140 police officers were injured, and five people died during or after the attack.[395][396] The event has been described as an attempted self-coup by Trump.[d]

Between terms (2021–2025)

Upon leaving the White House, Trump began living at Mar-a-Lago, establishing an office there as provided for by the Former Presidents Act.[400] His continuing false claims concerning the 2020 election were commonly referred to as the “big lie” by his critics, although in May 2021, with his supporters he began using the term to refer to the election itself.[401][402] The Republican Party used his election narrative to justify imposing new voting restrictions in its favor.[403][404][405] As of July 2022, he continued to pressure state legislators to overturn the election.[406] Unlike other former presidents, Trump continued to dominate his party; a 2022 profile in The New York Times described him as a modern party boss.[407] He continued fundraising, raising a war chest containing more than twice that of the Republican Party, and profited from fundraisers many Republican candidates held at Mar-a-Lago. Much of his focus was on party governance and installing in key posts officials loyal to him.[407] In the 2022 midterm elections, he endorsed over 200 candidates for various offices.[408] In February 2021, he registered a new company, Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG), for providing “social networking services” to U.S. customers.[409][410] In March 2024, TMTG merged with special-purpose acquisition company Digital World Acquisition and became a public company.[411] In February 2022, TMTG launched Truth Social, a social media platform.[412]

Legal issues

See also: Personal and business legal affairs of Donald Trump and Legal affairs of the first Donald Trump presidency

In 2019, journalist E. Jean Carroll accused Trump of raping her in the 1990s and sued him for defamation over his denial.[413] Carroll sued him again in 2022 for battery and more defamation.[414] He was found liable for sexual abuse and defamation and ordered to pay $5 million in one case[415] and $83.3 million in the other.[415][416] In 2022, New York filed a civil lawsuit against Trump accusing him of inflating the Trump Organization’s value to gain an advantage with lenders and banks;[417][418] He was found liable and ordered to pay $350 million plus interest.[418]

Classified intelligence material found during search of Mar-a-Lago

In connection with Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election and his involvement in the January 6 attack, in December 2022 the U.S. House committee on the attack recommended criminal charges against him for obstructing an official proceeding, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and inciting or assisting an insurrection.[419] In August 2023, he was indicted on 13 charges, including racketeering, by a grand jury in Fulton County, Georgia for his efforts to subvert the 2020 election in the state.[420][421]

In January 2022, the National Archives and Records Administration retrieved 15 boxes of documents Trump had taken to Mar-a-Lago after leaving the White House, some of which were classified.[422] In the ensuing Justice Department investigation, officials retrieved more classified documents from his lawyers.[422] On August 8, 2022, FBI agents searched Mar-a-Lago for illegally held documents, including those in breach of the Espionage Act, collecting 11 sets of classified documents, some marked top secret.[423][424] A federal grand jury constituted by Special Counsel Jack Smith indicted Trump in June 2023 on 31 counts of “willfully retaining national defense information” under the Espionage Act, among other charges.[422][425][426] Trump pleaded not guilty.[427] In July 2024, judge Aileen Cannon dismissed the case, ruling Smith’s appointment as special prosecutor was unconstitutional.[428]

In May 2024, Trump was convicted on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records.[429] The case stemmed from evidence that he booked Michael Cohen‘s hush-money payments to adult film actress Stormy Daniels as business expenses to cover up his alleged 2006–2007 affair with Daniels during the 2016 election.[429][430] On January 10, 2025, the judge gave Trump a no-penalty sentence known as an unconditional discharge, saying that punitive requirements would have interfered with presidential immunity.[431] After his reelection, the 2020 election obstruction case and the classified documents case were dismissed without prejudice due to Justice Department policy against prosecuting sitting presidents.[432]

2024 presidential election

Main article: Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign

Further information: 2024 Republican Party presidential primaries, 2024 United States presidential election, and Second presidential transition of Donald Trump

Trump at a rally in Arizona, August 2024

In November 2022, Trump announced his candidacy for the 2024 presidential election and created a fundraising account.[433][434] In March 2023, the campaign began diverting 10 percent of the donations to his leadership PAC. His campaign had paid $100 million towards his legal bills by March 2024.[435][436] In December 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled him disqualified for the Colorado Republican primary for his role in inciting the January 6, 2021, attack on Congress. In March 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court restored his name to the ballot in a unanimous decision, ruling that Colorado lacks the authority to enforce Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, which bars insurrectionists from holding federal office.[437]

During the campaign, Trump made increasingly violent and authoritarian statements.[438][439][440][441] He said that he would weaponize the FBI and the Justice Department against his political opponents[442][443] and use the military to target Democratic politicians and those that do not support his candidacy.[444][445] He used harsher, more dehumanizing anti-immigrant rhetoric than during his presidency.[446][447][448][449] His harsher rhetoric against his political enemies has been described by some historians and scholars as authoritarian, fascist,[e] and unlike anything a political candidate has ever said in American history.[454][445][455] Age and health concerns also arose during the campaign, with several medical experts highlighting an increase in rambling, tangential speech and behavioral disinhibition.[456]

Trump mentioned “rigged election” and “election interference” earlier and more frequently than in the 2016 and 2020 campaigns and refused to commit to accepting the 2024 election results.[457][458] Analysts for The New York Times described this as an intensification of his “heads I win; tails you cheated” rhetorical strategy; the newspaper said the claim of a rigged election had become the backbone of the campaign.[458]

On July 13, 2024, Trump was shot in the ear in an assassination attempt at a campaign rally in Butler Township, Pennsylvania.[459][460][461] Two days later, the 2024 Republican National Convention nominated him as their presidential candidate, with Senator JD Vance as his running mate.[462] In September, he was targeted in another assassination attempt in Florida.[463]

Trump won the election in November 2024 with 312 electoral votes to incumbent vice president Kamala Harris’s 226,[464] making him the second president in U.S. history to be elected to a nonconsecutive second term.[465] He also won the popular vote with 49.8% to Harris’s 48.3%.[466] His victory in 2024 was part of a global backlash against incumbent parties,[467][468] in part due to the 2021–2023 inflation surge.[469][470] Several outlets described his reelection as an extraordinary comeback.[471][472]

Second presidency (2025–present)

Main article: Second presidency of Donald Trump

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Donald Trump presidencies.

Trump taking the oath of office, administered by Chief Justice John Roberts, January 20, 2025

Trump began his second term upon his inauguration on January 20, 2025.[473] He became the oldest individual to assume the presidency[474] and the first president with a felony conviction.[475]

Early actions, 2025–present

See also: Second presidential transition of Donald Trump and First 100 days of the second Donald Trump presidency

Upon taking office, Trump signed a series of executive orders that tested the limits of executive authority. Many drew immediate legal challenges.[476] He issued more executive orders on his first day than any other president.[477] Four days into his second term, analysis conducted by Time found that nearly two-thirds of his executive actions “mirror or partially mirror” proposals from Project 2025.[478] He pardoned around 1,500 January 6 rioters, including those who violently attacked police, and commuted the sentences of 14.[479] In his first weeks, several of his actions have ignored or violated federal laws, regulations, and the Constitution according to American legal scholars.[480][481][482] In his administration’s first month, Trump issued ninety executive orders, memorandums, and directives.[483] By March 7, his orders and actions on immigration, firing commissioners and watchdogs, downsizing the federal workforce, and others had been challenged by over 100 lawsuits nationwide.[484]

Mass terminations of federal employees

Main article: 2025 United States federal mass layoffs

Trump implemented a hiring freeze across the federal government and ordered telework of federal employees to be discontinued within 30 days.[485][486] He ordered a review of many career civil service positions with the intention of reclassifying them into at-will positions without job protections.[486][487][488] He initiated mass job terminations of federal employees,[489] which were described by legal experts as unprecedented or in violation of federal law,[490] with the intent of replacing them with workers more aligned with his agenda.[491] By late February, the administration had fired more than 30,000 people.[492] To facilitate further terminations, it adopted a novel legal interpretation that vastly expands the range of departments and agencies considered as having national security for their primary function,[493][494][495] declaring various federal workers’ unions “hostile”.[496][497] A late March executive order based on this interpretation excluded dozens of departments and agencies from federal labor-management relations programs, prompting them to sue to invalidate their collective bargaining agreements,[498][495] which could remove union protections from 1 million federal employees.[496][499] He ordered an end to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) projects in the federal government and placed employees in DEI offices on leave. He rescinded Executive Order 11246, which mandated affirmative action and nondiscrimination practices for federal contractors.[500][501]

Trump and Elon Musk‘s Department of Government Efficiency largely dismantled several federal agencies including USAID and the Department of Education, unilaterally fired several thousand staff, and reduced administrative functions to statutory minimums.[502][503][504] Some actions, such as attempts to dismantle the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, were paused by federal courts.[505] Many of his actions attempted to bring historically independent institutions under direct executive branch control in diminished forms.[506]

Domestic policy, 2025–present

See also: Second presidency of Donald Trump § Economy

Trump canceled and paused federal grants and made large cuts to scientific research.[507] Trump appointed oil, gas, and chemical lobbyists to the EPA to reverse climate regulations and pollution controls.[508] He declared a national energy emergency, allowing the suspension of environmental regulations, loosening the rules for fossil fuel extraction and limiting renewable energy projects.[509][510] He initiated a review of the “legality and continued applicability” of the EPA endangerment finding, which is the basis of most federal regulations on greenhouse gases,[511] and again withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement on climate change.[512]

Trump frequently blamed diversity, equity, and inclusion and wokeness for problems in government and society, and equated diversity with incompetence.[513] He repealed and reversed pro-diversity policies in the federal government.[514][515] His administration took an aggressive approach against what it called “gender ideology“, ending the ability to change the gender listed on passports, halting federal funding to entities providing gender-affirming care to minors, banning transgender people from the military, and preventing transgender women from competing in women’s sports programs at institutions that receive federal funding.[516][517]

Immigration, 2025–present

Main articles: Immigration policy of the second Donald Trump administration and Mexico–United States border crisis § Second Trump administration (2025–present)

Further information: Deportation of illegal immigrants in the second presidency of Donald Trump and Mexico–United States border wall § Second Trump administration (2025–present)

In his first days in office, Trump instructed border patrol agents to summarily deport migrants crossing the border, disabled the CBP One app that was being used to schedule border crossings, resumed the remain in Mexico policy, designated drug cartels as terrorist groups, and ordered construction to be resumed on a border wall.[518][519] The number of illegal crossings had been dropping since early 2024. In February 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehensions were at the lowest level since monthly data became available in 2000.[520][521]

Trump sought to implement mass deportations, with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) setting a goal of 1,200 to 1,500 daily arrests. However, actual numbers of arrests have lagged these goals and the rates of arrests under the Obama and Biden administrations.[522][523][524] Trump initially focused deportation operations in sanctuary cities and against individuals on “target lists” of criminals formed prior to the Trump administration. Removals were also expedited for asylum applicants who failed to meet requirements.[525][526][527] Trump revoked the parole status of migrants who entered the U.S. under CBP One and CHNV humanitarian parole.[519][527] He attempted to remove birthright citizenship and suspend the Refugee Admissions Program.[528][529] On January 29, 2025, he signed the Laken Riley Act into law.[530] In March 2025, he attempted to use the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 for the first time since World War II to deport migrants, but was temporarily blocked by a federal judge.[531] He targeted activists, legal immigrants, tourists, and students with green cards who expressed criticism of his policies or engaged in pro-Palestinian advocacy.[532]

Foreign policy, 2025–present

Main article: Foreign policy of the second Donald Trump administration

Further information: Tariffs in the second Trump administration and American expansionism under Donald Trump

Trump and JD Vance engaging in discussion with Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Trump’s second term foreign policy has been variously described as imperialist, expansionist,[533][534] isolationist, and autarkist, employing the “America First” ideology as its cornerstone.[535] His relations with allies were transactional and ranged from indifference to hostility, including threats of annexation.[536][537] He ordered the U.S. government to stop funding and working with the WHO and announced the U.S.‘s intention to formally leave the WHO.[538][539][540]

Trump and his incoming administration helped broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas alongside the Biden administration, enacted a day prior to his inauguration.[541][542][543] In March, Israel—with the Trump administration’s backing—broke the ceasefire.[543]

In February 2025, Trump and Vice President Vance met with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, in the Oval Office. The meeting, which was televised live, was highly contentious as Trump and Vance berated Zelenskyy. Media outlets described it as an unprecedented public confrontation between an American president and a foreign head of state.[544][545]

Trump’s economic policies have been described as protectionist, with Trump raising tariffs to the highest levels since the end of World War II.[546] Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on major trading partners, including China, Canada, and Mexico.[547] He also suspended American financial contributions to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and announced plans for an extensive global “reciprocal tariff policy” on April 2, 2025.[548][549]

Personnel, 2025–present

Main articles: Second cabinet of Donald Trump and Political appointments of the second Trump administration

In his second term, Trump selected cabinet members with personal loyalty to him, and many appointees lacked relevant experience.[550][551] On February 3, 2025, the White House said that Elon Musk was a special government employee.[552] Trump gave Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) access to many federal government agencies.[552] Musk’s teams operated in eighteen departments and agencies in the administration’s first month,[553] including in the Treasury Department’s $5 trillion payment system,[554] the Small Business Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, and the General Services Administration.[555]

Judiciary, 2025–present

See also: List of federal judges appointed by Donald Trump

Following legal setbacks, Trump increased his criticism of the judiciary and called for impeachment of federal judges who ruled against him.[556] He threatened, signed executive actions, and ordered investigations into his political opponents, critics, and organizations aligned with the Democratic Party.[557] His defiance of court orders and a claimed right to disobey the courts raised fears among legal experts of a constitutional crisis.[558]

Political practice and rhetoric

Further information: Trumpism, Political positions of Donald Trump, and Rhetoric of Donald Trump

Beginning with his 2016 campaign, Trump’s politics and rhetoric led to the creation of a political movement known as Trumpism.[559] His political positions are populist,[560][561] more specifically described as right-wing populist.[562][563] He helped bring far-right fringe ideas and organizations into the mainstream.[564] Many of his actions and rhetoric have been described as authoritarian and contributing to democratic backsliding.[565][566] Trump pushed for an expansion of presidential power under a maximalist interpretation of the unitary executive theory.[567][568] His political base has been compared to a cult of personality.[f] Trumpists are the dominant faction in the Republican Party as of 2024.[576][577][578][579][580]

Trump’s rhetoric and actions inflame anger and exacerbate distrust through an “us” versus “them” narrative.[581] He explicitly and routinely disparages racial, religious, and ethnic minorities,[582] and scholars consistently find that racial animus regarding blacks, immigrants, and Muslims are the best predictors of support for Trump.[583] His rhetoric has been described as using fearmongering and demagogy,[584] and he has said that he believes real power comes from fear.[585] The alt-right movement coalesced around and supported his candidacy, due in part to its opposition to multiculturalism and immigration.[586][587][588] He has a strong appeal to evangelical Christian voters and Christian nationalists,[589] and his rallies take on the symbols, rhetoric, and agenda of Christian nationalism.[590] Trump has also used anti-communist sentiment in his rhetoric, regularly calling his opponents “communists” and “Marxists“.[591][592]

Racial and gender views

Many of Trump’s comments and actions have been characterized as racist.[593] In a 2018 national poll, about half of respondents said he is racist; a greater proportion believed that he emboldened racists.[594] Several studies and surveys found that racist attitudes fueled his political ascent and were more important than economic factors in determining the allegiance of Trump voters.[595] Racist and Islamophobic attitudes are strong indicators of support for Trump.[596] He has also been accused of racism for insisting a group of five black and Latino teenagers were guilty of raping a white woman in the 1989 Central Park jogger case, even after they were exonerated in 2002 when the actual rapist confessed and his DNA matched the evidence. In 2024, the men sued Trump for defamation after he said in a televised debate that they had committed the crime and killed the woman.[597]

Trump answering questions about the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville

In 2011, Trump became the leading proponent of the racist “birther” conspiracy theory that Barack Obama, the first black U.S. president, was not born in the United States.[598] He claimed credit for pressuring the government to publish Obama’s birth certificate, which he considered fraudulent.[599] He acknowledged that Obama was born in the U.S. in September 2016,[600] though reportedly expressed birther views privately in 2017.[601] During the 2024 presidential campaign, he made false attacks against the racial identity of his opponent, Kamala Harris, that were described as reminiscent of the birther conspiracy theory.[602]

Trump has a history of belittling women when speaking to the media and on social media.[603][604] He made lewd comments, disparaged women’s physical appearances, and referred to them using derogatory epithets.[604] At least 25 women publicly accused him of sexual misconduct, including rape, kissing without consent, groping, looking under women’s skirts, and walking in on naked teenage pageant contestants. He has denied the allegations.[605] In October 2016, a 2005 “hot mic” recording surfaced in which he bragged about kissing and groping women without their consent, saying that, “when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. … Grab ‘em by the pussy.”[606] He characterized the comments as “locker-room talk”.[607][608] The incident’s widespread media exposure led to his first public apology, videotaped during his 2016 presidential campaign.[609]

Link to violence and hate crimes

Further information: Rhetoric of Donald Trump § Violence and dehumanization

Trump’s refusal to condemn the white supremacist Proud Boys during a 2020 presidential debate[610] and his comment, “Proud Boys, stand back and stand by”, were attributed to increased recruitment for the pro-Trump group.[611]

Trump has been identified as a key figure in increasing political violence in the U.S., both for and against him.[612][613][614] He is described as embracing extremism, conspiracy theories such as Q-Anon, and far-right militia movements to a greater extent than any modern American president,[615][616] and engaging in stochastic terrorism.[617][618]

Research suggests Trump’s rhetoric is associated with an increased incidence of hate crimes,[619][620] and that he has an emboldening effect on expressing prejudicial attitudes due to his normalization of explicit racial rhetoric.[621] During his 2016 campaign, he urged or praised physical attacks against protesters or reporters.[622][623] Numerous defendants investigated or prosecuted for violent acts and hate crimes cited his rhetoric in arguing that they were not culpable or should receive leniency.[624][625] A nationwide review by ABC News in May 2020 identified at least 54 criminal cases, from August 2015 to April 2020, in which he was invoked in direct connection with violence or threats of violence mostly by white men and primarily against minorities.[626] Trump’s normalization and revisionist history of the January 6 Capitol attack, and grant of clemency to all January 6 rioters, were described by counterterrorism researchers as encouraging future political violence.[627][628]

Conspiracy theories

Main article: List of conspiracy theories promoted by Donald Trump

Since before his first presidency, Trump has promoted numerous conspiracy theories, including Obama “birtherism”, global warming being a hoax, and alleged Ukrainian interference in U.S. elections.[629][630][631] After the 2020 presidential election, he promoted conspiracy theories for his defeat that were characterized as “the big lie“.[632][633]

False or misleading statements

Main article: False or misleading statements by Donald Trump

Fact-checkers from The Washington Post,[634] the Toronto Star,[635] and CNN[636] compiled data on “false or misleading claims” (orange background), and “false claims” (violet foreground), respectively.

Trump frequently makes false statements in public remarks[637][120] to an extent unprecedented in American politics.[637][638][639] His falsehoods are a distinctive part of his political identity[638] and have been described as firehosing.[640] His false and misleading statements were documented by fact-checkers, including at The Washington Post, which tallied 30,573 false or misleading statements made by him during his first presidency,[634] increasing in frequency over time.[641]

Some of Trump’s falsehoods were inconsequential,[642][643] while others had more far-reaching effects, such as his unproven promotion of antimalarial drugs as a treatment for COVID-19,[644][645] causing a U.S. shortage of these drugs and panic-buying in Africa and South Asia.[646][647] Other misinformation, such as misattributing a rise in crime in England and Wales to the “spread of radical Islamic terror”, served his domestic political purposes.[648] His attacks on mail-in ballots and other election practices weakened public faith in the integrity of the 2020 presidential election,[649][650] while his disinformation about the pandemic delayed and weakened the national response to it.[651][652][653] He habitually does not apologize for his falsehoods.[654] Until 2018, the media rarely referred to his falsehoods as lies, including when he repeated demonstrably false statements.[655][656][657]

Social media

Main articles: Social media use by Donald Trump and Twitter use by Donald Trump

Trump’s social media presence attracted worldwide attention after he joined Twitter in 2009. He posted frequently during his 2016 campaign and as president until Twitter banned him after the January 6 attack.[658] He often used Twitter to communicate directly with the public and sideline the press;[659] in 2017, his press secretary said that his tweets constituted official presidential statements.[660]

Twitter began attaching fact-checks to tweets in which Trump made false claims in May 2020.[661] In response, he said social media platforms “totally silence” conservatives and he would “strongly regulate, or close them down”.[662] After the January 6 attack, he was banned from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and other platforms.[663] The loss of his social media presence diminished his ability to shape events[664][665] and correlated with a dramatic decrease in the volume of misinformation on Twitter.[666] In February 2022, he launched social media platform Truth Social where he only attracted a fraction of his Twitter following.[667] Elon Musk, after acquiring Twitter, reinstated his Twitter account in November 2022.[668][669] Meta Platforms‘ two-year ban lapsed in January 2023, allowing him to return to Facebook and Instagram,[670] although in 2024, he continued to call the company an “enemy of the people“.[671] In January 2025, Meta agreed to pay $25 million to settle a 2021 lawsuit filed by Trump over his suspension.[672]

Relationship with the press

Further information: First presidency of Donald Trump § Relationship with the news media, and Personal and business legal affairs of Donald Trump

Trump talking to the press, March 2017

Trump sought media attention throughout his career, sustaining a “love-hate” relationship with the press.[673] In the 2016 campaign, he benefited from a record amount of free media coverage.[674] As a candidate and as president, he frequently accused the press of bias, calling it the “fake news media” and “the enemy of the people“.[675] The first Trump presidency reduced formal press briefings from about one hundred in 2017 to about half that in 2018 and to two in 2019; they also revoked the press passes of two White House reporters, which were restored by the courts.[676] Trump’s 2020 presidential campaign sued The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN for defamation in opinion pieces about his stance on Russian election interference. All the suits were dismissed.[677][678] By 2024, Trump repeatedly voiced support for outlawing political dissent and criticism,[679] and said that reporters should be prosecuted for not divulging confidential sources and media companies should possibly lose their broadcast licenses for unfavorable coverage of him.[680] Following his reelection, Trump launched lawsuits and created blacklists against certain media outlets, took over the process run by the White House Correspondents’ Association to choose what outlets could gain access to him,[681] and the Federal Communications Commission launched investigations into media outlets accused of bias against him.[682]

Personal life

Family

Further information: Family of Donald Trump

In 1977, Trump married Czech model Ivana Zelníčková.[683] They had three children: Donald Jr. (b. 1977), Ivanka (b. 1981), and Eric (b. 1984). The couple divorced in 1990, following his affair with model and actress Marla Maples.[684] He and Maples married in 1993 and divorced in 1999. They have one daughter, Tiffany (b. 1993), whom Maples raised in California.[685] In 2005, he married Slovenian model Melania Knauss.[686] They have one son, Barron (b. 2006).[687]

Health

Main article: Age and health concerns about Donald Trump

Trump says he has never drunk alcohol, smoked cigarettes, or used drugs.[688][689] He sleeps about four or five hours a night.[690][691] He has called golfing his “primary form of exercise”, but usually does not walk the course.[692] He considers exercise a waste of energy because he believes the body is “like a battery, with a finite amount of energy”, which is depleted by exercise.[693][694] In 2015, his campaign released a letter from his longtime personal physician, Harold Bornstein, stating that he would “be the healthiest individual ever elected to the presidency”.[695] In 2018, Bornstein said Trump had dictated the contents of the letter and that three of Trump’s agents had seized his medical records in a February 2017 raid on Bornstein’s office.[695][696]

Religion

Main article: Donald Trump and religion

Trump said in 2016 that he was a Presbyterian and a Protestant.[697][698] In 2020, he said he was a nondenominational Christian.[699]

Assessments

Public image

Main articles: Public image of Donald Trump and Donald Trump in popular culture

See also: Opinion polling on the first Donald Trump administration and Opinion polling on the second Donald Trump administration

A Gallup poll in 134 countries comparing the approval ratings of U.S. leadership between 2016 and 2017 found that Trump led Obama in job approval in 29 countries, most of them non-democracies;[700] approval of U.S. leadership plummeted among its allies.[701] By mid-2020, 16 percent of international respondents to a 13-nation Pew Research poll expressed confidence in Trump, lower than China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.[702]

During his first presidency, research from 2020 found that Trump had a stronger impact on popular assessments towards American political parties and partisan opinions than any president since Harry S. Truman.[703] In 2021, he was identified as the only president never to reach a 50 percent approval rating in the Gallup poll, which dates to 1938, partially due to a record-high partisan gap in his approval ratings: 88 percent among Republicans and 7 percent among Democrats.[704] His early ratings were unusually stable, ranging between 35 and 49 percent.[705] He finished his term with a rating between 29 and 34 percent—the lowest of any president since modern polling began—and a record-low average of 41 percent throughout his presidency.[704][706]

In Gallup’s annual poll asking Americans to name the man they admire the most, Trump placed second to Obama in 2017 and 2018, tied with Obama for first in 2019, and placed first in 2020.[707][708] Since Gallup started conducting the poll in 1946, he was the first elected president not to be named most admired in his first year in office.[709]

According to Gallup, Trump began his second term with an approval rating of 47% and a disapproval rating of 48%. His approval rating was extremely politically polarized, being approved by 91% of Republicans, 46% of independents, and 6% of Democrats.[710]

Scholarly rankings

Further information: Historical rankings of presidents of the United States

In C-SPAN‘s 2021 survey of presidential historians,[711] historians ranked Trump as the fourth-worst president. He rated lowest in the leadership characteristics categories for moral authority and administrative skills.[712][713] The Siena College Research Institute‘s 2022 survey ranked him third-worst. He was ranked near the bottom in all categories except for luck, willingness to take risks, and party leadership, and ranked last in several categories.[714] In 2018 and 2024, members of the American Political Science Association ranked him the worst president.[715][716]

See also

- Awards and honors received by Donald Trump

- Pseudonyms used by Donald Trump

Notes

References

Works cited

Books

- Barrett, Wayne (2016) [1992]. Trump: The Greatest Show On Earth: The Deals, the Downfall, the Reinvention. Regan Arts. ISBN 978-1-68245-079-6.

- Blair, Gwenda (2015) [2001]. The Trumps: Three Generations That Built an Empire. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-5011-3936-9.

- Buettner, Russ; Craig, Susanne (2024). Lucky Loser: How Donald Trump Squandered His Father’s Fortune And Created The Illusion of Success. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0-593-29864-0.

- D’Antonio, Michael (2015). Never enough : Donald Trump and the pursuit of success. Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin’s Press. ISBN 978-1-250-04238-5.

- Haberman, Maggie (2022). Confidence Man: The Making of Donald Trump and the Breaking of America. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0-593-29734-6.

- Harvey, Michael (2022). “Introduction: History’s Rhymes”. In Harvey, Michael (ed.). Donald Trump in Historical Perspective. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003110361-1. ISBN 978-1-003-11036-1.

- Hassan, Steven (2019). The Cult of Trump. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-9821-2733-6.

- Johnston, David Cay (2016). The Making of Donald Trump. Melville House Publishing. ISBN 978-1-61219-658-9.

- Johnston, David Cay (2021). The Big Cheat: How Donald Trump Fleeced America And Enriched Himself And His Family. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-9821-7804-8.

- Kakutani, Michiko (2018). “The Firehose of Falsehood: Propaganda and Fake News”. The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump. Crown/Archetype. ISBN 978-0-525-57484-2.

- Klein, Naomi (2017). No Is Not Enough. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-198679-1.

- Kranish, Michael; Fisher, Marc (2017) [2016]. Trump Revealed: The Definitive Biography of the 45th President. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-5011-5652-6.

- O’Brien, Timothy L. (2005). TrumpNation: The Art of Being The Donald. Warner Books. ISBN 978-0-446-57854-7.

- Meacham, Jon (2016). Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8129-7947-3.

- O’Donnell, John R.; Rutherford, James (1991). Trumped!. Crossroad Press Trade Edition. ISBN 978-1-946025-26-5.

Journals

- Adams, Kenneth Alan (Spring 2021). “The Trump Death Cult”. Journal of Psychohistory. 48 (4): 256–276. ISSN 0145-3378. Retrieved November 6, 2024.

- Almond, Douglas; Du, Xinming (December 2020). “Later bedtimes predict President Trump’s performance”. Economics Letters. 197. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109590. ISSN 0165-1765. PMC 7518119. PMID 33012904.

- Berman, Sheri (May 2021). “The Causes of Populism in the West”. Annual Review of Political Science. 24: 71–88. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102503. ISSN 1094-2939.

- Campani, Giovanna; Concepción, Sunamis Fabelo; Soler, Angel Rodriguez; Savín, Claudia Sánchez (November 2, 2022). “The Rise of Donald Trump Right-Wing Populism in the United States: Middle American Radicalism and Anti-Immigration Discourse”. Societies. 12 (6): 154. doi:10.3390/soc12060154.

- Castañeda, Ernesto; Jenks, Daniel (April 17, 2023). Costa, Bruno Ferreira; Parton, Nigel (eds.). “January 6th and De-Democratization in the United States”. Social Sciences. 12 (4). MDPI: 238–253. doi:10.3390/socsci12040238. ISSN 2076-0760.

- Diamond, Michael J. (February 22, 2023). “Perverted Containment: Trumpism, Cult Creation, and the Rise of Destructive American Populism”. Psychoanalytic Inquiry. 43 (2): 96–109. doi:10.1080/07351690.2023.2163147.

- Edwards, Jason A. (2018). “Make America Great Again: Donald Trump and Redefining the U.S. Role in the World”. Communication Quarterly. 66 (2): 176. doi:10.1080/01463373.2018.1438485.

- Franks, Andrew S.; Hesami, Farhang (September 18, 2021). “Seeking Evidence of The MAGA Cult and Trump Derangement Syndrome: An Examination of (A)symmetric Political Bias”. Societies. 11 (3): 113. doi:10.3390/soc11030113.

- Gaufman, Elizaveta; Ganesh, Bharath (2024). “The Trump Carnival: Populism, Transgression and the Far Right Bias - Chapter 6: Laughing Culture”. De Gruyter Contemporary Social Sciences. 35: 69–70. doi:10.1515/9783111238135-006.

- Jacobson, Gary C. (October 24, 2020). “Donald Trump and the Parties: Impeachment, Pandemic, Protest, and Electoral Politics in 2020”. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 50 (4): 762–795. doi:10.1111/psq.12682. ISSN 0360-4918.

- Johnson, Kevin R. (2017a). “Immigration and civil rights in the Trump administration: Law and policy making by executive order”. Santa Clara Law Review. 57 (3): 611–665.

- Johnson, Kevin R.; Cuison-Villazor, Rose (May 2, 2019). “The Trump Administration and the War on Immigration Diversity”. Wake Forest Law Review. 54 (2): 575–616.

- Kaufman, Robert R.; Haggard, Stephan (2019). “Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?”. Perspectives on Politics. 17 (2): 417–432. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003377. S2CID 149457724.

- Lajevardi, Nazita; Oskooii, Kassra A. R. (2018). “Old-Fashioned Racism, Contemporary Islamophobia, and the Isolation of Muslim Americans in the Age of Trump”. Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics. 3 (1): 112–152. doi:10.1017/rep.2017.37.

- McGurk, Brett (January 22, 2020). “The Cost of an Incoherent Foreign Policy: Trump’s Iran Imbroglio Undermines U.S. Priorities Everywhere Else”. Foreign Affairs.

- Nacos, Brigitte L.; Shapiro, Robert Y.; Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli (2020). “Donald Trump: Aggressive Rhetoric and Political Violence”. Perspectives on Terrorism. 14 (5): 2–25. ISSN 2334-3745. JSTOR 26940036. Retrieved January 20, 2025.

- O’Brien, Shannon (July 22, 2020). “Donald Trump and the Kayfabe Presidency - Wrestling with the Presidency: How Donald Trump Uses Wrestling and Theatrical Tactics in the Public Sphere”. Rhetoric, Politics and Society: 39–58. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-50551-6_3.

- Parker, Christopher Sebastian; Towler, Christopher C. (May 2019). “Race and Authoritarianism in American Politics”. Annual Review of Political Science. 22: 503–519. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-064519. ISSN 1094-2939.

- Perry, Samuel L.; Whitehead, Andrew L.; Grubbs, Joshua B. (April 21, 2021). “The Devil That You Know: Christian Nationalism and Intent to Change One’s Voting Behavior For or Against Trump in 2020”. Politics and Religion. 15 (2): 229–246. doi:10.1017/S175504832100002X. hdl:11244/334967.

- Piazza, James; Van Doren, Natalia (October 8, 2022). “It’s About Hate: Approval of Donald Trump, Racism, Xenophobia and Support for Political Violence”. American Politics Research. 51 (3): 299–314. doi:10.1177/1532673X221131561. ISSN 1532-673X. Retrieved January 20, 2025.

- Pion-Berlin, David; Bruneau, Thomas; Goetze, Richard B. Jr. (April 7, 2022). “The Trump self-coup attempt: comparisons and civil–military relations”. Government and Opposition. FirstView (4): 789–806. doi:10.1017/gov.2022.13. S2CID 248033246.

- Reyes, Antonio (May 4, 2020). “I, Trump The cult of personality, anti-intellectualism and the Post-Truth era”. Journal of Language and Politics. 19 (6): 869–892. doi:10.1075/jlp.20002.rey. ISSN 1569-2159.

- Rothe, Dawn L.; Collins, Victoria E. (November 17, 2019). “Turning Back the Clock? Violence against Women and the Trump Administration”. Victims & Offenders. 14 (8): 965–978. doi:10.1080/15564886.2019.1671284.

- Ross, Bertrall L. (October 2024). “Polarization, Populism, and the Crisis of American Democracy”. Annual Review of Law and Social Science. 20: 293–308. doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-041922-035113. ISSN 1550-3631. Retrieved December 20, 2024.

- Schaffner, Brian F.; Macwilliams, Matthew; Nteta, Tatishe (March 2018). “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism”. Political Science Quarterly. 133 (1): 9–34. doi:10.1002/polq.12737.

- Stephens-Dougan, LaFluer (May 2021). “The Persistence of Racial Cues and Appeals in American Elections”. Annual Review of Political Science. 24: 301–320. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-082619-015522. ISSN 1094-2939.

- Sundahl, Anne-Mette Holmgård (May 4, 2022). “Personality Cult or a Mere Matter of Popularity?”. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. 36 (4): 431–458. doi:10.1007/s10767-022-09423-0. PMC 9066393. PMID 35528318.

- Trump, Donald (January 29, 2025). “Withdrawing the United States From the World Health Organization” (PDF). Federal Register. 90 (18). Office of the Federal Register: 8361.

- Urbinati, Nadia (May 2019). “Political Theory of Populism”. Annual Review of Political Science. 22: 111–127. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070753. ISSN 1094-2939. Retrieved December 20, 2024.

Further reading

- Mercieca, Jennifer R. (2020). Demagogue for President: The Rhetorical Genius of Donald Trump. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-1-62349-906-8.

External links

Library resources about

Donald Trump

- Resources in your library

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By Donald Trump

- Resources in your library

- Resources in other libraries

- Archive of Donald Trump’s tweets

- Appearances on C-SPAN

- Donald Trump at IMDb

- Donald Trump on the Internet Archive

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Tariffs in the second Trump administration

For the tariffs imposed in 2018 and 2019, see Tariffs in the first Trump administration.

This article documents a current political event. Information may change rapidly as the event progresses, and initial news reports may be unreliable. The latest updates to this article may not reflect the most current information. Feel free to improve this article or discuss changes on the talk page, but please note that updates without valid and reliable references will be removed. (April 2025) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Trump showing a table with claimed reciprocal tariffs during his speech on April 2, 2025

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Tariffs during the second presidency of Donald Trump have reflected an escalation of protectionist trade policies in the United States, with Trump announcing a series of high import “reciprocal” tariffs impacting all trading partners. While his first administration imposed tariffs on approximately $380 billion in imports, the total under his second administration is projected to exceed $1.4 trillion by April 2025.[1]

Trump resumed a trade war with China, raising tariffs on the country to an effective 54% after April 9.[2] He launched a second trade war with Canada and Mexico by imposing a 25% tariff on most Canadian and Mexican goods, but later exempted all USMCA-compliant goods indefinitely.[3] Trump framed the actions as a way to hold these countries accountable for contraband drug trafficking and illegal immigration while supporting domestic manufacturing.[4][5] On March 12, 2025, a 25% global tariff on steel and aluminum products went into effect.

On April 2, a day Trump nicknamed “Liberation Day“, Trump announced a 10% universal import duty on all goods brought into the US and even higher rates for 57 trading partners. The higher rates, which were supposed to be representative of foreign countries’ trade barriers against the US, were roughly calculated as half the result of dividing the US trade deficit with a given country by the value of imports from that country.[6] The 10% baseline tariff takes effect on April 5 while the additional rates begin April 9.[7] On April 3, a 25% tariff on all imported automobiles went into effect,[8] with imported auto parts expected to follow.[9] Canada, China, and the European Union have announced counter-tariffs, while other countries began proactive negotiations to prevent additional trade disputes.

Background

Since the 1980s, Trump has advocated for import tariffs as a tool to regulate trade and retaliate against foreign nations that he believes have been “ripping off” Americans.[10] In his campaigns for the US presidency, Trump promised to use tariffs to achieve a wide range of goals including preventing war, reducing trade deficits, improving border security, and subsidizing childcare.[11] Although Trump has said foreign countries pay his tariffs, US tariffs are fees paid by US consumers and businesses either directly or in the form of increased prices.[10][11][12] Shortly after being reelected to a second term, Trump acknowledged that tariffs might cause “some pain” for Americans but insisted “it will all be worth the price that must be paid”.[13]

During his first term, Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, resulting in price increases for Americans.[14] In December 2021, the price of one metric ton of hot-rolled band steel was $1,855 in the US compared to $646 in China and $1,031 in Europe.[15] The World Trade Organization later ruled that the implementation violated global trade rules.[16] While he and his first successor, Joe Biden, rolled back some of these tariffs, most remained in place by the start of Trump’s second term.[17] Trump also launched a trade war with China which subjected 60% of US-China trade to 20% tariffs[18] and was widely characterized as a failure for the United States.[19]

In May 2019, Trump used tariff threats of up to 25% on Mexico to negotiate an expansion of his “Remain in Mexico” policy and the deployment of Mexican soldiers to help control illegal immigration.[20] Mexico deployed nearly 15,000 troops to its border with the US and 6,500 troops to its border with Guatemala.[21] In 2020, the US, Mexico and Canada renegotiated NAFTA as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) and recommitted to 0% tariffs on most products traded between them. Five weeks after the USMCA went into effect, Trump used an exemption for national security concerns to implement a 10% tariff on Canadian aluminum after claiming it was flooding the US market.[22][23] He withdrew the tariff a month later, three hours before Canada planned to retaliate.[24]

Planning

While campaigning for his second term as US president, Trump pledged even larger tariffs than his first term, including 60% on China, 100% on Mexico, and 20% on all other countries. He also proposed tariffs to penalize US companies that outsourced manufacturing, such as a 200% tariff on John Deere. Trump also suggested replacing income taxes with tariff revenue—an idea economists from the Tax Foundation deemed “mathematically impossible.”[25]

Trump appointed close economic advisor Peter Navarro as his Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing. Navarro had been recently imprisoned for defying congressional subpoenas related to his role in attempts to overturn the 2020 election, including his “Green Bay Sweep” strategy.[26] Navarro wrote books criticizing corporations for prioritizing profits over American jobs and arguing that traditional economic analysis overlooks the harm free trade can inflict on people’s lives. He advocates a permanent regime of trade barriers to balance the trade deficit. Navarro had served in high-ranking trade roles during Trump’s first term but was often rebuffed by free market-minded Trump administration officials such as Gary Cohn, who resigned in protest of Trump’s 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs.[27] The Financial Times reported Navarro would receive more influence and less opposition in Trump’s second administration. Navarro began working closely with cabinet nominees Howard Lutnick and Jamieson Greer.[28]

During his inaugural address on January 20, 2025, Trump pledged to “immediately begin the overhaul of our trade system to protect American workers and families. Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich other countries, we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens.”[29]

On March 4, 2025, the US notified the World Trade Organization, a watchdog for international trade, that it would suspend planned contributions indefinitely. The US was set to provide about 11% of the WTO’s $232 million 2024 budget, a fee based on the country’s share of global trade.[30] On 26 March UPS launched a tool allowing online shoppers to view the added cost of tariffs at checkout instead of being surprised by additional costs when their parcel arrived.[31]

Legality

Although the US Constitution grants Congress the authority to levy taxes, including tariffs, Congress has passed laws allowing the President to unilaterally impose tariffs for national security reasons.[32] In his second term, Trump added tariffs to steel, aluminum, and auto imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (TEA), which allows the President to modify imports if the Secretary of Commerce conducts an investigation, holds public hearings, and determines that the imports threaten national security.[33][34] Trump directed the USTR to initiate similar investigations to impose tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[35]

Trump also invoked unprecedented powers under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by declaring multiple “national emergencies” related to border security, illegal immigration, and energy.[36] Declaring these emergencies allowed Trump to quickly enact tariffs without following the complex procedures required by TEA or other trade statutes.[37] While the IEEPA had been used for sanctions, it had never before been used for tariffs. As he signed the orders, Trump stated that declaring an emergency “means you can do whatever you have to do to get out of that problem.”[36] The New York Times reported that “many economists and legal experts believe that the idea of an emergency has been concocted to justify Mr. Trump’s desire to impose sweeping import duties without regard to congressional approval or international trade rules”.[38]

To terminate a national emergency under the NEA, a member of Congress can file a privileged resolution requiring their chamber to vote on the topic within 15 days. In February 2025, Democratic Senators Tim Kaine and Mark Warner introduced a resolution to end Trump’s national emergency on energy, but it was defeated by the Senate’s Republican majority.[39] The Senate passed a resolution to terminate the national emergency justifying tariffs on Canada, but the bill is unlikely to pass the House.[40] A provision was added to the March 2025 budget bill to block the process by declaring that the remainder of the year “shall not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 202 of the National Emergencies Act.”[41][42][43]

Multinational tariffs

Steel and aluminum tariffs

On March 12, 2025, the US imposed 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, aiming to strengthen domestic production.[44] Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said Trump would soon add a copper tariff as well.[45] The EU and Canada announced counter-tariffs, while Australia, Britain, Japan, and Brazil criticized the move but withheld retaliation.[44] On April 2, 2025, aluminum tariffs expanded to include empty aluminum cans and canned beer.[46]

The measures expanded Trump’s first-term steel and aluminum tariffs by eliminating all exemptions and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25%.[33] The administration argued previous exemptions “inadvertently created loopholes that were exploited by China and others with excess steel and aluminum capacity”.[47] Trump also mandated that steel be “melted and poured” and aluminum “smelted and cast” in the US to qualify for duty-free status to prevent tariff circumvention.[48]

In 2023, the US imported 44% of its aluminum and 26% of its steel.[49] Canada was its largest supplier of both, accounting for more than half of aluminum[50] and two-thirds of primary aluminum imports.[49] While the US was the world’s largest producer of aluminum through 2000, it accounted for less than 2% of global supply by 2021, largely due to high electricity costs that made it less competitive in the global market.[51] In 2021, primary aluminum smelters operated at 55% capacity in the US compared to 95% in Canada and 88% globally. The US remained a major producer of the less energy-intensive secondary aluminum, but secondary aluminum is less desirable for defense or electronics.[51]

Car and auto part tariffs

In January 2025, President Trump announced broad tariffs on Canada and Mexico, threatening the highly integrated North American auto supply chain.[52] Due to decades of free trade agreements including USMCA, factories in the US, Canada, and Mexico grew accustomed to shipping auto parts back and forth multiple times during the manufacturing process.[52] The three largest US automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Stellantis—lobbied for exemptions, warning the tariffs would hurt American companies more than foreign competitors.[53] Ford CEO Jim Farley warned investors, “Long term, a 25% tariff across the Mexico and Canadian border will blow a hole in the US industry that we have never seen.”[52] Trump agreed to delayed tariffs on USMCA-compliant vehicles,.[3] Still, non-USMCA compliant brands manufacturing in Canada or Mexico, such as BMW, were affected starting March 4, 2025.[53] BMW chose to cover these tariffs until May 1, 2025.[54]

The USMCA exemption closed on April 3, when Trump imposed a 25% tariff on all imported cars, including those from Mexico and Canada.[55] The tariff will extend to non-US content in domestically assembled vehicles “no later than May 3”.[56] The White House argued the move would boost domestic manufacturing and generate $100 billion in tax revenue,[57] noting that about 50% of the 16 million cars bought by Americans in 2024 were imported.[58] The same day, Stellantis announced it would temporarily close factories in Canada and Mexico and lay off 900 American employees as it assessed the impact of tariffs.[59]

“Reciprocal tariff” policy

See also: Donald Trump’s Liberation Day speech

Table showing “Liberation Day” tariffs

On February 13, 2025, Trump directed his staff to research both monetary and non-monetary trade barriers imposed by other countries and to develop custom “reciprocal tariffs” for each one to counter and penalize them.[38] He instructed them to consider factors such as existing tariffs, exchange rates, and trade balances in their analysis. Lutnick said his team would have a plan ready by April 1, 2025.[60] Trump announced that he would unveil the reciprocal tariffs on April 2, 2025, a date he referred to as “Liberation Day.”[61][62]

On April 2, 2025, Trump declared a national emergency to address what he described as a “large and persistent US trade deficit”, enabling him to invoke the IEEPA to impose a 10% tariff on all imports to the US, effective April 5, 2025.[63] He also announced higher tariffs for 57 countries and territories set to begin April 9.[64] The White House confirmed that these tariffs would be applied in addition to existing measures on Chinese imports, resulting in an effective tariff rate of 54% on Chinese goods after April 9, 2025.[2] Politico described the measures as “the most significant US protectionist trade action since the 1930s”, when Congress passed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act.[63]

Reuters reported the Trump administration struggled to design reciprocal tariffs because each of the 186 members of the World Customs Organization applied different duties.[65] The administration initially considered dividing all countries into tiers of high, medium, and low trade barriers.[66] Later, officials Scott Bessent and Kevin Hassett told Fox Business that the administration would focus on the United States’ largest trading partners and assign individualized tariff rates.[66][61] Hassett stated that “more than 100 countries don’t really have any tariffs on us and don’t have any non-tariff barriers” and that only “10 to 15 countries” were a concern.[61] However, on March 30 Trump told reporters, “I don’t know who told you 10 or 15”, dismissing the idea as a “rumor” and saying he would impose tariffs on “all countries”.[67][68] Although many countries attempted to negotiate deals in the weeks leading up to April 2, no exemptions were granted.[69][70] The lack of clarity contributed to economic volatility and stock market declines.[71] March 2025 became the worst month for the US stock market since December 2022, with the S&P 500 declining by over 5% and the NASDAQ dropping more than 10% for the quarter.[72][73]

Economists and trade experts pointed out that Trump repeatedly made false and exaggerated claims on trade and tariffs in his “Liberation Day” speech.[74][75][76] ING Group noted that plans for the policy appeared to align with Navarro’s section of Project 2025, titled “The Case for Fair Trade”.[77] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told “every country”: “do not retaliate, sit back, take it in, let’s see how it goes, because, if you retaliate, there will be escalation.”[78]

Formula calculation

Soon after the unveiling, financial journalist James Surowiecki reported that the final “reciprocal tariff” policy appeared to calculate the value of a country’s trade barriers by taking the US trade deficit with that country and dividing it by the value of the country’s exports to the United States. The “reciprocal” tariff rate Trump imposed was then calculated by dividing that value in half.[79] For example, dividing the US’s 2024 trade deficit in goods with China, $295 billion, by the amount the US imported from China, $439 billion, results in the 67% tariff barrier value the US assigned to China: $295bn ÷ $439bn = .67 which, as a percentage, is 67%.[80]

The White House later published their trade barrier formula online, which simplified to the same formula.[81][82] A White House official told the New York Post that the tariffs relied “on the concept that the trade deficit that we have with any given country is the sum of all trade practices, the sum of all cheating.”[83] Politico reported that many economists found “the rates on most countries bore little relation to the barriers those countries imposed on U.S. goods and services.”[84]

Impacted regions

The White House’s list of impacted areas included the uninhabited Heard Island and McDonald Islands, owned by Australia.[85] A tariff of 29% was implemented on Norfolk Island, which has a population around 2,000 and also belongs to Australia; the rest of Australia received a tariff of 10%.[86] Tariffs of 10% were applied on the British Indian Ocean Territory, whose population of around 3,000 comprises American and British military personnel and contractors stationed at the American/British military base of Diego Garcia.[87]

The highest tariffs of 50% were placed on Lesotho, described by Trump as a country that “nobody had ever heard of”, and France’s Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands, with population around 5,000.[85] Other countries facing some of the highest tariffs are Cambodia (49%), Laos (48%), Madagascar (47%), Vietnam (46%), and Myanmar (44%).[88]

Among the countries not marked for tariffs in this round were Russia, Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Canada and Mexico.[89] Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt commented that Russia escaped tariffs because current American sanctions on Russia resulted in no “meaningful trade” between the two countries; in 2024, the value of this trade was $3.5 billion, greater than countries Mauritius or Brunei who suffered this round’s American tariffs.[90] For the others, Leavitt cited that the tariffs and sanctions on Belarus, Cuba, and North Korea were already high, and that Canada and Mexico had tariffs of 25% previously imposed.[90]

List of reciprocal tariffs by country

Country or territory

Tariff rate[91][92]

Algeria

30%

Angola

32%

Bangladesh

37%

Bosnia and Herzegovina

35%

Botswana

37%

Brunei

24%

Cambodia

49%

Cameroon

11%

Chad

13%

China

34%

Croatia

20%

Democratic Republic of the Congo

11%

Equatorial Guinea

13%

European Union

20%

Falkland Islands (United Kingdom)

41%

Fiji

32%

Guyana

38%

India

26%

Indonesia

32%

Iraq

39%

Israel

17%

Ivory Coast

21%

Japan

24%

Jordan

20%

Kazakhstan

27%

Laos

48%

Lesotho

50%

Libya

31%

Liechtenstein

37%

Madagascar

47%

Malawi

17%

Malaysia

24%

Mauritius

40%

Moldova

31%

Mozambique

16%

Myanmar

44%

Namibia

21%

Nauru

30%

Nicaragua

18%

Nigeria

14%

North Macedonia

33%

Norway

15%

Pakistan

29%

Philippines

17%

Serbia

37%

South Africa

30%

South Korea

25%

Sri Lanka

44%

Switzerland

31%

Syria

41%

Taiwan

32%

Thailand

36%

Tunisia

28%

Vanuatu

22%

Venezuela

15%

Vietnam

46%

Zambia

17%

Zimbabwe

18%

Additional proposals

Digital Sales Tax investigation

On February 21, 2025, Trump issued a presidential memorandum ordering the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) as well as other officials, including Peter Navarro, to investigate digital service taxes (DSTs) and determine whether to take retaliatory action. A fact sheet accompanying the memo emphasized the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) would face scrutiny.[93]

DSTs are taxes on revenue from digital services such as online advertising and selling user data. These taxes allow countries to collect revenue from multinational companies that provide digital services in their jurisdiction.[93] USTR investigations initiated during Trump’s first term led to tariff threats on several countries under authority granted by section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[35] On October 8, 2021, over 135 countries participating in the OECD negotiations agreed on a two-pillar approach to reform and withdraw DSTs called the “Global tax deal“. The Pillar One deadline was December 31, 2023, but was subsequently extended to December 31, 2024.[93] As of January 2025, Trump withdrew from Pillar Two of the agreement, and many countries’ DSTs remain in effect.[94][93]

Secondary tariffs

“Secondary tariffs” are a new trade policy introduced by the second Trump administration that resembles secondary sanctions.[95] Unlike primary tariffs, which directly target a specific country, secondary tariffs penalize the third-party countries or entities that trade with the targeted nation.[96]

On March 24, following actions such as the March 2025 Venezuelan deportations, Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on nations that purchase oil from Venezuela at the Secretary of State’s discretion.[97] He subsequently threatened secondary tariffs on countries buying Russian oil, unless Russia agreed to a peace treaty with Ukraine,[98] and on countries that trade with Iran.[99]

Closing the de minimis exemption

Trump’s February 2025 executive orders announcing tariffs on imports from China, Mexico, and Canada initially suspended the US de minimis exemption.[100] The de minimis exemption waives standard customs procedures on low-value packages to reduce administrative burdens. US Congress quadrupled the de minimis threshold from $200 to $800 in 2016, resulting in an over 1000% increase in shipments claiming the exemption by 2023.[101][102] The US exemption was among the highest globally, over five times the size of the European Union‘s, and used by many companies to send goods to the US without close inspection or taxes.[102] The largest beneficiaries were Chinese e-commerce companies such as Shein and AliExpress. Some shipments were linked to drug trafficking.[101] However, by February 7, 2025, Trump indefinitely restored the de minimis exemption for all three target countries to avoid overwhelming US customs officials.[103][104][105]

On April 2, 2025, Trump signed a new order to close the exemption for China and Hong Kong starting May 2, 2025. The Secretary of Commerce is expected to submit a report within 90 days to assess the impact and consider whether to close the exemption for Macau.[106]

Country-specific tariffs

China

Main article: China–United States trade war

China, South Korea, and Japan agreed to strengthen free trade in the face of Trump tariffs on March 30, 2025

On February 1, 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14195 establishing a new 10% tariff on all Chinese imports. The order, which went into effect on February 4, came at the behest of the National Security Council.[107][108] On February 10 China retaliated with tariffs of 15% on coals and liquefied natural gas and 10% on oil and agricultural machines. China also added PVH Corp. and Illumina to the Unreliable Entity List, launched an antitrust investigation into Google, and added export controls to some metals including tungsten.[109][110]

Capital Economics, a UK-based macroeconomic research consultancy, estimated that while the US levied new tariffs on about $450 billion worth of Chinese goods, China’s additional tariffs only targeted about $20 billion of US goods. Julian Evans-Pritchard, the firm’s head of China Economics, stated “The measures are fairly modest, at least relative to US moves”. Reuters said China’s “limited” response “underscored an attempt by Chinese policymakers to engage Trump in talks to avert an outright trade war”.[110]

On March 4, 2025, Trump raised tariffs on Chinese imports again from 10% to 20%.[111][112] In response, China announced the same day that it would impose a 15% tariff on US chicken, wheat, corn, and cotton, as well as a 10% tariff on US sorghum, soybeans, pork, beef, aquatic products, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products, effective March 10, 2025.[113][114] Additionally, China launched an anti-circumvention investigation into optical fiber products imported from the United States.[115] The General Administration of Customs of China suspended US lumber imports and revoked soybean import licenses for three US firms.[116] On March 30, 2025, China, South Korea, and Japan reached an agreement at a meeting of top trade officials to strengthen their free trade ties, including supply-chain cooperation, in response to Trump tariffs.[117][118]

Retailer Walmart had asked some Chinese suppliers to lower prices due to tariffs. On March 12, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce held talks with Walmart, according to state media reports.[119] Costco, a warehouse club chain, also took the same measures to Chinese suppliers.[120]

On March 26, 2025, Trump suggested he might reduce tariffs on China to reach a deal on a sale of TikTok.[121]

Canada and Mexico

Main article: 2025 United States trade war with Canada and Mexico

Liquor store in Ontario recommending non-American products in response to Trump tariffs, “for the good of Canada”. The pictured wines, however, are Chilean

On November 25, 2024, after winning reelection, Trump announced a 25% tariff on all imports from Canada and Mexico unless they took action against illegal immigration and drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Justin Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister at the time sought to de-escalate tensions.[122][123] While Trudeau noted that less than 1% of illegal border crossings and less than 1% of fentanyl into the US come from Canada,[124] he unveiled a $1.3 billion security plan for the Canada–US border on December 16, 2024.[125][126] Despite these efforts, on February 1 Trump ordered the tariffs to begin February 4, with a reduced 10% rate for Canadian energy products.[124][127] Bloomberg News reported that Trump advisors Peter Navarro and Stephen Miller led the economic discussions on the tariffs.[107]

Trudeau and Sheinbaum condemned Trump’s actions and threatened immediate economic retaliation, but on February 3 the three leaders negotiated a one-month delay on the tariffs. As part of the agreement, Mexico committed to deploying 10,000 troops to its border with the United States, while Canada pledged to appoint a “fentanyl czar” and continue implementing the border security plan announced in 2024.[128][129] In return, Trump pledged to take measures to curb weapons trafficking to Mexico and to collaborate with Canada on a joint anti-crime “strike force”.[130][131] However, on February 27, Trump claimed “Drugs are still pouring into our Country from Mexico and Canada” and reaffirmed his tariffs,[111] leading to their implementation on March 4, 2025.[132] Canada retaliated with 25% tariffs on $20 billion (CA$30 billion) in US goods, with plans to expand to $85 billion (CA$125 billion),[133] while Mexico prepared its response for March 9.[134] The Wall Street Journal warned the tariffs had “the potential to profoundly reshape relations between the US and two of its biggest trading partners, abruptly reversing America’s decades-long project of expanding free trade with its allies.”[135]

The onset of the trade war triggered stock market declines and economic concerns, particularly for retailers and car manufacturers.[136] Lutnick quickly signaled tariff reductions. “The president is listening to the offers from Mexico and Canada. He’s thinking about trying to do something in the middle,” he said on March 5.[137] The same day, Trump delayed tariffs on USMCA-compliant automakers.[53] The next day, he extended the delay to all USMCA-compliant goods—covering 50% of Mexican and 38% of Canadian imports—until April 2.[138] The Mexican government expected the number of compliant goods would increase to 85–90% within weeks.[139] Canada said it would maintain its initial tariffs but pause planned increases.[140] Tens of thousands of Mexicans celebrated with Sheinbaum in Mexico City’s central plaza.[141]

Although the USMCA exemption was expected to expire on April 2, that day the White House announced it would continue indefinitely. However, Trump signed new orders imposing 25% tariffs on imports of steel, aluminum, automobiles, and auto parts from any country, including Canada and Mexico.[3] Canada, the US’s largest supplier of steel and aluminum, was significantly impacted by US tariffs on these products, and retaliated on March 13 with 25% tariffs on an additional $20.6 billion (CA$29.8 billion) of US goods.[142]

Europe

European Union

Before his second inauguration, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Europe unless it reduced its trade surplus with the US by increasing imports of American cars, agricultural products, and oil and gas.[143] The US and the European Union (EU) traded a record $1.6 trillion in 2023. The European Commission pointed out that while the US ran a trade deficit with the EU in goods, it was offset by a trade surplus in services.[144] On February 2, 2025, Trump told reporters he planned to impose tariffs on the European Union “pretty soon”. He also suggested tariffs on the UK “might happen” but believed “that one can be worked out”.[145]

Some EU leaders threatened immediate retaliation while others expressed concerns about reigniting global inflation.[146][147][148] “We have to do everything to avoid this totally unnecessary and stupid tariff war,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.[146] On February 4, 2025, EU trade ministers met in Warsaw to discuss the US president’s threats.[149] On February 7, 2025, the EU proposed lowering tariffs on car imports from 10% to closer to the US’ 2.5% rate and to increase purchases of American liquefied natural gas and military equipment.[150] On February 25, French President Emmanuel Macron met with Trump at the White House and aimed to persuade him to refrain from initiating a trade war with Europe and to concentrate on China instead.[151][152][153]

On March 12, after Trump’s global steel and aluminum tariffs took effect, the European Union announced a two-phase retaliatory plan.[154] Initially scheduled to begin April 1, both phases were postponed to mid-April.[155] Phase one is reinstating tariffs imposed in 2018 and 2020 in response to Trump’s first-term metal tariffs. These measures, valued at €6.3 billion in 2018 but reduced to €4.5 billion in 2025 due to Brexit and declining US-EU trade, were suspended in 2023 after negotiations with then-president Joe Biden.[156] Phase two introduces tariffs targeting €18 billion worth of US industrial and agricultural goods, including steel, aluminum, home appliances, wood products, poultry, beef, and other food imports.[154][157] Trump condemned the EU’s planned 50% tariff on US whiskey and threatened to impose 200% tariffs on European alcohol in response.[158]

In the lead-up to the imposition of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, Bernd Lange, Chairman of the INTA, proposed retaliating with “tariffs on digital services on which the US has a huge surplus”.[159]

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom chose not to retaliate against President Trump’s metal tariffs.[44] Chancellor Rachel Reeves of the Labour Party stated that discussions were “ongoing” regarding a potential reduction of the UK’s Digital Services Tax (DST) to prevent further trade disputes with the United States. Introduced in 2020, the UK’s DST imposes a 2% levy on large digital companies, generating approximately £800 million annually. The proposal to reduce the tax faced criticism from the Liberal Democrats, who condemned it as a “tax handout to Elon Musk, Zuckerberg, and other US tech barons” and instead advocated for an increase to 6%.[160]

On April 3, 2025, the UK government published a 417-page list, which asked British businesses to point to products where tariffs would hurt the UK companies the least.[161]

India

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the White House in February to negotiate tariffs and advance a deal aimed at doubling bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030.[162] India’s trade-weighted average tariff was 12%, compared to the United States’ 2.2%, leading to Trump nicknaming and repeatedly calling the country “tariff king”, “tariff abuser” and a “big abuser” of trade ties.[163][164][165] Analyses projected reciprocal tariff measures would have significant economic impacts to India. Citi Research estimated that India could lose $7 billion annually.[162] An internal Indian analysis estimated that reciprocal tariffs would affect 87% of its total exports to the US, valued at $66 billion. India estimated increases of 6% to 10% in tariffs on items such as pearls, mineral fuels, and machinery, and the $11 billion worth of pharmaceutical and automotive exports would see the highest impact.[164]

India took several steps to address trade concerns. In February, it reduced tariffs on motorcycles and whiskey, pledged to review additional tariffs, and offered to increase US energy and defense equipment imports.[162] The following month, Reuters reported that India was negotiating a trade agreement with the US and was open to lowering or eliminating tariffs on 55% of its imports from the US, valued at $23 billion, which were currently subject to tariffs ranging from 5% to 30%. India warned the offer was contingent on relief from reciprocal tariffs and said decisions were not final.[164]

Other countries

On January 26, 2025, a dispute arose between Colombia and the US after Colombian president Gustavo Petro refused to allow the landing of two US military aircraft carrying deported Colombian nationals.[166] Petro called the treatment of deportees on military flights undignified and said he would accept deportation flights on civilian planes.[167] In response, Trump ordered retaliation against Colombia and its officials,[167] including 25 percent tariffs that would increase to 50 percent in one week if Petro did not reverse his position.[168] Petro responded by ordering a 25 percent tariff on the US that would also increase to 50 percent.[167] Hours later, the US said Colombia had agreed to “unrestricted acceptance” of deportees, including on military aircraft.[169] Colombia said it would “continue to receive” deported Colombians and would guarantee them “dignified conditions.”[166]

In November 2024 and again in January 2025, Trump attempted to threaten BRICS countries saying they would face 100% tariffs if they attempted to replace the US dollar as a reserve currency.[170] On March 24, 2025, Trump threatened to impose tariffs of 25% on imports from countries that purchase oil and gas from Venezuela.[171][172]

Trump did not announce tariffs on Russia in April 2025, due to sanctions related to the Ukraine war.[173][174] The White House said that the imposed sanctions “already rendered trade between the two countries as zero.”[175]

Impacts

Markets

Immediately after Trump’s announcement on April 2, markets sunk sharply lower. In Japanese markets, the Nikkei 225 dropped 2.8% while the TOPIX dropped 3.1%.[176] In Europe, the FTSE 100 was down 1.6%, while the CAC 40 in Paris fell 3.3%. The German DAX also fell 3.1%.[177]

In the United States, stock futures tied to the S&P 500 fell 3.9%. Dow Jones Industrial Average futures fell 2.7%, and Nasdaq 100 futures fell 4.7%.[178]

On April 3, 2025, the S&P 500 Index fell over 274 points or 4.88%, the second largest daily point loss ever. This was largely attributed to the tariff announcement on “Liberation Day,” (April 2, 2025). That same day, the Nasdaq Composite fell over 1,050 points or 5.97%, the largest point loss in its history. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 1,679.39 points or 3.98%, the fifth-largest point loss in its history. The Russell 2000 entered bear market territory after falling 134.82 points or 6.59% [179]

United States

Although Trump’s first term economic policy featured lower and more targeted tariffs with many exceptions, such as an exception for Apple products, Trump promised higher rates, broader impacts, and few exceptions in his second term.[180][181] According to the Tax Foundation, the first Trump administration imposed new tariffs on approximately $380 billion worth of imports. Comparatively, the second Trump administration was expected to impact more than $1.4 trillion of imports by April 2025.[1]

At the start of his second term, confusion over rapidly fluctuating tariff levels and other economic policies created significant uncertainty for businesses and economists.[182][183] US GDP grew by 2.8% in 2024, the year before Trump’s inauguration.[184] In March 2025, the Federal Reserve lowered its 2025 growth forecast from 2.1% to 1.7%,[185] while the OECD projected a decline to 2.2% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026.[184] The Federal Reserve also increased average inflation expectations from 2.5% to 2.7%.[185] The US Dollar value also decreased massively following the announcement compared to other currencies.[186][187][188][189]

The expected impact of the threatened 25% tariffs on Mexican and Canadian goods is high. Grocery prices were expected to rise as two-thirds of US vegetable imports came from Mexico.[180] The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimated that such a tariff retained through 2029 would reduce the gross domestic product of the United States by US$200 billion.[190] According to the Budget Lab at Yale University, American households would lose approximately US$1,200 in purchasing power.[191]

The Council on Foreign Relations notes the energy sector of the American economy is expected to be among the most impacted by tariffs.[192] A 10% tariff on Canadian energy imports is expected to increase energy prices for American consumers, in part, because Canada is the biggest supplier of energy to the United States, including 61 percent of crude oil imports in 2021.[193] American refineries, particularly in the Midwest, rely on crude oil to process into gasoline, and projections indicate that gas prices could increase up to 50 cents per gallon in the region due to tariffs.[192] On February 2, 2025, Canadian company Irving Oil released a statement, noting, “The majority of the product produced at our Saint John refinery is bound for the US market… This tariff will result in price increases for our US customers and have impacts on energy security and the broader economy.”[194] During his campaign, Trump promised voters he would cut energy prices in half during his first year in office.[195]

Economist Michael Hudson has argued that the tariffs have the potential to disrupt the global economy by disrupting the balance of payments between the United States and its foreign debtors. By reducing the export trade between the United States and countries targeted by the tariffs and raising the cost of dollar-denominated goods, the US makes it more difficult for those countries to pay their dollar debts. Hudson believes this could cause a debt crisis, and compares it to the historical examples of the Latin American debt crisis and the inter-allied repayment of loans during the World Wars.[196]

Following his global tariff announcements and worldwide trade war on April 3,[197][198] the Yale Budget Lab calculated the average effective US tariff to be 22%, up from 11% before the announcement and at the highest level since 1909.[38] Inflation Insights stated the weighted average tariff rate was set to rise to around 25% to 30%, up from 2% in the prior year.[199] The Cato Institute and other economists stated that the tariffs would “approach levels not seen since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930”,[200] which The Wall Street Journal put at roughly 20% and lasted until the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947.[201] After adjusting for inflation, the tarrifs amounted to the largest tax hike in U.S. history and triple the tax increase put in place to fight World War II.[202]

China

Nomura Holdings estimated that eliminating the US de minimis exemption for Chinese goods “would slow Chinese export growth by 1.3 percentage points and GDP growth by 0.2 point”.[101] When the US Congress raised the de minimis limit from $200 to $800 in 2016, they sparked a surge in US imports of cheap Chinese goods.[101] A 2023 US House Select Committee report estimated that “nearly half” of all de minimis shipments originated from China. Chinese e-commerce companies Temu and Shein, estimated to comprise more than 30% of daily de minimis exemptions to the US, onboarded more sellers with a physical presence in the US and expanded their distribution facilities beyond China, to mitigate the impact of losing the exemption.[103][100]

On February 7, 2025, Trump suspended closing the exemption for China until the Secretary of Commerce notified him that adequate systems to process and collect tariff revenue were in place.[103] The exemption is expected to be closed again on May 3, 2025.[106]

Other countries

Ontario Premier Doug Ford stated that the tariffs would likely impact around half a million jobs in the province’s automotive industry.[190] Peterson Institute Director of Studies Marcus Nolands believed the tariffs would cause deindustrialization in Mexico.[190] Similarly, Singapore Deputy Prime and Trade and Industry Minister Gan Kim Yong, and Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong, both cited that the tariffs could impact the economic growth and cost-of-living; Gan also spoke on a press media that they are monitoring the situation and economic forecast, and implementing measures if necessary.[203][204] Singapore analysts however, weighted the tariffs with risks of a trade slowdown, but noted a benefit by being a more attractive source of imports for American buyers to seek alternatives to heavily taxed suppliers.[205]

Summary table

Enacted US tariffs

Tariff

Announced

Effective

Status

Notes

Ref

25% tariffs on steel[206] and aluminum[207] products

February 10, 2025

March 12, 2025

In effect

[50][44]

25% on canned beer and empty aluminum cans

April 2, 2025

April 4, 2025

Announced

A notice from the Department of Commerce expanded aluminum tariffs to include empty aluminum cans and canned beer.

[46]

25% on all imported automobiles

March 26, 2025

April 3, 2025

In effect

Trump used Section 232 to impose these tariffs following a 2019 investigation. Auto parts expected to be added May 3.

[57]

10% universal import duty on all goods brought into the US

April 2, 2025

April 5, 2025

Announced

[64]

“Reciprocal” tariffs

February 13, 2025

April 9, 2025

Announced

See below: Tariffs in the second Trump administration § Reciprocal tariffs by country

[60]

25% tariff on most Canadian goods

February 1, 2025

March 4, 2025

Partially in effect

Tariffs on USMCA-compliant goods are delayed indefinitely.[3] 38% of Canadian goods were compliant in 2024.[138] Potash tariff lowered to 10%.[208]

[112]

10% tariff on Canadian oil and gas

February 1, 2025

March 4, 2025

Delayed

Tariff suspended until April 2.[209]

[112]

20% tariff on all Chinese goods

February 1, 2025

February 4, 2025; Increased March 4, 2025

In effect

Increased from 10% to 20% on March 4.

[108]

25% tariff on all Mexican goods

February 1, 2025

March 4, 2025

Partially in effect

Tariffs on USMCA-compliant goods are delayed indefinitely.[3] 50% of Mexican goods were compliant in 2024, but Mexico planned to increase to 85%-90%.[139] Potash tariff lowered to 10%.

[112]

Foreign retaliation

Country/Region

Announced

Effective

Status

Notes

Ref

Canada

February 1, 2025

March 4, 2025

In effect[140]

25% on $20.8 bn (CA$30 bn) of US goods in effect. A planned expansion to an additional $86 bn (CA$125 bn) worth of US goods was suspended on March 6.[140]

[210][211]

Canada

March 12, 2025

March 13, 2025

In effect

25% tariffs on $20.6 bn (CA$29.8 bn) of US goods: $8.7 bn (CA$12.6 bn) steel products, $2 bn (CA$3 bn) aluminum products, and $9.9 bn (CA$14.2 bn) misc. goods.

[142]

China

February 1, 2025

February 4, 2025

In effect

15% tariff on coals and liquefied natural gas, 10% on oil and agricultural machines, and investigations on U.S. companies.

[109]

China

March 4, 2025

March 10, 2025

In effect

10-15% tariffs on U.S. meat and agricultural products, suspension of U.S. lumber imports, revocation of soybean import licenses for 3 U.S. firms.[116]

[114]

European Union

March 12, 2025

Mid-April

Announced

Tariffs on €4.5 bn of U.S. consumer goods (delayed from April 1[155]) and €18 bn of US steel and agricultural products mid-April.

[156]

Proposed US tariffs

25% on countries importing Venezuelan oil

March 24, 2025

April 2, 2025

Announced

Secretary of State may impose a 25% tariff on goods from any country that imports Venezuelan oil, directly or indirectly, after April 2, 2025. In 2024, China imported 68% of Venezuelan oil.

[97]

25% on auto parts

March 26, 2025

May 3, 2025

Announced

USMCA-compliant auto parts will remain tariff-free until the Commerce Secretary and CBP establish a process to apply tariffs to their non-U.S. content, expected by May 3.[212]

[57]

Digital Service Taxes (DSTs)

February 21, 2025

Trump directed USTR to initiate a Section 301 investigation into DSTs, particularly against France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the UK

[93]

Copper

February 25, 2025

Trump directed Commerce Secretary to initiate Section 232 investigation into copper imports.[213]

[214]

Timber and lumber

March 1, 2025

Trump directed Commerce Secretary to initiate a Section 232 investigation into timber and lumber imports.[213]

[213]

See also

- Tariffs in the first Trump administration

- 2025 United States trade war with Canada and Mexico

- China–United States trade war

- List of the largest trading partners of the United States

- Movements for the annexation of Canada to the United States § Proposals to annex Canada by President Donald Trump

References

External links

US government report, notably used as a prop by Donald Trump in his 2 April 2025 Rose Garden tariffs speech.

- “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump imposes tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico and China”. The White House. February 1, 2025.

- “Executive Order: Imposing duties to address the flow of illicit drugs across our northern border”. The White House. February 1, 2025.

- “Reciprocal Tariff Calculations”. Office of the United States Trade Representative. April 2025. Retrieved April 3, 2025.

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tariffs_in_the_second_Trump_administration&oldid=1283873451”

Marine Le Pen

Checked

This article is part of a series on

Conservatism in France

Ideologies

- French nationalism

- Integral

- Nouvelle Droite

- Gaullism

- Political Catholicism

- Christian democracy

- Integralism

- Ultramontanism

- Révolution nationale

- Royalism

- Bonapartism

- Legitimism

- Maurrassisme

- Orléanism

- Sarkozysm

Principles

- Anti-communism

- Catholic social teaching

- Counter-revolution

- Dirigisme

- Elitism

- Meritocracy

- Noblesse oblige

- Ethnopluralism

- Family values

- French culture

- Imperialism

- Monarchism

- Restauration

- Metapolitics

- Nativism

- Natural order

- Patriotism

- Social hierarchy

- Social order

- Souverainisme

- Traditional authority

History

- Ancien Régime

- Monarchiens

- Feuillant

- Catholic and Royal Armies

- War in the Vendée

- Thermidorian Reaction

- Chouannerie

- Chouan

- First White Terror

- Companions of Jehu

- Muscadins

- Second White Terror

- Bourbon Restoration

- Ultra-royalists

- Dreyfus affair

- Second French Empire

- Philippe Daudet affair

- Algiers putsch of 1961

- Vichy France

- 2024 The Republicans alliance crisis

Intellectuals

- Ballanche

- Bainville

- Barbey d’Aurevilly

- Barruel

- Baudelaire

- de Benoist

- Blanc de Saint-Bonnet

- Bloy

- de Bonald

- Boutang

- Bruckner

- Brunetière

- Cau

- de Chateaubriand

- Fustel de Coulanges

- Daudet

- Dumézil

- de Fabrègues

- Faye

- Freund

- Girardet

- Guénon

- de Gobineau

- Social thinking

- Houellebecq

- de Jouvenel

- de La Mennais

- Le Bon

- Lefebvre

- Lemaître

- Le Play

- Lugan

- Madiran

- de Maistre

- Morel

- Maffesoli

- Maurras

- Maulnier

- Marcel

- Nimier

- Poulat

- Rémond

- Renan

- de Rivarol

- Rueff

- Salleron

- Taine

- de Tocqueville

Literature

- Considerations on France (1796)

- Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism (1797)

- The Genius of Christianity (1802)

- The Pope (1819)

- St Petersburg Dialogues (1821)

- Democracy in America (1835)

- The Ancient City (1864)

- “What Is a Nation?” (1882)

- The Crowd (1895)

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Marion Anne Perrine “Marine” Le Pen (French: [maʁin lə pɛn]; born 5 August 1968) is a French lawyer and politician who ran for the French presidency in 2012, 2017, and 2022. A member of the right-wing populist National Rally party (RN), she served as its president from 2011 to 2021. She has been the member of the National Assembly for the 11th constituency of Pas-de-Calais since 2017. Le Pen has served as parliamentary party leader of the National Rally in the Assembly since June 2022.

Le Pen is the youngest daughter of former party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and the aunt of former FN MP Marion Maréchal. Le Pen joined the FN in 1986. She was elected as a regional councillor of Nord-Pas-de-Calais (1998–2004; 2010–2015), Île-de-France (2004–2010) and Hauts-de-France (2015–2021), a Member of European Parliament (2004–2017), as well as a municipal councillor of Hénin-Beaumont (2008–2011). She won the leadership of the FN in 2011, with 67.6% of the vote, defeating Bruno Gollnisch and succeeding her father, who had been president of the party since he founded it in 1972.[1][2][3] In 2012, she placed third in the presidential election with 17.9% of the vote, behind François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy.[4][5][6] She launched a second bid for the presidency at the 2017 election. She finished second in the first round of the election with 21.3% of the vote and faced Emmanuel Macron of centrist party En Marche! in the second round of voting. On 7 May 2017, she conceded after receiving approximately 33.9% of the vote in the second round.[7] In 2020, she announced her third candidacy for the presidency in the 2022 election. She came second in the first round of the election with 23.2% of the votes, thus qualifying her for the second round against Macron,[8] losing in the second round after receiving 41.5% of the votes.

Le Pen has led a movement of “de-demonisation of the National Front” to soften its image,[9] including limited expulsion of members accused of racism, antisemitism or Pétainism. She expelled her father from the party in August 2015, after he made fresh controversial statements.[10][11] While liberalising some political positions of the party by revoking its opposition to same-sex partnerships, its opposition to unconditional abortions, and its support for the death penalty, Le Pen still advocates many of the same historical policies of her party, with particular focus on strong anti-immigration, nationalist and protectionist measures.[12][13][14] She is supportive of economic nationalism, favouring an interventionist role of government, and is opposed to globalisation and multiculturalism. Le Pen supports limiting immigration and banning ritual slaughter.[15] She has made supportive comments of Vladimir Putin and Russia in the past, advocating closer cooperation before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; she strongly condemned the war in Ukraine, but stated Russia could become “an ally of France again” if it ends.[16][17] She has supported Israel during the Gaza war.[18][19]

Time named Le Pen one of the 100 most influential people in the world in 2011 and 2015.[20][21] In 2016, Politico named her the second-most influential MEP in the European Parliament, after President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz.[22] In January 2024, after months of rising polling numbers, and for the first time ever, Le Pen became the most popular politician in France according to a Verian-Epoka for Le Figaro Magazine.[23]

On 31 March 2025, Le Pen, eight other MEPs, and 12 assistants were convicted of embezzlement for misappropriating over €4 million European Parliament funds to fund National Front staff. The sentences for several MEPs included bans from running for political office. Le Pen was sentenced to four years in prison and a five-year ban from running for political office, effectively disqualifying her from the upcoming 2027 French presidential election. She was also fined €100,000.[24][25][26][27][28][29]

Early life and education

Childhood

Marion Anne Perrine Le Pen was born on 5 August 1968 in Neuilly-sur-Seine,[30][31] the youngest of three daughters of Jean-Marie Le Pen (1928–2025), a Breton politician and former paratrooper, and his first wife, Pierrette Le Pen. She was baptised on 25 April 1969 at La Madeleine Church in Paris. Her godfather was Henri Botey, a relative of her father.[32]

Le Pen has two sisters: Yann and Marie-Caroline. In 1976, when Marine was eight, a bomb meant for her father exploded in the stairwell outside the family’s apartment as they slept.[33] The blast ripped a hole in the outside wall of the building, but Marine, her two older sisters and their parents were unharmed.[34]

She was a student at the Lycée Florent Schmitt in Saint-Cloud. Her mother left the family in 1984 when Marine was 16. Le Pen wrote in her autobiography that the effect was “the most awful, cruel, crushing of pains of the heart: my mother did not love me”.[35] Her parents divorced in 1987.[36][37]

Legal studies and work

Le Pen studied law at Panthéon-Assas University, graduating with a Master of Laws in 1991 and a Master of Advanced Studies (DEA) in criminal law in 1992.[38] Registered at the Paris bar association, she worked as a lawyer for six years (1992–1998),[38] appearing regularly before the criminal chamber of the 23rd district court of Paris which judges immediate appearances, and often acting as a public defender. She was a member of the Paris Bar until 1998, when she joined the legal department of the National Front.

Personal life

In 1995, Le Pen married Franck Chauffroy, a business executive who worked for the National Front. She has three children with Chauffroy (Jehanne, Louis, and Mathilde).[36] After her divorce from Chauffroy in 2000, she married Eric Lorio in 2002, the former national secretary of the National Front and a former adviser to the Regional election in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The couple divorced in 2006.

From 2009 until 2019, she was in a relationship with Louis Aliot, who is of ethnic French Pied-Noir and Algerian Jewish heritage.[39] He was the National Front general secretary from 2005 to 2010, then the National Front vice president.[40] She has lived in La Celle-Saint-Cloud with her three children since September 2014. She has an apartment in Hénin-Beaumont and owns a house with Aliot in Millas.[41]

Le Pen has described herself as a non-practising Catholic.[42] Her children were baptised by a priest of the Society of Saint Pius X (FSSPX) in the Church of Saint-Nicolas du Chardonnet.[43]

Early political career

1986–2010: Rise within the National Front

Marine Le Pen joined the FN in 1986, at the age of 18. She acquired her first political mandate in 1998 when she was elected a Regional Councillor for Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In the same year, she joined the FN’s juridical branch, which she led until 2003.

In 2000, she became president of Generations Le Pen, a loose association close to the party which aimed at “de-demonising the Front National”.[36] She became a member the FN Executive Committee (French: bureau politique) in 2000, and vice-president of the FN in 2003.[36] In 2006, she managed the presidential campaign of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. She became one of the two executive vice-presidents of the FN in 2007, with responsibility for training, communication and publicity.[38]

In the 2007 parliamentary election, she contested Pas-de-Calais’ 14th constituency but came second behind incumbent Socialist MP Albert Facon.[44]

2010–11: Leadership campaign

Early in 2010, Le Pen expressed her intention to run for leader of the FN, saying that she hoped to make the party “a big popular party that addresses itself not only to the electorate on the right but to all the French people”.[3]

On 3 September 2010, she launched her leadership campaign at Cuers, Var.[45] During a meeting in Paris on 14 November 2010, she said that her goal was “not only to assemble our political family. It consists of shaping the Front National as the centre of grouping of the whole French people”, adding that in her view the FN leader should be the party’s candidate in the 2012 presidential election.[46] She spent four months campaigning for the FN leadership, holding meetings with FN members in 51 departments.[47] All the other departments were visited by one of her official supporters.[48] During her final meeting of the campaign in Hénin-Beaumont on 19 December 2010, she claimed that the FN would present the real debate of the next presidential campaign.[49][50] Her candidacy was endorsed by a majority of senior figures in the party,[48] including her father.[51][52]

On several occasions during her campaign she ruled out any political alliance with the Union for a Popular Movement.[53][54] She also distanced herself from some of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s most controversial statements,[55] such as those relating to war crimes, which was reported in the media as attempts to improve the party’s image. While her father had attracted controversy by saying that the mass murder of Jews in gas chambers during the Holocaust was “a detail of the history of World War II”, she described genocide as “the height of barbarism”.[56][57]

In December 2010 and early January 2011, FN members voted by post to elect their new president and the members of the central committee. The party held a congress at Tours on 15–16 January.[58] On 16 January 2011, Marine Le Pen was elected as the new president of the FN, with 67.65% of the vote (11,546 votes to 5,522 for Bruno Gollnisch),[38][59] and Jean-Marie Le Pen became honorary chairman.

Muslim occupation comment

Marine Le Pen received substantial media attention during the campaign as a result of comments, made during a speech to party members in Lyon on 10 December 2010, in which she compared the use of public streets and squares in French cities (in particular rue Myrha in the 18th arrondissement of Paris) for Muslim prayers with the Nazi occupation of France. She said:

For those who want to talk a lot about World War II, if it’s about occupation, then we could also talk about it (Muslim prayers in the streets), because that is occupation of territory … It is an occupation of sections of the territory, of districts in which religious laws apply … There are of course no tanks, there are no soldiers, but it is nevertheless an occupation and it weighs heavily on local residents.[60][61]

Her comments were much criticised. Government spokesman François Baroin characterised her remarks as racist and xenophobic.[62] The Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF),[63] the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM)[64] and the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA)[65] condemned her statement, and groups including MRAP (Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples)[66] and the French Human Rights League (LDH)[67] declared their intention to lodge a formal complaint. The imam of the Great Mosque of Paris and former president of the CFCM, Dalil Boubakeur, said that, while her parallel was questionable and to be condemned, she had asked a valid question.[68]

Le Pen’s partner Louis Aliot,[39] a member of the FN’s Executive Committee, criticised “the attempted manipulation of opinion by communitarian groups and those really responsible for the current situation in France”.[69] On 13 December 2010, Le Pen reasserted her statement during a press conference at the FN headquarters in Nanterre.[70][71][72] After Jean-François Kahn‘s comments on BFM TV on 13 December 2010, she accused the Élysée Palace of organising “state manipulation” with the intention of demonising her in public opinion.[73][74] On 15 December 2015, a Lyon court acquitted her of “inciting hatred”, ruling that her statement “did not target all of the Muslim community” and was protected “as a part of freedom of expression”.[75]

Leadership of the National Front/National Rally (2011–2022)

Rebranding of the National Front

Le Pen has pursued a policy of “de-demonisation” of her party, to reform its image away from the extremism associated with her father, the former leader of the party and to increase the appeal of the party to voters. This has included policy reform and personnel replacement, including the expulsion of her own father from the party in 2015. Measures aimed at de-demonisation have included dropping all references to World War II or to the French colonial wars, which is often looked on as a generation gap.[76] and distancing herself from her father’s views.[77]

Marine Le Pen in the traditional Jeanne d’Arc march, 3 May 2007

Bernard-Henri Lévy, a strong opponent of the FN, described Le Pen’s leadership of it as “far-right with a human face”.[78] The measures have also attracted criticism from former allies as making the party too mainstream, abandoning long-held policies and ignoring grassroots support.[79]

In a 2010 RTL interview, Le Pen stated that her strategy was not about changing the FN’s programme but about showing it as it really is, instead of the image given to it by the media in the previous decades. The media and her political adversaries are accused of spreading an “unfair, wrong and caricatural” image of the National Front. She refuses the qualification of far-right or extreme-right, considering it a pejorative term: “How am I party of the extreme right? … I don’t think that our propositions are extreme propositions, whatever the subject”.[37]

In 2014, the American magazine Foreign Policy mentioned her, along with four other French people, in its list of the 100 global thinkers of the year, underlining the way she “renovated the image” of her party, which had become a model for other right-wing parties in Europe after her success in the European elections.[80] At a European level, she stopped the alliance built by her father with some right-wing extremist parties and refused to be part of a group with the radical Jobbik or the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Her transnational allies share the fact that they have officially condemned antisemitism, accepted a more liberal approach toward social matters, and are sometimes pro-Israel such as the Dutch PVV. French historian Nicolas Lebourg concluded that she is looked upon as a compass for them to follow while maintaining local particularities.[81][82]

While other European populists embraced Donald Trump‘s candidacy in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, she said only, “For France, anything is better than Hillary Clinton“. However, on 8 November 2016, she posted a tweet congratulating Trump on his election.[83][non-primary source needed]

Her social programme and her support of SYRIZA in the 2015 Greek general elections led Nicolas Sarkozy to declare her a far-left politician sharing some of Jean-Luc Mélenchon‘s propositions. President François Hollande said she was talking “like a leaflet of the Communist Party“. Éric Zemmour, then known as a journalist for the conservative newspaper Le Figaro, wrote during the 2012 presidential election that the FN had become a left-wing party under the influence of adviser Florian Philippot. She has also relaxed some political positions of the party, advocating for civil unions for same-sex couples instead of her party’s previous opposition to legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, accepting current abortion laws, and withdrawing the restitution of the death penalty from her platform.[12][84][85]

Despite Le Pen’s attempts to make the National Front more palatable to the international community, the party and Le Pen herself continue to attract criticism: German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said she “will contribute to make other political forces stronger than the National Front”;[86] Israel still holds a negative opinion of her party;[87][88] and former Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage – himself a frequent critic of Islam and immigration[89][90] – has said, “I’ve never said a bad word about Marine Le Pen; I’ve never said a good word about her party”.[91]

First steps as a New leader (2011)

Supporters of Marine Le Pen in 2011

As a president of the Front National, Marine Le Pen currently sits as an ex officio member among the FN Executive Office (8 members),[92] the Executive Committee (42 members)[93] and the Central Committee (3 ex officio members, 100 elected members, 20 co-opted members).[94]

During her opening speech in Tours on 16 January 2011, she advocated to “restore the political framework of the national community” and to implement the direct democracy which enables the “civic responsibility and the collective tie” thanks to the participation of public-spirited citizens for the decisions. The predominant political theme was the uncompromising defence of a protective and efficient state, which favours secularism, prosperity and liberties. She also denounced the “Europe of Brussels” which “everywhere imposed the destructive principles of ultra-liberalism and free trade, at the expense of public utilities, employment, social equity and even our economic growth which became within twenty years the weakest of the world”.[95] After the traditional Joan of Arc march and Labour Day march in Paris on 1 May 2011, she gave her first speech in front of 3,000 supporters.[96][97]

On 10 and 11 September 2011, she made her political comeback with the title “the voice of people, the spirit of France” in the convention centre of Acropolis in Nice.[98] During her closing speech she addressed immigration, insecurity, the economic and social situation, reindustrialization and ‘strong state’.[99] During a demonstration held in front of the Senate on 8 December 2011, she expressed in a speech her “firm and absolute opposition” to the right of foreigners to vote.[100] She regularly held thematic press conferences[101] and interventions[102] on varied issues in French, European and international politics.

First presidential candidacy (2011–2012)

Main articles: French presidential election, 2012 and Marine Le Pen presidential campaign, 2012

Le Pen on 19 November 2011 in Paris announcing her presidential candidacy (top) and singing “La Marseillaise” at the conclusion of her presentation (bottom)

On 16 May 2011, Marine Le Pen’s presidential candidacy was unanimously approved by the FN Executive Committee.[103] On 10 and 11 September 2011, she launched her presidential campaign in Nice.[99] On 6 October 2011, she held a press conference to introduce the members of her presidential campaign team.[104]

In a speech in Paris on 19 November 2011, Le Pen presented the main themes of her presidential campaign: sovereignty of the people and democracy, Europe, re-industrialisation and a strong state, family and education, immigration and assimilation versus communitarianism, geopolitics and international politics.[105][106][107] At a press conference on 12 January 2012,[108] she presented a detailed assessment of her presidential project,[109] and a plan to reduce France’s debt.[110] At another press conference on 1 February 2012, she outlined her policies for the overseas departments and territories of France.[111] Many observers noted her tendency to focus on economic and social issues such as globalisation and delocalisations, rather than immigration or law and order, which had until then been the central issues for the FN. On 11 December 2011, she held her first campaign meeting in Metz,[112][113] and from early January to mid-April 2012, she held similar meetings each week in the major French cities. On 17 April 2012, between 6,000 and 7,000 people participated part in her final campaign meeting, held at the Zenith in Paris.[114][115]

On 13 March 2012, she announced that she had collected the 500 signatures required to take part in the presidential election.[116][117] On 19 March 2012, the Constitutional Council approved her candidacy, and those of nine competitors.[4] On 22 April 2012, she polled 17.90% (6,421,426 votes) in the first round, finishing in third position behind François Hollande and incumbent president Nicolas Sarkozy.[5][6] She achieved better results, in both percentage vote-share and number of votes, than her father had in the 2002 presidential election (16.86%, 4,804,772 votes in the first round; 17.79%, 5,525,034 votes in the run-off).[118]

Marine Le Pen during her presidential campaign, on 15 April 2012

First round results in 2012: candidates with the most votes by departments (mainland France, overseas and French citizens living abroad). Marine Le Pen came first in Gard.

Le Pen polled first in Gard (25.51%, 106,646 votes), with Sarkozy and Hollande polling 24.86% (103,927 votes) and 24.11% (100,778 votes) respectively.[6][119] She also came first in her municipal stronghold of Hénin-Beaumont (35.48%, 4,924 votes), where Hollande and Sarkozy polled 26.82% (3,723 votes) and 15.76% (2,187 votes) respectively.[120] She achieved her highest results east of the line from Le Havre in the north to Perpignan in the south,[121] and conversely she won fewer votes in western France, especially cities such as Paris, overseas and among French citizens living abroad (5.95%, 23,995 votes).[122] However, she polled well in two rural departments in western France: Orne (20.00%, 34,757 votes)[123] and Sarthe (19.17%, 62,516 votes).[124]

Her highest regional result was in Picardy (25.03%, 266,041 votes),[125] her highest departmental result in Vaucluse (27.03%, 84,585 votes),[126] and her highest overseas result in Saint Pierre and Miquelon (15.81%, 416 votes).[127]

First round results 2012: candidates with the most votes by municipalities in metropolitan France (dark gray: Marine Le Pen)

She achieved her lowest regional result in Île-de-France (12.28%, 655,926 votes),[128] her lowest departmental result in Paris (6.20%, 61,503 votes),[129] and her lowest overseas result in Wallis and Futuna (2.37%, 152 votes).[130]

French sociologist Sylvain Crépon, who analysed the social and occupational groups of the FN voters in 2012, explained: “The FN vote is made up of the victims of globalisation. It is the small shopkeepers who are going under because of the economic crisis and competition from the out-of-town hypermarkets; it is low-paid workers from the private sector; the unemployed. The FN scores well among people living in poverty, who have a real fear about how to make ends meet”.[121] Crépon also analysed the increase of the FN vote in “rural” areas and the recent sociological changes in these areas made up of small provincial towns and new housing-estate commuter belts built on the distant outskirts of the cities: “The rural underclass is no longer agricultural. It is people who have fled the big cities and the inner suburbs because they can no longer afford to live there. Many of these people will have had recent experience of living in the banlieues (high immigration suburbs) – and have had contact with the problems of insecurity”.[121] Commentators also pointed that there were more young people and women voting for the party in 2012.[121]

On 1 May 2012, during a speech delivered in Paris after the traditional Joan of Arc and Labor Day march, Le Pen refused to back either Sarkozy or Hollande in the run-off on 6 May. Addressing the party’s annual rally at Place de l’Opéra, she vowed to cast a blank ballot and told her supporters to vote with their conscience, saying: “Hollande and Sarkozy – neither of them will save you. On Sunday I will cast a blank protest vote. I have made my choice. Each of you will make yours”. Accusing both candidates of surrendering to Europe and financial markets, she asked: “Who between Francois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy will impose the austerity plan in the most servile way? Who will submit the best to the instructions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) or the European Commission?”.[131]

Electoral results (2012–2016)

Following the increase in support for the FN in the presidential election, Le Pen announced the formation an electoral coalition to contest the June 2012 parliamentary elections called the Blue Marine Gathering. Standing as a candidate in the Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency, Le Pen won 42.36% of the vote, well ahead of the Socialist representative Philippe Kemel (23.50%) and far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon (21.48%). She was defeated by Kemel in the second round with 49.86% and filed an appeal with the Constitutional Council, which was rejected despite an observation of some irregularities. Nationally, the FN had two lawmakers elected: Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal and Gilbert Collard.

In 2014, Le Pen led the party to further electoral advances in the municipal and senatorial elections: eleven mayors and two senators were elected, with the FN entering the upper chamber for the first time.

France’s regional elections in 2015

On 24 May 2014, the FN received the most votes in the European elections in France, with a 24.90% share. Marine Le Pen came in first place in her North-West constituency with 33.60%. 25 FN representatives were elected to the European Parliament from France. They voted against the Juncker Commission when it was formed in July 2014. One year later, Le Pen announced the formation of Europe of Nations and Freedom, a parliamentary grouping composed of the National Front, the Freedom Party of Austria, Lega Nord of Italy, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Congress of the New Right from Poland, the Flemish Vlaams Belang of Belgium, and British independent MEP Janice Atkinson, formerly of UKIP. Le Pen’s first attempt to assemble this grouping in 2014 had failed due to UKIP and the Sweden Democrats refusing to join, as well as some controversial statements from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Le Pen sat on the commission for international trade. In 2016, Politico ranked her as the second most influential MEP after Martin Schulz.

In April 2015, Le Pen’s father gave two interviews including controversial statements about World War II and about minorities in France, causing a political crisis in the FN. Marine Le Pen organised a postal vote to ask FN members to change the party’s statutes to expel her father. J-M Le Pen pursued his movement and the justice cancelled the vote. On 25 August, the FN executive office voted to expel him from the party he had founded forty years earlier. Marine’s dependence on her closest adviser, Florian Philippot, a former left-wing technocrat, was observed. The party instigated a purge to expel the members who had opposed the changes within the FN under Marine Le Pen’s leadership.

Le Pen subsequently announced her candidacy for the presidency of the regional council of Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie in the 2015 regional elections, though she expressed her regret over the proximity of these elections to the next presidential election. On 6 December, she finished first with 40.6% of the vote, but the Socialist candidate (third with 18.12%) withdrew and declared support for her right-wing opponent Xavier Bertrand, who won with 57.80% of the vote. Her niece Marion also lost, under similar circumstances, by a smaller margin.

Second presidential candidacy (2016–2017)

Main article: French presidential election, 2017

Leading candidate in polls

Marine Le Pen’s 2017 campaign logo

Marine Le Pen announced her candidacy for the 2017 French presidential election on 8 April 2016. She appointed FN Senator David Rachline as her campaign manager. The FN had difficulty finding funding because of the refusal of French banks to provide credit. Instead, the FN borrowed €9 million from the First Czech-Russian Bank in Moscow in 2014, despite European Union sanctions placed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea. In February 2016, the FN asked Russia for another loan, this time of €27 million, but the second loan was not paid.[16]

Marine Le Pen during her presidential campaign, on 26 March 2017

Political analysts suggested that Le Pen’s strong position in opinion polls was due to the absence of a primary in her party (consolidating her leadership), the news of the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in France (reinforcing her political positions) and the very right-wing campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy in the Republican primary (enlarging her themes). In a 2016 interview with the BBC, Le Pen said that Donald Trump‘s victory in the US presidential election would help her, saying that Trump had “made possible what had previously been presented as impossible”.[132] However, she said she would not officially launch her campaign before February 2017, waiting for the results of the Republican and Socialist primaries, and preferred to keep a low media profile and use thematic think tanks to expand and promote her political programme. As a result, her rare media appearances attracted large audiences (2.3 million viewers for Vie politique on TF1 on 11 September 2016 and 4 million for Une ambition intime on M6 on 16 October).

The FN’s communications also received media attention: a new Mitterrand-inspired poster depicting her in a rural landscape with the slogan “Appeased France” was a response to surveys indicating that she remained controversial for large parts of the French electorate. Satirical treatment of this poster led to the slogan being changed to: “In the name of the people”. Meanwhile, the FN logo and the name Le Pen were removed from campaign posters.

Le Pen launched her candidacy on 4 and 5 February 2017 in Lyon, promising a referendum on France’s membership of the European Union if she could not achieve her territorial, monetary, economic and legislative goals for the country within six months renegotiation with the EU. Her first campaign appearance on television, four days later, received the highest viewing figures on France 2 since the previous presidential election (16.70% with 3.7 million viewers).[133] Her 2017 presidential campaign emphasised Le Pen as a softer, feminine figure, with a blue rose as a prominent campaign symbol.[134]

Campaign

Main article: 2017 Marine Le Pen presidential campaign

On 2 March 2017, the European Parliament voted to revoke Le Pen’s immunity from prosecution for tweeting violent imagery. Le Pen had tweeted an image of beheaded journalist James Foley in December 2015, which was deleted following a request from Foley’s family. Le Pen also faced prosecution for allegedly spending EU Parliament funds on her own political party; the lifting of her immunity from prosecution did not apply to the ongoing investigation into the misuse of parliamentary funds by the FN.[135]

Marine Le Pen and Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 24 March 2017

Le Pen met with several incumbent heads of state including Lebanon’s Michel Aoun,[136] Chad’s Idriss Déby,[137] and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.[138]

The ground floor of the building which housed Le Pen’s campaign headquarters was targeted by an arson attempt during the early morning of 13 April 2017.[139][140]

In 2017, Le Pen argued that France as a nation bore no responsibility for the Vel’ d’Hiv Roundup, in which Paris policemen arrested Jewish citizens for deportation to Auschwitz as part of the Holocaust. She repeated a Gaullist thesis according to which France was not represented by the Vichy regime, but by Charles de Gaulle‘s Free France.[141]

On 20 April 2017, in the wake of a shooting targeting police officers which was being treated as a suspected terrorist attack, Le Pen cancelled a planned campaign event. The next day, she called for the closure of all “extremist” mosques, a remark that was criticised by Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, who accused her of attempting to “capitalise” on the incident. She also called for the expulsion of hate preachers and people on the French security services’ watch list, and the revocation of their citizenship. The Guardian said the attack could serve as “ammunition” for right-wing candidates in the election, including Le Pen.[142]

On 21 April 2017, United States President Donald Trump wrote on Twitter that the shooting would have “a big effect on the presidential election”.[143] Later that day, Trump said that Le Pen was the “strongest on borders, and she’s the strongest on what’s been going on in France”.[144] Meanwhile, former US President Barack Obama phoned Emmanuel Macron to express his support.[145]

Second round

Results of the first round of the 2017 presidential election. Departments in which Le Pen received the largest share of the vote are shaded dark blue.

Le Pen won 21.3% of the vote (7.7 million votes) in the first round of the election on 23 April 2017, placing her second behind Macron, who received 24.0%,[146] meaning that they would face each other in the run-off on 7 May. On 24 April 2017, the day after the first round of voting, Le Pen announced that she would temporarily step down as the leader of the FN in an attempt to unite voters.[147] “The President of the Republic is the president of all the French people, they must bring them all together”, she said.[148][non-primary source needed]

After progressing to the second round, she said that the campaign was now “a referendum for or against France” and tried to convince those voting for the hard-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon to support her. This choice was later criticised by those in her party who believed that she had abandoned François Fillon‘s voters in spite of their conservative and anti-immigration stance. On 1 May 2017, a video emerged of Le Pen copying sections of a speech by Francois Fillon word-for-word.[149]

In the first days of the second round campaign, the gap in opinion polls began to narrow. On 25 April, Le Pen went to Amiens in an unexpected visit to meet workers at the Whirlpool factory while Macron was in a meeting with local officials at the same time, with Le Pen receiving a positive welcome. Macron then also visited the factory workers, but was booed by a hostile crowd.

Le Pen was generally regarded as the loser of the televised debate between the two candidates. Her performance was strongly criticised by politicians, commentators, and members of her own party, and described as a “sabotage” by conservative journalist Éric Zemmour. Le Pen herself subsequently acknowledged that she had “misfired” during the debate. In the following days, she began to slip in opinion polls.

On 7 May, she conceded defeat to Emmanuel Macron. Her vote share of 33.9% was lower than any polls had predicted, and was attributed to her poor performance in the debate. She immediately announced a “full transformation” of the FN in the following months.[7]

Member of the National Assembly: 2017–present

On 18 May 2017, Le Pen announced that she would run as a candidate at the parliamentary elections in the Pas-de-Calais’s 11th constituency, in her fifth attempt to be elected as a deputy. She received just under 46% of the vote in the first round, and won the second with just under 58% against Anne Roquet of En Marche. She became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly. She then resigned as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP).[150]

In 2019, it was reported that Le Pen no longer wants France to leave the European Union, nor for it to leave the euro currency. Instead, it was reported she and her party wants to change the EU bloc from the inside along with allied parties.[151]

On 4 July 2021, she was elected again to lead the National Rally with no opposing candidate.[152]

Third presidential candidacy and legislative election (2022)

Results of the first round of the 2022 presidential election. Departments in which Le Pen received the largest share of the vote are shaded dark blue.

Results of the second round of the 2022 legislative election. Constituencies in which Le Pen’s party won the election are shaded dark blue.

In January 2020, Le Pen announced her third candidacy for president of France in the 2022 presidential election.[153] On 15 January 2022, she launched her campaign.

In February 2022, during Le Pen’s presidential campaign, Stéphane Ravier, the only Senator from her political party, publicly endorsed her far-right presidential rival Zemmour.[154]

During the first round of the election, Le Pen won second place, with 23.15% of the votes.[8] On 22 April, she participated in a televised debate against Macron.[155] She was defeated in a run-off against Emmanuel Macron on 24 April: on this occasion, she obtained 41.45% of the votes, the highest share of the vote for a nationalist candidate in French history.[156]

It was remarked that a Є10.6 million loan provided by the Hungarian bank MKB Bank chaired by Lőrinc Mészáros, a close ally of Viktor Orbán, was used to finance her presidential campaign.[157] The transaction depended on Orban to be completed; normally the bankers would not have done it.[158]

During the 2022 French legislative election which followed soon after, she led her party into winning its highest number of seats in the National Assembly since its founding, RN eventually becoming the largest opposition party in Parliament.[159] Days later, she was elected by acclamation as leader of the parliamentary National Rally party in the Assembly, a position she currently holds.

Standing down

In November 2022 Le Pen stood down from chairing the National Rally. She was succeeded by Jordan Bardella who had previously acted as the party’s interim leader during her presidential campaign.[160]

Political positions

Main article: Political positions of Marine Le Pen

Le Pen with Spanish politician Santiago Abascal, 28 January 2022

Le Pen at the March for the Republic and Against Antisemitism in Paris, 12 November 2023

Immigration and multiculturalism

Further information: Immigration to France

Le Pen and the RN advocate a tough line on immigration, believing that multiculturalism has failed,[161] and oppose what they see as the “Islamisation” of France.[162] Le Pen has called for a moratorium on legal immigration.[163] She would repeal laws allowing illegal immigrants to become legal residents,[99] and has argued that benefits provided to immigrants be reduced to remove incentives for new immigrants.[164] Following the beginning of the Arab Spring and the European migrant crisis, she called for France to withdraw from the Schengen Area and reinstate border controls.[165][166]

She supports restrictions on ritual slaughter.

Le Pen took part in the March for the Republic and Against Antisemitism in Paris on 12 November 2023 in response to the rise in antisemitism since the start of the Gaza war.[167]

Economic policy

On energy, Le Pen advocates a policy of energy independence for France, with a strong emphasis on support for nuclear and hydroelectric power. Le Pen is strongly opposed to wind energy due to its intermittency, tax burden in utility bills and impact on the landscape and built heritage. She is proposing a moratorium on new wind energy development on both sea and land from 2022 and the eventual dismantling of all current wind turbines.[168] Le Pen favours protectionism as an alternative to free trade.[46] She supports economic nationalism,[169] the separation of investment and retail banking,[170] and energy diversification,[171] and is opposed to the privatisation of public services and social security,[172] speculation on international commodity markets,[172] and is opposed to the Common Agricultural Policy.[173] Le Pen also supports maintaining France’s system of sectoral bargaining and opposed Macron’s reforms of the labour code.[174]

Le Pen is opposed to globalisation, which she blames for various negative economic trends, and opposes European Union supranationalism and federalism, instead favouring a loosely confederate ‘Europe of the Nations’.[175] As of 2019, she no longer advocates for France to leave the EU or euro currency;[151] she had previously called both for France to leave the Eurozone[176] and for a referendum on France leaving the EU.[177] She has been a vocal opponent of the Treaty of Lisbon,[178] and opposes EU membership for Turkey and Ukraine.[179][180] She proposes the replacement of the World Trade Organization[181][182] and the abolition of the International Monetary Fund.[183]

Foreign policy

On foreign policy, Le Pen has criticised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[184] She also criticised the privileged relations that France maintains with countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which she said are helping to fund and arm Islamist fundamentalists,[185] while encouraging closer ties with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, which she said “fight fundamentalism”.[186] She has said she believes that Ukraine has been “subjugated” by the United States.[187] She was strongly critical of NATO policy in the region, of Eastern European anti-Russian sentiment,[187] and of threatened economic sanctions.[180] In response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Le Pen criticised Russia’s action despite her previous pro-Russia stance.[188] She advocated welcoming Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.[189] She has stated that if elected she would remove France from NATO’s integrated military command.[190] In October 2023, she condemned Hamas‘ actions during the Gaza war and expressed her support to Israel and its right to self-defence.[191][192] In May 2024, she officially met with an Israeli government minister for the first time.[193]

Other issues

Regarding feminism, Le Pen often says she identifies as a feminist in the context of defending women’s rights and improving women’s lives, although she is critical of what she calls “neo-feminism”, which she characterises as women going to war against men.[194][195][non-primary source needed]

Media image

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (August 2023)

National media

Marine Le Pen in May 2005

Le Pen’s appearances on television and radio have played an important role in her political career, and her political activities are regularly covered in the French media.[196][197]

During an appearance on the programme Mots croisés (Crossed Words) on France 2 on 5 October 2009,[198] Le Pen quoted sections of Frédéric Mitterrand‘s autobiographical novel The Bad Life, accusing him of having sex with underage boys and engaging in sex tourism, and demanding his resignation as Minister of Culture.[199][200] According to French political commentator Jérôme Fourquet, the Mitterrand case was Le Pen’s media breakthrough.[201]

Le Pen appeared several times on À vous de juger (You Be The Judge), a political discussion show on France 2 hosted by journalist and commentator Arlette Chabot. In her first appearance, on 14 January 2010, Marine Le Pen appeared opposite Éric Besson, then-Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Mutually Supportive Development.[202]

Marine Le Pen in 2008

In her first appearance as a main guest on À vous de juger, on 9 December 2010, she was questioned on economic, social and immigration issues by Chabot and political commentator Alain Duhamel; she then took part in debates, first with the socialist Mayor of Évry Manuel Valls and then Rachida Dati, Minister of Justice.[203] The broadcast was viewed by 3,356,000 viewers (14.6% of the television audience),[204] the highest viewing figures for 2010 and the fourth highest since the series first aired in September 2005.[205]

In December 2010, French journalist Guillaume Tabard described Le Pen as the “revelation of the year”, and as “first an electoral phenomenon” and “a media phenomenon after”.[206]

À vous de juger was replaced on France 2 by Des paroles et des actes (Words and Acts), hosted by journalist and anchorman David Pujadas. In her first appearance as a main guest on 23 June 2011, Le Pen appeared opposite Cécile Duflot, national secretary of The Greens.[207][208] The broadcast was viewed by 3,582,000 viewers (15.1% of the television audience at the time).[209][210]

Le Pen has also appeared on Parole directe (Direct Speech) on TF1, hosted by Laurence Ferrari and political commentator François Bachy. Her first appearance as a sole guest on 15 September 2011 was viewed by an average of 6 million viewers (23.3% of the television audience) with a peak of 7.3 million in the second half of the programme.[211][212]

International media

Le Pen has appeared in the news media of other European countries,[37][213] Russia,[214] the Middle East,[215] and the United States.[216][217] She appeared on Quebec web-radio station Rockik in December 2008,[218] Radio Canada in May 2010,[219] and the Israeli radio station 90FM in March 2011.[220] In March 2011, she appeared on the front cover of The Weekly Standard magazine.[221] She spoke to international journalists at a press conference on 13 January 2012, organised by the European American Press Club.[222]

On 21 April 2011, she was featured in the 2011 Time 100[20] with a commentary from Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and vice chairman of the State Duma.[223]

In October 2011, she launched her book “Pour que vive la France” in Verona, Italy, and met Assunta Almirante, the widow of Giorgio Almirante, leader of the far-right Italian Social Movement (MSI).[224]

In February 2013, she spoke at the Cambridge Union Society, the debating society of the University of Cambridge. Her appearance sparked controversy, with anti-fascist group Unite Against Fascism opposing her invitation on a No Platform basis and organising a demonstration outside the venue, attended by around 200 people.[225][226] The protests were supported by numerous Cambridge societies, including Cambridge University Students’ Union and Cambridge University Labour Club; other groups, such as the Cambridge Libertarians, supported her invitation.[227]

Legal issues

In October 2023, Le Pen was convicted of committing defamation against French NGO Cimade when she accused the organisation in a January 2022 television interview of being “accomplices to smugglers” and being involved in an “illegal immigration network from the Comoros” in Mayotte.[228] She was ordered to pay €500 and to also sustain court costs.[228]

National Front assistants affair

Main article: National Front assistants affair

In December 2023, Le Pen was ordered to stand trial after she was charged with paying National Front party officials through funds earmarked for European Parliament assistants.[229] Twenty-seven others, including her father Jean Marie, served as her co-defendants.[230] Her trial, for misappropriation of public funds, was scheduled in March 2024 to occur between 30 September and 27 November the same year.[231][232]

On 31 March 2025, eight MEPs, 12 assistants from the National Rally, and Le Pen were found guilty of embezzling European Union funds by a Paris court.[25][26][27][28] Le Pen received a four-year prison sentence, two years of which were suspended, in addition to a €100,000 fine. She did not begin serving the two years’ house arrest immediately as all appeals must be exhausted before this part of the sentence is executed. Similarly, she did not lose her seat in the lower house of the French parliament immediately.[233] On the other hand, the court also banned her, effective immediately, from standing for political office for five years, making her ineligible to run in the 2027 French presidential election.[234]

Elections contested

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (August 2023)

European elections

In the 2004 European Parliament election, Le Pen led the FN list in the Île-de-France constituency. The list polled 8.58% (234,893 votes), winning one of fourteen available seats.[235]

In the 2009 European parliament election, Le Pen led the FN list in the North-West France constituency. The party polled 10.18% (253,009 votes),[236] the highest FN vote share of French constituencies, and won one of the ten seats.[237] The FN’s constituency list received its highest regional result in Picardy (12.57%, 63,624 votes),[238] its highest departmental result in Aisne (13.40%, 19,125 votes),[239] and its highest municipal results in Pas-de-Calais: Hénin-Beaumont (27.92%, 1,799 votes),[240] Courcelles-lès-Lens (26.57%),[241] Noyelles-Godault (24.72%).[242]

Parliamentary elections

Paris in 1993

Le Pen first stood for parliament in the 1993 legislative election, in Paris’ 16th constituency (17th arrondissement of Paris). She finished third with 11.10% (3,963 votes), and Bernard Pons (UDR) was re-elected as the MP with 63.14% (22,545 votes) in the first round.[243]

Lens in 2002

She stood in the 2002 election in Pas-de-Calais’ 13th constituency, Lens, an economically deprived socialist stronghold. Le Pen polled 24.24% (10,228 votes) in the first round, qualifying for the run-off against socialist Jean-Claude Bois, in which Le Pen received 32.30% (12,266 votes); Bois was re-elected as the MP with 67.70% (27,510 votes).[244]

Hénin-Beaumont in 2007

Marine Le Pen during a presidential rally in Lille, 25 February 2007

In the 2007 election, Le Pen and her substitute Steeve Briois[clarification needed] stood for the FN in the Pas-de-Calais’ 14th constituency, Hénin-Beaumont, a former coal mining area with high unemployment. Le Pen expressed the view that due to unemployment, offshoring and insecurity, the constituency symbolised the major problems of France.[245] Le Pen’s campaign committee was led by Daniel Janssens, who had previously served for 24 years as the socialist deputy mayor of Leforest.

Le Pen finished second of fourteen candidates in the first round with 24.47% (10,593 votes), behind incumbent Socialist MP Albert Facon with 28.24% (12,221 votes).[246] Le Pen was the only FN candidate in France to qualify for the run-off.[247] After the first round, Le Pen was endorsed by Gaullist politicians Alain Griotteray and Michel Caldaguès and the souverainiste MEP Paul-Marie Coûteaux.[248]

In the run-off, Le Pen received 41.65% (17,107 votes), and Facon was re-elected as the MP with 58.35% (23,965 votes).[246] Her strongest results came in Courcelles-lès-Lens (48.71%),[249] Noyelles-Godault (47.85%),[250] and Hénin-Beaumont (44.54%, 4,729 votes).[251] According to political analysts, Le Pen’s strong showing in the constituency was a result of economic and social issues like de-industrialisation, unemployment and a feeling of abandonment, rather than immigration or security.[247]

Hénin-Beaumont in 2012

In the 2012 election, Le Pen, now leader of the FN, stood in Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency, which now contained Henin-Beaumont following redistricting, where she had got her best results in the presidential election.[252] Her opponents were Philippe Kemel and Jean-Luc Mélenchon.[253] She finished first in the first round on 10 June 2012, with 42.36% (22,280 votes),[254] and was defeated in the second round by Philippe Kemel.

In 2014, the Criminal Court of Bethune found Marine Le Pen guilty of electoral fraud, for producing and distributing flyers during the 2012 election purporting to be from electoral opponent Jean-Luc Mélenchon, calling for ‘Arab’ votes. She was ordered to pay a €10,000 fine.[255][256][257]

Hénin-Beaumont in 2017

In the 2017 French legislative election, Le Pen once again stood in Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency. She finished first in the first round on 11 June 2017, with 46.02% (19,997 votes), and won the seat in the second round with 58.60% (22,769 votes) over Anne Roquet of La République En Marche!.

Hénin-Beaumont in 2022

In the 2022 French legislative election, Le Pen stood for re-election in Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency. She finished first in the first round on 12 June 2022, with 53.96% (21,219 votes), and won the seat again in the second round with 61.03% (22,301 votes) over Marine Tondelier of Europe Ecology – The Greens.

Hénin-Beaumont in 2024

Le Pen once again stood for re-election in Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency in the 2024 French legislative election.

Regional elections

Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1998

Main article: French regional elections, 1998

In the 1998 elections, she was included in the FN list in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and was a regional councillor for six years (1998–2004).[36]

Île-de-France in 2004

Main article: French regional elections, 2004

In the 2004 elections, she led the FN regional list in Île-de-France and the departmental list in Hauts-de-Seine.

Her list polled 12.26% (448,983 votes) in the first round and achieved 10.11% (395,565 votes) with fifteen councillors elected in the run-off.[258][259]

Le Pen led the regional group for five years, stepping down in February 2009 to concentrate on the European election campaign in the North-West France constituency.[260] A member of the standing committee, she led opposition to the left-wing regional executive managed by Jean-Paul Huchon.

Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 2010

Main article: French regional elections, 2010

In the 2010 elections, Marine Le Pen led the FN regional list in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the departmental list in Pas-de-Calais.[261]

In the first round, her list polled 18.31% (224.871 votes) and finished in third position in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.[262] In Pas-de-Calais, her list polled 19.81% (96,556 votes), ahead of the UMP (15.91%, 77,550 votes),[263] and won by a large margin in Hénin-Beaumont (39.08%, 2,949 votes).[264] Le Pen’s list achieved the second-highest result of FN regional lists in the country, behind her father Jean-Marie Le Pen’s list in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, which received 20.30% (296,283 votes).[265] In Pas-de-Calais, she received a higher share of the vote than Jean-Marie Le Pen had received in the first round of the 2002 presidential election (18.41%, 135,330 votes).[266]

In the run-off, her list polled 22.20% (301,190 votes) in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, finishing in third position.[262] Eighteen FN councillors were elected among the 113 of Nord-Pas-de-Calais’ regional council.[267] Le Pen’s list had the second highest vote share of FN regional lists in France, behind Jean-Marie Le Pen’s list which received 22.87% (387,374 votes) with 21 councillors elected.[265] In Pas-de-Calais, her list polled 24.37% (130,720 votes), finishing ahead of the UMP (22.63%, 121,365 votes),[263] and achieved its highest municipal results in Hénin-Beaumont (44.23%, 3,829 votes)[264] and Courcelles-lès-Lens (40.60%).[268] Her list achieved the second-highest departmental FN result in the country behind Vaucluse (26.54%).[269] Her regional vote share and the vote share in Pas-de-Calais were higher than those of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the run-off of the 2002 presidential election (21.89%, 445,357 votes;[270] 22.17%, 170,967 votes).[266]

Le Pen’s success in these elections reinforced her internal position within the FN. As a member of the standing committee and a president of the regional group (Front National/Gathering for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais), she led opposition to the left-wing regional executive managed by Daniel Percheron.

Municipal elections

Marine Le Pen and Steeve Briois holding a press conference at Hénin-Beaumont, Pas-de-Calais, for the launch of the 2008 municipal election

Hénin-Beaumont in 2008

Main article: French municipal elections, 2008

Since 2001, Gérard Dalongeville has been the Mayor of Hénin-Beaumont, an economically deprived town in a former coal mining area.

A municipal councillor since 1995,[271] Steeve Briois led the FN list with Marine Le Pen in second position. The FN list came second with 28.53% (3,650 votes) in the first round and achieved 28.83% (3,630 votes) with five councillors elected in the run-off.[272][273]

Following the election, Briois and Le Pen sat in opposition against the re-elected mayor Gérard Dalongeville and his first vice-mayor Marie-Noëlle Lienemann.

2009 Hénin-Beaumont by-election

Main article: 2009 municipal by-election in Hénin-Beaumont

A municipal by-election was held in Hénin-Beaumont on 28 June and 5 July 2009. As in 2008, Steeve Briois was the FN top candidate with Le Pen in second position.

The FN list led by a large margin after the first round, with 39.33% (4,485 votes), and received 47.62% (5,504 votes) in the run-off, with eight councillors elected,[274] though the FN again failed to win the municipality.[275]

Briois, Le Pen and the six other FN councillors formed the opposition against the new mayor Daniel Duquenne and his successor Eugène Binaisse.

On 24 February 2011, Le Pen resigned as a municipal councillor because of the law on the accumulation of mandates (“cumul des mandats“).[276] In a letter entitled “I stay in Hénin-Beaumont!”, she expressed the view that her political activities would be more effective for the city at regional and European levels than in the municipal council.[277]

Political mandates

Local mandates

- Regional councillor of Nord-Pas-de-Calais: (15 March 1998 – 28 March 2004); since 26 March 2010: member of the standing committee, leader of the FN group.

- Regional councillor of Île-de-France (28 March 2004 – 21 March 2010): member of the standing committee, leader of the FN group until February 2009.

- Municipal councillor of Hénin-Beaumont (23 March 2008 – 24 February 2011).

European mandates

Member of the European Parliament in the Île-de-France constituency (20 July 2004 – 13 July 2009): Non-Inscrits (20 July 2004 – 14 January 2007/14 November 2007 – 13 July 2009); Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (15 January 2007 – 13 November 2007).

- Member: Committee on Culture and Education (21 July 2004 – 14 January 2007/15 January 2007 – 30 January 2007), Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (31 January 2007 – 13 July 2009), Delegation for relations with Israel (15 September 2004 – 13 March 2007/14 March 2007 – 13 July 2009)

- Substitute: Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (21 July 2004 – 14 January 2007/31 January 2007 – 13 July 2009), Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand (15 March 2007 – 13 July 2009)[278]

Member of the European Parliament in the North-West France constituency: Non-Inscrits (14 July 2009 – 16 June 2015); ENF

- Member: Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (since 16 July 2009), Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (since 16 September 2009)

- Substitute: Committee on International Trade (since 16 July 2009), Delegation for relations with Canada (16 September 2009 – 14 November 2010)[278][279]

Bibliography

- À contre flots, Jacques Grancher, 2006 ISBN 2-7339-0957-6 (autobiography) (in French)

- Pour que vive la France, Jacques Grancher, 2012, 260 pages (in French)

Notes

References

External links

Wikiquote has quotations related to Marine Le Pen.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Marine Le Pen.

- Official website

- Fan Club of Marine Le Pen in France Archived 12 July 2022 at the Wayback Machine

- Profile on the European Parliament’s official website

- Cross, Tony (4 May 2012) [3 May 2012]. “Has Marine Le Pen Made France’s Front National Respectable?”. RFI English. Retrieved 29 April 2017.

- Appearances on C-SPAN

Party political offices

Preceded by
Jean-Marie Le Pen

Leader of the National Front

2011–present

Incumbent

National Front nominee for President of France

2012 • 2017 • 2022

Most recent

New office

Chair of Europe of Nations and Freedom

2015–2017

Served alongside: Marcel de Graaff

Succeeded by
Nicolas Bay

European Parliament

New constituency

Member of the European Parliament

for Île-de-France

2004–2009

Succeeded by
Pervenche Berès

Preceded by
Carl Lang

Member of the European Parliament

for North-West France

2009–2017

Succeeded by
Christelle Lechevalier

National Assembly of France

Preceded by
Philippe Kemel

Member of the French National Assembly

for Pas-de-Calais’ 11th constituency

2017–present

Incumbent

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Marine_Le_Pen&oldid=1283827719”

2017 French presidential election

Presidential elections were held in France on 23 April and 7 May 2017. Incumbent president François Hollande of the Socialist Party (PS) was eligible to run for a second term, but declared on 1 December 2016 that he would not seek reelection in light of low approval ratings, making him the first incumbent head of state of the Fifth Republic not to seek reelection. As no candidate won a majority in the first round, a runoff was held between the top two candidates, Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! (EM) and Marine Le Pen of the National Front (FN), which Macron won with a difference of more than 30% of the vote.

François Fillon of The Republicans (LR)—after winning the party’s first open primary—and Le Pen of the National Front led first-round opinion polls in November 2016 and mid-January 2017. Polls tightened considerably by late January; after the publication of revelations that Fillon employed family members in possibly fictitious jobs in a series of politico-financial affairs that came to be colloquially known as “Penelopegate“, Macron overtook Fillon to place consistently second in first-round polling. At the same time, Benoît Hamon won the Socialist primary, entering fourth place in the polls. After strong debate performances, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (FI) rose significantly in polls in late March, overtaking Hamon to place just below Fillon.

The first round was held under a state of emergency that was declared following the November 2015 Paris attacks.[1] Following the result of the first round, Macron and Le Pen continued to the 7 May runoff.[2] It was the first time since 2002 that a National Front candidate continued to the second round and the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic that the runoff did not include a nominee of the traditional left or right parties;[3] their combined share of the vote from eligible voters, at approximately 26%, was also a historic low.[4]

Estimations of the result of the second round on 7 May indicated that Macron had been elected by a decisive margin; Le Pen immediately conceded defeat.[5] After the Interior Ministry published preliminary results, the official result of the second round was proclaimed by the Constitutional Council on 10 May. Overall, 43.6% of the registered electorate voted for Macron; in 2002, by contrast, two-thirds of eligible voters voted against then-FN candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen.[6] When Macron took office on 14 May, he became the youngest holder of the presidency in French history and the youngest French head of state since Napoleon. He named Édouard Philippe as Prime Minister the next day. The initial government was assembled on 17 May; legislative elections on 11 and 18 June gave En Marche! a substantial majority.

Background

The President of the French Republic and French Co-Prince of Andorra is elected to a five-year term in a two-round election under Article 7 of the Constitution: if no candidate secures an absolute majority of votes in the first round, a second round is held two weeks later between the two candidates who received the most votes.[7] In 2017, the first and second rounds were held 23 April and 7 May.[8]

Each presidential candidate must meet a specific set of requirements in order to run. They must be a French citizen of at least 18 years old. It is also necessary for candidates to be on an electoral roll, proving their eligibility to vote.

To be listed on the first-round ballot, candidates must secure 500 signatures[9] (often referred to as parrainages) from national or local elected officials from at least 30 different departments or overseas collectivities, with no more than a tenth of these signatories from any single department.[10] The official signature collection period followed the publication of the Journal officiel on 25 February to 17 March.[11] The collection period had initially been scheduled to begin on 23 February, but a visit by Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve to China on that date forced a delay.[12] French prefectures mailed sponsorship forms to the 42,000 elected officials eligible to give their signature to a candidate, which must then be delivered to the Constitutional Council for validation. Unlike in previous years, a list of validated signatures was posted on Tuesday and Thursday of every week on the council’s website; in the past, signatories were published only after the official candidate list had been verified after the end of the collection period. The end of the signature collection period also marked the deadline for the declaration of personal assets required of prospective candidates. The final list of candidates was declared on 21 March.[11]

Speaking time of candidates and supporters from 1 February to 10 April recorded by the CSA[13]

Fillon

300h58

Hamon

255h51

Macron

234h03

Le Pen

229h02

Mélenchon

160h36

Dupont-Aignan

44h00

Others

82h33

The Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) ensured that all candidates receive equal time in broadcast media “under comparable programming conditions” from 19 March onward.[8] The CSA warned on 8 March that the amount of speaking time broadcasters had given Fillon and his supporters was “unusually high”, even given the unusual circumstances surrounding his candidacy.[14] After the official start of the campaign on 10 April, the CSA strictly enforced equal time in broadcast media. Campaigning for the first round of the election ended at midnight on 21 April, two days before the vote. The Constitutional Council verified the results of the first round between the 24–26 April and officially certified the vote tallies on 26 April, with the same procedure being used for the second round. The new President of the French Republic was set to be proclaimed on 11 May and undergo their investiture ceremony on 14 May at the latest.[8]

Candidates

On 18 March 2017, the Constitutional Council published the names of the 11 candidates who received 500 valid sponsorships, with the order of the list determined by drawing lots.[15]

Candidate name and age,[16]

political party

Political office(s)

Campaign logo

Details

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (56)

Debout la France (DLF)

President of Debout la France

(since 2008)

Deputy for Essonne

(since 1997)

Mayor of Yerres

(1995–2017)

A former member of the RPR, RPF and UMP, Dupont-Aignan left the latter party on the eve of the 2007 presidential election due to disagreements with Nicolas Sarkozy. He subsequently founded the sovereignist political party Debout la République (DLR), which was later renamed Debout la France (DLF) in 2014. He previously stood as a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, in which he garnered 1.79% of the vote in the first round. Claiming the mantle of Gaullism, he sought to position himself between Le Pen and Fillon.[17] Five days after his elimination in the first round, he announced his support for Le Pen in the second round.[18]

Marine Le Pen (48)

National Front (FN)

President of the National Front

(2011–2017)

MEP for North-West France

(2004–2017)

Main article: 2017 Marine Le Pen presidential campaign

When Le Pen, a lawyer by occupation, stood in the 2012 presidential election, she came in third with 17.90% of first-round votes. She rose within the ranks of the National Front (FN), founded and previously led by her father Jean-Marie Le Pen, culminating in a bitter leadership struggle which she won in 2011. Her campaign programme prioritised the national interests of France and an exit from the eurozone,[17] emphasising her party’s traditional concern about security and immigration, as well as socioeconomic issues and the sovereignty of the French state, on matters of currency, borders, the economy and rule of law.[19] Her campaign was punctuated by judicial inquiries into her party and personal associates.[17]

Emmanuel Macron (39)

En Marche! (EM)

President of En Marche!

(2016–2017)

Minister of the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs

(2014–2016)

The youngest candidate in the race and a former cabinet member who had never run for elected office, Macron described himself as “neither of the right nor the left”. He was appointed deputy Secretary-General of the Élysée in 2012 and became Economy Minister in 2014, lending his name to the “Macron law” to promote economic growth and opportunities. He founded the En Marche! movement in April 2016 before resigning from the cabinet on 30 August.[17] The most explicitly pro-European of the candidates, Macron intends to implement reforms to modernize the French economy.[19] Macron secured support across the political spectrum, but primarily among liberal-leaning figures;[20] notable supporters include perennial centrist candidate François Bayrou, president of the Democratic Movement (MoDem),[21] as well as Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian.[22]

Benoît Hamon (49)

Socialist Party (PS)

Deputy for Yvelines

(2012 and 2014–2017)
Other offices

- Minister of National Education, Higher Education and Research in 2014

- Deputy Minister of the Economy and Finance responsible for Consumer Affairs and the Social and Solidarity Economy from 2012 to 2014

- Deputy Minister of the Economy, Finance and Foreign Trade responsible for the Social and Solidarity Economy in 2012

- MEP for East France from 2004 to 2009

Hamon, a left-wing critic of Hollande‘s policies, was the surprise winner of the Socialist primary in January 2017, defeating former Prime Minister Manuel Valls. Hamon’s primary victory was driven in part by his support for a universal basic income, which remained integral to his program. He negotiated the withdrawal and support of Yannick Jadot of Europe Ecology – The Greens (EELV) in February, becoming the joint candidate of both parties.[17] He also advocated for the legalization of cannabis and reforming the structure of government to a “Sixth Republic“.[19] He endorsed Emmanuel Macron in the second round.[2]

Nathalie Arthaud (47)

Workers’ Struggle (LO)

Spokeswoman of Lutte Ouvrière

(since 2008)

Arthaud first ran for the presidency in the 2012 election under the LO banner, receiving 0.56% of votes in the first round. A professor of economics, she described the objective of her candidacy as being to, “make the workers’ voice heard”, hoping to “allow workers, the unemployed and exploited to defend their interests, as opposed to [those who pocketed] millions and millions”.[17] She claims that she is the only communist candidate, and wants to see borders disappear and overthrow capitalism.[19] She intended to cast a blank vote in the second round.[2]

Philippe Poutou (50)

New Anticapitalist Party (NPA)

Spokesperson of the New Anticapitalist Party

(since 2009)

A long-time radical left-wing activist, as well as a trade unionist and Ford mechanic in Blanquefort, Poutou led opposition to the shutdown of the local factory. He also ran in the 2012 presidential election, obtaining 1.15% of votes. He launched his political activities at Lutte Ouvrière before joining the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) which became the NPA in 2009.[17] With Marxist and anarchist roots, he crusades against capitalism and espouses radical-left ideas.[19] He offered no voting instructions to his supporters for the second round.[2]

Jacques Cheminade (75)

Solidarity and Progress (S&P)

President of Solidarity and Progress

(since 1996)

Cheminade founded Solidarity and Progress in 1996 and is the figurehead of the LaRouche movement in France. He proposes leaving NATO, the EU, the eurozone and returning to the franc. He supports colonisation of the Moon to facilitate exploration of Mars. He was a candidate twice before, in 1995 and 2012, collecting 0.28% and 0.25% of the vote, respectively, but failed to appear on the ballot in 1981, 1988, 2002 and 2007.[17] His position on the second round is unclear,[2] only specifying that he, personally, would not cast a vote for Le Pen while also denouncing the forces of “financial occupation”.[23]

Jean Lassalle (61)

Résistons!

Deputy for Pyrénées-Atlantiques

(since 2002)

Mayor of Lourdios-Ichère

(since 1977)

Lassalle, a former member of the Democratic Movement (MoDem) and associate of François Bayrou running under the banner of Résistons!, considered himself the “defender of rural territories and a humanist ecology”. He became famous for a successful 39-day hunger strike protesting the movement of the Total factory from Accous to the Lacq basin 65 km (40 mi) away. In 2013, he walked 6,000 km (3,700 mi) on foot to “meet the French”.[17] He opted to cast a blank vote in the second round.[24]

Jean-Luc Mélenchon (65)

La France Insoumise (FI)

MEP for South-West France

(2009–2017)
Other offices

- President, then co-president of the Left Party from 2009 to 2014

- Senator for Essonne from 1986 to 2000 and from 2004 to 2010

- Deputy Minister of Vocational Education from 2000 to 2002

Denouncing the “liberal drift” of the party, Mélenchon left the PS in 2008 to found the Left Party. He made a previous presidential run in 2012, coming in fourth with 11.10% of votes,[17] with the backing of the French Communist Party (PCF). A critic of the presidency of François Hollande, he launched his 2017 bid without consulting the PCF, instead choosing to start his own movement, La France Insoumise (FI).[19] He later won the PCF’s support by a narrow margin.[25] His programme underlined left-wing and environmental principles,[17] including the establishment of a Sixth Republic, redistribution of wealth, renegotiating EU treaties, environmental planning and protecting the independence of France, namely from the United States. He sought a withdrawal from NATO and was largely criticised for refusing to denounce authoritarian leaders, most notably Nicolas Maduro.[19] He ran an innovative campaign, gathering a large following on social media[26] and holding simultaneous meetings in multiple cities via hologram.[27] He intended to consult with his movement before making any pronouncement on the second round.[2] After a few days, he stated that he would not vote for the FN, but never explicitly provided any further voting instructions.[28]

François Asselineau (59)

Popular Republican Union (UPR)

President of the Popular Republican Union

(since 2007)

A sovereignist, Asselineau surprised political observers with his ability to secure the 500 sponsorships required to stand as a candidate. Formerly of the RPF and UMP, he founded the Popular Republican Union (UPR) in 2007 and has agitated for the French to exit from the EU.[17] Sometimes classified as a far-right Eurosceptic, he has denounced “American imperialism” and proposed leaving NATO.[19] He offered no endorsement in the second round.[2]

François Fillon (63)

The Republicans (LR)

Deputy for Paris

(2012–2017)

Prime Minister

(2007–2012)
Other offices

- Co-president of the Union for a Popular Movement (interim) in 2014

- President of the Rassemblement-UMP group in the National Assembly from 2012 to 2013

- Minister of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing in 2012

- Deputy for Sarthe from 1981 to 1993, from 1997 to 2002 and in 2007

- Senator for the Sarthe in 2004 and from 2005 to 2007

- Minister of National Education, Higher Education and Research from 2004 to 2005

- Minister of Social Affairs, Labour and Solidarity from 2002 to 2004

- President of the regional council of Pays de la Loire from 1998 to 2002

- Mayor of Sablé-sur-Sarthe from 1983 to 2001

- President of the general council of the Sarthe from 1992 to 1998

- Deputy Minister responsible for Post, Telecommunications and Space from 1995 to 1997

- Minister of Information Technology and Post in 1995

- Minister of Higher Education and Research from 1993 to 1995

Fillon led a prolific political career starting from the early 1970s. The surprise winner of the primary of the right offered a liberal economic program ending the 35-hour workweek, dismissing 500,000 civil servants, abolishing the wealth tax (ISF), streamlining the labour code, and reforming the health insurance system. However, his campaign was hobbled in January 2017 following the publication of allegations of fictitious employment of family members, including his wife, collectively known as “Penelopegate“. He initially said he would drop his bid if placed under formal investigation, but continued his candidacy after such investigations began on 15 March.[17] He endorsed Emmanuel Macron in the second round.[2]

Sponsorships

A candidate must secure 500 signatures from elected officials in order to appear on the first-round ballot,[10] with the signature collection period ending on 17 March.[11] The table below lists sponsorships received by the Constitutional Council by candidate.[29]

Colour legend

1–50

51–100

101–150

151–200

201–250

251–300

301–350

351–400

401–450

451–500

500+

Signatures received by the Constitutional Council as of 18 March[29]

Candidate

Party

1 Mar

3 Mar

7 Mar

10 Mar

14 Mar

18 Mar

Total

Notes

Michèle Alliot-Marie

DVD

4

4

18

12

15

21

74

Nathalie Arthaud

LO

201

113

243

36

30

14

637

500 signatures validated by 7 March

François Asselineau

UPR

60

0

420

44

45

18

587

500 signatures validated by 10 March

François Baroin

LR

0

0

5

4

18

18

45

Not a candidate

Éric Besson

SE

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Jérôme Blanal

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Jean-Louis Borloo

UDI

0

0

0

0

2

1

3

Not a candidate

Philippe Bouriachi

EELV

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not the nominee of EELV

Renaud Camus

SE

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Bernard Cazeneuve

PS

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Not a candidate

Jacques Cheminade

SP

61

102

207

27

72

59

528

500 signatures validated by 18 March

Daniel Cohn-Bendit

EELV

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Robert de Prévoisin

AR

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Olivier Delafon

SE

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

DLF

31

174

354

64

49

35

707

500 signatures validated by 7 March

Bastien Faudot

MRC

3

1

6

8

7

4

29

Withdrew candidacy on 12 March[30]

Bertrand Fessard de Foucault

SE

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

François Fillon

LR

738

417

634

322

842

682

3,635

500 signatures validated by 1 March

Jean-Pierre Gorges

DVD

1

10

22

13

11

13

70

Michael Goué

SE

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Not a candidate[31]

Henri Guaino

DVD

2

3

3

4

5

16

33

Jean-Paul Guilbert

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Stéphane Guyot

SE

0

2

1

1

2

3

9

Benoît Hamon

PS

184

150

705

278

400

322

2,039

500 signatures validated by 7 March

Laurent Hénart

UDI

0

0

0

0

3

4

7

Not a candidate

François Hollande

PS

0

0

0

0

1

6

7

Not a candidate

Yannick Jadot

EELV

1

1

0

1

0

2

5

Withdrew candidacy to support Benoît Hamon[32]

Alexandre Jardin

SE

7

10

39

8

43

58

165

Lionel Jospin

PS

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Alain Juppé

LR

0

1

241

46

14

11

313

Renounced potential candidacy on 6 March[33]

Patrick Kanner

PS

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet

LR

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Camille Laine

SE

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Pierre Larrouturou

ND

1

4

6

4

10

8

33

Jean Lassalle

SE

14

56

163

56

164

255

708

500 signatures validated by 18 March

Marine Le Pen

FN

25

59

399

94

41

9

627

500 signatures validated by 10 March

Bruno Le Maire

LR

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Jean-Michel Levacher

SE

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Emmanuel Macron

EM

229

235

610

192

282

281

1,829

500 signatures validated by 7 March

Charlotte Marchandise

LP

4

3

21

7

36

64

135

Jean-Claude Martinez

SE

0

1

1

0

1

0

3

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

FI

87

49

220

76

234

139

805

500 signatures validated by 14 March

Kamel Messaoudi

SE

0

0

0

0

1

2

3

Nicolas Miguet

RCF

1

3

2

0

2

7

15

Jean-Luc Millo

SE

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Self-sponsored[31]

Hervé Morin

LC

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Alain Mourguy

SE

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Paul Mumbach

SE

2

0

4

3

4

1

14

Jacques Nikonoff

SE

0

0

3

2

0

1

6

Régis Passerieux

DVG

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Philippe Poutou

NPA

35

1

161

48

112

216

573

500 signatures validated by 18 March

Olivier Régis

SE

0

0

1

1

3

2

7

Didier Tauzin

SE

4

4

21

12

19

24

84

Oscar Temaru

TH

1

1

14

20

46

27

109

Emmanuel Toniutti

SE

0

2

1

0

1

5

9

Bernard Trambouze

DVG

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Self-sponsored[31]

Christian Troadec

SE

12

8

15

14

2

2

53

Withdrew candidacy on 6 March[34]

Michel Vergne

SE

0

1

0

1

0

1

3

Non-candidate; sponsored by friend as a joke[35]

Antoine Waechter

MEI

1

0

1

2

2

5

11

Laurent Wauquiez

LR

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Not a candidate

Rama Yade

DVD

8

21

84

38

66

136

353

Total

1,717

1,438

4,626

1,442

2,589

2,484

14,296

Non-candidates

Socialist Party (PS)

The 2017 presidential election was the first in the history of the Fifth Republic in which a sitting president did not seek a second term. On 1 December 2016, incumbent president François Hollande, acknowledging his low approval ratings, announced he would not seek a second term. His then-Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared on 5 December 2016 that he would run in the Socialist primary on 22 January 2017,[36] but he was defeated by Benoît Hamon in its second round on 29 January.[37]

Democratic Movement (MoDem)

François Bayrou in 2012

François Bayrou, the three-time centrist presidential candidate and leader of the Democratic Movement (MoDem) – who came fourth in 2002, third in 2007, and fifth in 2012 – initially supported the candidacy of Alain Juppé in the primary of the right against his long-time adversary Nicolas Sarkozy, whom he vowed to run against if he won the primary.[38] However, Fillon’s victory in the primary – which saw the elimination of Sarkozy in the first round and the defeat of Juppé in the runoff – led Bayrou to reconsider lodging a bid for the presidency, despite his 2014 election promise during his successful mayoral campaign in Pau that he would not seek the presidency if he won. After an extended period of suspense, he finally announced on 22 February that he would not run for a fourth time, instead proposing a conditional alliance with Emmanuel Macron, who accepted his offer.[21]

Europe Ecology – The Greens (EELV)

On 9 July 2016, Europe Ecology – The Greens (EELV) announced that it would hold a primary election before the 2017 presidential election. Those wishing to be nominated required the support of 36 of its “federal councilors” out of 240; nominations were open to individuals in civic society as well. The vote was open to both party members as well as sympathizers who could register to vote in the primary. The announcement came just days after prominent environmentalist Nicolas Hulot‘s surprise declaration that he would not offer himself as a presidential candidate on 5 July.[39] EELV were the first party to hold a presidential primary for the 2017 election, with two rounds held on 19 October and 7 November 2016. It was contested by deputy, former Minister of Territorial Equality and Housing, and ex-party leader Cécile Duflot, as well as three MEPs – Karima Delli, Yannick Jadot, and Michèle Rivasi.[40]

Voting materials for the first round of the ecologist primary

Duflot was considered the early favorite, though she initially opposed holding a primary, aware of the risk that she might lose it; and highlighted her experience in government. Her main proposal was to incorporate the fight against climate change into the Constitution. Jadot was perceived as her main challenger; elected as an MEP in 2009, he worked with Greenpeace France from 2002 to 2008, specializing in transatlantic trade and climate issues. With Thomas Piketty and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, he sought a “primary of all the left”, which failed to materialize. He rejected the “candidacy awaited by the political-media world” – that of Duflot, among others – and represented an anti-Duflot force from the party’s right wing. Rivasi only barely managed to qualify for the primary, earlier lacking the necessary sponsorships. Like Jadot, she represented the radical wing of the party – albeit on its left flank – and served as deputy for Drôme from 1997 to 2002 and led Greenpeace France from 2003 to 2004. Delli, the daughter of Algerian immigrants, first became involved in politics as part of collective movements, and sought to become an MEP in 2009 after a stint as parliamentary assistant to Marie-Christine Blandin. Also of the party’s left-wing, she declared that she would defend a “popular ecology”.[40]

Jadot and Rivasi advanced to the runoff after scoring 35.61% and 30.16%, respectively, in the first round; the other two candidates were eliminated, with Duflot garnering 24.41% and Delli 9.82%. Jadot won the second round of the primary on 7 November, obtaining 54.25% of the vote against Rivasi’s 40.75%, becoming the nominee of the EELV in the presidential election.[41] Jadot, who claimed 496 sponsorships just before the opening of the collection period,[42] withdrew his candidacy on 23 February and endorsed Hamon, the pair having agreed on a common platform.[32] An online vote among EELV primary voters from 24 and 26 February was required to confirm the agreement; an earlier vote to open talks with Hamon and Mélenchon was approved by 89.7% of those electors.[43] The Hamon–Jadot alliance was consummated on 26 February; among those who cast a vote, 79.53% voted to support it, with 15.39% opposed and 5.08% submitting blank ballots, and an overall voter turnout of 55.25% (9,433 votes).[44] This marks the first election since 1969 without a green candidate.[45]

Primaries

The Republicans (LR)

Main article: The Republicans (France) presidential primary, 2016

Results of the first round by department and region

After his loss as the nominee of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in the 2012 presidential election, ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy pledged to return to being a “Frenchman among the French”. However, he announced on 19 September 2014 that he would seek the presidency of the party,[46] a position he secured in an online vote on 29 November online vote with the backing of 64.50% of party members, against his main opponent Bruno Le Maire‘s 29.18%. He succeeded the triumvirate of Alain Juppé, François Fillon, and Jean-Pierre Raffarin, which assumed the party’s leadership after the resignation of Jean-François Copé.[47] Sarkozy was initially reluctant to accept the idea of holding a right-wing primary for the 2017 presidential election, but on 25 September 2014 he declared his support for a primary of the right after a warning from Juppé,[48] who on 20 August made public his intention to run for the nomination.[49]

The rules of the primary were confirmed in April 2015, scheduling the first round of an open primary for 20 November 2016, with a runoff on 27 November if no candidate received more than 50% of the vote. Those wishing to vote were required to pay €2 per ballot and sign a charter indicating their adherence to “Republican values of the right and centre”.[50] In order to appear on the ballot, prospective candidates needed to present sponsorships from 250 elected officials from at least 30 departments, with no more than a tenth from the same department, including at least 20 parliamentarians, in addition to the signatures of at least 2,500 party members across at least 15 departments, with no more than a tenth from the same department.[51] The charter permitted other parties wishing to participate to set their own sponsorship requirements.[50] The High Authority ultimately determined that seven candidates qualified to compete in the open primary of the right and centre: Fillon, Juppé, Le Maire, Copé, Sarkozy, and Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet of the Republicans,[52] the party’s name after May 2015,[53] as well as Jean-Frédéric Poisson of the Christian Democratic Party (PCD), who was not required to present signatures as the leader of another party.[52][54] The National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNIP) were also allowed to participate, but not to present a candidate.[55]

Results of the second round by department and region

The primary was initially fought primarily between Juppé and Sarkozy, the top two candidates in primary polls.[56] Sarkozy’s program emphasized the themes of Islam, immigration, security, and defense. He proposed to end family reunifications and reform the right to birthright citizenship, halt the flow of economic migrants, and increase residence requirements to secure French nationality. He reaffirmed his interest in the “assimilation” of immigrants, and intended to ban other menus for school canteens (i.e., options for Muslim students) as well as Muslim headscarves at universities. Sarkozy also suggested that radical imams be expelled and suspected terrorists be detained by authorities and tried by a special anti-terrorist court, in addition a reduction in the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16. He proposed to postpone the increase the retirement age to 64 until 2024, permit exemptions to the 35-hour workweek, cut 300,000 civil service jobs by increasing working hours to 37 per week, and abolish the wealth tax (ISF). Like Le Maire, he did not rule out the possibility of a referendum on the European Union (EU).[57] He also sought a European treaty “refounding”, the creation of a European monetary fund, to commit 2% to defense spending by 2025,[58] and to reduce public spending by €100 billion and taxes by €40 billion while reducing the budget deficit to under 3% of GDP.[59]

In contrast to Sarkozy, Juppé spoke of a “happy identity” and emphasized the importance of integration as opposed to assimilation.[60] He supported drawing up a common list of “safe countries” to differentiate refugees from economic migrants, setting a “quota” on immigrants as necessary, and to stop providing foreign aid to countries refusing to comply with their obligation to accept deported citizens. He questioned Sarkozy’s proposals on Schengen and instead merely acknowledged that it was not functioning correctly, but concurred with him in exempting the acquisition of French nationality by foreigners at the age of 18 if previously convicted.[61] Juppé also demanded transparency on the funding of places of worship, civic training for imams, and, unlike Sarkozy, favored allowing women to wear the Muslim headscarf at universities. On economic issues, he proposed to end the 35-hour workweek, abolish the wealth tax, reduce corporate taxation, and set the retirement age at 65. He also pledged to slash in half the number of parliamentarians, renegotiate Schengen, and increase defense spending in absolute terms by at least €7 billion by 2022.[62]

After several strong debate performances by Fillon, however, a second-round Juppé–Sarkozy duel no longer appeared inevitable.[63] Fillon’s rise was propelled by his proposals for a rigorous economic program. Seeking €100 billion in cuts, he proposed eliminating 500,000 civil service jobs by 2022 and a return to the 39-hour workweek for civil servants. Like the other primary candidates, he planned to eliminate the wealth tax; in addition, Fillon suggested abolishing the 35-hour workweek – capping it at the 48-hour maximum allowed within the EU – and the implementation of other liberal economic measures. He also adopted a staunchly conservative social program, opposing adoption by same-sex couples and arguing France had no religious problem apart from Islam itself. Like Sarkozy, he sought to expand the capacity of French prisons, but unlike his former superior, he opposed banning religious symbols in public places. He also professed a more pro-Russian stance than other candidates, urging cooperation in Syria against the Islamic State and supporting the “pragmatism” of Vladimir Putin‘s intervention in the Syrian civil war.[64]

The first round of the primary on 20 November saw the unexpected elimination of Sarkozy, with Fillon coming in first with 44.1%, Juppé at 28.6%, and Sarkozy at 20.7% of the vote, and all other candidates far behind. A second round between Fillon and Juppé was confirmed, and Sarkozy announced that he would vote for his former Prime Minister soon after the results became clear.[65][66] Fillon scored a landslide victory in the 27 November runoff with 66.5% of the vote to Juppé’s 33.5% and became the Republicans’ nominee; voter turnout – at 4.4 million – was even higher than in the first round.[67][68]

Socialist Party (PS)

Main article: French Socialist Party presidential primary, 2017

Results of the first round by department and region

At the 2012 Toulouse Congress, the Socialist Party (PS) modified its statutes to guarantee the selection of a candidate of the left through open primaries, with the National Council of the Socialist Party announcing the timetable and organization of the primaries at least one year beforehand.[69] On 11 January, Libération published an editorial in favor of a “primary of the left and ecologists”,[70] and on 9 April the National Council of the Socialist Party unanimously approved the idea of holding such a primary in early December.[71] On 18 June, the National Council finally confirmed that it would organize a primary to select a candidate for the 2017 presidential election. Applications could be submitted from 1 to 15 December, with two rounds of voting planned for 22 and 29 January 2017.[72] Prospective PS candidates were required to sign the primary’s charter of ethics requiring candidates to rally behind its winner and to secure the support of 5% of one of the following groups: members of the National Council; Socialist parliamentarians, regional and departmental Socialist councilors in at least 4 regions and 10 departments; or Socialist mayors representing more than 10,000 people in at least 4 regions and 10 departments.[73] The conditions for becoming a candidate of other member parties of the BAP – the PRG, UDE, PE, and Democratic Front (FD) – were determined by the respective parties’ leadership.[74]

The EELV declared on 20 June that it would not participate in the primary,[75] and the French Communist Party (PCF) did likewise the following day.[76] After declaring his candidacy for the presidential election, Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! also declined to participate,[77] as did Jean-Luc Mélenchon under the banner of la France Insoumise, saying that he did not want to run in a primary with François Hollande since he would not be able to support Hollande if he won.[78] He later reaffirmed this by saying that with the exclusion of the EELV and PRG the primary was not truly “of the left” but a “primary of the Socialist Party”.[79] On 1 December, Hollande declared that he would not seek a second term, becoming the first President of the Fifth Republic to renounce a reelection bid. His announcement reflected his high personal unpopularity and resentment among Socialist colleagues regarding remarks he made about cabinet members and other associates in the book Un président ne devrait pas dire ça… (A president should not say that…) by Gérard Davet and Fabrice Lhomme, journalists at Le Monde.[80]

Results of the second round by department and region

On 17 December, the High Authority declared that seven candidates qualified to appear on the ballot: four from the Socialist Party – former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît Hamon, and Vincent Peillon – and François de Rugy of the PE, Sylvia Pinel of the PRG, and Jean-Luc Bennahmias of the PD.[81] Early opinion polling placed Valls and Montebourg first and second, respectively, with Hamon a close third.[82] Shortly after declaring his candidacy on 5 December, Valls proposed to abolish article 49.3 of the French constitution, a procedure that allows bypassing legislative approval, in a “democratic renaissance”; as Prime Minister, he invoked it on six occasions, using it to pass the Macron and El Khomri laws.[83] He also proposed a 2.5% increase in public spending while keeping the budget deficit under 3%, guaranteeing a “decent income” of €800, reducing the gender pay gap by half, pausing the enlargement of the European Union, appending a charter of secularism to the Constitution, consolidating the nuclear industry, and mandating six months of civic service.[84][85] He was twice physically attacked during the primary campaign: on 22 December, he was flour-bombed by a protester in Strasbourg saying “we do not forget [the 49.3]!”,[86] and on 17 January, he was slapped by a young Breton regionalist in Lamballe, who was subsequently charged.[87]

Former Minister of the Economy Arnaud Montebourg, a Socialist rebel known for promoting “made in France”, presented a firmly left-wing project shortly after declaring his candidacy in August 2016. He promised to offer French enterprises preference in bidding, reverse the 2011 tax increases on the French middle class,[88] and repeal most of the El Khomri labor law while preserving certain “interesting” social protections such as the “right to disconnect” and “personal activity account”.[89] Critical of European austerity, he declared that he would defy the requirement to maintain a budget deficit under 3% of GDP and intended to strengthen intelligence services, require six months of civic service, and achieve gender equality.[88] He also proposed €30 billion in spending to stimulate economic growth, lower the general social contribution (CSG) to increase individuals’ purchasing power by €800 a year, create 5,000 new posts in hospitals, call a referendum on a new republic, promulgate a law on the separation of banking activities (as Hollande did), impose a European carbon tax, and establish a national anti-terrorism prosecutor.[90]

The signature proposal of Benoît Hamon was the implementation a universal basic income for all French citizens, rolled out in stages beginning in 2018, partially funded by a tax levied on property combining the existing property tax (taxe foncière) and the solidarity tax on wealth (ISF), in addition to a tax on robots to fund social protections in general. Like fellow Socialist dissidents, Hamon criticized the El Khomri labor law and promised to repeal it if elected, and suggested that it be replaced with legislation acknowledging the need for greater social protections, including the right to disconnect and recognizing burnout as an occupational disease.[91] He also proposed to reduce the 35-hour workweek to 32 hours, saying that it was time to put an end to the “myth” of economic growth. Another of his flagship proposals was to legalize cannabis, using funds for “prevention” rather than “repression”.[92]

Benoît Hamon congratulated by Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo after his primary victory on 29 January

In the first round of the primary on 22 January, Hamon and Valls received 36.03% and 31.48%, respectively, and advanced to the runoff on 29 January. Montebourg, who secured only 17.52% of votes,[93] declared that he would cast his second-round vote for Hamon soon after the result became apparent.[94] Among the remaining candidates, Peillon secured 6.81% of the vote, de Rugy 3.83%, Pinel 2.00%, and Bennahmias 1.02%. Overall turnout stood at 1.66 million.[93] The legitimacy of the first-round results published by the organizers of the primary was questioned by observers in the French press, who noted that an overnight update added 352,013 votes without significantly changing each candidate’s percentage, with vote totals for each candidate increasing by 28%. Christophe Borgel [fr], president of the organizing committee of the primary, claimed that the anomaly was nothing more than a “bug” induced by pressure to update the level of participation in the first round, effectively acknowledging that the results of the primary were manipulated. Only on 23 January did the High Authority of the primary publish “validated” results.[95] In the second round of the primary on 29 January, Hamon defeated Valls by a comfortable margin, 58.69% to 41.31%; turnout, at 2.05 million, was considerably higher than in the first round. As the winner of the primary, Hamon became the Socialist nominee for president.[96]

On 22 February, François de Rugy announced his support for Emmanuel Macron, breaking the commitment requested of former candidates to back the winner of the primary. While acknowledging that Hamon was the legitimate PS nominee, de Rugy said he preferred “coherence to obedience”.[97] On 13 March, Le Parisien reported that Valls, rather than backing Hamon, would urge voters to support Macron in the first round of the presidential election;[98] Valls denied the report at the time,[99] but on 29 March declared that he would vote for Macron but would not rally behind his candidacy.[100] On 8 April the High Authority of the PS reminded party members to abide by the “principle of loyalty”.[101] On 15 March, the PRG announced its support for Hamon, securing concessions on issues pertaining to European governance, and confirmed an agreement with the Socialist Party for the legislative elections; this followed a period of hesitation after the primary in which the party contemplated Macron’s candidacy, which secured several of its parliamentarians’ support.[102]

Fillon affair (Penelopegate)

Main article: Fillon affair

Penelope Fillon in 2007

On 25 January 2017, the satirical weekly Le Canard enchaîné first alleged that François Fillon employed his wife Penelope as his parliamentary assistant from 1998 and 2002 and for six months in 2012, with no evidence that she completed any substantial work. She collected a monthly salary of €3,900 to €4,600. After her husband’s appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in 2002 and during his later tenure as Minister of National Education, she went on to serve until 2007 as a parliamentary aide to Marc Joulaud, Fillon’s substitute, earning an increased salary upwards of €7,900 and with still no evidence of substantial work. The article claimed that she received a total of over €500,000 as a parliamentary aide, as well as €100,000 as a literary adviser to the Revue des deux Mondes. Its owner, billionaire Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière, is a close friend of François Fillon. While deputies in the National Assembly can employ family members, those are still required to complete legitimate work, evidence of which the paper was unable to find.[103] Based on that information and on the same day, the PNF (Parquet national financier, or national financial prosecutor’s office) initiated a preliminary investigation into possible embezzlement and misuse of public funds.[104]

On 26 January, François Fillon appeared on TF1 to respond to these allegations, stating that his wife had “edited my speeches” and “stood in for me at events when I couldn’t be there”, also claiming that the reason that she was never seen working in the Palais Bourbon was because “she was never on the front line”. In the interview, he disclosed that he also paid two of his children while a Senator for the Sarthe between 2005 and 2007, claiming that he employed them in their capacity as lawyers. He also pledged to resign if he would be personally placed under investigation.[105] However, on 27 January, it was revealed that both Marie and Charles Fillon were only law students when their father employed them during his stint in the Senate, contrary to his statements the previous day.[106] Interrogated by investigators the same day, former editor-in-chief of the Revue des deux Mondes Michel Crépu claimed that only “two or maybe three” bylines in the review were attributed to her, also saying that he had seen “no trace” of any work by her that would “resemble [that of] a literary adviser”.[107]

Marc Joulaud in 2014

On 1 February, a week after its initial report, Le Canard enchaîné published revelations that the total sum received by Penelope Fillon in fictitious jobs apparently totaled more than €930,000; with the addition of the period from 1988 to 1990, her income as a parliamentary assistant now totaled €831,440. In addition, the satirical weekly also revealed that the payments to two of Fillon’s children reached nearly €84,000, with €57,084 net for Marie Fillon and €26,651 for Charles Fillon.[108] Video excerpts of a May 2007 Sunday Telegraph interview with Penelope Fillon surfaced on 2 February, in which she claimed that she had “never been his assistant”, referring to her husband; The footage aired on Envoyé spécial on France 2 that evening.[109] The PNF expanded investigation into the fictitious employment affair to include Fillon’s two eldest children the same day to verify the veracity of their work, after Le Canard enchaîné reported that neither Marie nor Charles Fillon were lawyers at the time their father served in the Senate.[110] In a video on 3 February, François Fillon insisted that he would maintain his candidacy and called on his supporters to “hold the line”, seeking to assuage worries from within his own camp about the maintenance of his candidacy.[111]

On 6 February, Fillon held a press conference at which he “apologized to the French people” and acknowledged that he had committed an “error” in employing family members as parliamentary assistants, but appended that he “never broke the law”. He also argued that his wife’s “salary was perfectly justified”, adding that everything reported by the press on the issue was “legal and transparent”. He said he would not reimburse the payments received by his wife or children, and, saying that he had “nothing to hide”, divulged his property holdings. In addition to promising that his lawyers would question the competency of the PNF to carry out the investigation, he lambasted a “media lynching” of his campaign. His remarks followed Juppé’s declaration that “NO means NO” earlier in the day in response to rumors that he might replace Fillon as the party’s candidate should he decide to drop his bid.[112]

Sarkozy in 2015

Le Canard enchaîné continued its run of stories on Fillon in its issue of 8 February, revealing that Penelope Fillon collected severance payments totaling €45,000, with €16,000 in August 2002 for the period 1998–2002 and €29,000 in 2013 for seventeen months of employment for which she earned €65,839. The satirical weekly also asserted that she received a double salary during the summer of 2002, as she was hired by Joulaud’s office on 13 July, more than a month before her contract as a parliamentary assistant with her husband expired, on 21 August. Although aides are eligible to collect severance payments, the law does not permit such a high level for parliamentary assistants. An article in the same issue reported that Marie Fillon was simultaneously employed as a parliamentary assistant while training to become a lawyer, taking the first post in October 2005 and entering the EFB in January 2006. Fillon responded to the claims in a press release by saying that Le Canard enchaîné conflated the amount his wife collected in November 2013 with reported earnings in August 2007 after the conclusion of her work with Joulaud,[113] and denounced the paper’s allegations as “lies”.[114]

On 16 February, Fillon seemingly withdrew his earlier promise that he would terminate his candidacy if placed under formal investigation, saying “even if I am put under investigation, nothing will stop me” in private.[115] In an interview with Le Figaro published on 17 February, he insisted on continuing his campaign, declaring “I am the candidate and I will continue until victory” and that the closer to the election it was, the “more scandalous it would be to deprive the right and centre of a candidate”.[116] On 24 February the PNF finally opened a judicial investigation into the “embezzlement of public funds, […] influence-peddling and failure to comply with transparency obligations of the HATVP” against François Fillon, his wife, two of his children, and Marc Joulaud (who were left unnamed, presumably, to allow for expanding the investigation to other suspects, if necessary). The OCLCIFF, which failed to unearth any tangible proof of work by Fillon’s wife as a parliamentary assistant to her husband from 1988 to 1990, 1998 to 2000, and 2012 to 2013 or to Marc Joulaud from 2002 to 2007, and was unconvinced by the two reviews in the Revue des deux Mondes attributed to Penelope Fillon, tasked three investigative judges to continue pursuing the affair.[117] These three judges were identified on 27 February as Serge Tournaire, Stéphanie Tacheau, and Aude Buresi.[118]

On 1 March, Fillon was informed that he was summoned to appear before the judges and likely to be placed under formal investigation – generally a precursor to an eventual indictment – on 15 March.[119] In the subsequent hours and days, hundreds of campaign members, allies, and supporters rescinded their support for Fillon, including the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), a centre-right party whose president Jean-Christophe Lagarde backed Juppé in the primary, suspended its participation in the campaign.[120] fifteen campaign staffers,[121] and hundreds of others; a total of 306 elected officials and members of the Fillon campaign withdrew their support for the candidate by 5 March.[122] Many of those rescinding their support speculated about the potential return of Juppé to replace Fillon as the party’s candidate, with Fenech urging elected officials file sponsorships for the ex-primary candidate.[123] Meanwhile, associates of Juppé indicated that he was apparently warming to the idea of stepping in to run if needed, “ready but loyal”.[124]

Alain Juppé in 2015

Despite this chain of defections, François Fillon remained defiant, holding a rally at the Trocadéro on that afternoon intended as show of force.[125] He then appeared on 20 heures on France 2 that evening, during which he refused to give up his candidacy, saying that “there is no alternative” and adding that “no one today can stop me from being a candidate”, insisting that “it is not the party that will decide” the fate of his candidacy. He said that the rally at the Trocadéro cemented his legitimacy, and that though he would have stepped down two months ago if indicted then, it was now too close to the presidential election and it would be unfair to voters of the right if he quit now. With a “political committee” planned for the following day, he proposed to assemble a modified campaign team, naming François Baroin, Éric Ciotti, and Luc Chatel, in an attempt to rally support around his candidacy.[126] Immediately after Fillon’s appearance, Juppé announced on Twitter that he give a statement to the press in Bordeaux at 10:30 CET the day after.[127]

Juppé officially announced his abstention from the race on 6 March, saying that “for me, it is too late”, and added that Fillon was at a “dead end” with his allegations of political assassination.[33] The same day, the party’s “political committee” rallied behind Fillon, unanimously reaffirming its support for his candidacy.[128] The same day, Le Canard enchaîné revealed that Fillon had failed to declare to the HATVP a €50,000 loan from Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière, president of the Revue des deux Mondes.[129] The UDI renewed its support for Fillon that evening, albeit only conditionally.[130] On 13 March, Le Parisien revealed that investigators discovered suspicious wire transfers made by Marie and Charles Fillon to their father while employed by him, with Marie returning €33,000 of the €46,000 she was paid. Charles Fillon, in his hearing, referred to similar transfers to his parents’ joint account, worth about 30% of his salary.[131]

On the morning of 14 March, Fillon was placed under formal investigation for misuse of public funds, embezzlement, and failure to comply with HATVP disclosure requirements.[132] On 16 March the investigation into Fillon was extended to “aggravated fraud, forgery, and falsification of records”. In particular, the probe sought to determine whether documents seized during a search of the National Assembly in March were forged in order to corroborate the veracity of Penelope Fillon’s work as a parliamentary assistant.[133] The investigation was also expanded into possible influence-peddling related to Fillon’s consulting firm 2F Conseil, which was previously hired by billionaire Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière, owner of the Revue des deux Mondes, which employed Penelope Fillon. In 2013 de Lacharrière also provided a €50,000 loan to François Fillon, who failed to declare it as legally required.[134] On L’Émission politique on 23 March, Fillon said that Bienvenue Place Beauvau, a book co-authored by Didier Hassoux of Le Canard enchaîné, suggested President Hollande ran a shadow cabinet to spread rumours about his opponents, a claim Hassoux subsequently denied.[135] On 24 March, Marc Joulaud, Fillon’s former substitute, was formally placed under investigation for embezzlement of public funds.[136] Penelope Fillon was placed under formal investigation for complicity in and concealment of embezzlement and misuse of public funds, as well as aggravated fraud, on 28 March.[137]

On 10 April, Mediapart revealed that Penelope Fillon had in fact been paid by the National Assembly starting in 1982, not 1986, as earlier claimed by François Fillon.[138] The edition of Le Canard enchaîné set for publication on 12 April revealed that François Fillon secured his then-fiancée a job three times the minimum wage in a Parisian ministry as early as 1980 while he was serving as deputy chief of staff to Minister of Defence Joël Le Theule; her contract ended in 1981, after 15 months, after the Socialists swept into power.[139]

Other incidents

Yannick Jadot (EELV) withdrew to support Hamon

After securing his party’s nomination in its presidential primary on 29 January 2017, Socialist Party (PS) dissident Benoît Hamon proposed forming a “governmental majority” with Jean-Luc Mélenchon of la France Insoumise (FI) and Yannick Jadot of Europe Ecology – The Greens (EELV), seeking to “reconcile the left and the environmentalists”. Though Mélenchon had earlier demonstrated hostility to the possibility of an alliance, he expressed “satisfaction” with Hamon’s sentiments shortly after the primary.[140] On 23 February, Jadot cemented an agreement to withdraw his candidacy in favor of Hamon,[32] but on 26 February Hamon acknowledged that talks to secure an alliance with Mélenchon had failed, the pair only agreeing to a code of mutual respect.[141] The talks failed in part because of the candidates’ differing positions on matters related to the European Union (EU), European Central Bank (ECB), EU treaties, European defense, and the obligation to maintain a budget deficit below 3% of GDP, among other divergences.[142]

During a trip to Algeria on 15 February, Emmanuel Macron, candidate of En Marche!, remarked in an interview with local press that the French presence in the country had been a “crime against humanity” and “truly barbaric”, drawing the ire of numerous right-wing French politicians. François Fillon of the Republicans denounced Macron’s remarks as a “hatred of our history, this constant repentance is unworthy of a candidate for the presidency of the Republic”.[143] Seeking to put aside the controversy in a meeting in Toulon on 18 February, he attempted to qualify his remarks, saying that he was “sorry” for having “hurt” and “offended” many as a result, but nevertheless continued to insist on acknowledging that France had a responsibility for its colonial past, not just in Algeria.[144] His remarks were followed by a temporary resurgence for Fillon in polls of voting intentions.[145]

Marine Le Pen at Moscow Kremlin in 2017

The various investigations of the fictitious employment of 29 parliamentary assistants to 23 National Front (FN) MEPs, implicating the entourage of Marine Le Pen,[146] continued through 2017. These fictitious jobs would constitute €7.5 million in losses for European taxpayers from the period 2010 to 2016. The European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) pursued the case, establishing that one of Le Pen’s parliamentary assistants, Catherine Griset, never secured a lease in Brussels during the five years she was employed and only rarely appeared in the European Parliament, while another, Thierry Légier, worked as a bodyguard at the same time.[147] Though the European Parliament demanded that Le Pen return €298,392 by 31 January 2018,[148][149] representing the salary “unduly paid” to Griset,[150] she refused to do so,[148] and the European Parliament began to reduce her salary to reclaim the money.[149] On 20 February, investigators raided the FN’s headquarters in Nanterre for a second time in connection to the case;[151] though Le Pen was summoned to appear before judges on 22 February in the Griset case, she refused to do so until after the June legislative elections, invoking the parliamentary immunity granted to her as an MEP.[152] On 3 March, summoned to appear before judges to potentially be charged for breach of confidence, Le Pen was absent, again affirming that she would not respond to the case before the end of the campaign.[153] On 6 March, Charles Hourcade, who served as parliamentary assistant to FN MEP Marie-Christine Boutonnet, faced charges of “concealment of breach of confidence” in a separate case; like Le Pen, who described the investigations into the FN’s fictitious employment of parliamentary assistants as a “political operation”, Boutonnet declined to appear before judges.[154]

On 20 April, three days before the first round, three police officers were shot and one killed in an attack on the Champs-Élysées, interrupting the 15 minutes pour convaincre (15 minutes to convince) on France 2, a program featuring successive interviews with the 11 candidates; in the following interviews, the remaining candidates paid tribute to the victims of the attack.[155] In the wake of the attack, Le Pen and Fillon, suspended campaign activities the following day – the final day of campaigning – while Macron canceled two trips and Mélenchon insisted on maintaining his schedule to demonstrate that he would not allow violence to interrupt the democratic process; Hamon made similar remarks, proceeding with one campaign event the following day.[156]

A report published on 25 April by the Japan-based security firm Trend Micro alleged that a group of hackers was targeting the Macron campaign. The group, known as Pawn Storm (better known as Fancy Bear or APT28), is believed to be linked to the Russian state, and was responsible for previous attacks, including on TV5Monde in April and the Bundestag in May 2015. In particular, the group attempted a phishing operation, registering four domains strongly resembling those actually used by En Marche!, of which three were domiciled in Ukraine and one in France.[157]

In an interview with Associated Press the head of the French government’s cyber security agency, which investigated leaks from President Emmanuel Macron’s election campaign, said that they didn’t find any trace of a notorious Russian hacking group behind the attack.[158]

First round

A voting line of French expatriates in Morges, Switzerland

The official campaign began on 10 April and ended at midnight on 21 April. During this period, the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel was to ensure equal speaking time for candidates in audiovisual media.[8] On French public broadcasters, ten slots were allotted to the eleven candidates from 10 to 18 and 20 April, with nine slots on 19 April and eleven slots – one for each candidate – on 21 April, the final day of active campaigning.[159]

Voting in the first round took place on Saturday 22 April from 08:00 to 19:00 (local time) in the French overseas departments and territories situated east of the International Date Line and west of metropolitan France (i.e. French Guiana, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Pierre and Miquelon), as well as at French diplomatic missions in the Americas.[160] Although overseas voting took place one day before that in metropolitan France, the election results and final turnout figures were announced at the same time, starting at 20:00 (Paris time) on 23 April, once voting ended in metropolitan France.[161][162] Voting in metropolitan France (as well as the French overseas departments and territories of Mayotte, New Caledonia, Réunion and Wallis and Futuna, and French diplomatic missions outside the Americas) took place on 23 April from 08:00 to 19:00 or 20:00 (local time).[160]

The official election results were declared by the Constitutional Council on 26 April, with Macron and Le Pen advancing to the second round.[8]

Debates

See also: French presidential debates

A debate between François Fillon, Benoît Hamon, Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon took place on 20 March, hosted by TF1 and moderated by journalists Anne-Claire Coudray and Gilles Bouleau. It was the first time that a debate prior to the first round was held. The choice of date meant that TF1 would not be required to provide candidates with equal speaking time, as Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) regulations do not go into force until 9 April, the start of the official campaign. Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, who was not invited, denounced the debate as a “rape of democracy”,[163] and the CSA urged TF1 to guarantee fair speaking time for other candidates.[164] Dupont-Aignan filed an appeal that was rejected in part because he had already received airtime proportionate to his support.[165] On 18 March, appearing on TF1, he quit mid-interview, furious at his exclusion from the network’s debate.[166] The first debate began with an introductory question – “What kind of president do you want to be?” – followed by segments on three themes lasting about 50 minutes each: what type of society France should have, what type of economic model France should adopt, and the place of France in the world. The five candidates were given two minutes to answer each question, but opponents had the opportunity to interject 90 seconds in.[167] The debate was three and a half hours long,[168] and was watched by 9.8 million (47% of the audience share) on TF1, peaking at 11.5 million.[169]

BFM TV and CNews hosted the second debate on 4 April at 20:40 CEST, moderated by Ruth Elkrief and Laurence Ferrari,[170] inviting all candidates who qualified to appear on the first-round ballot.[171] The start time, earlier than that of the TF1 debate, was chosen to avoid continuing well past midnight. Three themes were addressed: employment, the French social model, and the protection of the French. The final part of the debate concerned the exercise of power and moralization of public officials. Each of the 11 candidates invited had a minute and a half to answer each question, and other candidates were permitted to challenge their answers. This was the first ever debate including all first-round candidates;[172] A total of 6.3 million people representing an audience share of 32% viewed the debate; BFM TV alone claimed 5.5 million viewers, equivalent to 28% audience share – an all-time record for the channel.[173]

France 2 intended to host a debate with all candidates on 20 April,[163] but on 28 March Mélenchon stated he was unhappy with its timing, planning not to attend, and would prefer that it be held before 17 April.[174] Macron also expressed reservations about the proposed third debate, stating that he wanted only one debate with all 11 candidates before the first round, and preferably not just three days before the first round of voting.[175] On 29 March, the CSA indicated that it was “concerned” that the date of the debate was too close to the first round, and recommended that candidates and broadcasters work to find an agreement as quickly as possible.[176] France Télévisions decided to maintain the date of 20 April due to the lack of a consensus on an alternative the following day,[177] but abandoned plans for a third debate on 5 April, instead proposing that individual candidates be interviewed by Léa Salamé and David Pujadas during that timeslot.[178] The plan was finally confirmed on 18 April, with France 2 offering successive 15-minute interviews to the 11 candidates with the two hosts.[179]

2017 French presidential election first-round debates

Date

Organizers

Moderators

P  Present  NI  Non-invitee

Notes

Arthaud

Poutou

Mélenchon

Hamon

Macron

Lassalle

Fillon

Dupont-Aignan

Asselineau

Le Pen

Cheminade

20 March

21:00 CET

TF1

LCI

Anne-Claire Coudray

Gilles Bouleau

NI

NI

P

P

P

NI

P

NI

NI

P

NI

[163][180]

4 April

20:40 CEST

BFM TV

CNews

Ruth Elkrief

Laurence Ferrari

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

[170][172]

Candidate viewed as “most convincing” in each debate

Debate

Poll source

Arthaud

Poutou

Mélenchon

Hamon

Macron

Lassalle

Fillon

Dupont-Aignan

Asselineau

Le Pen

Cheminade

Notes

20 March

TF1/LCI

Elabe

20%

11%

29%

19%

19%

[181]

OpinionWay

17%

8%

25%

20%

18%

[182]

Harris*

13%

6%

20%

17%

18%

[183]

Ifop-Fiducial*

17%

5%

19%

12%

16%

[184]

4 April

BFM TV/CNews

Elabe

3%

5%

25%

9%

21%

1%

15%

6%

3%

11%

0%

[185]

OpinionWay

1%

3%

20%

8%

19%

2%

17%

5%

3%

10%

0%

[186]

Harris*

1%

2%

14%

6%

16%

2%

12%

4%

1%

15%

0%

[187]

Ifop-Fiducial*

2%

6%

24%

7%

19%

2%

16%

5%

2%

16%

1%

[188]

* Harris and Ifop-Fiducial polls were conducted among those aware of the debate; Elabe and OpinionWay polls among debate viewers.

Electorate

Sociology of the electorate

Demographic

Arthaud/

Poutou

Mélenchon

Hamon

Macron

Fillon

Dupont-Aignan

Le Pen

Others

Turnout

Total vote

1.7%

19.6%

6.4%

24.0%

20.0%

4.7%

21.3%

2.3%

77.8%

First-round vote in 2012

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

1%

80%

5%

10%

0%

1%

3%

0%

80%

François Hollande

1%

24%

15%

47%

3%

3%

6%

1%

83%

François Bayrou

2%

10%

5%

43%

22%

9%

3%

6%

82%

Nicolas Sarkozy

0%

3%

1%

17%

59%

4%

14%

2%

87%

Marine Le Pen

0%

3%

0%

2%

6%

3%

85%

1%

86%

Political party

EXG

7%

62%

2%

7%

8%

0%

14%

0%

84%

FG

3%

84%

5%

3%

3%

1%

0%

1%

83%

EELV

5%

38%

22%

19%

2%

7%

4%

3%

66%

PS

2%

23%

27%

42%

2%

1%

2%

1%

83%

EM

0%

5%

1%

91%

1%

1%

1%

0%

88%

MoDem

1%

11%

3%

46%

24%

12%

0%

3%

84%

UDI

0%

0%

2%

36%

50%

9%

2%

1%

81%

LR

0%

2%

0%

9%

77%

4%

7%

1%

89%

FN

1%

2%

1%

2%

4%

2%

87%

1%

85%

None

4%

23%

3%

19%

10%

12%

21%

8%

57%

Self-described political position

Very left-wing

7%

72%

8%

3%

1%

0%

9%

0%

81%

Left-wing

2%

53%

20%

23%

1%

1%

0%

0%

88%

Rather left-wing

1%

30%

15%

47%

2%

1%

3%

1%

78%

Centre

0%

8%

2%

60%

15%

7%

5%

3%

81%

Rather right-wing

0%

2%

1%

23%

48%

9%

14%

3%

82%

Right-wing

0%

1%

0%

5%

66%

4%

24%

0%

91%

Very right-wing

1%

1%

0%

1%

12%

3%

80%

2%

91%

Neither left nor right

4%

16%

3%

17%

8%

9%

37%

6%

60%

Left subtotal

2%

44%

16%

32%

2%

1%

2%

1%

83%

Right and centre subtotal

0%

1%

1%

10%

47%

5%

34%

2%

88%

Sex

Men

2%

21%

4%

23%

18%

5%

24%

3%

78%

Women

2%

17%

8%

25%

21%

5%

20%

2%

77%

Age

18–24 years old

3%

30%

10%

18%

9%

6%

21%

3%

71%

25–34 years old

1%

24%

8%

28%

8%

3%

24%

4%

72%

35–49 years old

2%

22%

7%

21%

11%

6%

29%

2%

74%

50–59 years old

3%

21%

6%

21%

13%

6%

27%

3%

76%

60–69 years old

1%

15%

5%

26%

27%

5%

19%

2%

84%

70 or older

0%

9%

3%

27%

45%

4%

10%

2%

88%

Socio-occupational classification

Manager/professional

0%

19%

8%

33%

20%

4%

14%

2%

79%

Intermediate occupation

2%

22%

9%

26%

13%

6%

19%

3%

78%

White-collar worker

4%

22%

6%

19%

8%

7%

32%

2%

71%

Blue-collar worker

4%

24%

5%

16%

5%

5%

37%

4%

71%

Retired

1%

12%

4%

26%

36%

5%

14%

2%

87%

Employment status

Employee

3%

21%

7%

24%

11%

5%

26%

3%

74%

Private employee

2%

20%

6%

25%

12%

6%

26%

3%

73%

Public employee

3%

23%

7%

23%

9%

5%

27%

3%

75%

Self-employed

0%

24%

8%

24%

16%

5%

21%

2%

76%

Unemployed

3%

31%

7%

14%

8%

6%

26%

5%

73%

Education

Less than baccalauréat

2%

17%

4%

19%

19%

6%

30%

3%

75%

Baccalauréat

3%

21%

6%

24%

15%

5%

24%

2%

76%

Bac +2

1%

22%

6%

26%

22%

5%

15%

3%

80%

At least bac +3

1%

20%

10%

30%

24%

4%

9%

2%

81%

Monthly household income

Less than €1,250

3%

25%

7%

14%

12%

5%

32%

2%

70%

€1,250 to €2,000

3%

23%

6%

18%

15%

3%

29%

3%

76%

€2,000 to €3,000

2%

18%

7%

25%

17%

7%

20%

4%

80%

More than €3,000

1%

16%

5%

32%

25%

5%

15%

1%

84%

Moment of choice of vote

Several months ago

1%

16%

5%

20%

24%

2%

31%

1%

100%

A few weeks ago

2%

27%

7%

31%

15%

6%

10%

2%

100%

In the last few days

3%

21%

7%

29%

11%

14%

10%

5%

100%

At the last moment

5%

21%

9%

23%

17%

8%

11%

6%

100%

Agglomeration

Rural

3%

18%

5%

21%

19%

7%

23%

4%

80%

Fewer than 20,000 inhabitants

2%

20%

5%

23%

17%

5%

25%

3%

76%

20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants

1%

21%

7%

26%

18%

2%

24%

1%

73%

More than 100,000 inhabitants

1%

20%

7%

24%

21%

4%

21%

2%

78%

Paris agglomeration

1%

19%

6%

29%

25%

5%

14%

1%

76%

Religion

Catholic

2%

13%

4%

23%

28%

6%

22%

2%

80%

Regular practitioner

1%

8%

3%

20%

51%

5%

11%

1%

87%

Occasional practitioner

2%

13%

4%

23%

27%

6%

22%

3%

80%

Non-practitioner

2%

17%

6%

22%

16%

4%

29%

4%

77%

Others

2%

23%

9%

23%

21%

4%

15%

3%

72%

None

2%

28%

9%

25%

7%

4%

23%

2%

74%

Demographic

Turnout

Arthaud/

Poutou

Mélenchon

Hamon

Macron

Fillon

Dupont-Aignan

Le Pen

Others

Sociology of the electorate

Source: Ipsos France[189]

Second round

Candidates in the second round

Emmanuel Macron

Marine Le Pen

En Marche!

Front National

Minister of the Economy, Industry

and Digital Affairs

(2014–2016)

Member of the European Parliament

for North-West France

(2004–2017)

La Rotonde, where Macron celebrated the results of the first round

Supporters of Macron celebrating his victory at the Louvre on 7 May

After being eliminated in the first round, both François Fillon and Benoît Hamon called to vote for Emmanuel Macron, while Jean-Luc Mélenchon refused to pronounce in favor of either candidate, preferring to first consult activists from his movement.[2] Jean Lassalle and Nathalie Arthaud opted to cast a blank vote,[2][24] Philippe Poutou and François Asselineau gave no voting instructions,[2] and Jacques Cheminade only stated that he would personally refuse to vote for Le Pen and denounced the forces of “financial occupation”.[23] Nicolas Dupont-Aignan endorsed Le Pen during the evening of 28 April,[18] and was subsequently revealed as her choice for Prime Minister the following day.[190] On 2 May, the result of Mélenchon’s consultation was published, with 36.12% voting for a blank vote, 34.83% supporting a vote for Macron, and 29.05% opting to abstain;[191] Mélenchon, for his part, issued no voting instructions, only urging his supporters not to make the “terrible error” of voting for Le Pen.[192] Jean-Marie Le Pen supported his daughter.[193]

Voting cards for the second round.

On the evening of the first round, Macron and members of his entourage celebrated the result at La Rotonde, a brasserie in the 6th arrondissement of Paris; the move was criticized as premature and complacent, viewed as reminiscent of Nicolas Sarkozy‘s widely criticized post-election celebration at Fouquet’s in 2007.[194] On 24 April, Le Pen vacated her position as leader of the National Front on 24 April to focus on her presidential candidacy but remained a member of the party.[195] On 26 April, while Macron met with union representatives in his hometown of Amiens employed at the local Whirlpool factory, slated to close in 2018, Le Pen arrived at the site of the factory outdoors around noon in a visit to speak with workers, catching Macron by surprise. When Macron subsequently arrived at the factory site in mid-afternoon, he was whistled and heckled by a hostile crowd, with some shouting “Marine présidente”, before he subsequently spoke with the workers for half an hour.[196]

The official campaign ended at midnight on 5 May.[197] Just minutes before the election silence went into effect, emails and documents from the Macron campaign were leaked on a file-sharing website. The campaign team subsequently issued a statement claiming that they had been compromised, and alleged that the leak contained both real as well and some fabricated documents. Numerama, an online publication focusing on digital life, described the leaked material as “utterly mundane”, consisting of “the contents of a hard drive and several emails of co-workers and En Marche political officials.” Leaked documents included “memos, bills, loans for amounts that are hardly over-the-top, recommendations and other reservations, amidst, of course, exchanges that are strictly personal and private — personal notes on the rain and sunshine, a confirmation email for the publishing of a book, reservation of a table for friends, etc.”, in addition to some documents unrelated to Macron.[198]

Voting in the second round took place on Saturday 6 May from 08:00 to 19:00 (local time) in the French overseas departments and territories situated east of the International Date Line and west of metropolitan France (i.e. French Guiana, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Pierre and Miquelon), as well as at French diplomatic missions in the Americas. Voting in metropolitan France (as well as the French overseas departments and territories of Mayotte, New Caledonia, Réunion and Wallis and Futuna, and French diplomatic missions outside the Americas) took place on Sunday 7 May from 08:00 to 19:00 or 20:00 (local time).[160] The results of the second round were officially proclaimed on 10 May.[199]

Debate

Though TF1 initially had plans to hold its own debate between the first and second round, it instead jointly hosted one with France 2.[200] BFM TV also originally intended to host a debate between the two rounds, and it sought to join France 2 and TF1 in co-hosting a single debate but was rebuffed; while all channels were welcome to broadcast the debate, CEO of France Télévisions Delphine Ernotte said, it would not accept such an arrangement with BFM TV, which would mean three journalists moderating the debate.[201] Unlike Jacques Chirac, who refused to debate Jean-Marie Le Pen after the latter’s surprise advancement to the second round in the 2002 presidential election, Macron agreed to debate Marine Le Pen on 3 May.[202] The debate, planned to start at 21:00 CEST and last 2 hours and 20 minutes, was originally to be moderated by Gilles Bouleau and David Pujadas; however, after the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) raised concerns that the moderators would both be men for the first time since 1995, the final pair of Christophe Jakubyszyn of TF1 and Nathalie Saint-Cricq of France 2 was chosen.[203] A total of 16.5 million people (60% of the audience share) watched the debate.[204]

The debate was considered to have significantly damaged the image of Le Pen and the FN before the second round of the election, with Le Pen criticized for being overly aggressive, arrogant, and amateur in the topics at hand, and was also attributed as a cause of the poor performance of the FN in the subsequent legislative elections.[205]

2017 French presidential election second-round debate

Date

Organizers

Moderators

P  Present

Notes

Macron

Le Pen

3 May

21:00 CEST

TF1

France 2

Christophe Jakubyszyn

Nathalie Saint-Cricq

P

P

[203]

Candidate viewed as “most convincing”

Debate

Poll source

Macron

Le Pen

Notes

3 May

TF1/France 2

Elabe

63%

34%

[206]

Harris*

42%

26%

[207]

Ifop-Fiducial*

45%

29%

[208]

Odoxa*

48%

19%

[209]

* Elabe poll among viewers; Harris and Ifop-Fiducial polls among those aware of debate;

Odoxa poll among a representative sample of the French population

Electorate

Sociology of the electorate

Demographic

Macron

Le Pen

Blank/null votes

Turnout

Total vote

66.1%

33.9%

11.5%

74.6%

First-round presidential election vote

François Fillon

48%

20%

15%

83%

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

52%

7%

17%

76%

Benoît Hamon

71%

2%

10%

83%

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

27%

30%

20%

77%

Political party

EXG

59%

41%

–

60%

FG

80%

20%

–

72%

EELV

89%

11%

–

74%

PS

94%

6%

–

85%

EM

100%

0%

–

91%

MoDem

85%

15%

–

81%

UDI

85%

15%

–

87%

LR

70%

30%

–

78%

FN

3%

97%

–

82%

None

62%

38%

–

59%

Self-described political position

Very left-wing

77%

23%

–

62%

Left-wing

95%

5%

–

82%

Rather left-wing

91%

9%

–

79%

Centre

89%

11%

–

83%

Rather right-wing

76%

24%

–

78%

Right-wing

47%

53%

–

79%

Very right-wing

2%

98%

–

86%

Neither left nor right

48%

52%

–

63%

Left subtotal

92%

8%

–

79%

Right subtotal

47%

53%

–

63%

Sex

Men

62%

38%

–

73%

Women

68%

32%

–

76%

Age

18–24 years old

66%

34%

–

66%

25–34 years old

60%

40%

–

68%

35–49 years old

57%

43%

–

73%

50–59 years old

64%

36%

–

76%

60–69 years old

70%

30%

–

81%

70 or older

78%

22%

–

82%

Socio-occupational classification

Manager/professional

82%

18%

–

76%

Intermediate occupation

67%

33%

–

75%

White-collar worker

54%

46%

–

70%

Blue-collar worker

44%

56%

–

68%

Retired

74%

26%

–

83%

Employment status

Employee

62%

38%

–

73%

Private employee

63%

37%

–

72%

Public employee

61%

39%

–

75%

Self-employed

57%

43%

–

69%

Unemployed

53%

47%

–

65%

Education

Less than baccalauréat

55%

45%

–

73%

Baccalauréat

64%

36%

–

72%

Bac +2

69%

31%

–

77%

At least bac +3

81%

19%

–

78%

Monthly household income

Less than €1,250

55%

45%

–

66%

€1,250 to €2,000

59%

41%

–

75%

€2,000 to €3,000

64%

36%

–

76%

More than €3,000

75%

25%

–

80%

Level of financial security with current income

Very difficult

31%

69%

–

73%

Difficult

61%

39%

–

72%

Easily

79%

21%

–

78%

Future of the young generation

Better

80%

20%

–

80%

Worse

59%

41%

–

74%

Neither better nor worse

79%

21%

–

77%

Agglomeration

Rural

57%

43%

–

77%

Fewer than 20,000 inhabitants

65%

35%

–

75%

20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants

62%

38%

–

76%

More than 100,000 inhabitants

72%

28%

–

73%

Religion

Catholic

63%

37%

–

78%

Regular practitioner

66%

34%

–

82%

Occasional practitioner

66%

34%

–

78%

Non-practitioner

62%

38%

–

77%

Others

72%

28%

–

69%

None

68%

32%

–

71%

Demographic

Turnout

Macron

Le Pen

Blank/null votes

Sociology of the electorate

Source: Ipsos France[210]

Opinion polls

Main article: Opinion polling for the 2017 French presidential election

First round

Second round

Results

Candidate

Party

First round

Second round

Votes

%

Votes

%

Emmanuel Macron

La République En Marche!

8,656,346

24.01

20,743,128

66.10

Marine Le Pen

National Front

7,678,491

21.30

10,638,475

33.90

François Fillon

The Republicans

7,212,995

20.01

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

La France Insoumise

7,059,951

19.58

Benoît Hamon

Socialist Party

2,291,288

6.36

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Debout la France

1,695,000

4.70

Jean Lassalle

Résistons!

435,301

1.21

Philippe Poutou

New Anticapitalist Party

394,505

1.09

François Asselineau

Popular Republican Union

332,547

0.92

Nathalie Arthaud

Workers’ Struggle

232,384

0.64

Jacques Cheminade

Solidarity and Progress

65,586

0.18

Total

36,054,394

100.00

31,381,603

100.00

Valid votes

36,054,394

97.43

31,381,603

88.48

Invalid votes

289,337

0.78

1,064,225

3.00

Blank votes

659,997

1.78

3,021,499

8.52

Total votes

37,003,728

100.00

35,467,327

100.00

Registered voters/turnout

47,582,183

77.77

47,568,693

74.56

Source: Constitutional Council (First round  · Second round)

First round

By department

Department

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

François

Fillon

Jean-Luc

Mélenchon

Benoît

Hamon

Nicolas

Dupont-Aignan

Jean

Lassalle

Philippe

Poutou

François

Asselineau

Nathalie

Arthaud

Jacques

Cheminade

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Ain

73,692

22.62

81,455

25.00

69,805

21.43

51,736

15.88

16,711

5.13

19,788

6.07

3,465

1.06

3,098

0.95

3,612

1.11

1,842

0.57

595

0.18

Aisne

51,680

17.94

102,770

35.67

46,969

16.30

48,950

16.99

12,230

4.24

14,651

5.08

2,264

0.79

3,156

1.10

2,171

0.75

2,763

0.96

536

0.19

Allier

45,651

23.72

43,004

22.34

36,457

18.94

38,311

19.91

10,619

5.52

9,795

5.09

2,986

1.55

2,322

1.21

1,422

0.74

1,540

0.80

353

0.18

Alpes-de-Haute-Provence

19,960

20.02

24,463

24.53

18,442

18.49

22,448

22.51

4,983

5.00

4,861

4.87

1,721

1.73

1,178

1.18

932

0.93

521

0.52

205

0.21

Hautes-Alpes

18,948

21.80

18,474

21.25

16,645

19.15

18,796

21.62

5,109

5.88

4,938

5.68

1,609

1.85

1,049

1.21

783

0.90

411

0.47

165

0.19

Alpes-Maritimes

111,953

19.04

163,141

27.75

161,036

27.39

87,941

14.96

21,067

3.58

25,175

4.28

5,262

0.90

3,622

0.62

6,067

1.03

1,729

0.29

939

0.16

Ardèche

42,320

21.64

45,305

23.17

33,835

17.30

42,622

21.80

11,757

6.01

9,926

5.08

3,546

1.81

2,602

1.33

1,969

1.01

1,303

0.67

371

0.19

Ardennes

26,912

18.33

47,578

32.41

25,273

17.22

26,172

17.83

7,234

4.93

7,810

5.32

1,406

0.96

1,693

1.15

1,080

0.74

1,378

0.94

267

0.18

Ariège

19,523

20.92

20,247

21.70

11,892

12.75

24,970

26.76

7,326

7.85

3,369

3.61

3,304

3.54

1,180

1.26

799

0.86

556

0.60

140

0.15

Aube

30,565

18.98

48,846

30.33

37,122

23.05

22,496

13.97

6,545

4.06

10,235

6.35

1,159

0.72

1,387

0.86

1,317

0.82

1,107

0.69

289

0.18

Aude

43,015

20.07

60,585

28.26

32,281

15.06

46,126

21.52

13,614

6.35

8,265

3.86

4,642

2.17

2,507

1.17

1,783

0.83

1,195

0.56

348

0.16

Aveyron

45,584

25.83

28,588

16.20

36,664

20.78

34,689

19.66

10,878

6.16

8,554

4.85

6,461

3.66

2,322

1.32

1,304

0.74

1,106

0.63

313

0.18

Bouches-du-Rhône

203,312

19.37

286,397

27.28

207,466

19.76

231,194

22.02

47,564

4.53

40,447

3.85

10,040

0.96

8,006

0.76

9,418

0.90

4,114

0.39

1,740

0.17

Calvados

99,720

24.83

81,770

20.36

82,340

20.50

75,620

18.83

27,293

6.80

20,079

5.00

2,911

0.72

5,269

1.31

2,830

0.70

3,099

0.77

691

0.17

Cantal

24,477

26.73

16,641

18.17

21,589

23.58

14,566

15.91

4,810

5.25

4,047

4.42

2,840

3.10

1,179

1.29

527

0.58

692

0.76

198

0.22

Charente

49,889

25.07

42,598

21.40

33,744

16.96

40,755

20.48

12,569

6.32

10,008

5.03

3,085

1.55

2,724

1.37

1,540

0.77

1,651

0.83

450

0.23

Charente-Maritime

91,355

23.91

80,764

21.14

78,659

20.59

72,491

18.97

22,023

5.76

20,333

5.32

5,276

1.38

4,876

1.28

3,020

0.79

2,576

0.67

692

0.18

Cher

38,076

22.05

41,753

24.18

32,967

19.09

33,694

19.51

9,157

5.30

9,554

5.53

1,925

1.11

2,106

1.22

1,479

0.86

1,630

0.94

345

0.20

Corrèze

39,218

26.93

25,253

17.34

25,427

17.46

30,357

20.85

9,263

6.36

7,049

4.84

4,253

2.92

2,319

1.59

1,094

0.75

1,051

0.72

329

0.23

Corse-du-Sud

13,022

17.87

20,858

28.62

18,714

25.68

10,085

13.84

2,546

3.49

2,218

3.04

3,948

5.42

657

0.90

485

0.67

218

0.30

117

0.16

Haute-Corse

15,506

19.02

22,183

27.22

20,739

25.44

11,229

13.78

3,234

3.97

2,244

2.75

4,763

5.84

717

0.88

480

0.59

277

0.34

136

0.17

Côte-d’Or

67,436

23.65

64,200

22.52

60,625

21.26

50,859

17.84

16,810

5.90

14,980

5.25

2,635

0.92

2,818

0.99

2,457

0.86

1,795

0.63

509

0.18

Côtes-d’Armor

104,969

27.99

61,703

16.46

68,916

18.38

76,013

20.27

32,260

8.60

15,958

4.26

3,554

0.95

5,468

1.46

2,479

0.66

3,028

0.81

621

0.17

Creuse

15,807

22.50

13,966

19.88

12,637

17.99

14,827

21.11

5,494

7.82

3,521

5.01

1,352

1.92

1,209

1.72

580

0.83

684

0.97

174

0.25

Dordogne

55,945

22.49

52,044

20.93

42,510

17.09

57,132

22.97

15,783

6.35

11,424

4.59

6,050

2.43

3,578

1.44

2,128

0.86

1,626

0.65

490

0.20

Doubs

63,954

22.50

66,635

23.45

59,929

21.09

50,803

17.88

16,318

5.74

14,733

5.18

2,532

0.89

3,565

1.25

3,129

1.10

2,051

0.72

530

0.19

Drôme

63,164

21.88

68,996

23.90

53,403

18.50

58,037

20.10

17,385

6.02

14,997

5.19

3,868

1.34

3,174

1.10

2,988

1.03

2,196

0.76

533

0.18

Eure

66,986

19.89

98,719

29.31

63,436

18.84

58,844

17.47

16,999

5.05

19,096

5.67

2,602

0.77

3,933

1.17

2,927

0.87

2,633

0.78

602

0.18

Eure-et-Loir

51,038

21.74

58,886

25.08

51,275

21.84

38,035

16.20

12,317

5.25

14,103

6.01

1,942

0.83

2,659

1.13

2,253

0.96

1,817

0.77

454

0.19

Finistère

164,095

29.45

77,366

13.89

99,965

17.94

109,607

19.67

60,781

10.91

22,737

4.08

6,192

1.11

8,250

1.48

3,697

0.66

3,638

0.65

857

0.15

Gard

79,006

18.78

123,273

29.30

72,366

17.20

90,905

21.61

20,473

4.87

17,808

4.23

5,946

1.41

4,044

0.96

4,096

0.97

2,092

0.50

673

0.16

Haute-Garonne

190,128

26.43

120,225

16.71

118,608

16.49

170,446

23.69

60,180

8.37

27,833

3.87

14,445

2.01

7,116

0.99

5,955

0.83

3,166

0.44

1,291

0.18

Gers

27,775

23.40

23,387

19.71

21,312

17.96

23,089

19.45

9,527

8.03

5,378

4.53

5,059

4.26

1,254

1.06

1,037

0.87

677

0.57

188

0.16

Gironde

222,287

26.13

155,319

18.26

145,283

17.08

185,888

21.85

64,300

7.56

35,530

4.18

16,460

1.93

13,233

1.56

7,013

0.82

3,980

0.47

1,527

0.18

Hérault

128,621

20.52

161,119

25.70

110,339

17.60

143,996

22.97

36,180

5.77

23,159

3.69

8,461

1.35

5,660

0.90

5,919

0.94

2,496

0.40

894

0.14

Ille-et-Vilaine

181,373

30.26

84,648

14.12

114,034

19.03

118,096

19.70

53,418

8.91

26,822

4.48

4,531

0.76

7,065

1.18

3,994

0.67

4,339

0.72

1,021

0.17

Indre

27,301

20.85

31,985

24.43

25,476

19.46

24,938

19.05

7,786

5.95

7,177

5.48

1,728

1.32

1,757

1.34

1,098

0.84

1,390

1.06

298

0.23

Indre-et-Loire

83,165

24.47

64,522

18.98

72,196

21.24

65,931

19.40

22,898

6.74

18,452

5.43

2,929

0.86

3,907

1.15

2,620

0.77

2,606

0.77

679

0.20

Isère

164,091

24.77

147,910

22.33

112,927

17.05

135,949

20.52

43,652

6.59

33,773

5.10

6,537

0.99

6,382

0.96

6,558

0.99

3,595

0.54

1,140

0.17

Jura

31,896

21.33

36,110

24.14

28,373

18.97

30,331

20.28

7,589

5.07

8,533

5.71

1,994

1.33

1,980

1.32

1,330

0.89

1,148

0.77

285

0.19

Landes

61,043

24.63

44,956

18.14

42,464

17.13

49,949

20.15

21,550

8.69

11,021

4.45

10,485

4.23

2,875

1.16

1,916

0.77

1,235

0.50

372

0.15

Loir-et-Cher

40,639

20.98

48,662

25.12

42,756

22.07

31,576

16.30

10,956

5.66

11,646

6.01

1,843

0.95

2,198

1.13

1,516

0.78

1,542

0.80

404

0.21

Loire

90,677

23.17

94,222

24.08

71,848

18.36

73,388

18.75

22,698

5.80

22,689

5.80

5,041

1.29

4,107

1.05

3,483

0.89

2,547

0.65

667

0.17

Haute-Loire

32,821

23.51

32,185

23.06

25,956

18.60

25,419

18.21

7,435

5.33

8,346

5.98

3,112

2.23

1,928

1.38

1,050

0.75

1,043

0.75

282

0.20

Loire-Atlantique

232,602

28.66

111,194

13.70

159,703

19.68

178,357

21.98

65,140

8.03

36,546

4.50

6,029

0.74

9,618

1.19

6,129

0.76

4,785

0.59

1,354

0.17

Loiret

83,506

23.48

83,662

23.53

75,655

21.28

58,134

16.35

20,438

5.75

21,128

5.94

3,203

0.90

3,655

1.03

3,109

0.87

2,380

0.67

702

0.20

Lot

29,527

26.65

17,865

16.13

18,459

16.66

26,014

23.48

7,951

7.18

4,550

4.11

3,073

2.77

1,528

1.38

871

0.79

723

0.65

226

0.20

Lot-et-Garonne

39,253

20.79

47,271

25.03

34,828

18.44

36,018

19.08

10,639

5.63

9,407

4.98

6,083

3.22

2,292

1.21

1,660

0.88

1,044

0.55

327

0.17

Lozère

10,463

21.73

9,097

18.89

10,986

22.82

9,483

19.70

2,733

5.68

2,197

4.56

1,764

3.66

683

1.42

354

0.74

294

0.61

93

0.19

Maine-et-Loire

121,685

26.51

77,935

16.98

108,888

23.73

78,293

17.06

29,553

6.44

25,321

5.52

3,483

0.76

5,696

1.24

3,439

0.75

3,860

0.84

805

0.18

Manche

74,683

24.86

61,620

20.51

64,909

21.60

51,026

16.98

19,238

6.40

17,052

5.68

2,520

0.84

4,134

1.38

2,048

0.68

2,593

0.86

623

0.21

Marne

60,958

20.75

82,473

28.07

65,081

22.15

44,424

15.12

13,683

4.66

16,896

5.75

2,350

0.80

2,762

0.94

2,441

0.83

2,176

0.74

525

0.18

Haute-Marne

18,438

18.00

34,027

33.22

19,590

19.12

15,380

15.01

4,292

4.19

6,417

6.26

1,126

1.10

1,233

1.20

813

0.79

926

0.90

198

0.19

Mayenne

46,938

26.04

30,465

16.90

48,772

27.06

26,798

14.87

10,247

5.69

10,107

5.61

1,525

0.85

2,242

1.24

1,182

0.66

1,627

0.90

329

0.18

Meurthe-et-Moselle

83,703

22.04

98,194

25.86

62,654

16.50

77,400

20.38

23,632

6.22

19,331

5.09

3,236

0.85

4,483

1.18

3,458

0.91

2,942

0.77

733

0.19

Meuse

20,713

19.35

34,602

32.32

19,287

18.02

16,020

14.97

4,918

4.59

6,802

6.35

1,294

1.21

1,430

1.34

856

0.80

886

0.83

237

0.22

Morbihan

130,639

27.86

82,927

17.69

97,900

20.88

82,020

17.49

34,368

7.33

22,411

4.78

4,820

1.03

6,309

1.35

3,249

0.69

3,291

0.70

901

0.19

Moselle

117,738

21.05

158,542

28.35

96,003

17.17

100,118

17.90

29,480

5.27

32,525

5.82

5,763

1.03

6,975

1.25

5,977

1.07

4,929

0.88

1,167

0.21

Nièvre

27,356

22.71

29,817

24.76

20,773

17.25

23,079

19.16

7,854

6.52

6,446

5.35

1,365

1.13

1,547

1.28

959

0.80

1,004

0.83

234

0.19

Nord

268,723

19.85

382,030

28.22

226,710

16.75

288,115

21.28

76,531

5.65

65,245

4.82

8,535

0.63

13,151

0.97

11,450

0.85

10,975

0.81

2,338

0.17

Oise

86,680

19.80

135,188

30.88

76,783

17.54

77,415

17.68

20,525

4.69

23,936

5.47

3,414

0.78

4,682

1.07

4,666

1.07

3,677

0.84

827

0.19

Orne

35,815

21.57

39,532

23.81

41,084

24.74

24,542

14.78

8,659

5.21

9,644

5.81

1,480

0.89

2,147

1.29

1,291

0.78

1,513

0.91

350

0.21

Pas-de-Calais

153,682

18.45

286,147

34.35

119,077

14.29

159,342

19.13

43,084

5.17

41,427

4.97

5,832

0.70

9,002

1.08

5,484

0.66

8,667

1.04

1,408

0.17

Puy-de-Dôme

96,797

27.15

63,030

17.68

58,432

16.39

78,417

21.99

25,814

7.24

15,635

4.38

7,348

2.06

4,730

1.33

2,910

0.82

2,699

0.76

755

0.21

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

103,958

26.28

54,376

13.74

71,858

18.16

78,803

19.92

30,589

7.73

14,727

3.72

29,882

7.55

6,371

1.61

2,782

0.70

1,799

0.45

508

0.13

Hautes-Pyrénées

35,070

25.11

25,947

18.57

20,220

14.48

32,148

23.01

9,935

7.11

5,876

4.21

6,928

4.96

1,575

1.13

1,023

0.73

767

0.55

200

0.14

Pyrénées-Orientales

49,245

18.46

80,169

30.05

45,865

17.19

56,392

21.14

13,455

5.04

9,741

3.65

4,634

1.74

3,053

1.14

2,303

0.86

1,477

0.55

453

0.17

Bas-Rhin

133,347

22.29

147,714

24.70

131,564

22.00

88,420

14.78

31,931

5.34

39,299

6.57

6,420

1.07

6,549

1.09

6,841

1.14

4,823

0.81

1,197

0.20

Haut-Rhin

79,798

19.76

109,704

27.16

90,237

22.34

57,856

14.32

18,694

4.63

28,562

7.07

5,004

1.24

4,727

1.17

5,217

1.29

3,101

0.77

1,010

0.25

Rhône

236,137

26.58

144,476

16.26

205,781

23.16

175,051

19.70

60,094

6.76

38,429

4.33

6,703

0.75

7,146

0.80

9,188

1.03

4,061

0.46

1,446

0.16

Haute-Saône

27,332

19.59

43,753

31.36

25,184

18.05

22,150

15.88

6,596

4.73

8,176

5.86

1,512

1.08

2,021

1.45

1,206

0.86

1,325

0.95

267

0.19

Saône-et-Loire

69,212

22.33

75,258

24.28

60,100

19.39

55,249

17.83

19,184

6.19

18,961

6.12

3,153

1.02

3,588

1.16

2,535

0.82

2,201

0.71

510

0.16

Sarthe

64,618

20.04

67,083

20.80

92,261

28.61

56,851

17.63

17,195

5.33

13,657

4.24

2,141

0.66

3,565

1.11

2,074

0.64

2,452

0.76

547

0.17

Savoie

55,871

23.13

52,448

21.71

50,815

21.04

45,013

18.63

13,752

5.69

13,673

5.66

3,152

1.30

2,578

1.07

2,608

1.08

1,219

0.50

430

0.18

Haute-Savoie

100,174

24.23

77,919

18.84

105,057

25.41

67,079

16.22

21,805

5.27

24,785

5.99

4,649

1.12

4,263

1.03

5,021

1.21

1,919

0.46

827

0.20

Paris

375,006

34.83

53,719

4.99

284,744

26.45

210,548

19.56

109,550

10.18

17,997

1.67

5,490

0.51

6,799

0.63

8,337

0.77

2,897

0.27

1,472

0.14

Seine-Maritime

145,756

21.23

170,945

24.90

118,336

17.24

152,394

22.20

41,516

6.05

33,036

4.81

4,383

0.64

8,321

1.21

5,205

0.76

5,356

0.78

1,278

0.19

Seine-et-Marne

157,314

23.11

155,521

22.85

120,968

17.77

141,827

20.84

38,772

5.70

41,505

6.10

5,182

0.76

6,354

0.93

8,195

1.20

3,706

0.54

1,247

0.18

Yvelines

219,063

28.86

98,024

12.92

206,835

27.25

126,345

16.65

52,564

6.93

32,906

4.34

5,371

0.71

5,448

0.72

8,148

1.07

2,872

0.38

1,358

0.18

Deux-Sèvres

57,826

26.97

38,640

18.02

40,195

18.75

41,609

19.41

14,950

6.97

11,356

5.30

2,599

1.21

3,483

1.62

1,478

0.69

1,869

0.87

393

0.18

Somme

69,520

21.75

97,081

30.37

51,834

16.22

59,491

18.61

14,260

4.46

15,462

4.84

2,365

0.74

3,661

1.15

2,272

0.71

3,111

0.97

579

0.18

Tarn

51,755

22.14

52,402

22.42

41,052

17.56

48,094

20.57

15,530

6.64

11,440

4.89

7,105

3.04

2,721

1.16

1,822

0.78

1,397

0.60

439

0.19

Tarn-et-Garonne

30,319

20.65

39,183

26.69

25,992

17.71

27,841

18.97

8,567

5.84

7,233

4.93

3,660

2.49

1,573

1.07

1,337

0.91

830

0.57

266

0.18

Var

108,597

17.73

186,376

30.43

152,316

24.87

94,184

15.38

21,089

3.44

29,177

4.76

6,933

1.13

4,655

0.76

5,860

0.96

2,274

0.37

977

0.16

Vaucluse

58,208

18.52

95,930

30.53

59,619

18.97

60,852

19.37

13,553

4.31

14,452

4.60

3,989

1.27

2,804

0.89

2,890

0.92

1,388

0.44

543

0.17

Vendée

109,989

26.26

77,590

18.53

106,804

25.50

63,156

15.08

21,356

5.10

24,211

5.78

3,810

0.91

5,219

1.25

2,705

0.65

3,294

0.79

696

0.17

Vienne

59,146

24.88

47,024

19.78

42,703

17.96

49,061

20.64

16,861

7.09

11,920

5.01

2,861

1.20

3,642

1.53

1,896

0.80

2,074

0.87

560

0.24

Haute-Vienne

55,577

26.67

37,937

18.20

32,522

15.60

46,549

22.33

16,136

7.74

9,285

4.46

3,518

1.69

3,044

1.46

1,557

0.75

1,850

0.89

440

0.21

Vosges

43,604

19.86

63,924

29.12

39,579

18.03

36,524

16.64

10,887

4.96

14,323

6.53

2,750

1.25

3,229

1.47

2,223

1.01

2,004

0.91

455

0.21

Yonne

36,234

19.63

52,640

28.52

36,739

19.91

30,815

16.70

8,846

4.79

11,668

6.32

1,987

1.08

2,128

1.15

1,775

0.96

1,380

0.75

341

0.18

Territoire de Belfort

14,771

20.64

19,249

26.89

12,668

17.70

13,672

19.10

4,189

5.85

3,770

5.27

669

0.93

886

1.24

941

1.31

592

0.83

167

0.23

Essonne

163,389

26.21

102,461

16.43

112,478

18.04

136,392

21.88

42,072

6.75

44,793

7.18

4,468

0.72

5,755

0.92

7,514

1.21

2,924

0.47

1,241

0.20

Hauts-de-Seine

256,687

32.30

60,731

7.64

231,553

29.14

145,289

18.28

57,114

7.19

21,359

2.69

4,747

0.60

5,033

0.63

8,453

1.06

2,447

0.31

1,345

0.17

Seine-Saint-Denis

130,103

24.04

73,534

13.59

69,063

12.76

184,123

34.02

45,506

8.41

16,601

3.07

3,160

0.58

6,050

1.12

8,739

1.61

3,235

0.60

1,088

0.20

Val-de-Marne

172,202

28.33

69,878

11.50

122,814

20.21

149,112

24.53

47,228

7.77

26,252

4.32

3,957

0.65

5,226

0.86

7,303

1.20

2,749

0.45

1,066

0.18

Val-d’Oise

138,752

25.31

94,158

17.18

101,131

18.45

131,342

23.96

37,518

6.84

24,790

4.52

3,975

0.73

5,040

0.92

7,702

1.41

2,752

0.50

978

0.18

Guadeloupe

33,930

30.23

15,159

13.51

16,305

14.53

27,081

24.13

11,165

9.95

2,042

1.82

650

0.58

2,300

2.05

1,312

1.17

1,972

1.76

326

0.29

Martinique

27,893

25.53

11,949

10.94

18,400

16.84

29,903

27.37

10,661

9.76

2,338

2.14

870

0.80

3,217

2.94

1,407

1.29

2,253

2.06

373

0.34

French Guiana

5,031

18.75

6,521

24.30

3,935

14.66

6,633

24.71

1,529

5.70

472

1.76

273

1.02

1,405

5.23

480

1.79

462

1.72

98

0.37

Réunion

66,292

18.91

82,219

23.46

60,508

17.26

85,987

24.53

26,872

7.67

10,123

2.89

1,939

0.55

4,377

1.25

6,029

1.72

5,190

1.48

944

0.27

Mayotte

6,364

19.21

9,008

27.19

10,808

32.62

2,789

8.42

1,434

4.33

1,019

3.08

182

0.55

621

1.87

408

1.23

334

1.01

163

0.49

New Caledonia

11,089

12.75

25,290

29.09

27,065

31.13

7,703

8.86

8,125

9.34

2,521

2.90

695

0.80

1,284

1.48

2,098

2.41

836

0.96

240

0.28

French Polynesia

11,119

14.70

24,604

32.54

26,679

35.28

5,952

7.87

2,203

2.91

1,767

2.34

447

0.59

755

1.00

1,206

1.59

689

0.91

201

0.27

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

473

17.97

478

18.16

261

9.92

933

35.45

217

8.24

79

3.00

54

2.05

64

2.43

36

1.37

28

1.06

9

0.34

Wallis and Futuna

1,630

30.48

380

7.11

1,526

28.53

192

3.59

1,349

25.22

79

1.48

29

0.54

41

0.77

50

0.93

54

1.01

18

0.34

Saint Martin/Saint Barthélemy

1,572

19.99

1,834

23.32

2,518

32.02

1,153

14.66

247

3.14

216

2.75

68

0.86

92

1.17

112

1.42

35

0.45

18

0.23

French residents overseas

223,879

40.40

35,926

6.48

145,829

26.32

87,692

15.83

38,092

6.87

8,837

1.59

2,530

0.46

3,414

0.62

5,578

1.01

1,312

0.24

1,030

0.19

Total

8,656,346

24.01

7,678,491

21.30

7,212,995

20.01

7,059,951

19.58

2,291,288

6.36

1,695,000

4.70

435,301

1.21

394,505

1.09

332,547

0.92

232,384

0.64

65,586

0.18

Source: Ministry of the Interior

By region

Region

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

François

Fillon

Jean-Luc

Mélenchon

Benoît

Hamon

Nicolas

Dupont-Aignan

Jean

Lassalle

Philippe

Poutou

François

Asselineau

Nathalie

Arthaud

Jacques

Cheminade

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes

1,025,872

24.50

867,591

20.72

845,905

20.20

805,588

19.24

256,532

6.13

215,883

5.16

53,247

1.27

43,509

1.04

41,336

0.99

24,656

0.59

7,597

0.18

Bourgogne-Franche-Comté

338,191

21.89

387,662

25.09

304,391

19.70

276,958

17.93

87,386

5.66

87,267

5.65

15,847

1.03

18,533

1.20

14,332

0.93

11,496

0.74

2,843

0.18

Brittany

581,076

29.05

306,644

15.33

380,815

19.04

385,736

19.28

180,827

9.04

87,928

4.40

19,097

0.95

27,092

1.35

13,419

0.67

14,296

0.71

3,400

0.17

Centre-Val de Loire

323,725

22.68

329,470

23.08

300,325

21.04

252,308

17.67

83,552

5.85

82,060

5.75

13,570

0.95

16,282

1.14

12,075

0.85

11,365

0.80

2,882

0.20

Corsica

28,528

18.48

43,041

27.88

39,453

25.56

21,314

13.81

5,780

3.74

4,462

2.89

8,711

5.64

1,374

0.89

965

0.63

495

0.32

253

0.16

Grand Est

615,776

20.72

825,604

27.78

586,390

19.73

484,810

16.31

151,296

5.09

182,200

6.13

30,508

1.03

34,468

1.16

30,223

1.02

24,272

0.82

6,078

0.20

Hauts-de-France

630,285

19.50

1,003,216

31.04

521,373

16.13

633,313

19.59

166,630

5.15

160,721

4.97

22,410

0.69

33,652

1.04

26,043

0.81

29,193

0.90

5,688

0.18

Île-de-France

1,612,516

28.63

708,026

12.57

1,249,586

22.19

1,224,978

21.75

430,324

7.64

226,203

4.02

36,350

0.65

45,705

0.81

64,391

1.14

23,582

0.42

9,795

0.17

Normandy

422,960

22.36

452,586

23.93

370,105

19.57

362,426

19.16

113,705

6.01

98,907

5.23

13,896

0.73

23,804

1.26

14,301

0.76

15,194

0.80

3,544

0.19

Nouvelle-Aquitaine

851,304

25.12

640,148

18.89

602,830

17.79

703,439

20.75

240,157

7.09

155,581

4.59

91,904

2.71

49,646

1.46

26,664

0.79

21,439

0.63

6,262

0.18

Occitanie

740,031

22.32

762,087

22.98

566,036

17.07

734,193

22.14

216,349

6.52

135,403

4.08

75,482

2.28

35,216

1.06

28,603

0.86

16,776

0.51

5,524

0.17

Pays de la Loire

575,832

26.27

364,267

16.62

516,428

23.56

403,455

18.41

143,491

6.55

109,842

5.01

16,988

0.78

26,340

1.20

15,529

0.71

16,018

0.73

3,731

0.17

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

520,978

18.94

774,781

28.16

615,524

22.38

515,415

18.74

113,365

4.12

119,050

4.33

29,554

1.07

21,314

0.77

25,950

0.94

10,437

0.38

4,569

0.17

Guadeloupe

33,930

30.23

15,159

13.51

16,305

14.53

27,081

24.13

11,165

9.95

2,042

1.82

650

0.58

2,300

2.05

1,312

1.17

1,972

1.76

326

0.29

Martinique

27,893

25.53

11,949

10.94

18,400

16.84

29,903

27.37

10,661

9.76

2,338

2.14

870

0.80

3,217

2.94

1,407

1.29

2,253

2.06

373

0.34

French Guiana

5,031

18.75

6,521

24.30

3,935

14.66

6,633

24.71

1,529

5.70

472

1.76

273

1.02

1,405

5.23

480

1.79

462

1.72

98

0.37

Réunion

66,292

18.91

82,219

23.46

60,508

17.26

85,987

24.53

26,872

7.67

10,123

2.89

1,939

0.55

4,377

1.25

6,029

1.72

5,190

1.48

944

0.27

Mayotte

6,364

19.21

9,008

27.19

10,808

32.62

2,789

8.42

1,434

4.33

1,019

3.08

182

0.55

621

1.87

408

1.23

334

1.01

163

0.49

Source: Ministry of the Interior

Maps

- Second-place candidate by department

- First-place candidate by constituency

- First-place candidate by commune (2012 borders)

- First-place candidate by country (overseas French)

- First-place candidate in the arrondissements of Paris

- Support for Macron by department and major city

- Support for Le Pen by department and major city

- Support for Fillon by department and major city

- Support for Mélenchon by department and major city

Second round

Tables

Results by department

Department

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Votes

%

Votes

%

Ain

173,809

60.94

111,421

39.06

Aisne

119,202

47.09

133,939

52.91

Allier

106,579

63.90

60,207

36.10

Alpes-de-Haute-Provence

48,994

58.46

34,817

41.54

Hautes-Alpes

47,211

64.12

26,417

35.88

Alpes-Maritimes

278,407

55.35

224,544

44.65

Ardèche

104,599

62.37

63,109

37.63

Ardennes

64,424

50.73

62,571

49.27

Ariège

47,983

63.09

28,074

36.91

Aube

75,810

54.15

64,180

45.85

Aude

100,901

55.33

81,452

44.67

Aveyron

109,340

72.81

40,838

27.19

Bouches-du-Rhône

519,335

57.85

378,456

42.15

Calvados

232,615

67.11

114,002

32.89

Cantal

55,411

69.83

23,938

30.17

Charente

113,700

65.49

59,916

34.51

Charente-Maritime

215,465

64.84

116,854

35.16

Cher

90,376

61.17

57,358

38.83

Corrèze

88,029

71.00

35,955

29.00

Corse-du-Sud

31,139

50.59

30,415

49.41

Haute-Corse

35,680

52.28

32,567

47.72

Côte-d’Or

159,645

64.17

89,121

35.83

Côtes-d’Armor

236,953

73.47

85,554

26.53

Creuse

39,239

65.76

20,428

34.24

Dordogne

135,533

64.27

75,335

35.73

Doubs

158,304

63.77

89,935

36.23

Drôme

157,992

62.62

94,312

37.38

Eure

158,858

54.35

133,417

45.65

Eure-et-Loir

122,420

60.27

80,696

39.73

Finistère

371,332

77.33

108,890

22.67

Gard

194,989

54.75

161,125

45.25

Haute-Garonne

436,665

72.38

166,595

27.62

Gers

67,571

66.91

33,424

33.09

Gironde

515,491

70.06

220,261

29.94

Hérault

312,419

59.22

215,147

40.78

Ille-et-Vilaine

403,347

77.67

115,942

22.33

Indre

68,173

60.98

43,627

39.02

Indre-et-Loire

201,211

69.23

89,438

30.77

Isère

383,197

65.81

199,097

34.19

Jura

79,268

61.37

49,888

38.63

Landes

146,619

68.74

66,661

31.26

Loir-et-Cher

100,789

60.47

65,896

39.53

Loire

218,603

63.86

123,714

36.14

Haute-Loire

76,233

63.35

44,112

36.65

Loire-Atlantique

525,200

77.17

155,353

22.83

Loiret

195,004

63.16

113,735

36.84

Lot

66,937

72.18

25,802

27.82

Lot-et-Garonne

97,418

59.47

66,393

40.53

Lozère

26,994

67.03

13,275

32.97

Maine-et-Loire

288,817

72.82

107,781

27.18

Manche

176,664

67.23

86,126

32.77

Marne

144,840

57.01

109,227

42.99

Haute-Marne

45,192

50.48

44,331

49.52

Mayenne

112,192

72.02

43,581

27.98

Meurthe-et-Moselle

198,750

60.66

128,902

39.34

Meuse

48,303

51.62

45,267

48.38

Morbihan

289,594

71.56

115,076

28.44

Moselle

282,717

57.66

207,597

42.34

Nièvre

62,722

59.92

41,946

40.08

Nord

669,806

56.90

507,434

43.10

Oise

202,509

53.28

177,549

46.72

Orne

88,484

61.64

55,070

38.36

Pas-de-Calais

352,558

47.94

382,782

52.06

Puy-de-Dôme

219,437

71.34

88,155

28.66

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

253,617

74.81

85,377

25.19

Hautes-Pyrénées

79,794

68.19

37,225

31.81

Pyrénées-Orientales

118,644

52.84

105,874

47.16

Bas-Rhin

330,941

63.07

193,788

36.93

Haut-Rhin

203,599

57.97

147,599

42.03

Rhône

572,015

73.59

205,317

26.41

Haute-Saône

63,541

51.71

59,341

48.29

Saône-et-Loire

166,945

61.63

103,925

38.37

Sarthe

170,153

63.33

98,523

36.67

Savoie

135,118

64.74

73,598

35.26

Haute-Savoie

249,198

68.66

113,746

31.34

Paris

849,257

89.68

97,770

10.32

Seine-Maritime

355,441

60.42

232,857

39.58

Seine-et-Marne

369,762

63.86

209,221

36.14

Yvelines

503,661

77.15

149,138

22.85

Deux-Sèvres

135,827

71.54

54,039

28.46

Somme

153,326

54.22

129,465

45.78

Tarn

125,591

63.61

71,856

36.39

Tarn-et-Garonne

71,988

57.52

53,166

42.48

Var

266,724

50.85

257,769

49.15

Vaucluse

145,965

53.45

127,113

46.55

Vendée

253,914

69.96

109,035

30.04

Vienne

143,712

68.77

65,255

31.23

Haute-Vienne

126,418

70.95

51,763

29.05

Vosges

106,076

55.26

85,894

44.74

Yonne

88,939

55.04

72,651

44.96

Territoire de Belfort

36,345

58.18

26,128

41.82

Essonne

382,650

72.18

147,509

27.82

Hauts-de-Seine

590,963

85.65

99,032

14.35

Seine-Saint-Denis

367,823

78.82

98,825

21.18

Val-de-Marne

419,145

80.32

102,673

19.68

Val-d’Oise

342,018

72.53

129,518

27.47

Guadeloupe

100,635

75.13

33,310

24.87

Martinique

104,307

77.55

30,195

22.45

French Guiana

21,769

64.89

11,777

35.11

Réunion

212,081

60.25

139,917

39.75

Mayotte

19,140

57.11

14,374

42.89

New Caledonia

47,902

52.57

43,217

47.43

French Polynesia

52,378

58.39

37,319

41.61

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

1,467

63.29

851

36.71

Wallis and Futuna

4,715

79.14

1,243

20.86

Saint Martin/Saint Barthélemy

5,282

65.03

2,840

34.97

French residents overseas

496,344

89.31

59,415

10.69

Total

20,743,128

66.10

10,638,475

33.90

Source: Ministry of the Interior

Results by region

Region

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Votes

%

Votes

%

Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes

2,452,191

67.13

1,200,726

32.87

Bourgogne-Franche-Comté

815,709

60.48

532,935

39.52

Brittany

1,301,226

75.36

425,462

24.64

Centre-Val de Loire

777,973

63.32

450,750

36.68

Corsica

66,819

51.48

62,982

48.52

Grand Est

1,500,652

57.94

1,089,356

42.06

Hauts-de-France

1,497,401

52.94

1,331,169

47.06

Île-de-France

3,825,279

78.73

1,033,686

21.27

Normandy

1,012,062

61.96

621,472

38.04

Nouvelle-Aquitaine

2,011,068

68.65

918,237

31.35

Occitanie

1,759,816

62.99

1,033,853

37.01

Pays de la Loire

1,350,276

72.42

514,273

27.58

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

1,306,636

55.47

1,049,116

44.53

Guadeloupe

100,635

75.13

33,310

24.87

Martinique

104,307

77.55

30,195

22.45

French Guiana

21,769

64.89

11,777

35.11

Réunion

212,081

60.25

139,917

39.75

Mayotte

19,140

57.11

14,374

42.89

Source: Ministry of the Interior

Maps

- First-place candidate by department

- First-place candidate by commune (2012 borders)

- Vote share by department and major city

Aftermath

See also: 2017 French legislative election

On 8 May, Macron joined President Hollande on the Champs-Elysées to commemorate the 72nd anniversary of the surrender of Germany. The official transfer of power took place on 14 May,[5] after which Macron nominated his prime minister and government.[211] The legislative elections to elect the 15th National Assembly were held a month after the presidential election, with two rounds on 11 and 18 June 2017,[212] in which En Marche! presented its candidates under the label of La République En Marche!; a list of the movement’s candidates for the legislative elections was published on 11 May.[213]

Following the second round of the presidential election on 7 May, Macron announced he would be stepping down as president of En Marche!, Le Pen announced that she would undertake a “profound transformation” of the National Front, and Mélenchon urged his supporters to mobilize in the legislative elections.[5]

Campaign accounts

The campaign accounts of the eleven candidates were submitted by 7 July 2017 and published in August 2017,[214] and were validated and reimbursement announced by the National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing on 13 February 2018.

Candidate

1st round

Spending

€/vote

Reimbursement

Emmanuel Macron

24.01%

€16,698,320

€1.93

€10,640,794[215]

Marine Le Pen

21.30%

€12,416,567

€1.62

€10,691,775[216]

François Fillon

20.01%

€13,784,073

€1.91

€2,067,625[217]

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

19.58%

€10,676,699

€1.51

€6,031,304[218]

Benoît Hamon

6.36%

€15,072,745

€6.58

€7,949,043[219]

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

4.70%

€1,823,157

€1.08

€800,423[220]

Jean Lassalle

1.21%

€260,112

€0.60

€228,659[221]

Philippe Poutou

1.09%

€782,448

€1.98

€766,543[222]

François Asselineau

0.92%

€1,230,843

€3.70

€755,139[223]

Nathalie Arthaud

0.64%

€958,237

€4.12

€800,423[224]

Jacques Cheminade

0.18%

€412,983

€6.30

€337,606[225]

References

Further reading

- Elgie, Robert. “The election of Emmanuel Macron and the new French party system: a return to the éternel marais?.” Modern & Contemporary France 26.1 (2018): 15–29.

- Evans, Jocelyn, and Gilles Ivaldi. The 2017 French Presidential Elections: A Political Reformation? (Springer, 2017) excerpt.

- Evans, Jocelyn, and Gilles Ivaldi. “An atypical ‘honeymoon’election? Contextual and strategic opportunities in the 2017 French legislative elections.” French Politics 15.3 (2017): 322–339. Online

- Ferrara, Emilio. “Disinformation and social bot operations in the run up to the 2017 French presidential election.” arXiv (2017) online.

- Gil, Cameron Michael. “Spatial analysis of La République En Marche and French Parties, 2002–2017.” French Politics (2018): 1–27.

- Gougou, Florent, and Simon Persico. “A new party system in the making? The 2017 French presidential election.” French Politics 15.3 (2017): 303–321. Abstract

- Gougou, Florent, and Nicolas Sauger. “The 2017 French Election Study (FES 2017): a post-electoral cross-sectional survey.” French Politics 15.3 (2017): 360–370. Online

- Maillot, Agnès. “Setting the agenda? The Front National and the 2017 French presidential election.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 28 (2017): 45–56. Online

- Mény, Yves. “A tale of party primaries and outsider candidates: the 2017 French presidential election.” French politics 15.3 (2017): 265–278.

- Schön-Quinlivan, Emmanuelle. “‘The elephant in the room’ no more: Europe as a structuring line of political cleavage in the 2017 presidential election.” French Politics 15.3 (2017): 290-302 online.

External links

Wikinews has related news:

- Emmanuel Macron wins French presidential election race

Wikimedia Commons has media related to French presidential election (2017).

- Constitutional Council (in French)

- Ministry of the Interior (in French)

- List of all sponsorships by elected officials (in French)

- Data and graphics for sponsorships (in French)

- Results of the first round of the presidential election by constituency (in French)

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2017_French_presidential_election&oldid=1283662989”

2022 French presidential election

Presidential elections were held in France on 10 and 24 April 2022. As no candidate won a majority in the first round, a runoff was held, in which Emmanuel Macron defeated Marine Le Pen and was re-elected as President of France.[1] Macron, from La République En Marche! (LREM), had defeated Le Pen, leader of the National Rally, once already in the 2017 French presidential election, for the term which expired on 13 May 2022. Macron became the first president of France to win a re-election bid since Jacques Chirac won in 2002.[2]

In the first round Macron finished first with 28% of the vote, followed by Le Pen with 23%, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise with 22% and Éric Zemmour of Reconquête with 7%. Valérie Pécresse of the Republicans received 5% of the vote and Anne Hidalgo, mayor of Paris and Socialist Party candidate, 2%. Both the Republicans and the Socialists, considered to be the dominant parties until 2017,[3] received their worst results in a presidential election.[4]

In the second round, Macron beat Le Pen with 59% of the vote to her 41%, a narrower margin than in the 2017 election. Turnout was 72%, the lowest in a presidential election run-off since 1969.[5] Le Pen conceded defeat after exit projections became available. The presidential election was followed by the 2022 French legislative election, held on 12–19 June, to elect the 577 members of the National Assembly, the lower house of the French Parliament.

Electoral system

Official logo of the election

Under Article 7 of the Constitution of France, the president is elected to a five-year term in a two-round election.[6] If no candidate secures an absolute majority of votes in the first round, a second round is held two weeks later between the two candidates who received the most votes.[7] According to the Constitution of France, the first round of the presidential election must be held between 20 and 35 days before the transition of power at the end of the five-year term of the incumbent officeholder.[citation needed] As Emmanuel Macron took office on 14 May 2017, the transition of power is expected to take place on 13 May 2022. Correspondingly, the first round of the presidential election was to be held between 8 and 23 April 2022, with the second round held two weeks after the first.[8] On 13 July 2021, Government Spokesman Gabriel Attal announced the dates for the election, respectively 10 April 2022 for the first round and 24 April 2022 for the eventual second round.[9]

To be listed on the first-round ballot, candidates needed to secure at least 500 signatures (often referred to as parrainages in French) from national or local elected officials from at least 30 different departments or overseas collectivities, with no more than a tenth of these signatories from any single department. The signatures were submitted to the Constitutional Council, which is the sole authority to designate participants.[10]

First round

Campaign

Following the 2017 presidential election, The Republicans (LR) sent its members a questionnaire on the topic of the “re-foundation” of the party; of the 40,000 respondents, 70% voted against an open primary like that which was held in 2016 to determine the party nominee.[11] In a document dated 17 October 2017, the Socialist Party (PS) wrote that the financing of the 2022 presidential campaign was not assured despite “economic restructuring” but still planned to spend €12,000,000, the maximum legally permitted before the first round. According to the report, the party’s leadership had seriously considered the possibility of not presenting a PS candidate in 2022.[12]

Marine Le Pen, the president of the National Rally (RN), announced on 16 January 2020 that she would be running in the election. She previously ran in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections as the party’s candidate, then called the National Front (FN). She came third in 2012 with 17.9% of the vote in the first round and second in 2017 with 21.3% of the vote in the first round and 33.9% of the vote in the second round. Le Pen was elected to the National Assembly in the 2017 French legislative election.[13]

Jean Lassalle, who ran in the 2017 presidential election under the Résistons! banner, coming in seventh place with 1.2% of the vote, announced that he would run again.[14] In 2020, MP Joachim Son-Forget, a radiologist who was elected to the National Assembly for La République En Marche! (LREM) in 2017, formed a new political party called Valeur Absolue and announced his intention to enter the race for the presidency. He had resigned from the LREM group after posting tweets in 2018 that were deemed sexist; he then joined the UDI and Independents group in 2019 before resigning his membership later that year.[15]

On 8 November 2020, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, founder of La France Insoumise (LFI), announced that he would be running in the election. He previously ran in the 2012 presidential election for the Left Front (coming fourth with 11.1% of the vote in the first round) and in the 2017 presidential election for LFI (coming fourth again with 19.5% of the vote in the first round). Mélenchon was elected to the National Assembly in 2017.[16]

In November 2021, Ensemble Citoyens was founded. It is a political coalition composed of the presidential majority led under Emmanuel Macron.[17]

In January 2022, Éric Zemmour‘s party Reconquête, which was founded the month prior, gained a member of the National Assembly in Guillaume Peltier, previously elected as a member of LR,[18] as well as two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) when Jérôme Rivière and Gilbert Collard defected from Le Pen’s RN.[19][20] Previously, Son-Forget, who had declared he would run for the presidency, rallied behind Zemmour’s candidacy. In early February 2022, the party gained a third MEP when Maxette Grisoni-Pirbakas defected from the RN.[21] Stéphane Ravier became Zemmour’s first supporter in the Senate after he left the RN mid-February 2022.[22]

In February 2022, a wave of defections hit Valérie Pécresse, candidate put forward by LR, in favour of Macron.[23] She was accused by members of the party’s centrist wing of trying to pander to the voters of Zemmour,[24] whose sharp rise in the polls has been qualified as “meteoric”.[25] During a rally in February 2022, Pécresse said “in ten years time … will we be a sovereign nation, a US satellite or a Chinese trading post? Will we be unified or divided? Nothing is written, whether it is loss of economic status, or the Great Replacement.” She was criticised for referring to the Great Replacement; she later said that her mention was not an endorsement of what she considered to be a “theory of hate”.[26][27][28][29]

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February had significant implications for the campaign. As media coverage switched to covering the war, Macron’s polling improved significantly during the crisis.[30] Le Pen and Zemmour were made to explain historic statements of praise for Vladimir Putin.[31][32][33] In a 14 March 2022 interview with newspaper Le Figaro, Gérard Larcher, Senate President and a supporter of Pécresse, put into question the legitimacy of a possible second Macron term, stating: “If there is no campaign, the question of the legitimacy of the winner will arise.”[34] Those comments echoed Macron’s refusal to participate in any debate with the other candidates prior to the election’s first round.[35]

Macron formally announced his candidacy for re-election on 3 March 2022, by which time he had already received well more than the sponsorships from elected officials to qualify for the ballot.

Marion Maréchal of the Le Pen family, granddaughter of FN founder Jean-Marie Le Pen and niece of its current leader Marine Le Pen, formalised her support for Zemmour at a large rally in Toulon on 6 March 2022.[36][37] In the final days before the first round of voting, Le Pen’s polling numbers improved to within the margin of error of defeating Macron in the second round, while those of Pécresse and Zemmour fell.[38][39][40]

Mélenchon’s polling numbers also surged in the final days of campaigning.[41][42][43] Left-leaning independent candidate Christiane Taubira, former Minister of Justice (2012–2014) under President François Hollande and winner of the 2022 People’s Primary vote, withdrew her candidacy on 2 March 2022, endorsing Mélenchon.[44]

Primaries and congresses

Ecologist primary

Main article: 2021 French Green Party presidential primary

In September 2021, the Ecology Pole organised a presidential primary to determine their candidate. The following candidates participated in this primary:[45]

Nominee

- Yannick Jadot, Member of the European Parliament since 2009[46]

Eliminated

- Sandrine Rousseau, deputy national secretary of Europe Ecology – The Greens from 2016 to 2017[47]

- Delphine Batho, president of Ecology Generation and deputy for the 2nd constituency of Deux-Sèvres since 2013

- Éric Piolle, Mayor of Grenoble since 2014

- Jean-Marc Governatori, co-president of Cap Écologie and city councillor for Nice since 2020.[48]

Socialist primary

In October 2021, the Socialist Party had its primary. Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo won with 72% of the vote.[49][50]

Nominee

- Anne Hidalgo, Mayor of Paris since 2014[49][50]

Eliminated

- Stéphane Le Foll, Mayor of Le Mans since 2018[49][50]

People’s Primary

Main article: 2022 French People’s Primary

Independent activists launched a primary with the intention of nominating a unity left-wing candidate. The voting took place online from 27 to 30 January 2022. Of the seven candidates listed in the primary, three declined to participate.[51] The primary was conducted according to a majority judgment voting system, in which all voters are to rate all candidates, with the candidate with the highest median rating winning.[52]

Nominee

- Christiane Taubira, Minister of Justice 2012–2016 (withdrew, endorsed Mélenchon)

Eliminated

- Anna Agueb-Porterie, environmental activist

- Anne Hidalgo, Mayor of Paris since 2014, Socialist Party candidate (still a candidate)

- Yannick Jadot, Member of the European Parliament since 2009, Green Party candidate (still a candidate)

- Pierre Larrouturou, Member of the European Parliament since 2019

- Charlotte Marchandise, public health expert

- Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Member of the National Assembly, La France Insoumise candidate (still a candidate)

The Republicans congress

Main article: 2021 The Republicans congress

The Republicans selected their candidate via a congress of party members. On 4 December 2021, Valérie Pécresse won the nomination with 60.95% of the votes against Éric Ciotti.[53][54]

Nominee

- Valérie Pécresse, President of the Regional Council of Île-de-France since 2016

Eliminated

- Éric Ciotti, deputy for the 1st constituency of Alpes-Maritimes since 2007

- Michel Barnier, head of the Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom from 2019 to 2021

- Xavier Bertrand, President of the Regional Council of Hauts-de-France since 2016

- Philippe Juvin, Mayor of La Garenne-Colombes since 2001

Candidates

On 7 March 2022, the Constitutional Council published names of the 12 candidates who received 500 valid sponsorships, with the order determined by drawing lots.[55]

- Nathalie Arthaud

Workers’ Struggle

- Fabien Roussel

French Communist Party

- Emmanuel Macron

La République En Marche!

- Jean-Luc Mélenchon

La France Insoumise

- Jean Lassalle

Résistons!

- Marine Le Pen

National Rally

- Éric Zemmour

Reconquête!

- Anne Hidalgo

Socialist Party

- Yannick Jadot

Europe Ecology – The Greens

- Valérie Pécresse

The Republicans

- Philippe Poutou

New Anticapitalist Party

- Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Debout la France

Sponsorships

A candidate must have secured 500 Présentation signatures from elected officials in order to appear on the first-round ballot. The signature collection period ended on 4 March.[56] The table below lists sponsorships received by the Constitutional Council by candidate.[57] On the form, this is named a présentation but is more widely known as parrainage.[58] There were 46 individuals who received at least 1 sponsorship as of the closing date deadline of 4 March 2022. Some of them received sponsorships without being candidates, and one sponsored himself. Candidates labeled SE (sans etiquette) do not belong to any political party.

Colour legend

1–50

51–100

101–150

151–200

201–250

251–300

301–350

351–400

401–450

451–500

500+

Signatures received by the Constitutional Council as of 7 March[57]

Candidate

Party

1 Feb

3 Feb

8 Feb

10 Feb

15 Feb

17 Feb

22 Feb

24 Feb

1 Mar

3 Mar

4 Mar

Total

Notes

Christian-Jacques Arnal

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Not a candidate

Nathalie Arthaud

LO

12

126

230

51

90

20

30

3

6

2

6

576

500 signatures validated by 15 February

François Asselineau

UPR

10

46

115

22

17

7

24

6

16

16

14

293

Michel Barnier

LR

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not the nominee of LR

Corinne Bekaert

SE

0

0

1

0

2

0

0

1

1

0

1

6

Christophe Blanchet

LREM

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Jean-Louis Borloo

UDI[a]

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Thierry Cahez

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Marie Cau

SE

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

2

1

8

Bernard Cazeneuve

PS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Michel Chaudot

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Arnaud Chiche

SE

0

1

3

1

3

0

1

0

3

4

5

21

Patrick Cojan

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Vincent Delaby

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Carole Delga

PS

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

DLF

10

67

155

48

80

19

43

35

75

50

18

600

500 signatures validated by 1 March

Clara Egger

SE

0

3

3

1

6

3

6

2

4

6

2

36

Bertrand Fessard de Foucault

SE

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Éric Régis Fiorile

SE

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

Jean-Marc Fortané

SE

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

0

4

2

3

12

Jean Baptiste Giffon

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Raphaël Glucksmann

PP

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Not a candidate

Cédric Herrou

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Anne Hidalgo

PS

48

218

386

138

217

67

103

49

92

69

43

1,440

500 signatures validated by 8 February

François Hollande

PS

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Yannick Jadot

EELV

11

69

188

57

125

40

75

50

54

20

23

712

500 signatures validated by 22 February

Alexandre Juving-Brunet

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

Anasse Kazib

RP

1

20

63

15

17

6

6

2

14

5

11

155

Gaspard Koenig

S

0

2

21

4

1

3

7

11

23

19

16

107

Georges Kuzmanovic

RS

1

8

16

2

8

3

2

2

3

1

3

48

Nicolas Lacroix

LR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

Not a candidate

Yaya Lam

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Jean Lassalle

RES

15

109

192

66

89

32

58

18

23

18

22

642

500 signatures validated by 17 February

Christian Laurut

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

Marine Le Pen

RN

2

33

104

135

57

35

27

21

89

100

19

622

500 signatures validated by 1 March

Emmanuel Macron

LREM

105

424

397

124

210

85

118

81

241

189

124

2,098

500 signatures validated by 3 February

Philippe Célestin Marechal

SE

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Self-sponsored

Antoine Martinez

VPF

0

0

5

0

2

2

1

1

1

1

0

13

Philippe Mazuel

PACE

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

LFI

14

86

124

34

74

38

72

98

268

65

33

906

500 signatures validated by 24 February

Emmanuelle Ménard

EXD

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Guillaume Meurice

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

3

0

6

Not a candidate

Nicolas Miguet

RCF

0

2

7

0

3

0

0

6

9

8

5

40

Arnaud Montebourg

DVG

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Withdrew candidacy on 19 January

Paul Montserrat

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Valérie Pécresse

LR

34

290

615

310

575

121

198

128

186

99

80

2,636

500 signatures validated by 8 February

Thomas Pesquet

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Édouard Philippe

Horizons

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Not a candidate

Florian Philippot

LP

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Withdrew candidacy on 18 February

Philippe Poutou

NPA

4

50

73

19

42

11

25

19

99

97

157

596

500 signatures validated by 4 March

Stéphanie Rivoal

SE

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

Martin Rocca

SE

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

5

1

0

9

Antoine Rocquemont

SE

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Fabien Roussel

PCF

30

129

167

55

111

37

53

11

20

6

7

626

500 signatures validated by 17 February

François Ruffin

PD

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Not a candidate

Laëtitia Saint-Paul

LREM

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Josef Schovanec

SE

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Not a candidate

Rafik Smati

OF

0

0

2

0

3

2

1

0

1

0

1

10

Christiane Taubira

Walwari

0

8

28

11

26

13

18

24

53

60

33

274

Withdrew candidacy on 2 March

Hélène Thouy

PA

2

20

26

8

14

4

15

8

17

10

15

139

Gildas Vieira

LaFRA

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

Antoine Waechter

MEI

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

3

0

7

Stéphane Wendlinger

SE

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Éric Zemmour

REC

14

44

91

32

69

41

59

65

205

101

20

741

500 signatures validated by 1 March

Total

313

1,756

3,017

1,139

1,851

593

948

648

1,523

963

12,751

Graphs are unavailable due to technical issues. Updates on reimplementing the Graph extension, which will be known as the Chart extension, can be found on Phabricator and on MediaWiki.org.

Electorate

Sociology of the electorate

Demographic

Arthaud/

Poutou

Mélenchon

Roussel

Jadot

Hidalgo

Macron

Pécresse

Lassalle

Dupont-Aignan

Le Pen

Zemmour

Turnout

Total vote

1.5%

20.3%

2.6%

4.3%

2.0%

28.5%

4.8%

3.2%

2.2%

23.7%

7.0%

73.7%

First-round vote in 2017

Mélenchon

2%

66%

8%

3%

2%

6%

1%

3%

1%

7%

1%

81%

Benoit Hamon

2%

42%

6%

18%

12%

13%

0%

2%

0%

4%

1%

80%

Emmanuel Macron

1%

7%

1%

5%

3%

74%

2%

1%

0%

4%

2%

84%

Francois Fillon

0%

2%

0%

3%

0%

39%

21%

2%

3%

18%

12%

78%

Marine Le Pen

0%

2%

0%

1%

0%

3%

1%

0%

1%

78%

14%

79%

Political party

LFI

1%

94%

1%

0%

0%

1%

0%

0%

0%

3%

0%

78%

PS

1%

33%

6%

4%

21%

29%

0%

1%

0%

5%

0%

76%

EELV

0%

29%

2%

49%

2%

14%

1%

1%

0%

2%

0%

79%

LREM-MoDem

1%

3%

1%

0%

0%

91%

1%

1%

0%

2%

0%

82%

LR-UDI

0%

1%

0%

0%

1%

25%

37%

4%

2%

21%

9%

79%

FN

0%

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%

0%

1%

2%

93%

2%

80%

REC

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

3%

0%

7%

90%

77%

None

3%

19%

2%

3%

1%

30%

3%

8%

2%

25%

4%

64%

Sex

Men

1%

21%

2%

4%

2%

27%

5%

4%

2%

23%

9%

73%

Women

2%

20%

3%

5%

2%

29%

4%

3%

3%

24%

5%

75%

Age

18–24 years old

1%

31%

3%

6%

1%

20%

2%

2%

0%

21%

8%

58%

25–34 years old

3%

34%

0%

4%

1%

23%

3%

2%

0%

25%

5%

54%

35–49 years old

3%

22%

3%

5%

2%

24%

2%

4%

3%

28%

4%

78%

50–59 years old

0%

22%

2%

4%

1%

24%

3%

4%

3%

30%

7%

80%

60–69 years old

1%

17%

4%

5%

2%

30%

4%

4%

2%

22%

9%

88%

70 or older

1%

9%

3%

4%

3%

41%

12%

2%

3%

13%

9%

77%

Socio-occupational classification

Manager/Professional

1%

25%

1%

5%

4%

35%

6%

4%

2%

12%

5%

74%

Intermediate occupation

2%

25%

4%

4%

2%

28%

3%

4%

1%

24%

3%

73%

White-collar worker

3%

25%

1%

4%

2%

17%

2%

2%

2%

36%

9%

73%

Blue-collar worker

2%

23%

3%

1%

0%

18%

2%

2%

3%

36%

9%

67%

Retired

1%

11%

3%

4%

3%

38%

9%

3%

3%

17%

8%

81%

Employment status

Employee

2%

24%

2%

4%

2%

25%

3%

3%

2%

26%

5%

71%

Private employee

2%

23%

2%

2%

2%

26%

4%

3%

2%

28%

6%

69%

Public employee

2%

25%

3%

7%

2%

22%

2%

4%

2%

27%

4%

75%

Self-employed

2%

25%

0%

8%

0%

26%

3%

4%

4%

18%

10%

76%

Unemployed

3%

34%

1%

2%

2%

12%

1%

3%

6%

29%

7%

65%

Education

Less than baccalauréat

2%

14%

3%

3%

2%

23%

5%

3%

3%

35%

7%

76%

Baccalauréat

0%

22%

3%

3%

1%

26%

4%

4%

2%

27%

8%

72%

Bac +2

0%

17%

3%

5%

2%

31%

6%

4%

1%

23%

8%

75%

At least bac +3

2%

26%

2%

6%

3%

33%

5%

3%

2%

13%

5%

73%

Monthly household income

Less than €1,250

1%

28%

1%

5%

2%

14%

2%

2%

4%

31%

10%

66%

€1,250 to €2,000

3%

25%

4%

4%

1%

23%

3%

3%

1%

26%

7%

71%

€2,000 to €3,000

1%

19%

3%

4%

1%

27%

5%

3%

3%

27%

7%

75%

More than €3,000

1%

18%

2%

4%

3%

35%

6%

4%

2%

19%

6%

77%

Moment of choice of vote

Several months ago

1%

15%

2%

3%

1%

36%

5%

2%

2%

24%

9%

N/A

A few weeks ago

2%

27%

4%

5%

3%

23%

3%

3%

3%

24%

3%

N/A

In the last few days/Final Moment

3%

30%

4%

6%

3%

13%

6%

7%

4%

20%

4%

N/A

Agglomeration

Less than 2,000 inhabitants

3%

20%

2%

4%

3%

25%

3%

4%

3%

27%

6%

76%

2,000 to 9,999 inhabitants

1%

18%

3%

5%

2%

23%

2%

6%

3%

28%

9%

76%

10,000 to 49,000 inhabitants

1%

17%

3%

4%

2%

31%

7%

4%

1%

24%

6%

76%

50,000 to 199,999 inhabitants

1%

16%

2%

4%

2%

36%

6%

1%

2%

24%

6%

74%

More than 200,000 inhabitants

1%

23%

3%

4%

1%

29%

6%

3%

2%

20%

8%

71%

Religion

Catholic

1%

11%

2%

4%

1%

32%

7%

3%

3%

27%

9%

N/A

Regular practitioner

1%

6%

2%

4%

3%

35%

13%

3%

6%

9%

18%

N/A

Occasional practitioner

0%

14%

2%

6%

0%

30%

9%

3%

3%

20%

13%

N/A

Non-practitioner

1%

10%

2%

3%

2%

32%

6%

4%

2%

30%

8%

N/A

Others

1%

36%

1%

6%

3%

22%

7%

2%

5%

13%

4%

N/A

None

2%

30%

3%

5%

2%

25%

2%

3%

2%

21%

5%

N/A

Demographic

Turnout

Arthaud/

Poutou

Mélenchon

Roussel

Jadot

Hidalgo

Macron

Pécresse

Lassalle

Dupont-Aignan

Le Pen

Zemmour

Sociology of the electorate

Source: Ipsos France[59]

Second round

Endorsements

Arthaud and Lassalle both said they would vote blank, with Lassalle saying that he trusted the French people to do what is right.[60] Mélenchon and Poutou[61] stated their opposition to Le Pen but did not endorse Macron.[62][63][64] Hidalgo, Jadot, Pécresse and Roussel all supported Macron.

Candidate

Endorsement

Anne Hidalgo

Macron[62]

Yannick Jadot

Macron[62][65]

Valérie Pécresse

Macron[62][66]

Fabien Roussel

Macron[63][64]

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Le Pen[67]

Éric Zemmour

Le Pen[62]

Nathalie Arthaud

No endorsement[68][69]

Jean Lassalle

No endorsement[60][70]

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Against Le Pen[62]

Philippe Poutou

Against Le Pen[61]

Campaign

On 14 April 2022, Le Pen said if elected she would hold a referendum on whether to reinstate capital punishment in France, if such a proposal garnered enough signatures under the citizens’ initiative referendum system she wants to implement.[71][72] Le Pen had also campaigned for a ban on wearing Muslim headscarves in public.[73][74]

On 20 April, the only election debate of the campaign (moderated by Léa Salamé and Gilles Bouleau) to feature both major candidates was held. Polls conducted after the debate to ascertain which candidate performed best, showed that 59% of viewers thought that Macron had performed better, compared to 39% for Le Pen.[75][76] The election brought together new alliances of protest movements, concerned with issues such as police brutality, racism, feminism and climate change, which held a large demonstration before the poll.[77]

Candidates

Candidates in the second round

Emmanuel Macron

Marine Le Pen

La République En Marche!

National Rally

Incumbent

President of France

(2017–present)

Member of the National Assembly

for Pas-de-Calais

(2017–present)

Opinion polls

See also: Opinion polling for the 2022 French presidential election and Opinion polling on the Emmanuel Macron presidency

The trendlines below are constructed using local regressions.[78]

First round

Second round

Results

Wikinews has related news:

- Macron defeats Le Pen in French presidential runoff election

Macron was re-elected with 58.55% of the vote to 41.45% for Le Pen in the second round of the election.[79] Exit poll projections by Ipsos and Sopra Steria for France Télévisions and Radio France, released as voting closed, estimated that Macron defeated Le Pen with 58.2% of the vote to 41.8%.[80] He became the first French president to win re-election since Jacques Chirac in 2002.[81][82][83] The projections, based on actual ballot papers, also showed that 28% of registered voters did not show up to the second round,[84] making it the lowest turnout since 1969.[85] Official results showed that the turnout was 71.99%, with over 13 million abstentions in the second round, in addition to over 8.6% of ballots cast being blank or invalid (a marked increase over the first round).[79]

Candidate

Party

First round

Second round

Votes

%

Votes

%

Emmanuel Macron

La République En Marche!

9,783,058

27.85

18,768,639

58.55

Marine Le Pen

National Rally

8,133,828

23.15

13,288,686

41.45

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

La France Insoumise

7,712,520

21.95

Éric Zemmour

Reconquête

2,485,226

7.07

Valérie Pécresse

The Republicans

1,679,001

4.78

Yannick Jadot

Europe Ecology – The Greens

1,627,853

4.63

Jean Lassalle

Résistons!

1,101,387

3.13

Fabien Roussel

French Communist Party

802,422

2.28

Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Debout la France

725,176

2.06

Anne Hidalgo

Socialist Party

616,478

1.75

Philippe Poutou

New Anticapitalist Party

268,904

0.77

Nathalie Arthaud

Lutte Ouvrière

197,094

0.56

Total

35,132,947

100.00

32,057,325

100.00

Valid votes

35,132,947

97.80

32,057,325

91.34

Invalid votes

247,151

0.69

805,249

2.29

Blank votes

543,609

1.51

2,233,904

6.37

Total votes

35,923,707

100.00

35,096,478

100.00

Registered voters/turnout

48,747,876

73.69

48,752,339

71.99

Source: Minister of the Interior[86]

First round

Tables

Results by department

Department

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Jean-Luc

Mélenchon

Éric

Zemmour

Valérie

Pécresse

Yannick

Jadot

Jean

Lassalle

Fabien

Roussel

Nicolas

Dupont-Aignan

Anne

Hidalgo

Philippe

Poutou

Nathalie

Arthaud

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Ain

92,206

27.69%

86,755

26.05%

57,832

17.37%

27,530

8.27%

17,572

5.28%

15,843

4.76%

10,876

3.27%

5,938

1.78%

8,998

2.70%

5,644

1.69%

2,172

0.65%

1,658

0.50%

Aisne

58,721

22.09%

104,342

39.25%

41,172

15.49%

18,266

6.87%

10,920

4.11%

7,074

2.66%

6,468

2.43%

5,968

2.24%

5,790

2.18%

2,983

1.12%

2,118

0.80%

2,038

0.77%

Allier

49,706

26.73%

50,315

27.06%

31,013

16.68%

12,361

6.65%

10,319

5.55%

5,982

3.22%

7,782

4.18%

8,119

4.37%

4,216

2.27%

3,280

1.76%

1,503

0.81%

1,359

0.73%

Alpes-de-Haute-Provence

20,800

21.51%

26,010

26.90%

21,856

22.61%

7,926

8.20%

3,834

3.97%

3,957

4.09%

4,309

4.46%

2,721

2.81%

2,504

2.59%

1,396

1.44%

865

0.89%

505

0.52%

Hautes-Alpes

20,507

23.78%

19,696

22.84%

19,718

22.87%

6,164

7.15%

4,511

5.23%

5,013

5.81%

3,871

4.49%

1,925

2.23%

2,142

2.48%

1,459

1.69%

801

0.93%

428

0.50%

Alpes-Maritimes

139,966

24.99%

149,219

26.64%

92,815

16.57%

78,329

13.99%

31,304

5.59%

23,419

4.18%

12,784

2.28%

8,883

1.59%

13,326

2.38%

5,424

0.97%

2,994

0.53%

1,630

0.29%

Ardèche

45,353

23.03%

49,594

25.18%

42,837

21.75%

14,199

7.21%

9,553

4.85%

8,544

4.34%

9,033

4.59%

5,710

2.90%

4,927

2.50%

4,189

2.13%

1,817

0.92%

1,219

0.62%

Ardennes

31,656

23.64%

48,242

36.02%

22,281

16.64%

8,771

6.55%

5,556

4.15%

3,446

2.57%

4,084

3.06%

3,009

2.25%

2,957

2.21%

1,741

1.30%

1,112

0.83%

1,081

0.81%

Ariège

18,070

19.71%

21,958

23.94%

23,908

26.07%

5,820

6.35%

2,724

2.97%

3,020

3.29%

7,532

8.21%

2,701

2.95%

1,621

1.77%

3,208

3.50%

723

0.79%

417

0.45%

Aube

38,321

25.60%

49,316

32.95%

22,483

15.02%

11,374

7.60%

8,923

5.96%

4,619

3.09%

3,787

2.53%

3,094

2.07%

3,966

2.65%

1,720

1.15%

1,062

0.71%

1,005

0.67%

Aude

43,104

20.29%

64,027

30.14%

42,039

19.79%

18,434

8.68%

7,350

3.46%

6,322

2.98%

12,382

5.83%

5,622

2.65%

4,206

1.98%

6,166

2.90%

1,748

0.82%

1,026

0.48%

Aveyron

47,430

27.75%

34,357

20.10%

32,734

19.15%

10,112

5.92%

9,988

5.84%

6,746

3.95%

14,825

8.67%

4,515

2.64%

3,477

2.03%

4,470

2.62%

1,354

0.79%

894

0.52%

Bouches-du-Rhône

229,038

22.71%

264,754

26.25%

237,971

23.59%

108,617

10.77%

36,228

3.59%

42,109

4.17%

24,256

2.40%

24,295

2.41%

20,051

1.99%

11,760

1.17%

5,963

0.59%

3,578

0.35%

Calvados

120,366

31.16%

91,774

23.76%

73,950

19.15%

22,255

5.76%

18,383

4.76%

19,641

5.09%

9,816

2.54%

8,777

2.27%

7,920

2.05%

6,848

1.77%

3,764

0.97%

2,757

0.71%

Cantal

25,038

28.42%

21,570

24.48%

12,944

14.69%

4,906

5.57%

6,987

7.93%

2,751

3.12%

6,848

7.77%

2,496

2.83%

1,547

1.76%

1,810

2.05%

650

0.74%

555

0.63%

Charente

53,126

27.57%

50,430

26.18%

37,305

19.36%

10,617

5.51%

8,343

4.33%

7,557

3.92%

8,482

4.40%

5,374

2.79%

4,345

2.26%

4,003

2.08%

1,763

0.92%

1,319

0.68%

Charente-Maritime

113,753

28.87%

99,790

25.32%

71,633

18.18%

24,347

6.18%

19,316

4.90%

19,012

4.82%

14,335

3.64

10,002

2.54%

9,289

2.36%

6,857

1.74%

3,403

0.86%

2,330

0.59%

Cher

43,497

27.10%

44,772

27.89%

27,901

17.38%

10,822

6.74%

8,147

5.07%

5,028

3.13%

5,495

3.42%

5,749

3.58%

3,770

2.35%

2,585

1.61%

1,463

0.91%

1,304

0.82%

Corrèze

33,125

23.23%

31,658

22.20%

27,731

19.45%

8,012

5.62%

12,278

8.61%

5,040

3.53%

10,177

7.14%

6,292

4.41%

2,618

1.84%

3,605

2.53%

1,179

0.83%

885

0.62%

Corse-du-Sud

13,022

18.76%

20,285

29.22%

9,412

13.56%

9,279

13.37%

3,808

5.48%

2,281

3.29%

6,807

9.80%

1,866

2.69%

1,226

1.77%

630

0.91%

612

0.88%

198

0.29%

Haute-Corse

13,773

17.54%

21,998

28.02%

10,367

13.20%

9,657

12.30%

5,555

7.08%

2,520

3.21%

8,601

10.96%

2,687

3.42%

1,374

1.75%

959

1.22%

762

0.97%

257

0.33%

Côte-d’Or

80,734

28.55%

69,110

24.44%

53,875

19.05%

21,651

7.66%

14,344

5.07%

13,462

4.76%

8,183

2.89%

5,721

2.02%

6,478

2.29%

5,126

1.81%

2,286

0.81%

1,775

0.63%

Côtes-d’Armor

113,656

31.02%

79,850

21.79%

74,226

20.26%

17,319

4.73%

17,235

4.70%

19,349

5.28%

11,949

3.26%

11,628

3.17%

6,404

1.75%

8,279

2.26%

3,895

1.06%

2,603

0.71%

Creuse

15,542

23.25%

16,772

25.09%

13,679

20.46%

3,501

5.24%

4,391

6.57%

1,906

2.85%

4,275

6.40%

2,430

3.64%

1,556

2.33%

1,641

2.45%

665

0.99%

490

0.73%

Dordogne

58,648

23.74%

63,498

25.70%

50,164

20.30%

15,815

6.40%

11,300

4.57%

8,582

3.47%

15,885

6.43%

8,877

3.59%

5,428

2.20%

5,374

2.17%

2,224

0.90%

1,295

0.52%

Doubs

76,338

27.55%

66,703

24.07%

55,587

20.06%

19,486

7.03%

15,107

5.45%

13,096

4.72%

8,688

3.14%

5,001

1.80%

7,775

2.81%

4,902

1.77%

2,345

0.85%

2,069

0.75%

Drôme

72,228

24.78%

70,574

24.22%

65,258

22.39%

22,010

7.55%

13,204

4.53%

14,234

4.88%

9,945

3.41%

6,752

2.32%

7,758

2.66%

5,311

1.82%

2,109

0.72%

2,041

0.70%

Eure

83,058

26.05%

102,952

32.29%

55,571

17.43%

20,930

6.56%

13,552

4.25%

11,477

3.60%

7,768

2.44%

7,056

2.21%

7,563

2.37%

4,027

1.26%

2,710

0.85%

2,197

0.69%

Eure-et-Loir

59,869

27.21%

61,960

28.16%

40,529

18.42%

14,803

6.73%

13,003

5.91%

7,904

3.59%

5,694

2.59%

4,267

1.94%

5,731

2.60%

3,076

1.40%

1,766

0.80%

1,419

0.64%

Finistère

174,894

32.21%

100,890

18.58%

116,591

21.47%

25,607

4.72%

26,541

4.89%

33,200

6.12%

18,320

3.37%

15,340

2.83%

8,566

1.58%

13,077

2.41%

6,266

1.15%

3,627

0.67%

Gard

88,278

21.32%

121,480

29.34%

88,827

21.46%

38,479

9.29%

15,460

3.73%

14,974

3.62%

15,162

3.66%

12,123

2.93%

8,137

1.97%

6,585

1.59%

2,706

0.65%

1,768

0.43%

Haute-Garonne

197,049

26.90%

133,411

18.21%

189,462

25.87%

50,699

6.92%

27,195

3.71%

42,711

5.83%

35,517

4.85%

16,338

2.23%

12,460

1.70%

19,700

2.69%

4,899

0.67%

3,015

0.41%

Gers

28,970

24.89%

26,015

22.35%

21,353

18.35%

8,396

7.21%

5,126

4.40%

4,090

3.51%

11,720

10.07%

3,128

2.69%

2,418

2.08%

3,861

3.32%

793

0.68%

529

0.45%

Gironde

256,179

28.72%

191,542

21.47%

194,775

21.84%

58,321

6.54%

37,575

4.21%

46,677

5.23%

37,725

4.23%

21,522

2.41%

15,693

1.76%

19,598

2.20%

8,734

0.98%

3,679

0.41%

Hérault

142,306

22.28%

165,734

25.95%

154,819

24.24%

57,751

9.04%

23,230

3.64%

28,057

4.39%

22,068

3.45%

14,165

2.22%

11,475

1.80%

12,150

1.90%

4,393

0.69%

2,580

0.40%

Ille-et-Vilaine

205,882

34.50%

101,797

17.06%

132,510

22.20%

27,463

4.60%

26,194

4.39%

42,613

7.14%

13,985

2.34%

12,696

2.13%

10,560

1.77%

13,973

2.34%

5,376

0.90%

3,783

0.63%

Indre

31,498

26.03%

34,516

28.53%

20,954

17.32%

7,438

6.15%

6,589

5.45%

3,726

3.08%

4,984

4.12%

3,702

3.06%

2,886

2.39%

2,464

2.04%

1,155

0.95%

1,085

0.90%

Indre-et-Loire

101,503

30.99%

70,553

21.54%

68,012

20.77%

19,931

6.09%

16,279

4.97%

16,245

4.96%

8,520

2.60%

7,835

2.39%

7,271

2.22%

6,216

1.90%

2,882

0.88%

2,243

0.68%

Isère

180,553

26.85%

154,889

23.03%

153,506

22.83%

47,463

7.06%

28,581

4.25%

40,387

6.01%

17,031

2.53%

14,699

2.19%

14,332

2.13%

12,737

1.89%

4,831

0.72%

3,479

0.52%

Jura

36,138

24.88%

38,177

26.29%

28,881

19.89%

9,657

6.65%

7,423

5.11%

6,388

4.40%

6,218

4.28%

3,166

2.18%

4,143

2.85%

2,635

1.81%

1,342

0.92%

1,053

0.73%

Landes

69,459

26.92%

58,646

22.73%

44,548

17.26%

16,817

6.52%

10,393

4.03%

8,628

3.34%

24,308

9.42%

8,176

3.17%

4,914

1.90%

9,071

3.52%

1,975

0.77%

1,115

0.43%

Loir-et-Cher

50,480

27.92%

50,212

27.77%

30,377

16.80%

12,703

7.03%

9,586

5.30%

7,097

3.93%

5,483

3.03%

4,507

2.49%

4,427

2.45%

3,165

1.75%

1,527

0.84%

1,246

0.69%

Loire

104,096

26.95%

97,846

25.33%

78,222

20.25%

28,728

7.44%

18,558

4.80%

16,672

4.32%

11,944

3.09%

9,018

2.33%

9,043

2.34%

6,973

1.81%

2,776

0.72%

2,391

0.62%

Haute-Loire

32,417

23.21%

38,629

27.66%

24,332

17.42%

9,529

6.82%

9,560

6.85%

5,796

4.16%

7,817

5.60%

3,493

2.50%

3,366

2.41%

2,491

1.78%

1,205

0.86%

1,020

0.73%

Loire-Atlantique

256,609

31.98%

135,702

16.91%

187,977

23.43%

42,761

5.33%

37,541

4.68%

60,072

7.49%

18,298

2.28%

18,322

2.38%

14,779

1.84%

18,369

2.29%

7,280

0.91%

4,712

0.59%

Loiret

97,004

28.92%

85,832

25.59%

63,486

18.93%

22,878

6.82%

18,086

5.39%

14,401

4.29%

8,483

2.53%

7,530

2.24%

7,674

2.29%

5,656

1.69%

2,433

0.73%

1,959

0.58%

Lot

27,311

24.97%

21,422

19.58%

25,932

23.71%

6,123

5.60%

5,648

5.16%

4,603

4.21%

8,032

7.34%

3,559

3.25%

2,400

2.19%

2,766

2.53%

976

0.89%

618

0.56%

Lot-et-Garonne

42,568

23.12%

50,290

27.32%

34,044

18.49%

15,646

8.50%

7,703

4.18%

5,686

3.09%

13,600

7.38%

4,970

2.70%

3,912

2.12%

3,357

1.82%

1,437

0.78%

889

0.48%

Lozère

10,739

22.85%

10,497

22.34%

9,153

19.48%

3,148

6.70%

3,039

6.46%

1,736

3.69%

4,722

10.05%

1,343

2.86%

913

1.94%

1,045

2.22%

426

0.91%

235

0.50%

Maine-et-Loire

157,063

35.59%

89,433

20.26%

80,616

18.27%

21,704

4.92%

21,538

4.88%

26,634

6.03%

11,036

2.50%

8,362

1.89%

9,420

2.13%

8,801

1.99%

3,663

0.83%

3,071

0.70%

Manche

92,642

32.57%

69,770

24.53%

46,940

16.50%

13,990

4.92%

14,746

5.18%

11,873

4.17%

9,421

3.31%

7,368

2.59%

6,886

2.42%

5,853

2.06%

2,720

0.96%

2,249

0.79%

Marne

78,472

28.63%

83,756

30.56%

42,858

15.64%

19,501

7.11%

14,357

5.24%

9,561

3.49%

6,921

2.52%

5,307

1.94%

6,159

2.25%

3,542

1.29%

1,894

0.69%

1,778

0.65%

Haute-Marne

21,886

23.33%

34,331

36.60%

13,228

14.10%

6,450

6.88%

4,841

5.16%

2,580

2.75%

3,327

3.55%

1,833

1.95%

2,584

2.75%

1,305

1.39%

747

0.80%

696

0.74%

Mayenne

60,755

36.40%

37,376

22.39%

25,608

15.34%

8,042

4.82%

9,236

5.53%

7,934

4.75%

4,673

2.80%

3,313

1.98%

3,858

2.31%

3,468

2.08%

1,372

0.82%

1,273

0.76%

Meurthe-et-Moselle

95,252

26.92%

97,243

27.49%

73,892

20.89%

23,518

6.65%

13,387

3.78%

14,588

4.12%

8,739

2.47%

7,961

2.25%

7,271

2.06%

6,362

1.80%

3,214

0.91

2,373

0.67%

Meuse

24,539

24.91%

34,588

35.11%

13,559

13.76%

7,347

7.46%

4,403

4.47%

3,130

3.18%

3,500

3.55%

1,957

1.99%

2,422

2.46%

1,483

1.51%

883

0.90%

702

0.71%

Morbihan

152,740

32.68%

102,856

22.01%

84,200

18.02%

26,595

5.69%

22,838

4.89%

27,036

5.78%

14,399

3.08%

11,529

2.47%

9,586

2.05%

8,267

1.77%

4,376

0.94%

2,952

0.63%

Moselle

136,366

26.01%

159,254

30.37%

100,159

19.10%

39,369

7.51%

19,300

3.68%

18,931

3.61%

14,163

2.70%

8,750

1.67%

12,651

2.41%

7,534

1.44%

4,343

0.83%

3,499

0.67%

Nièvre

28,686

25.51%

32,838

29.20%

19,930

17.72%

7,378

6.56%

5,172

4.60%

3,552

3.16%

4,106

3.65%

4,281

3.81%

2,495

2.22%

2,160

1.92%

1,010

0.90%

833

0.74%

Nord

336,138

26.37%

373,127

29.27%

279,785

21.95%

73,168

5.74%

42,470

3.33%

46,962

3.68%

22,459

1.76%

45,902

3.60%

20,617

1.62%

18,215

1.43%

8,265

0.65%

7,673

0.60%

Oise

100,388

24.30%

133,449

32.30%

79,648

19.28%

30,448

7.37%

17,508

4.24%

13,836

3.35%

9,205

2.23%

9,076

2.20%

9,420

2.28%

4,274

1.03%

3,060

0.74%

2,869

0.69%

Orne

46,005

30.48%

41,804

27.69%

22,993

15.23%

8,910

5.90%

8,838

5.85%

5,513

3.65%

4,895

3.24%

3,261

2.16%

3,826

2.53%

2,368

1.57%

1,334

0.88%

1,203

0.80%

Pas-de-Calais

194,649

24.61%

305,900

38.68%

124,759

15.77%

40,776

5.16%

25,320

3.20%

19,302

2.44%

17,019

2.15%

26,152

3.31%

13,975

1.77%

11,619

1.47%

5,491

0.69%

5,891

0.74%

Puy-de-Dôme

100,134

28.00%

78,182

21.86%

74,534

20.84%

20,624

5.77%

17,352

4.85%

17,029

4.76%

16,136

4.51%

12,713

3.56%

6,922

1.94%

8,216

2.30%

3,189

0.89%

2,556

0.71%

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

111,610

27.80%

69,768

17.38%

76,030

18.94%

25,877

6.45%

17,166

4.28%

19,967

4.97%

48,246

12.02%

10,170

2.53%

6,721

1.67%

9,276

2.31%

4,982

1.24%

1,677

0.42%

Hautes-Pyrénées

33,692

24.98%

29,938

22.19%

26,449

19.61%

8,714

6.46%

4,560

3.38%

4,872

3.61%

14,761

10.94%

4,539

3.37%

2,409

1.79%

3,315

2.46%

1,003

0.74%

636

0.47%

Pyrénées-Orientales

55,169

20.54%

87,930

32.74%

51,556

19.20%

24,782

9.23%

8,815

3.28%

8,588

3.20%

11,690

4.35%

6,509

2.42%

5,209

1.94%

5,013

1.87%

1,995

0.74%

1,312

0.49%

Bas-Rhin

177,069

30.70%

145,883

25.30%

105,055

18.22%

40,459

7.02%

24,812

4.30%

28,573

4.95%

14,655

2.54%

7,015

1.22%

17,009

2.95%

8,348

1.45%

4,158

0.72%

3,687

0.64%

Haut-Rhin

107,244

27.85%

106,930

27.77%

66,234

17.20%

30,282

7.86%

15,993

4.15%

18,963

4.92%

11,059

2.87%

4,649

1.21%

13,744

3.57%

4,881

1.27%

2,842

0.74%

2,265

0.59%

Rhône

278,243

30.61%

150,463

16.55%

229,035

25.20%

74,168

8.16%

50,263

5.53%

51,907

5.71%

17,572

1.93%

15,938

1.75%

16,487

1.81%

15,895

1.75%

5,267

0.58%

3,774

0.42%

Haute-Saône

30,204

22.42%

46,618

34.60%

21,089

15.65%

9,675

7.18%

6,754

5.01%

4,292

3.18%

4,820

3.58%

2,836

2.10%

3,640

2.70%

2,345

1.74%

1,295

0.96%

1,171

0.87%

Saône-et-Loire

82,633

27.61%

81,970

27.39%

52,336

17.49%

20,686

6.91%

15,210

5.08%

10,730

3.59%

10,186

3.40%

7,419

2.48%

7,745

2.59%

6,037

2.02%

2,369

0.79%

1,979

0.66%

Sarthe

83,876

28.24%

82,234

27.68%

54,244

18.26%

16,218

5.46%

15,937

5.36%

13,541

4.56%

7,546

2.54%

6,908

2.33%

6,494

2.19%

5,409

1.82%

2,505

0.84%

2,150

0.72%

Savoie

64,689

26.26%

56,733

23.03%

49,858

20.24%

18,045

7.32%

13,608

5.52%

15,642

6.35%

8,081

3.28%

5,536

2.25%

6,694

2.72%

4,418

1.79%

1,849

0.75%

1,205

0.49%

Haute-Savoie

130,422

30.53%

87,744

20.54%

78,062

18.28%

33,353

7.81%

22,349

5.23%

29,948

7.01%

13,371

3.13%

5,997

1.40%

14,175

3.32%

6,606

1.55%

3,232

0.76%

1,880

0.44%

Paris

372,820

35.34%

58,429

5.54%

317,472

30.08%

86,088

8.16%

69,564

6.59%

80,374

7.61%

12,139

1.15%

17,267

1.64%

9,591

0.91%

22,901

2.17%

5,732

0.54%

2,891

0.27%

Seine-Maritime

179,698

27.95%

177,806

27.65%

136,136

21.17%

33,361

5.19%

24,281

3.78%

24,785

3.85%

13,588

2.11%

19,896

3.09%

12,365

1.92%

11,139

1.73%

5,477

0.85%

4,433

0.69%

Seine-et-Marne

165,386

25.00%

155,897

23.57%

171,080

25.86%

47,935

7.25%

36,867

5.57%

26,754

4.04%

13,813

2.09%

12,851

1.94%

15,061

2.28%

7,858

1.19%

4,608

0.70%

3,446

0.52%

Yvelines

246,062

33.41%

101,398

13.77%

168,585

22.89%

64,407

8.74%

61,296

8.32%

40,470

5.49%

13,687

1.86%

11,721

1.59%

13,097

1.78%

9,046

1.23%

3,963

0.54%

2,774

0.38%

Deux-Sèvres

68,540

32.93%

47,979

23.05%

39,197

18.83%

8,813

4.23%

9,262

4.45%

10,088

4.85%

7,026

3.38%

4,545

2.18%

4,536

2.18%

4,348

2.09%

2,136

1.03%

1,645

0.79%

Somme

83,185

27.79%

98,208

32.81%

52,415

17.51%

16,908

5.65%

11,397

3.81%

8,050

2.69%

7,376

2.46%

7,716

2.58%

5,623

1.88%

3,755

1.25%

2,207

0.74%

2,500

0.84%

Tarn

53,925

23.46%

56,543

24.60%

48,430

21.07%

15,982

6.95%

10,014

4.36%

8,680

3.78%

17,010

7.40%

5,313

2.31%

5,123

2.23%

5,818

2.53%

1,829

0.80%

1,175

0.51%

Tarn-et-Garonne

31,737

21.76%

42,183

28.93%

27,881

19.12%

11,772

8.07%

5,994

4.11%

4,835

3.32%

9,573

6.56%

3,628

2.49%

3,412

2.34%

3,069

2.10%

1,057

0.72%

679

0.47%

Var

142,335

23.77%

183,287

30.61%

89,272

14.91%

79,329

13.25%

28,342

4.73%

21,044

3.51%

17,784

2.97%

10,672

1.78%

15,286

2.55%

5,703

0.95%

3,578

0.60%

2,098

0.35%

Vaucluse

66,883

22.01%

89,411

29.43%

63,045

20.75%

30,473

10.03%

11,918

3.92%

12,128

3.99%

9,843

3.24%

6,234

2.05%

6,895

2.27%

3,769

1.24%

2,023

0.67%

1,234

0.41%

Vendée

149,587

35.64%

97,280

23.18%

60,524

14.42%

25,663

6.11%

22,534

5.37%

19,753

4.71%

13,039

3.11%

8,153

1.94%

9,664

2.30%

7,244

1.73%

3,621

0.86%

2,647

0.63%

Vienne

67,831

29.28%

54,216

23.40%

49,162

21.22%

11,939

5.15%

9,959

4.30%

10,727

4.63%

7,741

3.34

6,412

2.77%

5,095

2.20%

4,542

1.96%

2,315

1.00%

1,715

0.74%

Haute-Vienne

54,951

27.19%

45,357

22.44%

43,137

21.34%

10,796

5.34%

9,544

4.72%

7,877

3.90%

9,973

4.93%

8,030

3.97%

3,555

1.76%

5,654

2.80%

1,787

0.88%

1,457

0.72%

Vosges

51,477

25.25%

65,676

32.22%

32,690

16.04%

13,195

6.47%

9,359

4.59%

7,569

3.71%

7,210

3.54%

3,850

1.89%

6,155

3.02%

3,115

1.53%

1,988

0.98%

1,572

0.77%

Yonne

42,616

24.14%

55,162

31.25%

31,600

17.90%

12,941

7.33%

9,322

5.28%

5,917

3.35%

5,356

3.03%

4,023

2.28%

4,594

2.60%

2,286

1.30%

1,487

0.84%

1,203

0.68%

Territoire de Belfort

16,768

24.07%

19,061

27.37%

14,601

20.96%

5,583

8.02%

3,322

4.77%

2,798

4.02%

2,000

2.87%

1,485

2.13%

1,821

2.61%

1,052

1.51%

603

0.87%

560

0.80%

Essonne

164,503

27.65%

105,862

17.79%

167,310

28.12%

39,284

6.60%

33,046

5.55%

29,562

4.97%

11,610

1.95%

13,480

2.27%

15,203

2.56%

7,944

1.34%

4,306

0.72%

2,831

0.48%

Hauts-de-Seine

287,494

37.11%

64,812

8.37%

199,640

25.77%

62,761

8.10%

62,231

8.03%

47,103

6.08%

11,260

1.45%

13,170

1.70%

9,746

1.26%

10,518

1.36%

3,704

0.48%

2,306

0.30%

Seine-Saint-Denis

110,117

20.27%

64,542

11.88%

266,630

49.09%

27,968

5.15%

17,479

3.22%

19,352

3.56%

6,805

1.25%

11,642

2.14%

6,300

1.16%

5,890

1.08%

3,662

0.67%

2,756

0.51%

Val-de-Marne

171,409

29.10%

69,599

11.82%

192,427

32.67%

43,430

7.37%

32,522

5.52%

31,904

5.42%

8,944

1.52%

14,954

2.54%

9,359

1.59%

8,276

1.40%

3,730

0.63%

2,504

0.43%

Val-d’Oise

138,166

26.09%

91,081

17.20%

175,666

33.17%

37,564

7.09%

26,403

4.99%

20,710

3.91%

9,101

1.72%

10,060

1.90%

8,996

1.70%

6,094

1.15%

3,352

0.63%

2,392

0.45%

Guadeloupe

18,137

13.43%

24,204

17.92%

75,862

56.16%

3,098

2.29%

3,979

2.95%

1,927

1.43%

1,033

0.76%

668

0.49%

2,114

1.56%

2,266

1.68%

713

0.53%

1,084

0.80%

Martinique

20,043

16.30%

16,495

13.42%

65,292

53.10%

3,153

2.56%

4,731

3.85%

1,978

1.61%

1,162

0.95%

747

0.61%

2,989

2.43%

3,935

3.20%

977

0.79%

1,447

1.18%

French Guiana

5,101

14.22%

6,334

17.66%

18,143

50.59%

1,573

4.39%

997

2.78%

940

2.62%

516

1.44%

246

0.69%

717

2.00%

535

1.49%

462

1.29%

297

0.83%

Réunion

62,542

18.04%

85,770

24.73%

139,604

40.26%

13,070

3.77%

9,738

2.81%

7,994

2.31%

4,844

1.40%

3,074

0.89%

8,338

2.40%

5,549

1.60%

2,705

0.78%

3,538

1.02%

Mayotte

5,936

16.94%

14,958

42.68%

8,398

23.96%

482

1.38%

2,810

8.02%

295

0.84%

359

1.02%

206

0.59%

530

1.51%

318

0.91%

328

0.94%

430

1.23%

New Caledonia

28,561

40.51%

13,273

18.83%

9,711

13.77%

6,435

9.13%

4,144

5.88%

2,161

3.07%

1,031

1.46%

399

0.57%

2,697

3.83%

963

1.37%

560

0.79%

565

0.80%

French Polynesia

24,418

40.25%

11,797

19.45%

8,035

13.24%

4,311

7.11%

4,809

7.93%

2,166

3.57%

618

1.02%

376

0.62%

1,983

3.27%

874

1.44%

459

0.76%

819

1.35%

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

534

19.77%

459

16.99%

1,105

40.91%

80

2.96%

51

1.89%

116

4.29%

108

4.00%

19

0.70%

82

3.04%

75

2.78%

50

1.85%

22

0.81%

Wallis and Futuna

2,115

39.47%

579

10.80%

501

9.35%

118

2.20%

1,354

25.27%

72

1.34%

78

1.46%

34

0.63%

244

4.55%

118

2.20%

48

0.90%

98

1.83%

Saint Martin/Saint Barthélemy

2,070

24.74%

1,445

17.27%

2,354

28.13%

1,107

13.23%

354

4.23%

247

2.95%

208

2.49%

48

0.57%

339

4.05%

92

1.10%

63

0.75%

41

0.49%

French residents overseas

224,957

45.09%

26,380

5.29%

109,394

21.92%

43,252

8.67%

20,956

4.20%

40,774

8.17%

5,964

1.20%

3,266

0.65%

7,074

1.22%

12,489

2.50%

3,145

0.63%

1,300

0.26%

Total

Source: Ministry of Interior

Results by region

Region

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Jean-Luc

Mélenchon

Éric

Zemmour

Valérie

Pécresse

Yannick

Jadot

Jean

Lassalle

Fabien

Roussel

Nicolas

Dupont-Aignan

Anne

Hidalgo

Philippe

Poutou

Nathalie

Arthaud

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Votes

%

Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes

1,175,085

27.75%

943,294

22.28%

897,433

21.20%

312,916

7.39%

217,906

5.15%

224,735

5.31%

136,436

3.22%

96,409

2.28%

98,465

2.33%

77,570

1.83%

30,596

0.72%

23,137

0.55%

Bourgogne-Franche-Comté

394,117

26.31%

409,639

27.35%

277,899

18.56%

107,057

7.15%

76,654

5.12%

60,235

4.02%

49,557

3.31%

33,932

2.27%

38,691

2.58%

26,543

1.77%

12,737

0.85%

10,643

0.71%

Brittany

647,172

32.79%

385,393

19.53%

407,527

20.65%

96,984

4.91%

92,808

4.70%

122,198

6.19%

58,653

2.97%

51,193

2.59%

35,116

1.78%

43,596

2.21%

19,913

1.01%

12,965

0.66%

Centre-Val de Loire

383,851

28.53%

347,845

25.86%

251,259

18.68%

88,575

6.58%

71,690

5.33%

54,401

4.04%

38,659

2.87%

33,590

2.50%

31,759

2.36%

23,162

1.72%

11,226

0.83%

9,256

0.69%

Corsica

26,795

18.11%

42,283

28.58%

19,779

13.37%

18,936

12.80%

9,363

6.33%

4,801

3.25%

15,408

10.42%

4,553

3.08%

2,600

1.76%

1,589

1.08%

1,374

0.93%

455

0.31%

Grand Est

762,282

27.28%

825,219

29.54%

492,439

17.63%

200,265

7.17%

120,931

4.33%

111,960

4.01%

77,442

2.77%

47,425

1.70%

74,918

2.68%

40,031

1.43%

22,243

0.80%

18,658

0.67%

Hauts-de-France

773,221

25.40%

1,015,361

33.35%

577,878

18.98%

179,606

5.90%

107,631

3.53%

95,234

3.13%

62,548

2.05%

94,831

3.11%

55,439

1.82%

40,856

1.34%

21,150

0.69%

20,977

0.69%

Île-de-France

1,656,341

30.19%

711,690

12.97%

1,659,152

30.24%

409,532

7.47%

339,468

6.19%

296,229

5.40%

87,372

1.59%

105,170

1.92%

87,360

1.59%

78,561

1.43%

33,063

0.60%

21,907

0.40%

Normandy

521,769

29.26%

484,106

27.14%

335,590

18.82%

99,446

5.58%

79,800

4.47%

73,289

4.11%

45,488

2.55%

46,358

2.60%

38,560

2.16%

30,235

1.70%

16,005

0.90%

12,839

0.72%

Nouvelle-Aquitaine

945,332

27.63%

779,948

22.80%

681,405

19.92%

210,501

6.15%

157,230

4.60%

151,747

4.44%

201,773

5.90%

96,800

2.83%

67,662

1.98%

77,326

2.26%

32,600

0.95%

18,496

0.54%

Occitanie

777,780

23.48%

815,495

24.62%

742,543

22.42%

260,212

7.86%

129,143

3.90%

139,234

4.20%

184,994

5.59%

83,483

2.52%

63,260

1.91%

77,166

2.33%

23,902

0.72%

14,884

0.45%

Pays de la Loire

707,890

33.27%

442,025

20.78%

408,969

19.22%

114,388

5.38%

106,786

5.02%

127,934

6.01%

54,592

2.57%

45,058

2.12%

44,215

2.08%

43,291

2.03%

18,441

0.87%

13,853

0.65%

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

619,529

23.34%

732,377

27.59%

524,677

19.77%

310,838

11.71%

116,137

4.38%

107,670

4.06%

72,847

2.74%

54,730

2.06%

60,204

2.27%

29,511

1.11%

16,224

0.61%

9,473

0.36%

Guadeloupe

18,137

13.43%

24,204

17.92%

75,862

56.16%

3,098

2.29%

3,979

2.95%

1,927

1.43%

1,033

0.76%

668

0.49%

2,114

1.56%

2,266

1.68%

713

0.53%

1,084

0.80%

Martinique

20,043

16.30%

16,495

13.42%

65,292

53.10%

3,153

2.56%

4,731

3.85%

1,978

1.61%

1,162

0.95%

747

0.61%

2,989

2.43%

3,935

3.20%

977

0.79%

1,447

1.18%

French Guiana

5,101

14.22%

6,334

17.66%

18,143

50.59%

1,573

4.39%

997

2.78%

940

2.62%

516

1.44%

246

0.69%

717

2.00%

535

1.49%

462

1.29%

297

0.83%

Réunion

62,542

18.04%

85,770

24.73%

139,604

40.26%

13,070

3.77%

9,738

2.81%

7,994

2.31%

4,844

1.40%

3,074

0.89%

8,338

2.40%

5,549

1.60%

2,705

0.78%

3,538

1.02%

Mayotte

5,936

16.94%

14,958

42.68%

8,398

23.96%

482

1.38%

2,810

8.02%

295

0.84%

359

1.02%

206

0.59%

530

1.51%

318

0.91%

328

0.94%

430

1.23%

Total

Source: Ministry of Interior

Maps

- Simplified 2022 French presidential election’s first round map

- Map of which candidate placed second in every department during the first round

- 2022 French presidential election’s first round in Petite Couronne by commune

- Results of the first round by parliamentary constituency

- Results of the first round by municipality

- First-place candidate by country (Overseas French) during the first round

Second round

Tables

Results by department

Department

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Votes

%

Votes

%

Ain

166,635

54.99%

136,370

45.01%

Aisne

102,428

40.09%

153,069

59.91%

Allier

87,645

52.35%

79,761

47.65%

Alpes-de-Haute-Provence

41,657

48.55%

44,139

51.45%

Hautes-Alpes

42,209

55.06%

34,446

44.94%

Alpes-Maritimes

261,987

50.13%

260,627

49.87%

Ardèche

90,254

52.40%

82,001

47.60%

Ardennes

55,085

43.34%

72,026

56.66%

Ariège

39,297

51.09%

37,616

48.91%

Aube

68,830

48.32%

73,630

51.68%

Aude

85,464

45.10%

104,038

54.90%

Aveyron

89,953

60.07%

59,789

39.93%

Bouches-du-Rhône

481,129

52.08%

442,759

47.92%

Calvados

218,571

60.29%

143,955

39.71%

Cantal

45,054

56.07%

35,301

43.93%

Charente

95,654

55.06%

78,085

44.94%

Charente-Maritime

201,159

56.32%

156,020

43.68%

Cher

77,739

52.56%

70,160

47.44%

Corrèze

68,272

55.78%

54,131

44.22%

Corse-du-Sud

26,160

41.69%

36,595

58.31%

Haute-Corse

29,951

42.13%

41,137

57.87%

Côte-d’Or

144,548

57.27%

107,866

42.73%

Côtes-d’Armor

209,856

62.90%

123,798

37.10%

Creuse

30,552

52.04%

28,152

47.96%

Dordogne

111,480

51.52%

104,894

48.48%

Doubs

141,916

57.16%

106,347

42.84%

Drôme

143,696

55.72%

114,216

44.28%

Eure

146,750

48.62%

155,085

51.38%

Eure-et-Loir

109,744

53.29%

96,185

46.71%

Finistère

332,396

67.50%

160,073

32.50%

Gard

177,662

47.85%

193,659

52.15%

Haute-Garonne

409,932

64.42%

226,450

35.58%

Gers

57,115

55.66%

45,490

44.34%

Gironde

484,771

61.37%

305,112

38.63%

Hérault

297,211

52.57%

268,098

47.43%

Ille-et-Vilaine

390,332

70.94%

159,930

29.06%

Indre

57,574

51.41%

54,410

48.59%

Indre-et-Loire

189,230

62.66%

112,770

37.34%

Isère

359,685

59.80%

241,749

40.20%

Jura

68,843

53.07%

60,882

46.93%

Landes

128,771

56.54%

98,982

43.46%

Loir-et-Cher

91,359

53.81%

78,433

46.19%

Loire

194,878

56.64%

149,174

43.36%

Haute-Loire

62,372

50.16%

61,979

49.84%

Loire-Atlantique

492,422

69.20%

219,198

30.80%

Loiret

180,882

57.57%

133,331

42.43%

Lot

55,130

59.18%

38,031

40.82%

Lot-et-Garonne

81,345

49.53%

82,874

50.47%

Lozère

22,064

54.20%

18,644

45.80%

Maine-et-Loire

274,810

66.53%

138,259

33.47%

Manche

159,814

59.61%

108,292

40.39%

Marne

136,054

52.10%

125,074

47.90%

Haute-Marne

38,226

43.04%

50,581

56.96%

Mayenne

102,263

64.21%

57,006

35.79%

Meurthe-et-Moselle

179,248

54.42%

150,156

45.58%

Meuse

41,933

44.39%

52,527

55.61%

Morbihan

269,755

62.81%

159,717

37.19%

Moselle

249,589

50.46%

245,060

49.54%

Nièvre

50,698

49.89%

50,923

50.11%

Nord

634,038

52.85%

565,762

47.15%

Oise

182,791

47.27%

203,865

52.73%

Orne

79,267

55.11%

64,559

44.89%

Pas-de-Calais

324,144

42.51%

438,390

57.49%

Puy-de-Dôme

188,468

60.16%

124,825

39.84%

Pyrénées-Atlantiques

219,766

63.05%

128,779

36.95%

Hautes-Pyrénées

65,085

55.50%

52,182

44.50%

Pyrénées-Orientales

106,188

43.68%

136,922

56.32%

Bas-Rhin

320,198

58.96%

222,838

41.04%

Haut-Rhin

191,814

52.90%

170,777

47.10%

Rhône

551,544

68.66%

251,720

31.34%

Haute-Saône

53,568

43.10%

70,720

56.90%

Saône-et-Loire

144,989

53.33%

126,860

46.67%

Sarthe

154,909

55.41%

124,658

44.59%

Savoie

125,770

57.62%

92,487

42.38%

Haute-Savoie

237,506

61.66%

147,694

38.34%

Paris

808,996

85.10%

141,591

14.90%

Seine-Maritime

332,139

55.28%

268,688

44.72%

Seine-et-Marne

329,771

56.98%

249,014

43.02%

Yvelines

464,910

71.05%

189,474

28.95%

Deux-Sèvres

117,805

62.13%

71,791

37.87%

Somme

109,415

45.37%

131,773

54.63%

Tarn

106,768

53.06%

94,441

46.94%

Tarn-et-Garonne

62,503

47.98%

67,770

52.02%

Var

252,723

44.90%

310,126

55.10%

Vaucluse

134,475

48.00%

145,705

52.00%

Vendée

244,494

61.86%

150,772

38.14%

Vienne

125,174

60.12%

83,050

39.88%

Haute-Vienne

103,329

59.18%

71,263

40.82%

Vosges

91,555

47.59%

100,839

52.41%

Yonne

78,038

48.41%

83,169

51.59%

Territoire de Belfort

31,987

51.44%

30,202

48.56%

Essonne

338,567

65.43%

178,906

34.57%

Hauts-de-Seine

552,124

80.39%

134,685

19.61%

Seine-Saint-Denis

326,038

73.72%

116,223

26.28%

Val-de-Marne

376,204

74.48%

128,873

25.52%

Val-d’Oise

299,829

66.15%

153,446

33.85%

Guadeloupe

40,229

30.40%

92,106

69.60%

Martinique

46,918

39.13%

73,000

60.87%

French Guiana

14,073

39.30%

21,734

60.70%

Réunion

147,270

40.43%

217,021

59.57%

Mayotte

15,707

40.90%

22,694

59.10%

New Caledonia

43,794

61.04%

27,958

38.96%

French Polynesia

42,890

51.80%

39,913

48.20%

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

1,243

49.31%

1,278

50.69%

Wallis and Futuna

3,830

67.44%

1,849

32.56%

Saint Martin/Saint Barthélemy

3,850

44.58%

4,787

55.42%

French residents overseas

458,874

86.14%

73,830

13.86%

Total

18,768,639

58.55%

13,288,686

41.45%

Source: Minister of the Interior

Results by region

Region

Emmanuel

Macron

Marine

Le Pen

Votes

%

Votes

%

Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes

2,253,507

59.76%

1,517,277

40.24%

Bourgogne-Franche-Comté

714,587

52.87%

636,969

47.13%

Brittany

1,202,339

66.58%

603,518

33.42%

Centre-Val de Loire

706,528

56.44%

545,289

43.56%

Corsica

56,111

41.92%

77,732

58.08%

Grand Est

1,372,519

52.07%

1,263,522

47.93%

Hauts-de-France

1,384,266

47.87%

1,507,755

52.13%

Île-de-France

3,496,439

73.02%

1,292,212

26.98%

Normandy

936,541

55.84%

740,579

44.16%

Nouvelle-Aquitaine

1,768,079

58.33%

1,263,134

41.67%

Occitanie

1,574,372

53.96%

1,343,130

46.04%

Pays de la Loire

1,268,898

64.78%

689,893

35.22%

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur

1,214,180

49.52%

1,237,802

50.48%

Guadeloupe

40,229

30.40%

92,106

69.60%

Martinique

46,918

39.13%

73,000

60.87%

French Guiana

14,073

39.30%

21,734

60.70%

Réunion

147,270

40.43%

217,021

59.57%

Mayotte

15,707

40.90%

22,694

59.10%

French residents overseas

458,874

86.14%

73,830

13.86%

Source: Minister of the Interior

Maps

- Simplified 2022 French presidential election’s second round map

- Results of the second round by parliamentary constituency

- Results of the second round by municipality

Aftermath

The New York Times commented that the race was much closer than in 2017, when Macron won 66.1% of the vote to Le Pen’s 33.9%, but that Macron’s margin was wider than expected prior to the election.[87] Le Pen conceded defeat minutes after the estimated results were released,[85] but still called the outcome a victory for her political movement and for the upcoming parliamentary elections.[88][1] It was the best result for the far right in France since the founding of the Fifth French Republic in 1958.[89]

Olivier Véran, Minister for Solidarity and Health, stated that the government has “heard the French people’s message”, referring to the increasing number of votes for the far-right, and that “there will be a change of method”.[88] Macron reflected on the results of the elections self-critically, assuming that many voters voted for him to counter the far right rather than in support of his political positions.[90] Macron was congratulated by several world leaders on his re-election, with his first call coming from German chancellor Olaf Scholz.[91][92]

Notes

Footnotes

References

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to French presidential election (2022).

- Constitutional Council official website (in French)

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2022_French_presidential_election&oldid=1283664534”

National Front assistants affair

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Logo of the National Front, in use until 2007

Marine Le Pen at the European Parliament in 2014

Twenty-seven members of the National Front (renamed National Rally in 2018) party in France, including its then-leader Marine Le Pen, were accused of having hired people as European Parliament assistants between 2004 and 2016 to work for the political party while being paid with public funds.[1] Nine Members of European Parliament (MEPs), including Le Pen, and 12 assistants were convicted in March 2025, and sentences included temporarily banning several from running for political office.[2]

The French courts indicted several members of the National Front (FN) for embezzlement of public funds or complicity in this crime. Among the figures charged were Marine Le Pen, her father Jean-Marie Le Pen, Wallerand de Saint-Just, Nicolas Bay, Julien Odoul, and Louis Aliot. Current-day party leader Jordan Bardella, despite serving as a parliamentary assistant in 2015 to FN MEP Jean-François Jalkh, was not charged in this case.[3]

The trial occurred in 2024, and the judgment was delivered on March 31, 2025. Marine Le Pen and eight other MEPs were convicted of embezzling public funds. Additionally, twelve parliamentary assistants were found guilty of receiving stolen funds, while three other party members were convicted of complicity in the embezzlement. One defendant was acquitted.[2]

The damages in the case were estimated at €2.9 million. Marine Le Pen received a sentence of four years in prison, two of which were to be served under electronic tagging. She was also fined €100,000 and given five years of ineligibility with provisional execution. This sentence prevents her from running for office until 2030, including the 2027 French presidential election and the next legislative election. Marine Le Pen has decided to appeal the decision.[4]

Investigation and trial

In January 2014, the European Anti-Fraud Office opened an investigation into Marine Le Pen after receiving a tip-off alleging that she had hired fictitious assistants during her term as Member of the European Parliament (MEP), which began in 2004. The investigation found that Catherine Griset, Le Pen’s chief of staff, paid by the European Union, had only worked around 12 hours at the EU Parliament between October 2014 and August 2015.[1]

As the investigation continued, it widened to include a number of other RN politicians who had served as MEPs or had been hired as assistants to MEPs, including Louis Aliot, Bruno Gollnisch, Julien Odoul, and Nicolas Bay.[5]

In December 2023, French authorities announced that they would be charging Le Pen and twenty-six other members of the RN with embezzlement, with a trial to be held before the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris.[6] She faced up to ten years incarceration and ten years of ineligibility for election to public office.[7] The trial for the affair began in September 2024.[8]

Prosecution’s Requests

On November 13, the prosecution sought the following penalties:

- Marine Le Pen: Five years of imprisonment (two firm), five years of ineligibility, and a €300,000 fine, with provisional execution.

- RN Party: €4.3 million fine (€2 million suspended).

- Julien Odoul: 10 months suspended imprisonment, €20,000 fine, and one year of ineligibility with provisional execution.

- Louis Aliot, Dominique Bilde, Mylène Troszczynski, Nicolas Bay: 18 months imprisonment (12 suspended), €30,000 fine, and three years of ineligibility with provisional execution.

- Bruno Gollnisch: Three years imprisonment (two suspended), €200,000 fine, and five years of ineligibility with provisional execution.

- Fernand Le Rachinel: Two years imprisonment (one suspended), €100,000 fine, and five years of ineligibility with provisional execution.

- Yann Le Pen: 18 months suspended imprisonment and two years of ineligibility.

- Timothée Houssin: 10 months suspended imprisonment, €10,000 fine, and one year of ineligibility with provisional execution.

- Marie-Christine Arnautu: 18 months imprisonment (12 suspended), €50,000 fine, and three years of ineligibility with provisional execution.

Testimonies

Aymeric Chauprade

Aymeric Chauprade in 2018.

According to Aymeric Chauprade, former head of the FN MEP delegation and advisor to Marine Le Pen, she imposed on FN MEPs the hiring of parliamentary assistants who, in reality, participated in the operations of the FN.[9] On March 28, 2017, he testified before the investigators in charge of the case. He reported his testimony to the newspaper Le Monde. “On June 4, 2014, Marine Le Pen gathered at the Parliament in Brussels the twenty or so FN MEPs who had been elected a few weeks earlier. She explained to us that we would not have to pay part of our allowances to the FN, but that in exchange, we had to agree to hire only one assistant ourselves for our elected activities. She told us: I will be the one to control the assistants’ budget. There will be a delegation of authority form for recruitment.”[9]

Jean-Claude Martinez

Jean-Claude Martinez admitted to hiring Huguette Fatna, a close associate of Marine Le Pen. “She was imposed on me. She looked after Marine’s children. I said she was her nanny, and Marine Le Pen took me to court, along with journalist Caroline Fourest, who had reported my comments in 2012 (in the book Marine Le Pen Unmasked, Editor’s note). I showed that Huguette had never set foot in Brussels or Strasbourg. This former parliamentary assistant disputed the claim that she was Marine Le Pen’s nanny and asserted that she did indeed work for Jean-Claude Martinez, but from Paris. She is of Martinican origin, and it’s true that she acted as an intermediary in the dispute over bananas from Martinique and Guadeloupe, which benefited from a favorable tax regime by the European Union,” said Jean-Claude Martinez. On the other hand, he claimed to have refused to hire Thierry Légier, the bodyguard of Jean-Marie Le Pen and later Marine Le Pen.[10]

Gaël Nofri

Gaël Nofri is a former advisor to Marine Le Pen during the 2012 French presidential election, never a member of the National Front or the Rassemblement Bleu Marine. He claimed to have been the victim of an abusive procedure by the FN that led to his being paid as a parliamentary attaché without his knowledge, even though his initial contract was for a position within the presidential campaign. According to Mediapart, the financial brigade discovered pay slips in his name from January 2012 to April 2012. Gaël Nofri is listed as a parliamentary assistant to MEP Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, he stated that he had never been an assistant to Jean-Marie Le Pen.[11]

Sophie Montel

Sophie Montel in 2018.

On June 6, 2018, Sophie Montel, who left the FN in 2017, was questioned as a “free suspect” by police officers from the Central Office for the Fight against Corruption and Financial and Tax Offenses. During this hearing, she confirmed the statements of Aymeric Chauprade, who claimed that Marine Le Pen had asked party officials to retain only one parliamentary assistant to allow her collaborator Charles Van Houtte to choose the others. According to Sophie Montel, out of the twenty or so MPs, six refused this financial arrangement: Aymeric Chauprade, Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, Florian Philippot, Mireille d’Ornano, Bernard Monot, and herself. She told the police that Charles Van Houtte had asked her to hire Huguette Fatna, a close associate of the Le Pen family, as her assistant. She refused, considering herself unqualified for the position. From this stance, Sophie Montel believed she was isolated within the FN group. It was then deputy Dominique Bilde who hired Huguette Fatna. The latter rejected these allegations.[12]

Convictions

Judge Bénédicte de Perthuis presided over the court that sentenced Marine Le Pen to four years in prison, two of which were suspended, and imposed a five-year disqualification from office for embezzling European funds. On 31 March 2025, nine MEPs, 12 European parliamentary assistants, and four party officials were found guilty of crimes related to the misappropriation of public funds. Individual sentences with political consequences included several MEPs being banned from running for political office,[13] while the party was fined €2 million.[14]

Marine Le Pen (pictured 2025) was one of several party members convicted in the trial.

Marine Le Pen received a four-year prison sentence, two of which were suspended, in addition to a €100,000 fine. She did not begin serving the two years of house arrest immediately as all appeals must be exhausted before this part of the sentence is executed. Similarly, she did not lose her seat in the lower house of the French parliament immediately.[15] On the other hand, the court also banned her, effective immediately, from standing for political office for five years, making her ineligible to run in the 2027 French presidential election.[16]

The National Rally vice-president Louis Aliot, who served as an MEP between 2014 and 2017, was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, an €8000 fine, and a three-year ban from political office.[17] Nicolas Bay, who served as the party’s secretary general between 2014 and 2017, was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment, an €8000 fine, and a three-year ban on political office.[17] Both the former vice president and treasurer of the party, Wallerand de Saint-Just, and former vice president Bruno Gollnisch were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment (of which two were suspended), and a €50,000 fine as well as a period of ineligibility for public office (three years and five years respectively).[14] The former EU assistant Julien Odoul, now the National Rally spokesperson and a member of the Assemblée nationale, received a suspended eight-month prison sentence and one year of ineligibility.[13]

Political reactions

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Domestic

In January 2025, Prime Minister François Bayrou considered the charge of misappropriation of European funds, which concerned members of the RN and his own Democratic Movement party, to be “unfair”. He called the possible ineligibility of Marine Le Pen, with immediate application of this penalty, “very disturbing”. He also said he considers that members of the Democratic Movement have been “unjustly convicted”.[18][19] After Le Pen’s conviction, Bayrou said he was “disturbed” by the verdict.[20][21]

Jordan Bardella denounced Le Pen’s conviction as an attack on democracy and a “judicial dictatorship”.[20][22][23] The three judges involved in the decision were all threatened on social media, leading the Minister of Justice, Gérard Darmanin, as well as the Judicial council [fr] to express concern.[24] Two days after the convictions, President Emmanuel Macron expressed a need for the judges to be protected and reasserted the independence of the judiciary and the litigants’ right to appeal.[25] While the majority of left-wing opposition parties defended the ruling as proof of a functional judicial system, La France Insoumise said it “refused as a matter of principle that recourse should be impossible for any litigant”.[20][26][27]

In Europe

Marine Le Pen’s conviction provoked strongly negative reactions from far-right politicians in Europe. Several European right-wing populist leaders, including Geert Wilders, Matteo Salvini, Viktor Orbán, Robert Winnicki, Tom Van Grieken and Santiago Abascal, expressed their solidarity with Le Pen and condemned the verdict.[22][28][29]

International

A number of prominent far-right and right-wing populist international political figures released statements in support of Le Pen, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,[30] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov,[28][31][32] Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli,[28] Elon Musk,[31][32] Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini,[30] Geert Wilders[30] and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.[33][34] US President Donald Trump reacted to the conviction by drawing a parallel with his own court cases,[35][36] and the US State Department expressed concern about “excluding people from the political process.”[37]

See also

- Corruption scandals in the Paris region

References

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=National_Front_assistants_affair&oldid=1283856443”

2025 Myanmar earthquake

Coordinates: 21°59′46″N 95°55′34″E / 21.996°N 95.926°E

This article is about a current disaster where information can change quickly or be unreliable. The latest page updates may not reflect the most up-to-date information. Please help improve this article using reliable sources or help by discussing changes on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove this message)

On 28 March 2025 at 12:50:52 MMT (06:20:52 UTC), a M[w] 7.7 earthquake struck the Sagaing Region of Myanmar, with an epicenter close to Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city. The strike-slip shock achieved a maximum Modified Mercalli intensity of IX (Violent).[2] It was the most powerful earthquake to strike Myanmar since 1912,[3] and the second deadliest in Myanmar’s modern history, surpassed only by upper estimates of the 1930 Bago earthquake.[4] The earthquake caused extensive damage in Myanmar and significant damage in neighboring Thailand. Hundreds of homes were also damaged in Yunnan, China, while more than 300 apartments were affected in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

The earthquake has resulted in as many as 4,390 deaths in Myanmar and 36 in Thailand.[5][6] Up to 6,010 people were injured. Hundreds more were reported missing, including at a collapsed construction site in Bangkok, whose shallow geology makes it more vulnerable to seismic waves from far away and increases the city’s susceptibility to earthquake-related impacts.[7][8] Authorities in both Myanmar and Thailand declared a state of emergency.[9][10] As the earthquake struck during Friday prayer hours, collapsing mosques resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Muslims.[11] In addition, more than 670 Buddhist monasteries and 290 pagodas were damaged by the quake.[12] The ongoing civil war in Myanmar has exacerbated the difficulty of disaster relief and info exposure.[13][14] It is the deadliest earthquake globally since the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquakes.[15]

Tectonic setting

Further information: Sagaing Fault and Geology of Myanmar

The Sagaing Fault can be divided into segments

Myanmar is wedged between four tectonic plates (the Indian, Eurasian, Sunda, and Burma plates) that interact in active geological processes. Along the west coast of the Coco Islands, off the Rakhine coast, and into Bangladesh, is a highly oblique convergent boundary known as the Sunda megathrust. This large fault marks the boundary between the Indian and Burma plates. The megathrust emerges from the seafloor in Bangladesh, where it runs parallel and east of the Chin Hills. This boundary continues to the north of Myanmar where it ends at the eastern Himalayas.[16]

A 1,400-kilometre (870 mi) transform fault runs through Myanmar and connects the Andaman spreading center to a collision zone in the north. Called the Sagaing Fault, it is a boundary between the Burma and Sunda plates as they slide past each other at 18–49 mm (0.71–1.93 in) per year. It is Myanmar’s largest and most active source of earthquakes, running through or close to major cities including Yangon, Naypyidaw, and Mandalay. Large and damaging earthquakes occurred along the fault in May and December 1930 (Ms  7.3 & 7.5) 1931 (Ms  7.5), 1946 (Mw  7.3 & 7.7), 1956 (Ms  7.0), 1991 (Mw  6.9) and 2012 (Mw  6.9).[17] The magnitudes of earthquakes on the Sagaing Fault vary across the fault zone from Mw  7.0 to 8.0. The recurrence interval also varies depending on the location along the fault; its southern segments, which ruptured in 1930, have return periods of 100–150 years based on paleoseismological studies.[16]

Destructive earthquakes have affected the area for centuries, but academic research has been limited. Most earthquakes in Myanmar, including large surface rupturing events, are thus not well understood. A large Mw  8.5–8.8 earthquake in 1762 ruptured a section of the Sunda megathrust off the Rakhine coast. That earthquake may have been caused by the Indian plate subducting beneath the Burma plate along the megathrust. Remnants of the subducted Indian plate beneath central Myanmar also cause intraslab earthquakes; one example is the 1975 Bagan earthquake (Mw  7.0) which occurred at a depth of 120 km (75 mi).[16]

According to a study published in Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, the Sagaing Fault can be divided into two regions; the northern and southern sections. The Sagaing Fault between 16.5 and 23.5 degrees north latitude is defined as the southern section. It is further divided into five segments from south to north; the Bago, Pyu, Naypyidaw, Meiktila, and Sagaing segments. The Naypyidaw segment is characterised by two parallel faults running for 70 km (43 mi) with parts of them located beneath the capital city, Naypyidaw. The last recorded earthquake was in 1929 with a magnitude smaller than 7.0. The 220 km (140 mi) long Meiktila segment extends between Mandalay and Naypyidaw and is characterised as a linear feature. The nearly flat topography across this segment suggest the slip component is entirely horizontal. This segment has not experienced any major earthquakes, although it possibly ruptured during the 1839 Ava earthquake. The Sagaing segment is also another linear segment that runs parallel to the Irrawaddy River. The northern part of this segment ruptured during one of the mainshocks in the 1946 Sagaing earthquakes, while the 1956 Sagaing earthquake ruptured the southern strand.[18]

This earthquake also affected Thailand, with damage primarily concentrated in the Bangkok region, about 1,000 km (620 mi) away from the epicenter. Bangkok’s geology, characterised by a top layer of soft marine clay, renders its emerging high-rises vulnerable to distant, powerful earthquakes, as the ubiquitous clay layer contributes to local site effects amplifying long-period ground motion which in turn can match the resonant frequency of tall buildings.[8][19][20] Occupants in Bangkok have often felt effects from earthquakes centered many hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away. Research headed by Pennung Warnitchai of the Asian Institute of Technology had previously identified the Sagaing Fault as a potential risk, if a magnitude-8.0 earthquake were to occur in the Andaman Sea, 400 km (250 mi) from the city, resulting in future disaster.[21][22] For preventing catastrophic effects in skyscrapers, elementary seismic considerations were only added to the building code in 2007, with older structures being particularly dangerous.[19]

Earthquake

Further information: List of aftershocks of the 2025 Myanmar earthquake

Mw 7.7 finite fault

Distribution of slip across the rupture

Surface projection of finite fault model

The earthquake occurred at 12:50:52 MMT, with its epicenter located in Sagaing Township near the Sagaing–Mandalay border region, 14 km (8.7 mi) north-northwest of Sagaing city and 16 km (9.9 mi) west of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city. It measured 7.7 on the moment magnitude scale according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS),[2] while the Thai Meteorological Department put the magnitude at 8.2.[23] Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris placed the earthquake’s moment magnitude at 7.9.[24]

It is the largest earthquake with an epicenter in Myanmar since the 1912 Maymyo earthquake (which had an Mw  of 7.9).[25] The focal mechanism solution indicated it occurred due to strike-slip faulting at a depth of 10 km (6.2 mi). The type of faulting is consistent with rupture on the Sagaing Fault. According to a finite fault model released by the USGS, the earthquake rupture extended more than 460 km (290 mi) by 20 km (12 mi) from Singu in Mandalay to Pyu in Bago. From the epicenter the rupture propagated more than 75 km (47 mi) to the north and terminated just south of Singu. About 420 km (260 mi) of the rupture occurred to the south where it terminated at Pyu. Most of the slip which exceeded 1 m (3 ft 3 in) was concentrated between Singu and Oktwin while less than 1 m (3 ft 3 in) of slip occurred beneath Pyu and further south. A gap with an apparent lack of slip exists between Naypyidaw and Pyu which the USGS attributes to a lack of observations. A maximum slip of 4.3334 m (14.217 ft) was recorded southeast of the hypocenter, between Sagaing and Amarapura. The entire rupture process took just over 80 seconds with the greatest phase of seismic moment release occurring about 30 seconds after initiation. The rupture is thought to have propagated at speeds in excess of the shear wave velocity, making this an example of a supershear earthquake.[2]

Satellite data also confirmed the inferred observations of an exceptionally long surface rupture extending from Kyaukmyaung, Sagaing to Penwegon, Bago. The length of the surface rupture from satellite data was 500 km (310 mi). Throughout most of the rupture, slip at the surface exceeded 3 m (9.8 ft) while around the epicenter area, reached 4–5 m (13–16 ft).[26] A study of satellite data at the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan revealed that up to 6 m (20 ft) of horizontal displacement occurred along the fault.[27]

The earthquake was followed by more than 288 aftershocks by 07:00 ICT on 3 April, according to the Thai Meteorological Department. These aftershocks were recorded in Myanmar and nearby regions including 10 events between magnitude 5.0 and 5.9. There were also seven aftershocks recorded in Mae Hong Son with magnitudes of 1.4 to 3.5.[28] The largest aftershock measured Mww 6.7 and occurred 12 minutes after the mainshock with a hypocenter beneath Mandalay International Airport. This aftershock also had a focal mechanism corresponding to strike-slip faulting.[1]

A 2011 study by Nobuo Hurukawa and Phyo Maung Maung in Geophysical Research Letters identified two seismic gaps along the Sagaing Fault. One of these gaps is located in central Myanmar between 19.2 degrees north and 21.5 degrees north, corresponding to the Meiktila segment. The pair concluded that this 260 km (160 mi) gap could produce a magnitude 7.9 earthquake if it completely ruptures.[29] The Meiktila and Sagaing segment (to the north) may have been the source of the 1839 Ava earthquake. It is believed to have ruptured 285–325 km (177–202 mi) of the fault on both segments. A study of the seismic intensity distribution suggest the estimated magnitude of the 1839 event was 7.9.[30] Seismologists Judith Hubbard and Kyle Bradley said this seismic gap is located between the 1929 (Naypyidaw semgent) and 1956 (southern Sagaing segment) ruptures. The pair said this earthquake may have partially ruptured the seismic gap based on their analysis of the preliminary finite fault model by the USGS. The rupture extent corresponded with the Meiktila and Sagaing segments and overlapped with the rupture extent of the 1839 earthquake. The fault extent involved in the Mw  7.1 earthquake in 1956 also seemed to have moved during the 28 March 2025 event. They estimated that the 28 March 2025 rupture terminates in the north just south of the 2012 Shwebo earthquake rupture (which occurred on the central Sagaing segment).[31]

Several earthquakes of lower magnitudes hit the country through March leading up to this earthquake. In the first week of March alone, eight earthquakes hit Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy Region, and Shan State, causing public concern.[32]

Intensity

According to a USGS simulation, the maximum Modified Mercalli intensity (MMI) of the mainshock was estimated to have reached MMI IX (Violent) in areas of Mandalay, Sagaing, Bago, and Naypyidaw close to the rupture area; an estimated 2.6 million people were exposed to MMI IX shaking overall. The MMI also reached VII (Very Strong) in Magway, Kayin and Shan, and VI (Strong) in the administrative divisions of Yangon, Kachin Mon, Kayah and Ayeyarwady. MMI V (Moderate) was recorded in Bangkok and Chiang Mai in Thailand, Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture in China, and Imphal in India. Overall, 27.16 million people, about half of Myanmar’s population, were estimated to have been exposed to shaking levels exceeding MMI VI in 12 of the 15 administrative divisions.[a][2] In Thailand, shaking was felt in 63 of the country’s 77 provinces.[33]

Map showing estimated degree of damage (black to yellow) in settlements marked as dots.

Impact

See also: List of populated places affected by the 2025 Myanmar earthquake

Casualties by country

Country

Deaths

Injuries

Missing

Myanmar

c.4,390

c.5,970

c.700+

Thailand

36

34

58

China

0

2

0

Total

c.4,430+

c.6,010+

c.750+

In Myanmar

Damage to the Great Wall Hotel, Mandalay

The number of casualties in Myanmar varies across different sources. Mizzima News reported a death toll of more than 4,390 while 3,500 were injured.[34] According to data compiled by the Democratic Voice of Burma, more than 3,900 people died, 710 were missing and 5,970 more were injured.[5] Myanmar’s junta said more than 3,140 died, 220 were missing and 4,580 others were injured.[35] Deaths occurred in the administrative areas of Mandalay, Naypyidaw, Sagaing, Shan, Bago and Kayin.[5] The National Unity Government estimated that more than eight million Burmese were affected and were in urgent need of assistance.[36]

Phone and internet infrastructure was disrupted nationwide.[37] Casualty estimates in rural areas remained scarce.[38] At least 21,783 homes were damaged across the country, of which 15,114 collapsed,[39] along with 1,000 government buildings, with 50 health centers also damaged.[40] The All Myanmar Islamic Religious Organization estimated at least 250 people died as over 50 mosques collapsed during Friday prayer time.[41] The Spring Revolution Myanmar Muslim Network estimated that 700 Muslim worshippers were killed in Mandalay and Sagaing across at least 60 damaged mosques.[11] The junta put the number of Muslims killed at 500.[42] The junta also said 670 Buddhist monasteries and 290 pagodas had been damaged.[43] The World Health Organization estimated that four hospitals and one health center had been destroyed while 32 hospitals and 18 health centers had been damaged.[44]

In Mandalay Region, more than 2,400 died[5] and 1,670 were injured.[45] At least 1,200 people were killed in Mandalay city,[5] where half of all buildings were thought to have been severely damaged or destroyed.[46] At Mandalay International Airport, ceilings collapsed and some damage occurred in the basement.[47] Buildings at the campus of Mandalay University collapsed or caught fire with many trapped inside.[48] The Dokhtawaddy Bridge crossing the Myitnge River on the Yangon–Mandalay Expressway near Inwa also collapsed with supporting pylons falling down. Reportedly some vehicles were on the bridge at the time of the earthquake and fell into the river, though no casualties have been confirmed yet.[49]

All 40 mosques in Mandalay were damaged, 10 of which collapsed, resulting in more than 400 deaths.[50] Some mosques affected were over a century old and had not been allowed to be repaired since 1962.[41][51] Several monks were killed and injured when a monastery collapsed in the city.[52][53] Over 600 monks were trapped beneath the collapsed U Hla Thein Temple while they were taking examinations, 80 of whom died.[54] Amarapura also recorded 200 deaths,[5] including 150 from a collapsing mosque.[50] The 12-storey Sky Villa condominium building in Aungmyethazan Township progressively collapsed, killing nine people and trapping 90 more.[55][56] Roads in Mandalay were left “in complete darkness” at night, with residents unable to access utilities such as power and running water. Some people reportedly found shelter from the almost 40 °C heat in the shade of trees in lieu of staying indoors for fear of aftershocks.[57] At the collapsed Masoyein Monastery, at least 30 monks died and 50 were injured.[58] At the Mandalay Central Prison, 12 civillians and military personnel were killed in building collapses.[59]

In Maha Aungmye Township, a two-story tea shop collapsed, trapping around 70 people. Additionally, a three-story car accessories store also collapsed in Pyigyidagun Township, trapping more than 10 employees,[60] and in the same township, a building under construction was razed, killing eight and trapping many others.[61] A massive blaze in Sein Pan neighborhood of Maha Aungmye Township nearly reduced the entire place to the ground.[62] Later assessments revealed more than 800 homes were burnt and 3,000 residents were affected.[63] More than 400 people were killed and 1,000 more were injured in Pyawbwe Township, where most buildings were destroyed.[64][65] In the township, a five-story Kanbawza Bank building collapsed, killing all 40 people inside.[66] The Maha Aungmye Bonzan Monastery was also destroyed.[67] Mandalay Palace and the Mahamuni Pagoda also suffered significant structural damage.[68] A dam was also reported to have collapsed in Mandalay, causing flooding, while sections of the Mandalay-Yangon highway were damaged.[69] In Yamethin, more than 200 deaths and many missing persons were reported.[70][71] More than a dozen children were killed when a 100-year-old school collapsed in the township.[72]

In Meiktila, houses and religious buildings suffered structural collapse.[73] At least 44 deaths and 166 injuries were recorded in the city.[5][74] Search and rescue teams reported 100 fatalities in the village of Bone Oe.[38] In Wundwin Township, 51 deaths were reported[70] and at least 30 died in Singu Township when a mine collapsed.[75] Homes and pagodas were also razed in Madaya Township.[73] At least 129 people died in Kyaukse Township,[5] including 40 students and nine teachers who died in Kyaukse town after a school collapsed.[76][77]

In Sagaing Region, nearly 700 fatalities were reported.[5] In Sagaing city alone, more than 680 died[5] and 90 percent of structures were destroyed.[78] An estimated 40 or 50 Muslim worshippers in the city died across three collapsed mosques.[79] Much of the Ava Bridge[80] and the city’s fire station also collapsed, hampering relief efforts and trapping many.[81] Out of the five mosques in Sagaing, four collapsed due to the earthquake.[51] The Min Street Mosque is feared to have collapsed with over 100 people inside. Several monastic schools and a nunnery in the city were also damaged, likely killing people in the hundreds and trapping over 900 monks across four schools.[82] The United Nations Development Programme estimated that 80% of buildings in the city had been damaged, with 50% in a severe condition.[83] Historic temples in resistance-held Chaung-U Township, southwest Sagaing Region were damaged by the earthquake.[84] In Mingun, 20 people were killed by a collapsing military bunker and the nearby Hsinbyume Pagoda was also largely destroyed.[85] Over 200 were also killed in Tada-U Township and the town of Shwebo recorded four fatalities.[5]

Partially-collapsed building in Naypyidaw

Across Naypyidaw Union Territory, more than 470 people died.[5] In Zabuthiri Township, 204 deaths were reported; a number of the people killed were civil servants who died when their apartments collapsed in several complexes.[86][87] In many of these housing complexes, the ground floor collapsed, killing their inhabitants.[87] Offices of the rescue, information, home affairs, labour, foreign affairs, defense, and agriculture and irrigation ministries were also severely damaged and 20 bodies were found among the ruins.[87] Nearly 300 deaths were confirmed in Naypyidaw city.[5] The air traffic control tower of Nay Pyi Taw International Airport collapsed, killing six people[88] and reportedly leaving no survivors in the aftermath.[89] Roads buckled while ceilings partially collapsed in the city.[90] Several homes and religious shrines were also damaged.[69] Officials at a 1,000-bed hospital say hundreds of injured people arrived,[91] including 20 who died.[48] The roof of that hospital’s emergency room had collapsed.[57] The military headquarters, parliament buildings and official housing buildings were heavily damaged,[92] with several government buildings collapsing, killing the permanent secretary of the labour ministry and several other senior foreign officials.[48] The Defence Services Museum and the National Museum in Naypyidaw also sustained damage.[93][90] Eighty-six bodies were discovered beneath the rubble of several collapsed buildings and monasteries in Pyinmana.[94] Numerous military buildings in Naypyidaw collapsed, killing 100 soldiers.[95]

More than 150 people were killed in Shan, including 130 in Nyaungshwe Township;[5] many were reported in the 19 villages built on the shores of Inle Lake and 2,790 houses were damaged.[96][97] In Kayla, a village with more than 1,000 households, at least 75 percent of it was destroyed and 42 residents died.[98][96] The villages of Zayatgyi and Seong Wa Gyi also reported major destruction. A local charity group said many people died from home collapses or electrocution. Fifty-one bodies were taken to a hospital but some could not be recovered as they were trapped underwater.[98] In Aungban, 11 people were killed and 25 others were rescued after a six-storey hotel collapsed; six members of the same family were among the dead.[99] Jet fighters en route for an aerial bombing campaign against Danu People’s Liberation Army positions during the earthquake dropped bombs at 12:55pm MMT in Nawnghkio Township causing further damage to affected villages and killing seven soldiers minutes after the first earthquake.[84][100]

In Bago, the death toll stood at 90.[5] In Taungoo Township, 40 miners were killed by a collapsing mine.[101] A school collapse in the township killed five children while 14 more were killed by a collapsing mosque.[102] Another school serving as a shelter for displaced people collapsed, trapping more than 20 people.[103] More than 160 people were killed in Pyay Township.[65] In Pyu, 17 people died,[5] including four members of a family when a wall of their home toppled.[104] A local resident reported one death, 10 injuries and more than 50 damaged houses in the village of Ywa Ma Pai in Oktwin Township.[105]

Two deaths and building damage were reported in Karen National Union-controlled villages in Kyaukki and Shwegyin townships.[106] In Yangon, minor damage occurred, some buildings were tilted and phone lines were downed.[107] Power outages occurred, with the electricity supply in Yangon being limited to four hours daily.[108]

Several foreign nationals were also killed, injured or reported missing following the earthquake in Myanmar. The Chinese embassy said at least three of its nationals were among the dead while 15 others were injured.[109][110] A French couple travelling in Mandalay were also killed by falling debris.[111] One Taiwanese national was among the victims, killed in the collapse of the Great Wall Hotel Mandalay.[112] Four Filipino migrant workers also went missing,[113] including a couple who were trapped in the Sky Villa condominium in Mandalay.[114] A Japanese resident was reported missing in Mandalay, and is believed by the Japanese embassy to have been trapped at their collapsed residence.[115] Two other Japanese were also injured in Mandalay.[116]

In Thailand

Further information: 2025 Bangkok skyscraper collapse

A dashcam still of the State Audit Office building in Bangkok collapsing

In Thailand, the earthquake caused dozens of deaths in Bangkok. Twenty-nine fatalities and all 58 missing persons occurred when an under-construction skyscraper collapsed.[117] Seven additional deaths were reported in other parts of the city.[118][6] At least 33 were injured around Bangkok and one person was injured in Nonthaburi province.[119][33] The earthquake was felt in 63 of Thailand’s 77 provinces (including Bangkok), with damage reported in 18 provinces, mostly in the north and around Bangkok.[33]

The collapsed building was a 33-story office tower being built for the State Audit Office in Chatuchak district. The disaster resulted in 29 confirmed worker deaths[120] and 18 injuries, while 78 remained unaccounted for, as of 18:00 on 30 March.[6] (Earlier reports noted 68 who received medical attention.[121]) Some victims of the collapse were believed to be migrant workers from Myanmar.[122] Seven further deaths and 15 injuries occurred elsewhere in the city:[6] a crane operator died and four people were injured when a crane collapsed at a construction site in the Bang Pho area,[123] one construction worker was crushed by a falling concrete slab in Khan Na Yao District,[124] and five people died trying to evacuate from tall buildings, including two later in hospital.[6] Three people were injured when an elevator failed,[125] and another crane collapse in Din Daeng injured four and damaged the Chaloem Maha Nakhon Expressway‘s Din Daeng toll plaza, forcing its closure.[6][126]

Two sudden deaths, possibly from heart attacks, were also reported, in Nonthaburi and Samut Prakan provinces,[127][128] though these have not been officially confirmed to be related to the earthquake.

People evacuating from a Central Department Store in Khet Bangkok Noi, Bangkok, Thailand

Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai described the shaking as unprecedented in Bangkok in the past 100 years.[129] It caused marked swaying in high-rise buildings, triggering widespread panic among occupants, many of whom rushed to exit into the streets. Most buildings were evacuated, and public venues closed down. All rapid transit lines were suspended, and some roads were closed.[130] Road traffic came to a stand-still, and remained severely congested into the night.[131] After all other rapid transit lines reopened, MRT Pink Line remained suspended as its power rail was dislocated in Min Buri district, Bangkok.[132]

CCTV footage of the earthquake from a skyscraper swimming pool in Bangkok

Many high-rise buildings developed visible damage as a result of the earthquake. Sky bridges connecting three luxury high-rise apartment towers were severed by the tremor, causing debris to fall off while water spilled from the rooftop pools of the buildings, as well as many others.[133] One fire incident was also reported, which was caused by a stove left unattended by fleeing residents.[126] Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt stated that the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration‘s reporting platform received over 14,430 reports of building damage,[134] while it planned to inspect 700 structures across the city.[133] He later urged the owners of 11,000 buildings across the capital to assess their property’s safety.[135] The interior ministry said that 3,375 government buildings had been affected by the earthquake nationwide, with 221 of them in sustaining moderate damage and 34 others in severe condition.[136]

Throughout the country, the Ministry of Public Health reported that 63 of its hospitals in 17 provinces were affected by the earthquake, with many temporarily evacuating patients. Several sustained damage, mostly in the form of wall cracks.[137][138] Rajavithi Hospital in Bangkok moved patients out of its 25-storey building, housing them in a sports hall while the main building, which exhibited multiple cracks, awaited inspection.[139] It later transferred 162 patients to other hospitals.[140]

In Chiang Mai, several condominium buildings suffered cracks.[141] Across the country, damage was reported from 591 houses, 55 temples, 86 hospitals, 9 buildings, 52 schools and 25 government buildings in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Phayao, Lamphun, Lampang, Mae Hong Son, Phrae, Nan, Phetchabun, Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, Ang Thong, Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya, Pathum Thani, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon and Chai Nat provinces.[142] Damage to religious and cultural sites was recorded in Lampang, Nan, and Chiang Mai provinces.[143] Twenty 10-tonne (11-ton) concrete beams being installed for an elevated section of the new Den Chai–Chiang Rai–Chiang Khong railway [th] also collapsed and crushed six vehicles in Chiang Rai province, without causing injuries.[144] Half a dozen sinkholes were reported in Ban Mae Surin, a village in the Khun Yuam district of Mae Hong Son.[145]

Elsewhere

A CCTV still of a rooftop infinity pool collapse sweeping away a crowd of people in Yunnan Province, China

In Yunnan, China, the earthquake was strongly felt across the province. Two people were injured in the border city of Ruili,[146][147] while nine others were rescued after being trapped in an elevator.[148] About 847 homes were damaged in the city, affecting 2,840 people.[149] Other provinces including Guizhou, Guangxi and Sichuan also felt the tremors.[150] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China said no Chinese citizens were killed in the earthquake.[133]

Tremors were felt in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,[151] as well as in Vientiane, Laos, causing people to evacuate buildings.[152] In Ho Chi Minh City, 342 apartments were damaged.[153]

In India, shaking was experienced in the Delhi-National Capital Region, causing people to evacuate buildings.[154][155] Northeastern states, particularly Meghalaya, experienced noticeable aftershocks with a 4.0-magnitude tremor reported in the East Garo Hills.[156] Tremors were also felt in cities like Kolkata and Imphal.[157] In Basirhat, residents reported the shaking of natural water bodies.[158] The Bengali newspaper agency Aajkaal reported that residents of Basirhat felt the earthquake for as long as 30 minutes, as water bodies shook for that duration.[159] Tremors were also felt in parts of Assam including Guwahati.[160]

Tremors were felt across Bangladesh, including cities such as Dhaka, Sylhet, Rajshahi and Chittagong, causing people to panic and evacuate buildings.[161][162]

Tremors were also felt in Cambodia[163] and the northern Malaysian states of Penang, Kedah and Kelantan.[164][165]

Estimations of losses

The USGS Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) service estimated a 35 percent probability of economic losses between US$10 billion and US$100 billion and a 31 percent probability of economic losses exceeding US$100 billion; upper estimates of economic losses exceed Myanmar’s GDP of $64.2 billion.[166] The service also estimated a 35 percent probability of deaths between 10,000 and 100,000 and a 33 percent probability of deaths exceeding 100,000.[2] The Thai Hotels Association said that it expected international tourist arrivals to decrease by at least 10–15% in the two weeks following the earthquake, adding that 10% of foreign tourists had checked out following the earthquake.[167] Tourism minister Sorawong Thienthong noted that there had been over 1,000 hotel room bookings in the two days following the earthquake, while there was a shift in destination preferences from Bangkok to other places such as Pattaya.[168]

Aftermath

In a statement by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 1 April, shelter, clean water and medicine were running low in Myanmar. Additionally, due to the lack of clean water, the United Nations warned about the possibility of a cholera outbreak. The World Health Organization said that many hospitals in the region were also running beyond their intended capacity. Damaged roads and bridges also hampered rescue missions. OCHA added that it took their team 13 hours to reach Mandalay from Yangon instead of the typical eight-hour travel time.[169] In many parts of Myanmar, the first responders were volunteer groups who, without special equipment, tried to pull survivors from the rubble.[170]

Although the military regime appealed for international aid, several human rights organisations said there is selective allocation of assistance. Some affected regions such as Sagaing and Shan were receiving less aid whereas most resources were directed at Mandalay and Naypyidaw. Some groups said the regime may be falsely claiming logistical challenges to rationalise restricting aid in resistance-controlled areas. Amnesty International also shared a similar statement.[171] United Nations rapporter Tom Andrews said there were many reports of the military preventing aid and workers from accessing some areas.[172]

Many residents in Mandalay slept in the streets during the first night after the earthquake due to persistent aftershocks.[173] Due to limited equipment and emergency specialists, the city’s residents conducted their own rescue activities.[174] On 29 March, rescuers were still working to retrieve at least 90 people trapped in one of the condominiums that collapsed. According to a Red Cross member, nine bodies and 44 survivors were pulled from the wreckage.[175] The Mandalay General Hospital reached its capacity and dozens of injured patients received treatment outside the building.[176] Fires also spread through Thannauk, Sein Pan and Maha Aungthan West wards with the latter being entirely reduced to ashes, according to Mandalay residents. Roads closures and fuel shortages in Mandalay continued to hinder rescue efforts.[82] By 31 March, the Myanmar Fire Services Department said it rescued 403 people and recovered 259 bodies in the city.[177] While most residents left their apartments, reports emerged of lootings at night in some parts of the city.[178]

In Sagaing, a resident said many bodies were buried in mass graves but due to the lack of space, others were sent to nearby Mandalay for cremation. Even so, there was a lack of cremators to accommodate the overwhelming number of dead which began to decompose in the days after the earthquake.[179] Officials were short on body bags, food and dress.[180] Rescue efforts in the city were minimal, in part due to collapsed fire station trapping emergency personnel and lack of safe bridge access from Mandalay.[81] Many bodies remained buried beneath the rubble while much of the city was abandoned. Residents also reported a strong stench emanating from residential areas due to unrecovered bodies.[181] In Naypyidaw, many people were buried beneath collapsed structures.[182] Workers of the junta regime continued to work in the open lawn beside the ruins of their ministry buildings. The city morgue was overwhelmed by the number of bodies and the lack of power meant they were rotting. Decomposing bodies were also found along the road outside the facility.[183] As the Muslim cemetery in Sagaing had been closed due to fighting between the military and rebels, the remains of Muslim fatalities were transported to Mandalay for burial.[184]

Nearly a week after the earthquake, rescue efforts were still ongoing in Taungoo, Bago. A resident said there was no international assistance so residents carried out rescue efforts themselves while a social worker said their equipment were inadequate.[185] Telecommunication services in Yangon were disabled from the time of the earthquake until past 22:00 MMT. Electricity was only available intermittently, and in townships further afield not available at all.[186] In Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region, the earthquake knocked out electrical services and disabled the generators used for water pumping for several days.[187]

The airbase in Monywa continued operations against resistance-held Chaung-U Township, deploying a paradrop attack at 19:00 MMT on the day of the earthquake.[84] The following day, the junta resumed aerial bombardment on territories held by resistance forces in Karen, northern Shan, Bago and Sagaing regions.[188] The People’s Defence Force, a rebel force, said they would observe a partial ceasefire for two weeks beginning on 30 March.[189] Despite this, the junta conducted a bombing campaign in Pauk Township, Sagaing Region.[190] An airstrike in Singu Township, Mandalay, on 31 March injured several residents and burnt down their homes.[191] The junta also continued bombing campaigns in Rakhine State, destroying parts of the hospital in Arakan Army-controlled Ponnagyun on 28 March with Arakan Army continuing offensive operations in Kyaukphyu Township.[192][193] On 2 April, troops from the regime fired warning shots at nine trucks carrying Chinese relief items in Nawnghkio Township, Shan.[194]

In Bangkok, trading on the Stock Exchange of Thailand was suspended.[195] The finance ministry did not report any major losses on the economy, fiscal infrastructure or financial system.[196]

Thai Air Traffic Control issued a nationwide no-fly order for all airports,[197] while train services between Bangkok and north and northeastern Thailand were also suspended.[198] Services on the BTS Skytrain and “long-distance” routes were resumed by the evening of 28 March.[196] The MRT Blue Line and Purple Line resumed operations on the morning of 29 March, followed by the Yellow Line on 30 March.[199][200] The Pink Line partially reopened on 31 March; Min Buri station remained closed due to a dislocated power rail.[201] Inspectors were deployed across Bangkok to check the safety of buildings.[133]

On 29 March, rescuers said at least 15 people were found alive but trapped within the rubble of the State Audit Office building site in Chatuchak district.[122] Many of the workers trapped were believed to be migrants from Myanmar. Rescuers used drones, sniffer dogs and cranes to carry out their operations. The family members of those trapped also visited the site of the collapse.[202]

On 31 March, a mb 4.1 aftershock caused additional buildings to collapse in Mandalay.[203][204]

Domestic responses

Myanmar

Myanmar’s military junta declared a state of emergency in six regions, including Sagaing, Mandalay, Bago, Magway, Shan State, and Naypyidaw, following the earthquake. The junta’s leader, Min Aung Hlaing, visited a hospital in Naypyidaw to assess the treatment of the injured. The junta also requested international humanitarian aid to assist with the aftermath of the disaster.[205][206] General Zaw Min Tun said many hospitals in Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Sagaing received a large number of injured patients and needed blood donors.[207] In Sagaing city, junta soldiers conducted security checks and prevented unpermitted rescue operations from being carried out.[208] Military checkpoints also hampered efforts to bury bodies as they blocked off the Islamic cemetery in the city.[209] Emergency response teams from Ayeyarwady Region and Yangon were dispatched to Naypyidaw to help with search and rescue efforts.[210] Reporters in Mandalay described rescue operations as slow with a shortage of personnel. Many collapsed buildings remain unsearched and few survivors have been found in searched buildings.[211]

The National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) met to coordinate emergency immediate relief efforts and called for international aid.[212] US$1 million was allocated for emergency rescue with PDF forces deployed to aid affected resistance-controlled regions in Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway Regions. The government offered assistance in bring aid into their territories if the junta would guarantee the safety of medical personnel.[213] The day after the earthquake, the NUG announced a two-week pause on offensives to coordinate humanitarian efforts with the UN and non-governmental groups.[214] Despite this, the military continued airstrikes against rebel-held villages, prompting condemnation from United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews.[215] Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing announced on 1 April that he would continue military operations against rebels.[216] That same day, the Three Brotherhood Alliance announced a month-long ceasefire to facilitate relief efforts, followed on 2 April by the junta, which said it would observe a ceasefire until 22 April.[217] However, the following day, the junta conducted an aerial bombing campaign in Indaw, Sagaing Region and continued shelling in Bhamo, Kachin State,[218] which occurred despite a ceasefire declared on 2 April by the Kachin Independence Army.[44]

On 31 March 2025, the junta declared a period of national mourning that would last until 6 April 2025.[219] A minute of silence was held at 12:51:02 MMT, the exact time the earthquake occurred, on 1 April.[220]

Thailand

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra cut short her attendance at a tourism conference in Phuket to return to Bangkok[221] and held an emergency meeting on the disaster.[90] She later visited the collapsed State Audit Office building site in Chatuchak[222] and ordered the formation of a committee of experts to investigate the collapse within a week.[223] She also announced that the Thai monarchy would place those injured by the earthquake under its patronage.[224]

Governor of Bangkok Chadchart Sittipunt declared a level 2 disaster area for the city,[225] which was lifted on 31 March.[226] He also ordered Lumphini, Benchasiri, Benjakitti and Chatuchak Parks to remain open overnight on 28 March to accommodate stranded and displaced people.[198] Around 400 people took shelter in city parks overnight.[227] The Ministry of Transport deployed additional public buses,[228] while the management of Suvarnabhumi Airport implemented a temporary shuttle bus service to mitigate a shortage of taxis traveling to and from the airport.[229] The Ministry of Education ordered a nationwide closure of schools.[230] Mental health hotlines maintained by the Ministry of Health expanded its hotline services and received at least 1,598 following the earthquake.[231] Pathum Thani and Phrae provinces were also declared as emergency disaster assistance zones.[232] Criticism arose in Thailand over a delay in the dissemination of SMS warnings regarding the earthquake.[233]

On 30 March, Thailand’s interior minister Anutin Charnvirakul said an investigation into the audit office building collapse was to be completed within a week. Charnvirakul also added that Chinese disaster specialists would assist in the enquiry.[234] The Anti-Corruption Organisation of Thailand, a government watchdog, found substandard steel rebars after gathering debris samples and performing an initial test.[174] On 31 March 2025, reports of cracks and tremors prompted the evacuation of multiple buildings across Bangkok. While initially reported by some outlets as being due to aftershocks,[235] the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation confirmed that the aftershocks on 31 March were too weak to affect Thailand. Authorities later dismissed the scare as a false alarm, with city engineers stating that the reported cracks were not new and had appeared since 28 March.[236][237] The Ministry of Health also warned against what it called “earthquake drunk” syndrome, a condition attributed to disruptions to balance that resulted in people having swaying or moving feelings following an earthquake.[238]

On 31 March, a minute of silence was held in the Senate of Thailand for the victims of the earthquake.[239]

China

Authorities in Yunnan deployed 646 rescuers and 14 search dogs for rescue operations in the province.[148]

International humanitarian efforts

Airlift by IAF consisting of NDRF volunteers and equipment for rescue operations

Indian Navy officials loading INS Satpura and INS Savitri with 40 tonnes of humanitarian aid under Operation Brahma, heading for the Port of Yangon

International organisations

Various countries pledged support in the form of humanitarian aid. Myanmar accepted aid from India and the AHA Centre while the United Nations said it would provide an early sum of US$5 million in emergency aid.[196] The International Charter Space and Major Disasters was activated by the United Nations Satellite Centre (UNOSAT) on behalf of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at 10:21 UTC on 28 March, thus providing for widespread humanitarian satellite coverage.[240] The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies launched an emergency appeal on 30 March for more than $100 million to help earthquake victims.[241] The World Health Organization announced a dispatch of 60 tonnes of critical medical supplies, including mobile medical tents, surgical kits and medicines.[242]

The European Union (EU) provides a total of €2.5 million in initial emergency assistance to Myanmar.[243] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) has deployed the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) to conduct rapid needs assessment in affected areas with the association member states also have responded individually with search and rescue operations, the deployment of relief teams with assessment experts, humanitarian assistance support such as food and medical supplies, financial aid, logistics, and equipments.[244]

State actors

Australia provided an initial AU$2 million through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for immediate humanitarian relief in Myanmar.[245] A rapid response team was also mobilised through Australia Assists with a further AU$3.5 million allocated to Australian NGOs and their local partners for the distribution of food, water and sanitation and emergency health and education, another AU$500,000 contribution to the Emergency Action Alliance, and another AU$3 million for emergency relief supplies to support the efforts of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management.[245][246] Caritas Australia launched an appeal for Myanmar and preparing a response for humanitarian requirements such as emergency shelter, food, other essentials, as well as psychosocial support.[247]

Bangladesh Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus ordered the Bangladesh Armed Forces to urgently deploy rescue and medical teams to Myanmar with relief supplies, including medicine, tents, dry food, and medical services.[248] These supplies and medicines were delivered in two phases using three transport aircraft from the Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Air Force.[249]

Cambodia pledged an initial US$100,000 in aid to Myanmar.[250]

The Chinese embassy in Myanmar said the country would allocate US$13.77 million worth of supplies including tents, blankets, medical kits, sustenance and other items.[251] On 29 March 37 members of a search and rescue team from Yunnan, China, arrived in Yangon. The team, along with over 100 rescue equipment, travelled to Naypyidaw to participate in rescue missions.[252] On 30 March, China sent 17 trucks loaded with shelter and medical supplies to Mandalay. Hong Kong sent a group of 51 search-and-rescue personnel and two rescue dogs. The team also carried nine tons of life detecting devices and automatic satellite tracking antenna system among other critical items.[253]

The Indian Air Force sent an aircraft carrying over 15 tonnes of relief material containing essential shelter and medical supplies to Myanmar.[254] The efforts were conducted under the moniker Operation Brahma.[255] On 1 April, the Indian team also established a field hospital in Mandalay with a capacity of 200 patients. The staff treated more than 100 patients and performed two critical surgeries within the first day.[256]

Indonesia’s defense ministry said 12 tonnes of humanitarian relief and 39 military personnel were flown to Naypyidaw to assist medical needs, construct shelters and search for the missing.[257] The National Alms Agency (BAZNAS) of Indonesia sent a total of 100 generators, 50 tents, 10 thousand sarongs, and five thousand packages each of women’s essentials and children’s necessities.[258] A search and rescue team consisting of 53 personnel was also dispatched by Indonesia.[259]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered a search and rescue team, led by Colonel Yossi Pinto, be sent to Thailand to assist local authorities.[260] The Israeli embassy sent a scanning device that was used to search for survivors at the State Audit Office building,[6] while IsraAid deployed an emergency team.[261]

Japan deployed 450 tents, 240 waterproof sheets and a group of medical personnel to affected areas in Myanmar.[262] It also pledged $6 million in emergency grant aid to the country.[116]

The Laos Ministry of National Defence sent an emergency response team to Myanmar to assist in search and rescue efforts, consisting of 33 firefighters, 11 soldiers and other supporting staff.[263][264]

Malaysia sent an immediate 50 members of the Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) relief personnel for rescue operations in Myanmar,[14][265] with RM10 million (US$2.3 million) humanitarian aid also provided.[266]

New Zealand also pledged NZ$2 million to Myanmar.[267]

Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority prepared to send 70 tons of relief materials, with 35 tons handed over to Myanmar authorities in Yangon on 1 April.[268][269]

The Philippines sent a 91-member Inter-Agency Humanitarian Contingent that consists of personnel from the Office of Civil Defense, Department of Health, Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Bureau of Fire Protection, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, and the private sector.[270]

The Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation also sent two aircraft with 120 doctors and rescue personnel to Myanmar.[252][271] A mobile air hospital was established in Mandalay.[272]

The Singapore Civil Defence Force sent an 80-member team to assist the rescue efforts in Myanmar.[273]

South Korea pledged US$2 million in humanitarian aid to Myanmar.[274]

Spain, through the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, sent €500,000 to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and another €1,500,000 to the Disaster Response Emergency Fund of IFRC (IFRC-DREF).[275]

Sri Lanka pledged US$1 million in humanitarian aid to assist with ongoing relief and recovery efforts and prepared medical teams and health sector assistance for deployment to Myanmar.[276] The Temple of the Tooth also announced Rs15 million financial aid to Myanmar.[277]

The Taiwanese National Fire Agency placed 120 personnel and six dogs on standby to assist in rescue efforts in Myanmar,[278] but the offer was declined, and the team was disbanded.[279][280] The Taiwanese Red Cross pledged US$50,000 in aid,[281] while Fo Guang Shan committed US$61,553 in financial and material aid. China Airlines offered to transport disaster relief supplies free of charge.[282]

The Royal Thai Armed Forces said it would deploy a 49-member search and rescue team to Myanmar.[283]

The United Kingdom announced a £10 million humanitarian aid package for Myanmar.[284]

US President Donald Trump said the country will be sending aid to Myanmar, despite recent cuts on foreign aid.[285] The US embassy pledged up to $2 million through local organizations, adding that a team of experts was on its way to Myanmar.[286] In Thailand, the US Indo-Pacific Command deployed personnel to assist in rescue operations at the State Audit Office.[287]

The Vietnam People’s Army deployed an 80-member earthquake relief team which arrived in Yangon on 30 March.[288] A 26-member team from Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security on 31 March 2025 arrived in Myanmar’s Sagaing city, beginning their search and rescue operations.[289] In response to Myanmar’s request for assistance, Vietnam offered an emergency aid package worth $300,000 to support earthquake recovery efforts.[290]

See also

- Myanmar portal

- Thailand portal

- Lists of earthquakes

- Lists of 21st-century earthquakes

- List of earthquakes in 2025

- List of earthquakes in Myanmar

- List of earthquakes in Thailand

Notes

References

Content attribution

- This article incorporates public domain material from Earthquake Hazards Program. United States Geological Survey. Retrieved 28 March 2025.

External links

- Media related to 2025 Myanmar earthquake at Wikimedia Commons

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2025_Myanmar_earthquake&oldid=1283873136”

Gaza war

This article is about the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and Israel. For the broader conflict, see Gaza–Israel conflict and Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For the previous wars, see Gaza War (disambiguation).

The Gaza war[q] has been fought between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups[r] in the Gaza Strip and Israel since 7 October 2023. It is the 15th war of the Gaza–Israel conflict,[80] and has sparked an ongoing Middle Eastern crisis. The first day was the deadliest in Israel’s history and the war is the deadliest for Palestinians in the history of the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[81]

On 7 October 2023, Hamas-led militant groups launched a surprise attack on Israel, in which 1,195 Israelis and foreign nationals, including 815 civilians, were killed, and 251 taken hostage.[82][83] After clearing militants from its territory, Israel launched an intensive bombing campaign[84][85] and invaded Gaza on 27 October with the stated objectives of destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages.[86][87] Israeli forces launched numerous campaigns during the invasion, including the Rafah offensive from May 2024, three battles fought around Khan Yunis, and the siege of North Gaza from October 2024. Flashpoints during the war attracting global attention include the Nova festival massacre, the kidnapping and killing of the Bibas family, the Al-Ahli Arab Hospital explosion, the flour massacre, the Tel al-Sultan attack, and the killing of five-year-old Hind Rajab. A temporary ceasefire in November 2023 broke down, and a second ceasefire in January 2025 ended in March, when Israel launched surprise airstrikes across Gaza.[88][89][90]

Since the start of the Israeli offensive, over 50,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been reported as killed,[s] over half of them women and children, and more than 110,000 Palestinians have been injured.[16][18][11] Israel has assassinated Hamas leaders inside and outside of Gaza. Their tightened blockade cut off basic necessities, causing a severe hunger crisis with a high risk of famine persisting as of November 2024.[91][92] By early 2025, Israel had caused unprecedented destruction in Gaza and made large parts of it uninhabitable,[93] leveling entire cities[94] and destroying the healthcare system, agricultural land,[95] religious and cultural landmarks,[96] educational facilities,[97][98] and cemeteries.[99] Nearly all of the strip’s 2.3 million Palestinian population have been forcibly displaced.[100][101] Over 100,000 Israelis were internally displaced as of February 2024.[102] Torture and sexual violence were committed by Palestinian militant groups and Israeli forces.[103]

Various experts and human rights organizations have stated that Israel and Hamas have committed war crimes, and that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza.[104] A case accusing Israel of committing genocide is being reviewed by the International Court of Justice, while the International Criminal Court reviewed and issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant and Mohammed Deif, though Deif’s warrant was withdrawn when he was killed.[105] Israel received extensive military and diplomatic support from the United States, which has vetoed multiple pro-ceasefire resolutions from the UN Security Council.[106] The war has reverberated regionally, with Axis of Resistance groups across several Arab countries and Iran clashing with the United States and Israel. By late 2024, a year of strikes between Israel and Hezbollah led to a brief Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as well as the fall of the Assad regime and an ongoing Israeli invasion of Syria. The war continues to have significant regional and international repercussions, with large protests worldwide calling for a ceasefire, as well as a surge of antisemitism and anti-Palestinianism.

Names

The Gaza war is referred to by different names. Israel calls it the “iron swords war” (Hebrew: מלחמת חרבות ברזל).[107][t] It has also been referred to as the “Simchat Torah war”, as the war started on the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, reminiscent of the Yom Kippur War.[110] Palestinian militant groups refer to it as the “battle of al-Aqsa Flood” (Arabic: معركة طوفان الأقصى), in reference to Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[111][112] Western media outlets have variably described it as the “Israel–Hamas war”[113] or the “Israel–Gaza war”,[114][failed verification] while others use “war on Gaza”.[115] Others have used the term “October 7 war”.[116][117] Some have rejected “war” as an appropriate framework and call it the “Gaza genocide“,[118][93] “second Nakba“,[119] or “Nakba 2023”.[120][121]

Background

Main article: Background to the Gaza war

Israeli and Palestinian deaths preceding the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, of which most were civilians[51][122]

The 1948 Palestine war saw the establishment of Israel over most of what had been Mandatory Palestine, with the exception of two separated territories that became known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were held by Jordan and Egypt respectively. Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[123] The upcoming period witnessed two popular uprisings by Palestinians against the Israeli occupation; the First and Second Intifadas in 1987 and 2000 respectively,[124] with the latter’s end seeing Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.[125][126]

Since 2007, the Gaza Strip has been governed by Hamas, an Islamist militant group, while the West Bank remained under the control of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. After Hamas’s takeover, Israel imposed a blockade of the Gaza Strip,[127][128] that significantly damaged its economy.[129] The blockade was justified by Israel citing security concerns,[130] but international rights groups have characterized the blockade as a form of collective punishment.[131][132][133] Due to the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, UNRWA reported that 81% of people were living below the poverty level in 2023, with 63% being food insecure and dependent on international assistance.[122][134]

Since 2007, Israel and Hamas, along with other Palestinian militant groups based in Gaza, have engaged in conflict,[130][128][135] including in four wars: in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021.[136][137] These conflicts killed approximately 6,400 Palestinians and 300 Israelis.[138][51][122] In 2018–2019, there were large weekly organized protests near the Gaza-Israel border, which were violently suppressed by Israel, whose forces killed hundreds and injured thousands of Palestinians by sniper fire.[139][140] Soon after the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis began, Hamas’s military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, started planning the 7 October 2023 operation against Israel.[141][142] According to diplomats, Hamas had repeatedly said in the months leading up to October 2023 that it did not want another military escalation in Gaza as it would worsen the humanitarian crisis that occurred after the 2021 conflict.[133]

Hamas officials stated that the attack was a response to the Israeli occupation, blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israeli settler violence against Palestinians, restrictions on the movement of Palestinians, and imprisonment of thousands of Palestinians, whom Hamas sought to release by taking Israeli hostages.[143][144][145] Numerous commentators have identified the broader context of Israeli occupation as a cause of the war.[146][147][148] The Associated Press wrote that Palestinians are “in despair over a never-ending occupation in the West Bank and suffocating blockade of Gaza”.[149] Several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International,[150] B’Tselem[151] and Human Rights Watch[152] have likened the Israeli occupation to apartheid, although supporters of Israel dispute this characterization.[153][154] However, an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice published in July 2024 affirmed the occupation as being illegal and said it violated Article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which prohibits racial segregation and apartheid.[155] The Netanyahu government has been criticized within Israel for granting work permits to Gazan residents, facilitating the transfer of funds to Hamas and pursuing relative calm. These actions have been criticized as having backfired in light of the attacks on 7 October 2023.[156][157][158] US President Joe Biden has said the aim of the 7 October attacks was to disrupt the Saudi–Israel normalization talks.[159]

Confrontations

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war.

For a more comprehensive list, see List of military engagements during the Gaza war.

7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel

Main article: 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel

See also: List of Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel in 2023

Clockwise from top:

- Approximate situation on 7–8 October

- A blood-stained floor in the aftermath of the Nahal Oz attack

- Aftermath of Hamas rocket hit on the maternity ward of Barzilai Medical Center

- Satellite view of widespread fires in Israeli areas surrounding the Gaza Strip

- Footage of Israeli soldiers securing the area after the Nova music festival massacre

In the morning of 7 October 2023,[160] during the Jewish holidays of Simchat Torah and Shemini Atzeret on Shabbat,[161] Hamas announced the start of what it called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood“, firing between 3,000 and 5,000 rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel within a span of 20 minutes, killing at least five people.[162][163][164] In the evening, Hamas launched another barrage of 150 rockets towards Israel.[163] Simultaneously, around 3,000 Hamas militants[40] infiltrated Israel from Gaza using trucks, motorcycles, bulldozers, speedboats, and paragliders.[149][160][165] They took over checkpoints at Kerem Shalom and Erez, and created openings in the border fence in five other places.[166]

Militants massacred civilians in several kibbutzim,[167][168] where they took hostages[169] and set fire to homes.[170] In one massacre at an outdoor music festival near Re’im, at least 325 people were killed, with more injured or taken hostage.[171][172] In total, 251 people, mostly civilians, were taken hostage, including[173][174] children, elderly people, and soldiers.[175] Hamas militants also reportedly engaged in mutilation, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence.[176][177][178]

The 7 October attack was described as “an intelligence failure for the ages”[179] and a “failure of imagination” on the part of the Israeli government.[180] A BBC report commented on Hamas’s “extraordinary levels of operational security”.[181] It later emerged that abnormal Hamas movements had been detected the previous day by Israeli intelligence, but the military’s alert level was not raised and political leaders were not informed.[182]

A briefing in The Economist noted that “the assault dwarf[ed] all other mass murders of Israeli civilians”, and that “the last time before October 7th that this many Jews were murdered on a single day was during the Holocaust.”[168] Hamas stated that its attack was a response to the blockade of the Gaza Strip, the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements, rising Israeli settler violence and recent escalations at Al-Aqsa.[143][144][145] According to both Hamas officials and external observers, the attack was a calculated effort to create a “permanent” state of war and revive interest in the Palestinian cause.[183][184]

Initial Israeli counter-operation (October 2023)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (7 October 2023 – 27 October 2023).

See also: Israeli government response to the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel and Hannibal Directive

Clockwise from top:

- Approximate situation on 9 October

- A Palestinian refugee carries his injured grandchildren from the Israeli bombing of Nuseirat refugee camp

- Building in the Gaza Strip being destroyed by Israeli missiles

- Damage following an Israeli airstrike on the El-Remal aera in Gaza City on October 2023

- An injured child in the Gaza Strip in the Oct 2023 Israeli airstrikes.

The IDF began Israel’s counter-attack several hours after the Hamas-led invasion.[185] The first helicopters sent to support the military arrived at the Gaza Strip an hour after fighting began.[171] They encountered difficulties in determining which places were occupied, and distinguishing between civilians, IDF soldiers, and Palestinian militants on the ground.[171] A June 2024 UN report[186][187] and a July 2024 Haaretz investigation revealed that the IDF ordered the Hannibal Directive to be used, killing many Israeli civilians and soldiers.[188][189] An ABC News (Australia) investigation reported that at least 13 civilians were killed in a ‘Hannibal’ incident in Beeri. At 6:40 p.m., anticipating that militants would flee back to Gaza, the Israeli army launched artillery strikes targeting the border fence area. The IDF said it was not aware of any civilians being hurt in these bombardments,[188] but eyewitness accounts and testimony contradicted the IDF’s official review, which exonerated itself.[188][190]

The attack was a complete surprise to the Israelis.[191] In a televised broadcast, Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, announced that the country was at war.[165] He threatened to “turn all the places where Hamas is organized and hiding into cities of ruins”, called Gaza “the city of evil”, and urged its residents to leave.[192][143] Overnight, Israel’s Security Cabinet voted to act to bring about the “destruction of the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad“.[193] The Israel Electric Corporation, which supplies 80% of the Gaza Strip’s electricity, cut off power to the area.[194] This reduced Gaza’s power supply from 120 MW to 20 MW, provided by power plants paid for by the Palestinian Authority.[195]

The IDF declared a “state of readiness for war”,[163] mobilized tens of thousands of army reservists,[160][194] and declared a state of emergency for areas within 80 kilometers (50 mi) of Gaza.[196] The Yamam counterterrorism unit was deployed,[197] along with four new divisions, augmenting 31 existing battalions.[149] Reservists were reported deployed in Gaza, in the West Bank, and along borders with Lebanon and Syria.[198] Residents near Gaza were asked to stay inside, while civilians in southern and central Israel were “required to stay next to shelters”.[194] The southern region of Israel was closed to civilian movement,[197] and roads were closed around Gaza[149] and Tel Aviv.[194] While Ben Gurion Airport and Ramon Airport remained operational, multiple airlines cancelled flights to and from Israel.[199] On 9 or 10 October, Hamas offered to release all civilian hostages held in Gaza if Israel would call off its planned invasion of the Gaza Strip, but the Israeli government rejected the offer.[200]

Blockade, bombardment, and evacuation of northern Gaza

Main articles: 2023 Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israeli bombing of the Gaza Strip, and Evacuation of the northern Gaza Strip

See also: Attacks on Palestinians evacuating Gaza City and al-Ahli Arab Hospital explosion

Clockwise from top:

- Destruction caused by Israeli bombing of Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza Strip

- A man carries the body of a Palestinian child killed during the shelling of 17 October 2023

- A newborn baby was killed as a result of the Israeli airstrike

- Wounded Palestinians receive treatment on the floor at the overcrowded emergency ward of Al-Shifa Hospital

- Video Interviews conducted with several survivors of Oct 2023 Israeli airstrikes.

Following the surprise attack, the Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes that they said targeted Hamas targets,[163][196][201] employing its artificial intelligence Habsora (“The Gospel”) software.[202][203] These airstrikes were killing, on average, 350 persons per day during the first twenty days, totaling over 7,000 deaths during that time.[204] Israel also rescued two hostages before declaring a state of war for the first time since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[205][206] On 9 October, Defense Minister Gallant announced a “complete siege” of the Gaza Strip, cutting off electricity and blocking the entry of food and fuel.[207] This order drew criticism from Human Rights Watch (HRW) who described it as “abhorrent” and as a “call to commit a war crime”.[208][209] Gallant backed down under pressure from US President Joe Biden, and a deal was struck ten days later to allow aid into Gaza.[210] The first such aid convoy entered Gaza on 21 October,[211] while fuel did not arrive until November.[212]

On 13 October, the IDF ordered all civilians in Gaza City to evacuate to areas south of the Wadi Gaza[213] within 24 hours. The Hamas Authority for Refugee Affairs responded by telling residents in northern Gaza to defy those orders.[214] The Israeli order was widely condemned as “outrageous” and “impossible”, and calls were made for it to be reversed.[215] As a part of the order, the IDF outlined a six-hour window on 13 October for refugees to flee south along specified routes.[216] An explosion along one of the safe routes killed 70 Palestinians. Israel and Hamas blamed each other for the attack.[217] The IDF said Hamas set up roadblocks to keep Gaza residents from evacuating.[218] Israeli officials, foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations condemned Hamas’s use of hospitals and civilians as human shields, which it denied doing.[219][220]

On 17 October, Israel bombed areas of southern Gaza.[221] Late in the evening, an explosion occurred in the parking lot of the Al-Ahli Arabi Baptist Hospital in the center of Gaza City, killing hundreds. The ongoing conflict prevented independent on-site analysis.[222] Palestinian statements that it was an Israeli airstrike were denied by the IDF, which stated that the explosion resulted from a failed rocket launch by Palestinian Islamic Jihad,[223] who denied any involvement.[224][225]

Initial invasion to first truce (October–November 2023)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (28 October – 23 November 2023) and Timeline of the Gaza war (24 November 2023 – 11 January 2024).

Main article: Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip

Israeli military during ground operations

On 27 October, after building up an invasion force of over 100,000 soldiers, the IDF launched a large-scale ground incursion into parts of northern Gaza.[226][227] Israeli airstrikes targeted the area around al-Quds hospital,[228] where around 14,000 civilians were believed to be sheltering.[228] The following day, the IDF struck Jabalia refugee camp, killing 50 and wounding 150 Palestinians. Israel said the attack killed a senior Hamas commander, whose presence Hamas denied, and dozens of militants.[229][230][231] The attack resulted in several ambassador recalls.[232][233][234]

On 31 October, Israel bombed a six-story apartment building in central Gaza, killing at least 106 civilians including 54 children in what Human Rights Watch called an “apparent war crime”.[235] On 1 November, the first group of evacuees left Gaza for Egypt. Five hundred evacuees, comprising critically wounded and foreign nationals, were evacuated over several days.[236] On 18 November, Israel struck a marked Médecins Sans Frontières convoy, killing two aid workers.[237] On 22 November, Israel and Hamas reached a temporary ceasefire agreement, providing for a four-day pause[238] in hostilities to allow for the release of 50 hostages held in Gaza.[238][239] The deal also provided for the release of approximately 150 Palestinian women and children incarcerated by Israel.[239]

Resumption of hostilities (December 2023 – January 2024)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (12 January – 6 May 2024).

Israel adopted a grid system to order precise evacuations within Gaza. It was criticized as inaccessible, due to the lack of electricity and internet connectivity in Gaza, and confusing. Some evacuation instructions were vague or contradictory,[240][241] and Israel sometimes struck areas it had told people to evacuate to.[242][243][244] Law experts called these warnings ineffective.[245] Amnesty International found no evidence of Hamas targets at the sites of some strikes, and requested that they be investigated as possible war crimes.[246] On 6 December, Refaat Alareer, a prominent professor and writer in Gaza, was killed by an Israeli airstrike.[247] His poem “If I Must Die” was widely circulated after his death.[248]

Palestine refugees enforced to flee Hamad quarter in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, after receiving an evacuation warning from the IDF

In December, the IDF reported its troops had reached the centers of Khan Yunis, Jabalia, and Shuja’iyya.[249] Intensified bombing pushed Palestinian civilians south to Rafah.[250] Between 7 and 10 December, Israel detained more than 150 men; according to Israel, they surrendered en masse,[251][252] but this account was disputed by several publications.[253][254][255] On 15 December, the IDF killed three Israeli hostages in a friendly fire incident, after mistakenly identifying them as enemies.[256][257][258] The same day, Pope Francis condemned the killing of two women sheltering at a convent as “terrorism.”[237]

On 1 January 2024, Israel withdrew from neighborhoods in North Gaza.[259] On 15 January, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the most intense fighting in the north of the Gaza Strip had ended, and a new phase of low-intensity fighting was about to begin.[260] By 18 January, the IDF, who had previously stated that Hamas control over North Gaza was “dismantled”, reported that Hamas had significantly rebuilt its fighting strength in North Gaza.[261]

On 22 January 24 IDF soldiers died in the deadliest day for the IDF since the invasion began. Of these, 21 died when Palestinian militants fired an RPG at a tank, causing adjacent buildings to collapse.[262][263][264] On 29 January, Israeli forces killed Hind Rajab, a five-year-old girl, and six of her family members when the car they were driving was struck by an Israeli tank and machine gun fire; two rescue workers who attempted to retrieve Rajab were also killed.[265] The Red Crescent released the audio from Rajab’s phone call with rescue workers, causing international outrage over her death.[266]

Build-up to the Rafah offensive (February–April 2024)

Main article: Background of the Rafah offensive

An aerial view showing destruction in Rafah after Israeli forces withdrawal and as the ceasefire took hold, Gaza Strip

An aerial view of the Flour massacre captured by an Israeli drone, February 2024

Between February and May 2024, preparations to invade Rafah became a dominant theme in Israeli officials’ public rhetoric. On 12 February, Israel started a bombing campaign on Rafah.[267] Food supplies became an increasing issue. On 5 February, Israeli gunboats shelled a clearly marked UNRWA convoy, forcing UNRWA to suspend its operations for almost 3 weeks, affecting 200,000 people.[237] On 29 February, Israeli forces opened fire on Palestinians waiting for food aid southwest of Gaza City, killing 100 and wounding 750. Some of the victims were run over by trucks as panic spread.[268] Survivors described it as an intentional ambush by Israeli forces.[269][270] On 1 March, the United States announced it would begin an operation to airdrop food aid into Gaza.[271] Some experts called the initiative performative, saying it would not alleviate the food situation.[272] During his State of the Union Address, Biden announced that a temporary port on Gaza’s coast would be constructed to enable aid delivery.[273]

Al-Shifa Hospital, previously besieged in November 2023, was raided again between 18 March and 1 April.[274] Israeli forces killed Faiq al-Mabhouh, who they said was head of the operations directorate of Hamas’s internal security service. Hamas said al-Mabhouh was in charge of civil law enforcement and had been coordinating aid deliveries to north Gaza.[275][276] The IDF said it killed 200 people in the hospital fighting, including senior Hamas leaders; this account was disputed.[277][278] Survivors denied that militants had organised on the hospital grounds.[279] Israeli forces were accused of reducing the hospital to a “blown out, fire-blackened” state, and of massacring 400 Palestinians.[280][281][282]

A World Central Kitchen car after IDF strike, April 2024

A 25 March UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza for Ramadan[283] was ignored by the IDF.[284] On 1 April, seven international aid workers from World Central Kitchen (WCK) were killed in an Israeli airstrike south of Deir al-Balah.[285][286][287] WCK, who said their vehicles were clearly marked and their location known to Israel, subsequently withdrew from operating in Gaza alongside ANERA and Project HOPE.[286][288] On 4 April, Israel opened the Erez Crossing for the first time since 7 October after US pressure.[289]

By 6 March, Israel had completed a new east–west road in Gaza. It was intended to mobilize troops and supplies, to connect and defend IDF positions on al-Rashid and Salah al-Din streets, and prevent people in the south of Gaza from returning to the north.[290] On 7 April, Israel withdrew from the south Gaza Strip, with only one brigade remaining in the Netzarim Corridor in the north.[291] Palestinians displaced from that city began to return from the south of the Gaza Strip.[292] Israel planned to initiate its ground offensive in Rafah around mid-April, but postponed to consider its response to the Iranian strikes on Israel.[293] On 25 April, Israel intensified strikes on Rafah ahead of its threatened invasion.[294][295]

Beginning of the Rafah offensive (May–July 2024)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (7 May – 12 July 2024).

Main article: Rafah offensive

Israeli Merkava tanks at the Rafah Border Crossing

On 6 May, the IDF ordered 100,000 civilians in eastern Rafah to evacuate to Al-Mawasi, west of Khan Yunis.[296] Later that day, Hamas announced that it had accepted the terms of a ceasefire brokered by Egypt and Qatar.[297] The deal included a 6-week ceasefire and exchange of prisoners.[298] However, Israel rejected this deal.[299] Israel said that it found the terms unacceptable, but that it would continue to negotiate while the military operation on Rafah was ongoing to “exert military pressure on Hamas”.[300][301] On 31 May, the United States announced a ceasefire framework for ending the war.[302]

The same day, the IDF entered the outskirts of Rafah,[303][304][305] seizing control of the Gaza side of the Rafah Crossing to Egypt the following day.[306][307] On 11 May, the IDF ordered more residents to evacuate eastern and central Rafah.[308] By 15 May, an estimated 600,000 had fled Rafah and another 100,000 from the north, according to the United Nations.[309]

An aerial view of Al-Mawasi area where displaced Palestinians live in tents, Gaza Strip

On 24 May, the United Nations said only 906 aid truckloads had reached Gaza since Israel’s Rafah operation began.[310] Israel bombed the Tel al-Sultan displacement camp in Rafah on 26 May, killing at least 45 people, allegedly including two senior Hamas officials.[311][312][313] This provoked a skirmish between Egyptian and Israeli soldiers at the Gaza border in which one Egyptian soldier was killed.[314] Less than 48 hours afterwards, another evacuation zone, the Al-Mawasi refugee camp, was bombed, killing at least 21 people.[311][315][316] The IDF denied involvement in the attack.[317]

On 6 June, Israel bombed a school in the Nuseirat refugee camp, killing dozens. Two days later, Israel conducted an attack on Nuseirat refugee camp which resulted in the rescue of four hostages[318][319] and the deaths of 274 Palestinians.[320] On 27 June, Israeli forces re-invaded the al-Shuja’iyya neighborhood.[321] According to Middle East Monitor and ReliefWeb, between 4 July and 10 August, Israel attacked 21 schools in Gaza, killing 274 people.[322][323]

Rafah, Khan Yunis, and general bombardment (July–September 2024)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (13 July – 26 September 2024).

On 22 July, the IDF began a brief second invasion of Khan Yunis.[324][325] Israel ordered the evacuation of the eastern part of Khan Yunis;[326] 73 people were killed during the first day of the attack.[325][327][328] Footage from an Israeli drone surfaced showing the destruction of the Grand Mosque in Khan Yunis.[329] A third, month-long battle ended on 30 August when the IDF withdrew its 98th battalion from Khan Yunis and Deir el-Balah, stating it killed over 250 Palestinian militants.[330]

UN analysis covering killed Palestinian civilians between November 2023 and April 2024.[331][332]

1. Children (44%)

2. Women (26%)

3. Men (30%)

On 13 July, at least 90 people were killed and 300 were injured in an Israeli strike on Al-Mawasi and 22 people were killed in an Israeli strike targeting people gathered to pray in the Al-Shati refugee camp.[333][334][335] On 10 August, at least 80 Palestinians were killed in Israeli airstrikes on Al-Tabaeen school.[336] The IDF claimed to have killed 200 militants and discovered dozens of weapons in Tel al-Sultan in one week in its operation in Rafah.[337] On 10 September, Israeli missile strikes on a tent encampment in Al-Mawasi killed 19 to 40 people.[338][339][340] An IAF UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crashed in Rafah while trying to evacuate a critically injured combat engineer, killing two Israeli soldiers and injuring seven others.[341]

An Israeli airstrike on Nuseirat refugee camp on 11 September killed at least 18 people.[342][343][344]

Continued operations throughout Gaza (October–December 2024)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Gaza war (27 September 2024 – 16 October 2024), Timeline of the Gaza war (17 October – 26 November 2024), Timeline of the Gaza war (27 November 2024 – 18 January 2025), and Timeline of the Gaza war (19 January 2025 – present).

Further information: Siege of Jabalia and Killing of Yahya Sinwar

In October, Israeli airstrikes on Shuhada al-Aqsa mosque in Deir el-Balah and a school in central Gaza killed at least 26 Palestinians and injured over 93.[345][346][347] An Israeli strike on Rufaida school which was serving as a shelter for displaced people in Deir el-Balah killed at least 28 people and injured 54 others.[348][349][350] Oxfam condemned the killing of four engineers working with one of its partners by an Israeli airstrike, despite prior coordination of their activities with Israeli authorities.[351]

On 8 October, the IDF began to encircle Jabalia camp, killing several Palestinian militants and civilians in air strikes and street battles.[352][353] On 10 October, the IDF issued evacuation orders for three hospitals in northern Gaza.[352] The IDF’s air and ground operations in Jabalia continued for the rest of October.[354] During that month and November, strikes on Jabalia killed hundreds of people.[355] On 10 December, the IDF said that it killed 10 Hamas operatives who were involved in the killing of three Israeli soldiers one day prior.[356] On 30 December, the IDF said that it killed dozens of militants in Jabalia.[357]

The IDF has been accused of blocking aid delivery to the Gaza Strip by allowing looting gangs to target aid convoys.[358] On 16 November 98 out of 109 food trucks carrying UN aid from Kerem Shalom crossing were looted in Israeli-controlled areas of the Gaza strip.[358][359][360] On 1 December, the UN suspended its aid shipments to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing, blaming Israel for failing to “ensure safe conditions for delivering relief supplies.”[361] On 12 December, two Israeli strikes on an aid convoy in southern Gaza killed 13 people and wounded at least 30 people, including several of them seriously.[362][363][364]

On 30 November, a strike on a World Central Kitchen vehicle transporting supplies killed three aid workers.[365][366][367] An Israeli airstrike on a group of Palestinians waiting for receiving food from an aid convoy in Khan Yunis killed at least 12 Palestinians and injured several others.[368] On 9 December, an Israeli strike hit people who lined up for buying flour in Rafah, killing 10 people.[369]

On 16 October, IDF ground forces killed Yahya Sinwar in a shootout in Tal as-Sultan.[370] The conscript soldiers who participated in the shootout were initially unaware of Sinwar’s presence, and he was identified the following day by his dental records.[371] There were no hostages in Sinwar’s vicinity at the time of his death,[372] and no civilian casualties were reported.[373] Biden urged Israel to end the war after Sinwar’s death.[374]

Siege of northern Gaza

See also: Israeli generals’ plan and Siege of North Gaza

A street in northern Gaza pictured in the aftermath of the siege during the initial phase of the 2025 ceasefire

On 13 October, senior IDF officials told Haaretz that the government was not seeking to revive hostage talks and that political leadership was pushing for the annexation of parts of the Gaza Strip.[375] In the later weeks of October, Israel’s siege of North Gaza intensified and daily aid shipments dropped significantly. Eyewitnesses reported the shelling of hospitals, razing of shelters, and abductions of men and boys by the Israeli military, leading to speculation that Israel had decided to implement a plan by a group of retired generals to turn the northern Strip into a closed military zone and declare all who refuse to leave as combatants.[376] On 5 November, Israeli Brigadier General Itzik Cohen told reporters that “there is no intention of allowing the residents of the northern Gaza Strip to return” and that no food aid had entered northern Gaza because there were “no more civilians left”.[377]

The IDF continued its encirclement of Jabalia by sending tanks to Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun and issuing evacuation orders to residents.[378] On 24 October, an IDF attack destroyed at least 10 residential buildings in the Jabalia refugee camp. According to an assessment by Gaza Civil Defense, 150 people were killed or injured.[379] On 25 October, the WHO said it had lost contact with Kamal Adwan hospital, and UN human rights chief Volker Türk called recent developments in North Gaza the “darkest moment” in the war so far.[380] Food aid to Gaza reached a new low in October at an average of 30 trucks per day, or less than 6% of the daily pre-war average.[381] Residents of northern Gaza said in November that no aid had reached their cities since 5 October.[377] The UN warned that the situation had become “apocalyptic” and that “The entire Palestinian population in North Gaza is at imminent risk of dying from disease, famine and violence”.[382] On 2 November, UNICEF said that over 50 children were killed in Israeli strikes in Jabalia in the past two days.[383] On 12 November, aid in Gaza fell to its lowest level in 11 months despite a US ultimatum that it be restored.[384]

On 24 November, Israel issued a new wave of evacuation orders, triggering another round of displacements in Jabalia.[385] UNRWA said that Israel had rejected nine attempts to deliver aid to north Gaza in the month of November and obstructed an additional 82 attempts; they added that the survival conditions were diminishing for the 60,000 to 70,000 civilians remaining in north Gaza.[386] Mahmoud Almadhoun, a chef who founded the Gaza Soup Kitchen, was targeted and killed by an Israeli quadcopter near Kamal Adwan hospital.[387] On 5 December, Israeli Army Radio announced that 18,000 Palestinians were evacuated from Beit Lahia and that soldiers killed approximately 20 militants during fighting on the previous day.[388]

On 13 December, Israeli tank fire killed Dr. Sayeed Joudeh, the last orthopedic surgeon in northern Gaza.[389] On 26 December, an Israeli air strike hit a building in the vicinity of Kamal Adwan Hospital, killing about 50 people, including five staff.[390] Over the next days, the World Health Organization announced that the hospital had been put out of service by Israeli attacks and the hospital’s director, Hussam Abu Safiya, had been abducted: the IDF forced patients to evacuate to an already-destroyed hospital by cutting off their oxygen.[391] The IDF claimed to have killed 19 militants during its raid;[392][393] Gaza Health Ministry said that 50 people including hospital staff were killed.[392]

Israeli resumption of hostilities (March 2025–present)

Main articles: March 2025 Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip and March 2025 Rafah humanitarian convoy attacks

On 18 March, Israel launched attacks across Gaza, killing over 400 and ending the ceasefire.[90][394][395][396] Israel stated the attack was due to the refusal of Hamas to extend the first phase of the ceasefire by releasing more hostages, and was also in response to Hamas’s rearming and reorganizing over the course of the two months of ceasefire.[397] Hamas said that it had adhered to the ceasefire agreement, implementing it precisely, and that Israel had resumed aggression and war. Internationally, the strikes were seen to stymie hopes for a lasting ceasefire.[398] Observers have noted that Israel chose to launch the attack on the day Netanyahu would testify in his corruption trial, forcing the legal proceedings to be postponed.[399]

Multiple senior members of Gaza’s government and the Hamas political bureau were killed during this round of fighting, including Issam al-Da’alis, whose position is akin to the Prime Minister of Gaza, Salah al-Bardawil[400] and Ismail Barhoum (members of the political bureau),[401][402][403] Mahmoud Abu Watfa (undersecretary of the Interior Ministry of the Gaza Strip) and Bahjat Abu Sultan (chief of internal security). Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman Abu Hamza was also killed in the airstrikes.[404][405] The Popular Resistance Committees announced the death of Muhammad al-Batran, commander of its artillery unit and a member of its Central Military Brigade Council.[406]

On 19 March, the IDF said that it had launched “targeted ground activities” in the Gaza Strip to create a “partial buffer” in the territory, partially recapturing the center of the Netzarim Corridor.[407][408] Two days later, the IDF destroyed a hospital via controlled demolition.[409] On 23 March, IDF troops fired on several humanitarian vehicles, including five ambulances, a fire truck, and a United Nations vehicle, in Al-Hashashin area in southern Rafah, killing 15 Palestinian medics. It was not until 30 March that their bodies were discovered in a mass grave.[410][411] On 27 March, an Israeli airstrike on a tent in Jabalia killed Hamas spokesman Abdel-Latif al-Qanoua.[412] The same day, a World Central Kitchen volunteer was killed in an Israeli strike on a WCK supported community kitchen as meals were being served.[413]

On 25 March, amid the Israeli operation,[398] hundreds[414] to thousands[415] of Palestinians in Gaza rose up in protest against Hamas, demanding an end to the war and an end to Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip. The protests were caused by war-weariness and dissatisfaction with Hamas, specifically their alleged misuse of humanitarian aid intended for Gazans,[416] suppression of the freedom of speech and of the press, and abuse of Palestinian civilians.[417]

Truces

See also: 2023 Israeli–Palestinian prisoner exchange

First ceasefire (November 2023)

Main article: 2023 Gaza war ceasefire

13-year old Israeli hostage released by Hamas during the first ceasefire, 26 November 2023.

Following the introduction of a Qatari-brokered truce on 24 November 2023, active fighting in the Gaza Strip ceased. Hamas exchanged some hostages for the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.[418] Israel arrested almost as many Palestinians as it released during the truce.[419] This occurred until 28 November, when both Israel and Hamas accused each other of violating the truce.[420][421] On 30 November, in a “last-minute agreement”, Hamas released eight hostages in exchange for the release of 30 imprisoned Palestinians and a one-day truce extension.[422] The truce expired on 1 December, as Israel and Hamas blamed each other for failing to agree on an extension.[423]

Second ceasefire (January–March 2025)

Main article: 2025 Gaza war ceasefire

See also: March 2025 Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip

Return of displaced people via Al-Rasheed Street after ceasefire, January 2025, Gaza Strip

On 15 January 2025, an agreement was announced between Israel and Hamas, through the mediation of Qatar, in which Hamas agreed to release a number of Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip since the 7 October attack in exchange for Hamas militants and other Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. The two parties also agreed to a ceasefire for the second time during the war;[424] it went into effect on the morning of 19 January 2025.[425] On 27 January, tens of thousands of Palestinians began a mass return to northern Gaza after Israel opened a corridor for civilian movement following a 48-hour delay.[426] Hamas claimed that Israel had violated the terms of the ceasefire, and announced the suspension of the release of Israeli hostages on 10 February.[427] After Netanyahu and Trump threatened to restart fighting in Gaza,[428] Hamas relented on 13 February,[429] allowing the release of hostages to begin again two days later.[430] On 22 February, Hamas released six Israeli hostages;[431] however, Israel refused to release the 600 Palestinian prisoners, with Netanyahu objecting to the “use of hostages for propaganda” and saying that Israel would release the prisoners once the next hostage release was guaranteed without the ceremonies.[432] On 25 February, Israel and Hamas reached a deal to exchange the bodies of Israeli hostages who were agreed to be handed over during the first phase for releasing hundreds of Palestinian prisoners without public ceremony.[433]

On 1 March, the day the first phase of the ceasefire was scheduled to end, Hamas rejected an Israeli proposal to extend it to release more hostages, demanding the implementation of the second phase.[434] Negotiations for implementing the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, intended to see the release of all remaining living hostages, the withdrawal of the Israeli military from Gaza and a permanent end to the war, were supposed to have begun in February, sixteen days after the initial ceasefire began, but never happened.[435][436] Netanyahu’s office said that Israel endorsed a US plan to extend the Gaza truce for the Ramadan and Passover periods. Under this plan, half of the living and dead hostages would be released on the first day of the extended truce and the remaining hostages would be released at the end of the period if a permanent truce was reached. It claimed that the initial deal allowed Israel to resume war at any moment after 1 March if negotiations were deemed ineffective. Following Hamas’s refusal to accept the US proposal,[437][438] Netanyahu ceased the entry of aid to Gaza the next day.[439][440]

The humanitarian aid blockade was condemned by mediators, namely Egypt, as a violation of the ceasefire, which stipulated that phase one would automatically be extended as long as phase two negotiations were in progress.[441][442] On 9 March, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen ordered a halt to supply of Israeli electricity to Gaza.[443] On 14 March, Hamas said that it agreed to a proposal from mediators to release Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander and the bodies of four dual-national hostages.[444][445] The U.S. and Israel rejected the offer, which did not conform to their joint proposal calling for the release of five living hostages on the first day of an extended ceasefire.[446][447] On 18 March, Israel launched surprise airstrikes on Gaza as Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israel has “returned to fighting in Gaza”.[448]

Post-war plans

Main article: Potential American ownership of the Gaza Strip

After the announcement of a second ceasefire in January 2025, Donald Trump announced his intention to displace the Palestinian population of Gaza, reiterating his position that they should be resettled in neighboring Arab countries three more times that month.[449] Ahead of a 4 February meeting with Netanyahu, Trump specified his intention to permanently displace Gaza’s Palestinian inhabitants, which would be in violation of international law. He proposed a US takeover of Gaza that evening during a press conference with Netanyahu.[450]

Trump insisted that neighboring countries would pay for Gaza’s reconstruction and that “world people” would live there. He did not rule out deploying US troops if necessary. On 5 and 6 February, Trump aides and Trump himself walked back some of his comments, including his willingness to deploy US soldiers. On 10 February, Trump said that Palestinians who leave Gaza would have no right of return. In a meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan, Trump said that the US would take rather than buy Gaza because “It’s a war torn area. It’s Gaza. There is nothing to buy.”[451] Trump had proposed Jordan take in the displaced Palestinians from Gaza, which Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi categorically rejected, stating “They don’t want to come to Jordan and we don’t want them to come to Jordan.”[452]

These statements were met with condemnation from world leaders; however, in Israel, far-right Jewish supremacist Itamar Ben-Gvir praised Trump, saying that Palestinian “migration” was the only solution to the war.[453] Netanyahu and Ben-Gvir characterized the planned displacement of Gazans as a “voluntary migration”, but communications minister Shlomo Karhi said the transfer will be forced rather than voluntary.[454]

In February the leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, proposed that Gaza be returned to Egypt for up to 15 years in exchange for the cancellation of its external debt. Egypt rejected the proposal stating it undermined the Palestinian cause.[455]

Arab governments have rejected Trump’s transfer plan, instead backing an Egyptian proposal. The Arab League, meeting on 4 March in Cairo, devised a $53bn plan detailing the reconstruction of Gaza while keeping its population in place.[456] The proposal also included the demand that Hamas disarm, step down and fresh elections to a reformed Palestinian Authority be held.[457] Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune boycotted the league meeting claiming that it was “monopolized by a limited and narrow group of Arab countries” namely the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.[457] Hamas also reiterated that the group’s arms were non-negotiable and rejected the plan.[457] In turn, on 5 March, Trump has rejected the Arab plan claiming that “The current proposal does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance,” and that the Trump administration will go ahead with seizing the territory “to bring peace and prosperity to the region”.[457]

In March 2025, the United States and Israel claimed to have contacted officials from Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland to discuss the resettlement of Gaza residents in their territories.[458] Egypt,[459] Jordan,[452] and Sudan,[460] rejected the proposal while Somalia and Somaliland denied that they had been contacted.[461]

On 2 April, Israel Katz announced the Israeli government’s intention to “seize large areas” of Gaza as large air and ground operations resumed following the end of the March ceasefire.[462]

Spillover

Main articles: Middle Eastern crisis (2023–present) and Spillover of the Gaza war in Syria

See also: Israel–Hezbollah conflict (2023–present), Israeli invasion of Syria (2024–present), 2024 Iran–Israel conflict, and Red Sea crisis

- Rising smoke after the Israel strike on Hezbollah headquarters

- A damaged building in Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel

- Two United States carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean Sea.

The war’s spillover has resulted in a major escalation of existing tensions between Israel and Iran, with groups in the Axis of Resistance launching attacks on American military bases, and the Yemeni Houthi movement attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea and incurring a US-led military operation.[463] Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the Houthi movement in Yemen launched limited attacks against Israel shortly after the start of the war. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have also traded attacks with the US and IDF.[464]

Israel has bombed targets in and around Damascus throughout the war,[465][466][467] with an attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April 2024 leading to a series of retaliatory airstrikes on Israel in response.[468][469] On 31 July, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, where he had traveled to attend the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian,[470] and on 1 October, Iran fired approximately 200 missiles at Israel.[471][472]

By the end of 2024, a year-long exchange of strikes between Israel and Hezbollah escalated into a brief Israeli invasion of Lebanon, before it was paused after a ceasefire.[473] The crisis has also seen the fall of the Assad regime and an ongoing Israeli invasion of Syria.[474][475]

West Bank and Israel

Further information: Israeli incursions in the West Bank during the Gaza war, 2023 Givat Shaul shooting, and 2024 Kiryat Malakhi attack

West Bank sector of war

West Bank Palestinian enclaves (Areas A & B)

West Bank under Israeli control (Area C)

Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem

Amnesty International released a report[476] on 5 February 2024 stating that Israel is carrying out unlawful killings in the West Bank and displaying “a chilling disregard for Palestinian lives” and that Israeli forces are carrying out numerous illegal acts of violence that constitute clear violations of international law.[477][478]

Before the war, 2023 was the deadliest year for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank in 20 years. Violence in the West Bank has increased since the war began with more than 607 Palestinians and over 25 Israelis killed.[479][480] At the same time, Israeli settler violence further increased to around 1,270 attacks, against 856 for all of 2022.[481] About 1,000 Palestinians have been forcibly displaced by settlers since 7 October and almost half of the clashes have included “Israeli forces accompanying or actively supporting Israeli settlers while carrying out the attacks” according to a U.N. report.[482] According to the West Bank Protection Consortium, since the 7 October attacks six Palestinian communities have been abandoned due to the violence.[483]

On 19 October, more than 60 Hamas members were arrested and 12 people were killed in overnight Israeli raids across the West Bank. Those arrested included the movement’s spokesperson in the West Bank, Hassan Yousef.[484]

In July, Israeli authorities approved the seizure of 12.7 square kilometers of land in the occupied West Bank. According to Peace Now, this was the largest single appropriation approved since the 1993 Oslo accords.”[485] Israeli authorities also approved plans for almost 5,300 new houses in occupied West Bank.[486] By July 2024, Israeli land seizures exceeded the combined total of the previous 20 years.[487] The following month, the Israeli government approved new settlements in the occupied West Bank,[488][489] and it was reported that Israeli settlers had taken advantage of the ongoing war to expand settlement activity supported by a far-right Israeli government,[490][481][491] including land seizure and large scale settlement plans.[492]

On 7 August, Wafa reported that Israeli forces destroyed the regional headquarters of Fatah in the Balata Camp.[493][494] On 28 August, Israel launched the largest military operation into the northern West Bank in more than 20 years. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said that the operation was a “full-fledged war”.[495] Israeli forces carried out simultaneous operations in Jenin, Tubas, Nablus, Ramallah and Tulkarem. In Jenin, Israeli forces destroyed the city’s infrastructure and carried out mass arrests of men and boys. Civilians were trapped in their homes and denied access to food, water and medicine. Members of the press were denied access to the city and the army blocked access to hospitals and ambulances.[496] A day later, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres demanded a halt to the operations,[497] and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said the operations “must not constitute the premises of a war extension from Gaza, including full-scale destruction.”[498] On 3 September, Israeli media reported that the IDF had classified the West Bank as a “combat zone” and now viewed it as the second most important front in the war.[499][500] Yoav Gallant said that Israel was “mowing the lawn” with its West Bank operations, but that it would eventually need to “pull out the roots”.[501] On 6 September, Turkish-American protestor Ayşenur Eygi was killed by an Israeli sniper at a demonstration near Nablus.[502]

On 3 October, an Israeli airstrike in Tulkarm Camp killed at least 20 people.[503][504] On 13 November, Israeli far-right finance minister Bezalel Smotrich said that with Donald Trump‘s victory in the 2024 United States presidential election, Israel was “a step away” from “sovereignty in Judea and Samaria.” Later comments by Mike Huckabee, chosen by Trump as the next ambassador to Israel, corroborated the possibility of an Israeli annexation of the West Bank.[505] On 21 January 2025, the IDF said it launched a major raid in West Bank.[506][507] On 29 January, the IDF said that it conducted a drone strike targeting a group of militants in Tammun, killing at least 10 people.[508][509][510]

Attacks in Israel

On 30 November, two Palestinian gunmen killed three and wounded eleven Israeli civilians at a bus stop on the Givat Shaul Interchange in Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility.[511] On 16 February 2024, a Palestinian gunman shot and killed two Israeli civilians and injured four others in Kiryat Malakhi, Israel. The shooter was killed by an off-duty IDF reservist at the scene.[512] On 12 April, a 14-year-old Israeli shepherd went missing near Ramallah and was found dead a day later. On 15 April, two Palestinians were killed by Israeli settlers in Aqraba.[513] On 13 May, at the Tarqumiya checkpoint, a convoy of trucks carrying food supplies to Gaza was attacked by Israeli settlers, who damaged the trucks and threw supplies on the ground.[514]

Israeli prisons and detention camps

Israel has increased its administrative detention of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Palestinian citizens of Israel, since the start of the war. Administrative detention was already at a 20-year high before October 2023.[515] More than 11,000 Palestinians are held in Israeli jails, not counting detainees taken from Gaza during the war.[516] At least 60 Palestinians have died in Israeli detention since 7 October.[517] They are held without charge or trial, which violates international law.[518]

In December 2023, a military base at Sde Teiman in the Negev Desert was converted to a detention camp by the IDF. Whistleblowers and detainees reported beatings and torture of Palestinian detainees at the camp, as well as amputations of limbs due to injuries sustained from handcuffing, medical neglect, arbitrary punishment and sexual abuse. Prisoners have been coerced to make confessions that they are members of Hamas.[519][520][521] After conditions in the camp came to light in May 2024, the Supreme Court of Israel held a hearing and the IDF began transferring 1,200 of the prisoners to Ofer Prison.[522] Detainees have reported severe instances of violence during transfers between prisons.[517][523]

Several Palestinian healthcare workers have been abducted from Gaza hospitals during sieges by Israeli forces.[523] On 5 December, Israeli forces abducted the adult men present at Al-Awda hospital and took them to Sde Teiman camp. Dr. Adnan Al-Bursh was detained and later died in Israeli custody.[524] In March, Israeli forces abducted Khaled Alser, lead author of the first Lancet paper on trauma among Gazan ER patients and doctors, from Nasser Hospital. As of 31 August, he remains in detention and his whereabouts are unknown.[525]

Al-Araby TV correspondent Mohammed Arab was abducted from the Gaza strip in March 2024 and transferred to Ofer prison in July. After reports of his treatment were leaked to al-Araby, he was beaten, threatened and tortured. According to Arab’s testimony, prison guards used dogs and fire extinguishers to enact sexual violence on other prisoners.[516]

In July 2024, military police raided Sde Teiman to arrest ten soldiers “suspected of the serious sexual abuse” of a Palestinian detainee. Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and other members of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party condemned the arrests.[519] Supporters of the arrested soldiers including Ben Gvir, Amihai Eliyahu, Zvi Sukkot, and Nissim Vaturi stormed Sde Teiman that night in protest. Hours later, protestors broke into Beit Lid where the soldiers were being held.[526]

On 7 October 2024, American journalist Jeremy Loffredo and three other international and Israeli journalists were detained at a checkpoint in the West Bank on suspicion of “assisting an enemy in war” for their reporting on the October 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel. The journalists’ cameras and phones were confiscated. Loffredo was released after four days in detention, and barred from leaving the country until 20 October.[527]

As of February 2025, at least 160 healthcare workers from Gaza were believed to be held in detention by Israel, with another 24 missing after being taken from hospitals in Gaza. Al-Shifa hospital director Mohammed Abu Selmia, who was detained for 7 months and released without charges, detailed many of the abuses he faced and said that “no day passes without torture” in Israeli prisons.[528]

American involvement

Main article: Potential American ownership of the Gaza Strip

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israeli President Isaac Herzog in Tel Aviv, Israel, 9 January 2024

The extent of American support for Israel has led the war to be labelled as ‘the first US-Israeli joint war’.[529] Alongside substantial military, financial, and diplomatic support, the US also intervened in the war directly. 100 American soldiers were deployed in combat to man a THAAD anti-air battery.[530][531] In addition, America piloted drones over Gaza in order to provide intelligence to Israel.[532] This intelligence was aimed at locating Palestinian militant leaders in Gaza and the location of hostages;[533] this also included information on Sinwar’s location.[534]

On 18 March 2025, Israel launched a surprise attack[535] on the Gaza Strip, ending the 2025 Gaza war ceasefire. These attacks killed more than 400 Palestinians, including 263 women and children.[536] Israel’s government spokesman David Mencer revealed that operation was “fully coordinated with Washington” and thanked the Trump administration “for their unyielding support for Israel”.[537]

Casualties

Main article: Casualties of the Gaza war

Further information: Gaza war hostage crisis, Mass detentions in the Gaza war, Killing of journalists in the Gaza war, and Killing of health workers in the Gaza war

Event

Total

Civilians

Children

Total

%

Total

%

October 7 attacks

1,195[47]

815[47]

68.2%

36[538]

3.2%

Israeli invasion of Gaza

48,405[539]

~80%[u]

33.1%[543]

Israeli attacks in the West Bank

555[v]

102[544]

18.37%

As of 4 March 2025, over 50,000 people – 48,405 Palestinian[539][544] and 1,706 Israeli[w] – have been reported killed in the Gaza war according to the official figures of the Gaza Health Ministry, as well as 166 journalists and media workers,[x] 120 academics,[557] and over 224 humanitarian aid workers, a number that includes 179 employees of UNRWA.[558] Scholars have estimated 80% of Palestinians killed are civilians.[541][540][542][559] A study by OHCHR, that verified fatalities from three independent sources, found that 70% of the Palestinian killed in residential buildings or similar housing were women and children.[332][560]

The majority of casualties have been in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Health Ministry (GHM) total casualty count is the number of deaths directly caused by the war. The demographic breakdown is a subset of those individually identified.[561][562] On 17 September 2024, the GHM published the names, gender and birth date of 34,344 individual Palestinians whose identities were confirmed and continues to attempt to identify all casualties.[561] The GHM count does not include those who have died from “preventable disease, malnutrition and other consequences of the war”.[563] An analysis by the Gaza Health Projections Working Group predicted thousands of excess deaths from disease and birth complications.[564]

In January 2025, a peer-reviewed analysis of deaths in the Gaza war between October 2023 and 30 June 2024 was published in The Lancet. The paper estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injury during this period, and likely exceeding 70,000 by October 2024, with 59.1% of them being women, children and the elderly. It concluded that the GHM underestimated trauma-related deaths by 41% in its report, and also noted that its findings “underestimate the full impact of the military operation in Gaza, as they do not account for non-trauma-related deaths resulting from health service disruption, food insecurity, and inadequate water and sanitation.”[7]

A survey by PCPSR reported showed over 60% of Gazans have lost family members since the war began.[565][566] Thousands of more dead bodies are thought to be under the rubble of destroyed buildings.[567][568] The number of injured is greater than 100,000;[569] Gaza has the most amputated children per capita in the world.[570]

The 7 October attacks on Israel killed 1,195 people, including 815 civilians.[47] A further 806 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem).[571] Casualties have also occurred in other parts of Israel, as well as in southern Lebanon,[572] Syria,[573] Yemen,[574] and Iran.[575]

According to the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Rehabilitation Division, about 1,000 soldiers are wounded every month.[576] On 14 August 2024, the ministry predicted that it would have to account for 100,000 disabled IDF veterans by 2030 due to the war.[577]

Humanitarian crisis

Main article: Gaza humanitarian crisis (2023–present)

Further information: Gaza Strip famine and Timeline of the Gaza Strip healthcare collapse

See also: Humanitarian aid during the Gaza war, Effect of the Gaza war on children in the Gaza Strip, and Gaza Strip evacuations

Residents inspect the ruins of an apartment in Gaza destroyed by Israeli airstrikes

The Gaza Strip is experiencing a humanitarian crisis as a result of the war,[578][579] including a hunger crisis, in which famine-like conditions occurred in some areas of the strip and a high risk of famine persists as of October 2024,[580][92] as well as a healthcare collapse. At the start of the war, Israel tightened its blockade on the strip, resulting in significant shortages of fuel, food, medication, water, and essential medical supplies.[578][581][582] This siege resulted in a 90% drop in electricity availability, impacting hospital power supplies, sewage plants, and shutting down the desalination plants that provide drinking water.[583] In July 2024, available water worked out to 4.74 litres per person per day, just under a third of the recommended minimum in emergencies.[584] Doctors warned of disease outbreaks spreading due to overcrowded hospitals.[579] A polio epidemic was the target of mostly-successful vaccination campaigns.[585]

Heavy bombardment by Israeli airstrikes caused catastrophic damage to Gaza’s infrastructure, further deepening the crisis. Direct attacks on telecommunications infrastructure by Israel, electricity blockades, and fuel shortages caused the near-total collapse of Gaza’s largest cell network providers.[586][587][588] Lack of internet access has obstructed Gazan citizens from communicating with loved ones, learning of IDF operations, and identifying both the areas most exposed to bombing and possible escape routes.[586] The blackouts impeded emergency services, making it harder to locate and access the time-critical injured,[586] and have impeded humanitarian aid agencies and journalists.[586] By December 2023, 200,000 Gazans (approximately 10% of the population) had received internet access through an eSIM provided by Connecting Humanity.[589]

UN OCHA casualties summary, as of 19 June 2024

The Gaza Health Ministry reported over 4,000 children killed in the war’s first month.[590] UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that Gaza had “become a graveyard for children.”[y][593][594] Indirect Palestinian deaths are expected to be much higher due to the intensity of the conflict, destruction of healthcare infrastructure, lack of food, water, shelter, and safe places for civilians to flee to, and reduction in UNRWA funding, with a Lancet study stating that the death toll in Gaza, including future deaths indirectly caused by the war, may exceed 186,000.[541][595]

Scale of destruction

Main article: Bombing of the Gaza Strip (2023–present)

See also: Attacks on health facilities during the Gaza war, Attacks on schools during the Israeli invasion of Gaza, 2023 Israeli airstrikes on municipal services in the Gaza Strip, Attacks on religious sites during the Israeli invasion of Gaza, and AI-assisted targeting in the Gaza Strip

Rimal in Gaza City following an Israeli airstrike, 10 October 2023

The scale and pace of destruction and damage of buildings in the Gaza Strip ranks among the most severe in modern history,[596][597][598] surpassing the bombing of Dresden, Hamburg, and London combined during World War II,[599][600][601][z] and included apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, religious sites, factories, shopping centres, and municipal infrastructure.[601] As of January 2024, researchers at Oregon State University and the City University of New York estimated that 50–62% of buildings in the Gaza Strip had been damaged or destroyed.[603][604][aa][ab] The damage to buildings in northern Gaza reportedly exceeds that in Bakhmut and Mariupol in the Russian invasion of Ukraine,[600] Aleppo in the Battle of Aleppo,[596] and Mosul and Raqqa in the War against the Islamic State.[596] The 29,000 munitions Israel had dropped on Gaza in three months exceeded the amount (3,678) dropped by the US between 2004 and 2010 after its invasion of Iraq.[607] According to satellite analyses, 68% of roads, 70% of greenhouses, and nearly 70% of tree crops have been damaged or destroyed.[608] After a year, the UN estimates that a total of 42m tonnes of rubble clutter the Strip, to clear and rebuild which might take 80 years and cost over $80bn.[609]

The Guardian reported that the scale of destruction has led international legal experts to raise the concept of domicide, which it describes as “the mass destruction of dwellings to make [a] territory uninhabitable”.[597] The term urbicide has also been used to refer to the destruction of Gazan cities and their institutions.[610] In October 2024, after monitoring and analyzing Israel’s war conduct in Gaza for more than a year, Forensic Architecture published a cartographic map platform detailing Israel’s campaign in Gaza titled “A Cartography of Genocide”, accompanied by an 827-page text report that concludes that “Israel’s military campaign in Gaza is organised, systematic, and intended to destroy conditions of life and life-sustaining infrastructure”.[611]

War crimes

Main article: War crimes in the Gaza war

See also: Israeli war crimes, Palestinian war crimes, and Gaza genocide

A UN Commission to the Israel–Palestine conflict stated that there is “clear evidence that war crimes may have been committed in the latest explosion of violence in Israel and Gaza, and all those who have violated international law and targeted civilians must be held accountable.”[612][613][614] On 27 October, a spokesperson for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for an independent court to review potential war crimes committed by both sides.[615]

The International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed that its mandate to investigate alleged war crimes committed since June 2014 in the State of Palestine extends to the current conflict.[616][617] On 20 May, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced his intention to seek arrest warrants against Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the war.[618][619][620] On 21 November, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Deif for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.[621][622][623]The ICC canceled Deif’s arrest warrant after confirming his death.[624]

On 7 June 2024, both Israel and Hamas were added to the list of shame, an annex attached to an annual report submitted by the UN Secretary-General documenting rights violations against children in armed conflict. While past reports accused Israel of grave rights violations against children, the country was never included in the annex.[625][626][627]

On 19 June 2024, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory presented a detailed report to the United Nations Human Rights Council covering the war from 7 October to 31 December 2023, affirming that both Hamas and Israel committed war crimes and that Israel’s actions also constituted crimes against humanity.[628] In a second report, the Commission found that Israel had carried out a policy of destroying Gaza’s healthcare system.[629][630]

The June report found that the military wing of Hamas and six other Palestinian armed groups were responsible for the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilians, murder or willful killing, torture, inhuman or cruel treatment, destroying or seizing the property, outrages upon personal dignity, and taking hostages, including children.[631][632] In relation to IDF operations and attacks in Gaza, the commission concluded that Israeli authorities are responsible for the war crimes of starvation as a method of warfare, murder or willful killing, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, forcible transfer, sexual violence, torture and inhuman or cruel treatment, arbitrary detention and outrages upon personal dignity. It also found that Israel committed numerous crimes against humanity, including carrying out the extermination of Palestinians and gender persecution targeting Palestinian men and boys.[633][634][635] The commission said that they had submitted 7,000 pieces of evidence to the ICC related to crimes committed by Israel and Hamas, as part of the International Criminal Court investigation in Palestine.[636]

In another report published in October 2024, the commission accused Israel of “committing war crimes and the crime against humanity of extermination with relentless and deliberate attacks on medical personnel and facilities” as well as accusing the IDF of deliberately killing and torturing medical personnel, targeting medical vehicles, and restricting patients from leaving Gaza. The report also addressed the detention of Palestinians in Israeli military camps and facilities, finding that thousands of child and adult detainees, many arbitrarily detained, faced widespread abuse, including physical and psychological violence, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, and conditions amounting to torture, highlighting that deaths resulting from such abuse or neglect constituted war crimes and violations of the right to life. Israel refused to cooperate with the investigation, contending that it had an “anti-Israel” bias.[630][637]

On 5 December 2024, Amnesty International published a report concluding that Israel was committing genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip;[93][638] and on 19 December 2024, Human Rights Watch published a 179-page report concluding that Israel is responsible for the crime of genocide by intentionally depriving Palestinians in Gaza of access to safe water for drinking and sanitation needed for basic human survival.[639]

On 13 March 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory released a report stating that Israel’s attacks on women’s healthcare facilities in Gaza amounted to genocidal acts, destroying “in part the reproductive capacity of Palestinians in Gaza as a group”.[640] Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the report as “false and absurd”, and accused UN Human Rights Council of being anti-Israel and anti-Semitic.[641]

Diplomatic impact

Main article: Diplomatic impact of the Gaza war

Further information: 2023 Gaza war ceasefire, 2023 Israeli–Palestinian prisoner exchange, and 2024 Beijing Declaration

See also: Israeli–Palestinian peace process and Two-state solution

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 19 April 2024

The war sparked a diplomatic crisis, with countries around the world reacting strongly to the conflict that affected the momentum of regional relations.[642] At least nine countries withdrew their ambassadors or cut diplomatic ties with Israel.[643][644] The war has also resulted in a renewed focus on a two-state solution to the broader conflict.[645][646] Global public opinion of Israel dropped during the war; a Morning Consult poll published in January 2024 indicated that the United States was the only remaining wealthy country in which Israel had net positive approval.[647]

Negotiations have focused on the possibility of a ceasefire, with United States, Egypt and Qatar serving as negotiation mediators between Israel and Hamas.[648][649] The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 2728 in March 2024, demanding an immediate ceasefire and the unconditional release of hostages for the month of Ramadan.[283][650] The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 2735 in June 2024, demanding acceptance of the three-phase ceasefire proposal.[651]

Following talks mediated by China, on 23 July 2024, Palestinian groups including Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement to end their divisions and form a unity government for Gaza, which they announced in the Beijing Declaration.[652]

At the UNGA, Saudi Arabia announced a global alliance to push for a two-state solution. Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide said almost 90 countries were at the launch of The Global Alliance for the Implementation of a Palestinian State and a Two-State Solution.[653][654][655] On 29 September, Saudi Arabia said they would send aid to the Palestinian Authority, $60 million in six installments according to a senior PA official. The aid is seen as means of keeping the PA solvent and maintaining the push for a two-state solution, notwithstanding Israeli financial restrictions.[656]

Reactions

Main article: International reactions to the Gaza war

See also: Arms embargoes on Israel

Israel

Main article: Israeli government response to the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel

The Israeli government’s response to the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel has multiple aspects, including a military response leading to the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip. In October, the Knesset approved a war cabinet in Israel, adding National Unity ministers and altering the government; Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz froze non-war legislation, establishing a war cabinet with military authority.

Settler expansions and officials’ remarks heightened unrest, leading to protests in Israel. The Knesset’s law criminalizing “terrorist materials” consumption drew criticism.[657]

In an interview to the Wall Street Journal on 25 December, Netanyahu said that Israel’s objectives were to “destroy Hamas, demilitarize Gaza and deradicalize the whole of Palestinian society”.[658] There was broad support in Israeli society for military operations in Gaza.[659][660] Public opinion poll conducted in December 2023 by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 87% of Jewish Israelis supported the war in Gaza.[661]

Palestinian territories

Initially, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas asserted the Palestinian people’s right to self-defense against the “terror of settlers and occupation troops”[662] and condemned the orders by Israel for residents to evacuate north Gaza, labeling it a “second Nakba”.[663] Later, Abbas rejected the killing of civilians on both sides, and said that the Palestinian Liberation Organization was the sole representative of the Palestinian people.[664]

International

Main article: International reactions to the Gaza war

Further information: Arms embargoes on Israel, United States support for Israel in the Gaza war, and United Kingdom support for Israel in the Gaza war

See also: Gaza war protests, Violent incidents in reaction to the Gaza war, and Calls for a ceasefire during the Gaza war

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (May 2024)

US Vice President Kamala Harris with Israeli President Isaac Herzog at the 60th Munich Security Conference in Germany, February 2024

Significant geopolitical divisions emerged during the war. Much of the Western world provided strong diplomatic and military support to Israel,[665] including the United States,[666] United Kingdom,[667] and Germany,[668] however several European nations have been less supportive of Israel’s actions, most notably Spain, Norway, and Ireland who formally recognised the State of Palestine in a coordinated move in June 2024.[669] Spain and Ireland have also supported South Africa’s genocide case against Israel.[670][671] This has led to retaliatory action by Israel, who recalled its ambassadors to all three countries and later announced that it would be closing its embassy in Dublin.[672][673][674] Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations says that during the Cold War, Israel sided with the West against the Arab countries supported by the Soviets, and Western leaders generally see Israel “as a fellow member of the liberal democratic club” and that this partially “explains the continued strong Western support for Israel – which has now largely become reflexive”.[665] At least 44 nations denounced Hamas and explicitly condemned its conduct on 7 October as terrorism, including a joint statement by the US, UK, France, Italy, and Germany.[675]

In contrast, the Islamic world and much of the Global South denounced the actions of Israel and its allies, criticizing the “moral authority of the West” and alleging that it holds double standards surrounding human rights.[665][676] The double standards, in their view, is condemning an illegal occupation in Ukraine while standing firmly behind Israel that has occupied Palestinian lands.[677] Bolivia has cut all ties with Israel as a result of the conflict, while Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors to the country.[233][676]

The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany have supplied Israel with substantial military and medical aid.[667][678][679]

The Israeli government’s response prompted international protests, arrests, and harassment.[680]

Evacuations of foreign nationals

Main article: Evacuations during the Gaza war

Brazil announced a rescue operation of nationals using an air force transport aircraft.[681] Poland announced that it would deploy two C-130 transport planes to evacuate 200 Polish nationals.[682] Hungary evacuated 215 of its nationals from Israel using two aircraft on 9 October, while Romania evacuated 245 of its citizens, including two pilgrimage groups, on two TAROM planes and two private aircraft on the same day.[683] Australia also announced repatriation flights.[684] 300 Nigerian pilgrims in Israel fled to Jordan before being airlifted home.[685]

On 12 October, the United Kingdom arranged flights for its citizens in Israel; the first plane departed Ben Gurion Airport that day. The government had said before that it would not be evacuating its nationals due to available commercial flights. However, most commercial flights were suspended.[686] Nepal arranged a flight to evacuate at least 254 of its citizens who were studying in Israel.[687] India launched Operation Ajay to evacuate its citizens from Israel.[688] Ukraine facilitated the evacuation of ~450 of its citizens from Israel as of 18 October, with additional evacuation flights planned for the near future.[689]

Impacts

Main article: Impacts of the Gaza war

Regional impact

According to Daniel Byman and Alexander Palmer, the attack showcased the decline of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the rise of Hamas as a power center in Palestinian politics. They predicted the PLO’s further decline if the status quo held.[690] Laith Alajlouni wrote that the immediate effect of the Hamas offensive was to unite Hamas and PLO.[691]

Amit Segal, chief political commentator for Israel’s Channel 12, said that the conflict would test Benjamin Netanyahu’s survival as prime minister, noting that past wars had toppled the governments of several of his predecessors such as that of Golda Meir following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Menachem Begin following the 1982 Lebanon War, and Ehud Olmert following the 2006 Lebanon War.[692] Citing the Israeli intelligence failure, which some observers attributed to the incumbent government focusing more on internal dissent, the judicial reform, and efforts to deepen Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories,[693] some commentators criticized Netanyahu for putting aside the PLO and propping up Hamas,[156] and described him as a liability.[694][695]

In an analysis by The Times of Israel, the newspaper wrote, “Hamas has violently shifted the world’s eyes back to the Palestinians and dealt a severe blow to the momentum for securing a landmark US-brokered deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia.”[696] Andreas Kluth wrote in his Bloomberg News column that Hamas “torched Biden’s deal to remake the Middle East”, arguing that the deal that was being discussed between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US would have left Palestinians in the cold, so the group decided to “blow the whole thing up”. He added that viewed from Gaza, things were only going to get worse, considering that Netanyahu’s coalition partners opposed a two-state solution. He suggested they would prefer to annex the entirety of the West Bank, even at the expense of turning Israel into an apartheid state.[697]

Economic impact

Main article: Economic impact of the Gaza war

The Bank of Israel estimates that by 2025, the war will have cost the country US$67 billion, notwithstanding a $14.5 billion US aid package, part of the $22.76 billion the U.S. has so far allocated for military assistance.[698][ac]

As early as 9 November 2023, the Bank of Israel reported that the drop in labor supply caused by the war was costing the Israeli economy $600 million a week, or 6% of weekly GDP. The bank also stated that the estimate did not include damage caused by the absence of Palestinian and foreign workers.[700] In the final quarter of 2023, the Israeli economy shrank by 5.2% quarter-to-quarter due to labour shortages in construction and from the mobilization of 300,000 reservists.[701] While Israel did still see economic growth of 2%, this was down from 6.5% growth in the year before the war. Consumer spending declined by 27%, imports declined by 42% and exports declined by 18%.

Israel’s high-tech factories reported in December that recent bureaucratic obstacles with electronic imports from China had led to higher import costs and delayed delivery times.[702] Israeli officials also reported that China had refused to send workers to their country during the war against the backdrop of a worker shortage in Israel’s construction and farming sectors.[703] China’s actions were described as a de facto sanction.[704][702]

The 3,500-member Water Transport Workers Federation of India said it would refuse to operate shipments carrying weapons to Israel.[705] The declaration came a few months after one Indian company halted production of Israeli police uniforms due to the war in Gaza.[706]

About 9,855 Thai workers in the agricultural sector, 4,331 workers in the construction sector and 2,997 in the nursing sector left Israel following the 7 October attack. In addition, the prevention of 85,000 Palestinian workers from entering Israel created a shortage of about 100,000 foreign and Palestinian workers.[707]

It has been calculated that the carbon cost in terms of climate impact of rebuilding Gaza would exceed the annual greenhouse emissions of 135 countries.[708]

Media coverage

Main article: Media coverage of the Gaza war

In reporting on the conflict, foreign media have limited access to Gaza and only in the presence of Israeli soldiers. Vox reported that the news organizations “have to submit all materials and footage to the IDF for review before publication”.[709] The conflict has also seen large numbers of journalists wounded or killed in action. On 14 December, CBS reported on a statement from the International Federation of Journalists that “the number of journalists killed in the past two months in the war in Gaza has surpassed the amount killed in the Vietnam War, which lasted two decades”.[710] Reporters Without Borders filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court under section 8.2.b of the Rome Statute, accusing Israel of committing war crimes against 8 journalists.[711][709] It also lodged a complaint against Hamas, under section 8.2.a of the Rome Statute for the killing of a reporter covering the 7 October attack.[711] The Committee to Protect Journalists accused Israel of targeting journalists reporting from Gaza and their families, saying that in at least two cases, “journalists reported receiving threats from Israeli officials and Israel Defense Forces officers before their family members were killed”.[712]

See also

- Gaza genocide

- Misinformation in the Gaza war

- Outline of the Gaza war

- List of modern conflicts in the Middle East

- List of wars involving Israel

- List of wars involving the State of Palestine

- Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2023

- Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2024

Notes

References

External links

Gaza war at Wikipedia’s sister projects

- Media from Commons

- Quotations from Wikiquote

- Data from Wikidata

- Israel–Hamas war at the Encyclopædia Britannica

- Israel–Hamas war at Google News

- Hostilities in Gaza and Israel, Humanitarian Situation Updates, OCHA.

- Monthly Bulletin (Action by UN System and IGOs Relevant to Question of Palestine), UNRWA

- Swords of Iron, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gaza_war&oldid=1283828539”

M23 campaign (2022–present)

For the prior conflict, see M23 rebellion (2012–2013).

The M23 campaign is an ongoing series of military offensives launched by the March 23 Movement (M23), a Rwandan-backed rebel paramilitary group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, since March 2022. In November 2021, the M23 first launched attacks against the Congolese military (FARDC) and MONUSCO, seizing military positions in Ndiza, Cyanzu, and Runyoni in North Kivu Province.[53] This coincided with the deployment of Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to the region to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group operating in the Congo’s North Kivu and Ituri provinces.[54][55][56][57]

The conflict escalated between March and June 2022, as M23 overran key areas in Rutshuru Territory, including the strategic border town of Bunagana, forcing Congolese soldiers to flee into Uganda.[54][53][58][13] Uganda alleged that Rwanda orchestrated the offensive to undermine UPDF operations against the ADF, while Rwanda counterclaimed that Uganda was leveraging M23 elements to threaten its national security.[54] The DRC accused Rwanda of provisioning armaments and reorganizing the insurgency, a claim substantiated by a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Group of Experts report.[54] Rwanda and M23, in turn, accused the DRC of collaborating with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and claimed their campaign aimed to protect Banyamulenge from FDLR aggression.[59][60] A UNSC report noted that Rwandan military incursions into Congolese territory had begun prior to alleged FARDC-FDLR cooperation, with analysts posited that M23’s resurgence was primarily driven by economic and commercial interests rather than ethno-political or security concerns.[61][54]

The conflict drew regional involvement, leading the East African Community (EAC) to deploy the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) to stabilize the situation.[62] On 26 January 2023, M23 captured Kitchanga.[63] Exasperated by the perceived inaction of the EACRF, the Congolese government sought military assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and established a reserve corps, which encouraged the formation of militias under the Wazalendo movement near M23-controlled areas.[64] In June 2023, Human Rights Watch documented widespread human rights abuses by M23, including extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, and other war crimes, with allegations of Rwandan complicity.[65] The UNSC subsequently called for sanctions against M23 leaders and implicated high-ranking Rwandan officials in the violence.[65] By March 2024, M23 had launched further offensives, including a northern push into Rutshuru Territory, capturing Rwindi and the Vitshumbi fishery along Lake Edward.[66] An April UNSC-commissioned report estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops were present in eastern DRC, surpassing the estimated 3,000 M23 combatants.[66][67] In June 2024, M23 and RDF forces seized Kanyabayonga and Kirumba and entering Lubero Territory for the first time.[66] Diplomatic efforts, led by Angolan President João Lourenço, faltered after President Paul Kagame failed to attend a tripartite summit in Luanda on 15 December, which was meant to address the FDLR issue alongside President Félix Tshisekedi and President Lourenço.[68][69][70][71][72] Rwanda’s absence fueled suspicions that its involvement in eastern DRC was driven primarily by economic interests, particularly access to Kivu‘s mineral resources, rather than security concerns.[73][74][75]

Beginning in January 2025, M23 began making major advances towards Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu, with alleged Rwandan backing, intensifying growing tensions between the two nations. By 30 January, M23 had captured all of Goma and began an advance towards Bukavu, capturing the town by 16 February. Following the capture of Goma, M23 announced their intentions to march on Kinshasa.[76]

Background

Further information: M23 rebellion (2012–2013) and Kivu conflict

M23 rebels in Goma, November 2012

The March 23 Movement waged a rebellion in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2012 to 2013. M23 was formed by deserters of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), who had integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) following a 2009 peace agreement.[4][23][58] The agreement, which was negotiated after the arrest of CNDP leader General Laurent Nkunda, included provisions for prisoner releases, CNDP’s transformation into a political party, refugee reintegration, and the incorporation of CNDP members into government institutions and the national army.[77] However, resistance from local communities—who viewed CNDP leaders as perpetrators of crimes—hindered the full implementation of these measures.[77] Ex-CNDP fighters within the military were accused of exploiting their positions for illegal mineral trade. The rebellion formally commenced on 6 May 2012, culminating in clashes with the Congolese army and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).[77] Both the CNDP as well as the March 23 Movement’s first rebellion were supported by Rwanda and Uganda.[78][79][58] Human Rights Watch accused M23 of committing war crimes, including summary executions, sexual violence, and forced recruitment, and suggested that some Rwandan officials were complicit due to their continued support for M23 operations.[77] The uprising was defeated by a joint campaign of the DRC and MONUSCO force. After agreeing to a peace deal, M23 was largely dismantled, its fighters disarmed and moved into refugee camps in Uganda.[4]

Despite the agreement, hostilities between M23 and the DR Congo continued. In 2017, M23 commander Sultani Makenga and about 100 to 200 of his followers fled from Uganda to resume their insurgency, setting up camp at Mount Mikeno in the border area between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DR Congo.[13][80] On 7 November 2021, Makenga’s troops carried out a small-scale attack on FARDC positions in Ndiza, Cyanzu, and Runyoni, resulting in four fatalities.[53] However, this offensive had little impact, as M23 no longer received significant international support. That same month, Uganda and the DRC had greatly improved their relations, cooperating against a common enemy, the Allied Democratic Forces,[13] during Operation Shujaa.[41] In early 2022, a growing number of M23 combatants began leaving their camps and moving back to the DRC;[4] the rebel movement launched more attacks in February 2022, but these were repelled.[13] The M23 leadership argued that parts of their movement had resumed the insurgency because the conditions of the 2013 peace deal were not being honored by the DRC government.[4][58] The rebels also argued that they were attempting to defend Kivu’s Tutsi minority from attacks by Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),[22] although critics pointed out that the FDLR no longer posed a substantial threat and that M23 operations had commenced before FARDC-FDLR cooperation intensified.[81][61][54] Meanwhile, Ugandan authorities accused Rwanda of reigniting M23’s insurgency after its economic interests in the DRC were disrupted.[54] Earlier, in June 2021, Presidents Paul Kagame and Félix Tshisekedi signed an agreement permitting Dither Ltd—allegedly linked to the Rwandan military—to refine gold extracted by Sakima.[54] This deal was seen as an effort to cut off funding for armed groups profiting from mineral smuggling. However, as allegations of Rwandan backing for M23 grew, the DRC suspended the agreement in early June 2022.[54]

The situation was further complicated by the factionalism within M23, as the movement was split into rival groups, namely the “Alliance for the Salvation of the People” headed by Jean-Marie Runiga, and the “Revolutionary Army of Congo” of Bertrand Bisimwa respectively.[24][35] In addition, Makenga’s group was de facto separate from the other M23 forces which were still mainly based in Uganda.[36] Later research organized by the United Nations Security Council suggested that Makenga’s return to an insurgency had started the gradual rearmament and restoration of M23, with Bisimwa’s “Revolutionary Army of Congo” joining these efforts in late 2021 by reorganizing its remaining fighters and recruiting new ones in cooperation with Makenga. The headquarters of the restored M23 is believed to be located at Mount Sabyinyo.[35]

By 2022, M23 was just one of 120 armed groups that operated in the eastern DR Congo.[41] Before March 2022, the Congolese government made attempts to reinforce its position against the resurgent M23 by sending more troops. However, such measures weakened its presence in other areas, such as those affected by the Allied Democratic Forces insurgency.[35]

Offensive

Initial rebel attacks

In the night of 27 March 2022, M23 rebels launched a new offensive in North Kivu,[82] first attacking the villages of Tshanzu and Runyoni in the Rutshuru Territory[83] from their strongholds at the surrounding hills.[58] The two villages had been important strongholds of the M23 Movement during the 2012–13 rebellion.[83] The rebel attack was reportedly led by Sultani Makenga.[13] The DRC government claimed that Rwanda supported the insurgent operation, a claim which was denied by the Rwandan government[4] and the rebels.[58] International Crisis Group researcher Onesphore Sematumba argued that claims about Rwandan aid were believable. He suggested that the resurgence of M23 was probably influenced by Rwanda’s wish to stop an infrastructure project that would link the DR Congo and Uganda.[58]

On 29 March, the FARDC was able to repel a rebel attack against the border town of Bunagana, but M23 captured several villages, including Mugingo, Gasiza, Chengerero, Rugamba, Kibote, Baseke and Kabindi.[82] Also, a UN helicopter crashed at Tshanzu, killing eight MONUSCO peacekeepers (six Pakistanis, a Russian, and a Serbian). The FARDC blamed M23 rebels for shooting down the aircraft.[4][84] At Bunagana, the FARDC received support by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). UPDF ground forces crossed the border, while Ugandan aircraft bombed the rebels.[13][14] By 1 April, the clashes at Rutshuru had displaced 46,000 locals according to UNHCR.[85] Meanwhile, the M23 fighters temporarily retreated to their mountain bases, with their first attacks being regarded as a failure.[13] They proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire.[84][86] One ex-M23 officer told the newspaper taz that it was entirely unclear what the rebel offensive was trying to achieve, with him speculating that Makenga was possibly hoping for one last battle to die in his homeland.[13]

Failure of peace talks and resumption of fighting

See also: Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda conflict

On 6 April, the FARDC rejected any negotiations with the M23 forces based in the DR Congo, and started a counter-attack.[84] Four days later, M23 announced that it would withdraw its troops from any villages captured during the earlier clashes.[86] However, as the fighting raged on, FARDC increasingly lost ground to the insurgents.[84] In late April, the DRC government and several rebel groups held peace talks in Nairobi,[23] but the Bisimwa faction of M23 voluntarily left[24] or was expelled from the negotiations due to the ongoing clashes in North Kivu.[23][22]

M23 forces, reportedly led by Makenga[23] and including the Bisimwa faction,[24] restarted their offensive in May.[23] This operation was reportedly supported by at least 1,000 Rwandan soldiers.[6] According to a local, M23 overran Kibumba on 18 May.[42] On 19 May, M23 rebels attacked MONUSCO peacekeepers at Shangi, Rutshuru Territory, as the latter joined the FARDC in counter-insurgency operations. The rebel leadership declared that the attack was in response to a previous joint FARDC-FDLR operation.[22][c] From 22 May, the rebels attempted to advance on North Kivu’s provincial capital, Goma,[23] displacing 70,000 people.[87] From 22 to 23 May, a battle raged at Kibumba, while the insurgents temporarily seized Rumangabo before it was retaken by the FARDC.[42] According to independent researchers, the insurgents were supported by Rwandan soldiers during the battle for Rumangabo.[6]

On 25 May, M23 reached Goma’s outskirts,[23] but were repelled by MONUSCO, FARDC,[87] and the FDLR[6] after heavy fighting. The insurgents subsequently retreated, and there was a pause in fighting for the rest of the month.[87] At this point, the FARDC accused the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) of fighting directly alongside the rebels, claiming that local vigilantes had captured two Rwandan soldiers. On the other side, Rwanda claimed that the DR Congo had fired rockets into its territory, was aided by the FDLR,[23] and had “abducted” the two RDF soldiers.[8] The fighting also stoked local ethnic tensions; North Kivu’s deputy police commander, Francois-Xavier Aba van Ang, released a video urging civilians to organize as militiamen to combat M23 in a “people’s war”.[23] The FARDC also armed existing local militias so that they could assist in the campaign against M23.[6]

Fall of Bunagana, further rebel advances, and pro-government counter-attacks

Map of the initial M23 offensive

By early June, clashes again took place at Bunagana.[37][87] M23 militants reportedly attacked a MONUSCO force at Muhati, Rutshuru Territory, on 8 June.[8] On 12 June, the FARDC repelled another M23 attack on Bunagana, coinciding with the visit of King Philippe of Belgium at Bukavu to the south.[88] Unlike the previous attack on Bunagana, however, the Ugandan security forces across the border did not intervene and instead retreated from the hills overlooking the town.[14] M23 captured Bunagana on the following day, reportedly after encircling it and thus forcing the local garrison[89] of 137 soldiers and 37 police officers to retreat to Kisoro in Uganda.[41][90] There, they surrendered to the local Ugandan security forces. Many civilians also fled across the border.[41] Later, the commanders of the Bunagana garrison, Colonels Ndyadya and Lobo, and the regional sector commander, Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, accused each other of having given the order to retreat.[91]

North Kivu’s military governor Constant Ndima Kongba initially denied that the FARDC had lost the city,[89] but the FARDC spokesman Sylvain Ekenge later declared that the fall of Bunagana constituted “no less than an invasion” by Rwanda.[92] Tensions between Rwanda and the DR Congo consequently continued to escalate, as the latter suspended “all agreements” with the former.[93] At this point, two senior Congolese security sources[89] and members of the Congolese parliament also accused Uganda of supporting the rebel offensive. The Congolese parliamentarians claimed that the Ugandan retreat before the rebel attack had facilitated the takeover, and specifically singled out Muhoozi Kainerugaba, head of the Ugandan troops involved in Operation Shujaa, for supporting M23. The DR Congo proceeded to terminate the military cooperation with Uganda.[14] The Ugandan government subsequently halted Operation Shujaa, while the Ugandan military claimed that M23’s latest attacks did not pose a threat to Ugandan citizens and equipment, making an intervention on their part unnecessary.[93] The local MONUSCO leadership stated that the claims about the Ugandan support for M23 were “nonsense” and called for calm and cooperation.[94]

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta reacted to the fall of Bunagana and the growing regional tensions by calling for the East African Community (EAC) to “immediate[ly]” organize a new peacekeeping mission called the “East African Regional Force” to restore security in the eastern DR Congo.[95] Meanwhile, MONUSCO began to prepare its local troops to support the efforts of the Congolese security forces to retake the city.[96] FARDC troops belonging to operations sector “Sokola 2” launched an attack from Kabindi on 16 June,[97] and later claimed that they had recaptured Bunagana.[98] However, the city was reportedly still in rebel hands on the following day, with heavy fighting taking place to its west.[14][99] M23 reportedly counter-attacked, capturing the town of Tshengerero[100] and the villages of Bugusa, Kabindi and Rangira. The insurgents were advancing on Rutshuru, and shot down a FARDC helicopter.[101] Fighting had also spread into the Virunga National Park. Environmentalists pointed out that this threatened the survival of the local mountain gorillas.[102]

The renewed advances of M23 were reportedly part of a plan by Sultani Makenga to cut off and eventually capture Goma, hoping to extract political concessions from the Congolese government in this way.[103] By 18–19 June, the frontline had stabilized along the Rutshuru-Bunagana axis. Combined FARDC-MONUSCO forces still held settlements in the direct vicinity of Tshengerero such as Ntamugenga and Rwanguba, including the latter’s important bridge.[104][105] Fighting shifted to the Runyoni-Rumangabo axis, where clashes were reported at the villages of Kavumu and Bikenge.[105] Meanwhile, an EAC meeting was organized in Nairobi to discuss the diplomatic tensions between the DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda as well as the deployment of a new peacekeeping force in reaction to the M23 attacks. The DRC government declared that it would welcome an EAC peacekeeping mission, but only under the condition of Rwanda’s exclusion from the operation.[106][107] The EAC subsequently called on M23 to retreat from Bunagana[108] as precondition for a ceasefire, but the insurgents rejected the order.[109] Instead, M23 reopened the Bunagana border post under its own administration,[110] whereupon North Kivu’s government forbid the import and export of goods through rebel-held territory.[111]

Pro-government forces retake territory and stalemate

See also: Anti-MONUSCO protests

Moroccan MONUSCO peacekeepers on a long-range patrol to protect civilians from M23 rebels in Rutshuru Territory

From 19 to 22 June, clashes continued as M23 attempted to break through FARDC defense positions. At first, the rebels assaulted villages along the southern axis, but were repelled at Karambi, Kitagoma and Kitovu, Bweza, and Busanza. They subsequently focused on Bikenge, Ruvumu, Shangi, and Bukima, overrunning the villages before the FARDC organized a counter-attack. The military was able to retake most of these settlements, though Ruvumu, Buharo, and Rutokara reportedly remained rebel-held. Overall, the pro-government forces generally held their positions, but the rebel assaults increasingly threatened the Matebe-Rwanguba axis.[112][113] Human Rights Watch reported that 17 civilians, including two children, had been summarily executed on 21 June by the M23 for suspected collaboration with the FARDC.[114] According to the newspaper Eco News, the FARDC reportedly inflicted a defeat on M23 at the Runyoni frontline around this time, wounding Sultani Makenga and killing another rebel commander, Colonel Yusuf Mboneza.[26] Mboneza’s death was later disputed by pro-M23 sources.[27] There was a lull in fighting from 24 to 27 June.[115] Combat resumed on 28 June, as rebels attacked FARDC positions at Bushandaba, Ruseke and the strategic hill of Bikona.[116] Pro-government forces, consisting of the military and police, counter-attacked, and retook the villages of Nkokwe, Ruvumu, Rugarama, Rutakara, Ntamugenga and Rutsiro.[117] On 29 June, the FARDC continued its advance, capturing Kabindi and Chengerero, though M23 militants countered by attacking Rutsiro.[118]

On 1 July, the FARDC claimed to had won a major victory over M23 and allied Rwandan troops after heavy fighting at Rutsiro, Ntamugenga and Nyabikona,[119] completely evicting the insurgents from the Bweza grouping (French: groupement) in Rutshuru.[120] Clashes continued at Bikenge and Ruseke on 4 July, as the FARDC repelled M23 assaults.[121] On 6 July, the FARDC reorganized the leadership of the forces opposing M23 to improve their efficiency;[28] in addition, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi held a meeting on the same day. According to the Congolese side, a ceasefire and the withdrawal of M23 from Congolese soil was agreed upon. Instead of adhering to this agreement, the rebels attacked Kanyabusoro and Rwanguba on the following day.[122] Over the next days, clashes continued at various villages in the Bweza and Jomba groupements, as M23 attempted to retake territory.[123][124] At the same time, however, combat died down along other parts of the frontline.[125]

In the following days, combat largely ceased in the Bweza and Jomba groupements, but fighting erupted in the Kisigari groupement and at two important hills near Rumangabo.[126] Heavy fighting also took place in the Bashali-Mukoto groupement of Bashali Chiefdom, as two “Nyatura” factions clashed. One of them was a “dissident” group led by Jean-Marie Nyatura who was considered close to M23; Jean-Marie Nyatura’s force attempted to capture several villages before being evicted from most of them by its local rivals.[127] After this point, there was again a lull in fighting.[128] Negotiations continued between Rwanda and the DR Congo under international mediation, though little progress was made.[129] On 14 July, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni made another attempt at convincing M23 and the Congolese government to organize a ceasefire.[130] Meanwhile, MONUSCO and the FARDC announced that they were shifting forces from other areas to prepare for an operation to fully push M23 back.[131] On 18 July, Congolese government spokesman Patrick Muyaya Katembwe reaffirmed that any negotiations with the rebels depended on M23 retreating from its occupied territory beforehand.[132]

Anti-MONUSCO protests in Goma, July 2022

By the end of July, M23 was installing its own officials in the occupied territories and raised a tax.[133] Violent protests also erupted in Goma and other eastern Congolese cities, with civilians attacking MONUSCO members and buildings, accusing the organization of inaction in the face of the ongoing regional rebellions. Protesters, MONUSCO peacekeepers, and bystanders were killed during the clashes.[134] The North Africa Post alleged that the rebels had used the protests as cover for attacks, and had been involved in an attack on Moroccan peacekeepers at Nyamilima.[135] One MONUSCO soldier was killed in a direct clash with M23 at Bunagana.[136] On 27 July, fighting between M23 and FARDC resumed at Kabingo, Rutshuru, as the rebels attempted to harvest the crops planted by locals but were confronted by government soldiers.[137] On 2 August, the rebels and FARDC fought at five villages in Rutshuru.[138] In the following weeks, however, a truce held along the frontline. This was condemned by many local civilians who argued that it allowed the rebels to consolidate their territorial gains.[139]

On 15 August, the first contingent of East African Community peacekeepers arrived in Kivu.[140] This group, consisting of Burundian soldiers, pledged to assist in the campaign against M23 and other insurgent factions.[15] The arrival of the Burundian peacekeepers received mixed reactions by local civil groups; some welcomed them, some considered the Burundians to be exploitative foreigners, and some took a more neutral stance.[141] Sporadic clashes restarted on 16 August, when rebels, allegedly supported by Rwandan troops, attacked Rwanguba, Rangira, and Muhibira in Rutshuru.[142][143] The M23 leadership claimed that these operations were in response to FARDC aggression, and declared that it wanted a “dialogue” with the government.[144] On 19 August, M23 shelled FARDC positions at Jomba, Bweza and Busanza.[145]

Renewed offensive

Fighting renewed on 20 October after according to the FARDC, M23 attacked a military post. on 23 October M23 group captured the town of Ntamugenga killing five soldiers, fighting soon spread to the strategic RN2, four civilians were killed and 40 were injured in the fighting. By 24 October fighting caused more than 23,000 people to flee their homes.[146][147] the offensive continued along the RN2 highway leading to M23 capturing the towns of Rubare, Kalengera, and Kako.[148] On 29 October M23 rebels took control of Rutshuru and Kiwanja.[149] Around this time, allegedly Rwandan-equipped Nyatura rebels clashed with FDLR militants at in Rugari.[38] In response to the offensive, the government of the DRC ordered the Rwandan Ambassador to the country, Vincent Karega, to leave within the next 48 hours.[150]

Anti-Rwandan protests broke out on 31 October in Goma, demanding that the DRC leave the East African Community and that Russia intervene in the conflict. Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya said that the DRC would not negotiate with M23.[151] On 2 November, Kenya announced that it would send 900 soldiers to fight against the M23.[17] Riots broke out in Goma after rumors of the UN transporting M23, and several UN vehicles were burned by rioting civilians. The UN accounted a “strategic and tactical withdrawal” from the Rumangabo military base.[152] On 7 November, the Congolese military stated they were training 3,000 new recruits to go and fight M23,[153] and soon after began to bomb the rebels with two fighter jets. Rwanda protested that a Congolese Air Force Sukhoi Su-25 had violated its airspace.[40]

By 15 November 2022, M23 had pushed to the towns of Rugari and Tongo clashing with the FARDC. A M23 attack on Kibumba was initially repelled. As the insurgents advanced, hundreds of civilians fled.[154] By 17 November, M23 claimed to have captured the towns of Kibumba, Ruhunda, Buhumba, Kabuhanga, Tongo, and Mulimbi from the FDLR who they accuse of working with the Congolese army.[155] The Ugandan military said that they would participate in the fight against the M23 joining Kenyan troops.[156] On 18 November, Rwanda declared a ceasefire on behalf of the rebels.[157] By late November, the FARDC had reportedly formed a coalition with several local militias, including FLDR, Mai-Mai groups, and some Nyatura factions.[20]

A MONUSCO investigation reported in December that massacres by the M23 in November killed at least 131 civilians in the Rutshuru Territory villages of Bambo and Kishishe.[158] The victims included 102 men, 17 women and 12 children, each of whom were “arbitrarily executed … as part of reprisals against the civilian population” who were perceived to be aligned with the government.[158] On 23 December, M23 was forced by heavy international pressure to officially hand over Kibumba to the EAC Regional Force. Despite this, their withdrawal was only partial; the insurgents maintained a presence in the town’s outskirts. FARDC declared the alleged handover of Kibumba a “sham”, intended to distract from M23’s attempts to advance in other areas.[21] On 28 December 2022, South Sudan sent a contingency of 750 troops to join the East African Contingency to be stationed in Goma.[18] Over the next weeks, heavy fighting took place between M23 and a number of rival militias allied to FARDC, including APCLS which declared its aim to capture Bwiza from the rebels. Meanwhile, M23 captured several villages and the town of Nyamilima near the Ugandan border.[21]

In January, clashes continued even as M23 declared its intention to surrender the Rumangabo military base to the EAC Regional Force.[21] On 18 January Felix Tshisekedi accused the M23 of not withdrawing from the seized territory as agreed.[159] On 24 January a Congolese Su-25 was damaged by ground fire from Rwanda after Rwanda said it violated its airspace.[160] On 27 January M23 captured the city of Kitshanga causing people to flee and take refuge in the nearby UN base.[161] Kitshanga’s capture cut off the road linking Butembo, North Kivu’s second largest city, to Goma.[162] After two days of heavy fighting, M23 seized the village of Mushaki on February 24, forcing civilians to flee and threatening supply routes to Goma.[163] Three days later M23 took the town of Rubaya and its coltan mines.[164] The next day, the town of Mweso also fell to the rebels.[165]

In March, continued clashes caused 100,000 civilians to flee their homes.[166] Further attempts to implement a ceasefire, including one organized by Angola, had failed. However, M23 did withdraw from a few villages to hand them over to the EAC Regional Force.[167] At this point, the insurgents controlled much of the land north of Goma, while still advancing westward.[168] In late March and early April, M23 rebels vacated some villages, though also fought with a rival Nyatura faction during this withdrawal.[169] M23 also kept attacking the FARDC in other areas.[170]

On 3 April, Ugandan EAC soldiers entered Bunagana. However, instead of replacing the M23 occupation (as previously agreed), the peacekeepers coexisted with the rebels.[171] Such an arrangement was also observed at Rumangabo, where Kenyans and M23 inhabited the same base, and along the Sake-Kilolirwe-Kitshanga-Mwesso axis, where Burundian and rebel forces operated next to each other.[172] In addition, local sources suggested that M23 had begun to arm and train other militias.[171] On 10 April, M23 rebels completely retreated from the Bwito chiefdom in Rutshuru, allowing EAC peacekeepers to move in.[173] On the other side, the insurgents fortified and reinforced their positions in Kibumba, in one case in the direct vicinity to Kenyan EAC troops.[174]

In October 2023, the DRC ordered the EAC force in the country to leave by 8 December, due to a “lack of satisfactory results on the ground”.[175] On 26 October, the M23 rebels launched an offensive on Bambo, seizing the town.[176] Meanwhile, fighting continued to close in on the city of Goma, with clashes taking place 20 kilometers from the city.[177]

On 4 February 2024, M23 seized the town of Shasha, severing a road linking Goma to outside areas- M23 subsequently seized the towns of Kihindo, Kituva, Bukobati, and Nyamubingwa, and was in control of the Goma-Minova road by 5 February. The fighting caused many civilians and the Congolese military to flee to the town of Minova, and M23 ended up in control of all routes leading out of Goma.[178][179] The M23 rebels were advancing on the town of Sake by 7 February, causing many in the town to flee to Goma.[180] The town of Sake had been heavily defended by the Congolese government and the forces of MONUSCO over the course of a year.[181]

On 20 June, Rwandan president Paul Kagame declared to France 24, “we are ready to fight” against the DRC if necessary, while evading questions about Rwanda’s military presence in the region.[182] In July 2024, a report commissioned by the UN Security Council disclosed that between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan military interventions and operations had been conducted in the Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, and Masisi territories, collaborating with M23 rebels, with “Kigali exercising significant control over the rebel group’s operations.”[67][183] The report estimated that by April, the number of Rwandan troops was “matching if not surpassing” the estimated 3,000 M23 soldiers. It includes authenticated photographs, drone footage, video recordings, testimonies, and intelligence substantiating the RDF’s systematic border incursions.[67] The evidence depicts rows of armed personnel in uniform, operating equipment such as artillery, armored vehicles with radar and anti-aircraft missile systems, and troop transport trucks.[67] It also reveals that children as young as 12 were recruited from “nearly all refugee camps in Rwanda” by intelligence officers through false promises of payment or employment, only to be sent to training camps in the rebel-controlled zone under the supervision of Rwandan soldiers and M23 combatants.[67] On 5 August, nearly a hundred officers of the Congolese national police fled to Uganda as fighting between M23 and the Congolese army intensified.[184] Diplomatic efforts led by Angolan President João Lourenço stalled after the Rwandan delegation failed to attend a tripartite summit on 15 December in Luanda, which was intended to discuss the neutralization of the FDLR alongside Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and President Lourenço.[68][69][70][71][72] Rwanda’s absence heightened suspicions that its involvement in the DRC was driven primarily by economic interests, particularly access to the mineral resources in Kivu, rather than security-related concerns.[73][74]

January 2025: Intensified hostilities

On 4 January, M23 seized Masisi, a town with a population of 40,000 and the administrative seat of Masisi Territory. Agence France-Presse said that M23 forces had previously captured the Katale area before entering Masisi.[185] On 9 January, Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege called for the international community to impose strong sanctions on Rwanda, urging action beyond verbal condemnations.[186] The same day, M23 forces began moving toward Rubaya, a key area for the extraction of coltan, a mineral vital to global technology supply chains. On 13 January, FARDC reported successfully repelling an M23 offensive on its newly established positions in Ngungu, in the Mupfuni-Shanga groupement.[187][188] FARDC conducted airstrikes in Mbingi, a region it was expected to control but failed to maintain for more than a day due to reinforcements arriving for M23.[189] The following day, M23 fighters based in Mulimbi launched an assault on the Wazalendo stronghold in the Lubwe Sud urban area, within the Tongo groupement of Bwito Chiefdom. During an ambush by Wazalendo near Kiseguro, located in the Binza groupement in Rutshuru Territory, five members of the M23/RDF coalition were killed.[188][190] M23 fighters were apprehended while looting agricultural products from farmers.[188][190] Explosions from both heavy and light weaponry echoed for several hours after the ambush, particularly in the localities of Kiseguro and Ngwenda, where Wazalendo forces engaged in combat with M23 troops.[188] On the same day, M23 seized control of Luofu, approximately 60 kilometers from Lubero-center in Lubero Territory, which had been under FARDC control for over two days.[189] Humanitarian sources detailed accounts of atrocities, including the sexual assault of five young girls in Kalungu, 15 kilometers south of Minova in the Buzi groupement, Kalehe Territory, and two additional women in Bihovu, a locality within Shanje in Lowa-Numbi village.[191]

By 15 January, clashes between FARDC and M23 rebels continued in Alimbongo and Luofu villages within Lubero Territory.[189] That day, Wazalendo forces mounted another ambush in Kihondo, located within the Bwito Chiefdom. The engagement resulted in nine civilian fatalities perpetrated by M23 combatants.[190] Kihondo was subsequently occupied by FARDC, while Nyanzale was bifurcated—its southern region held by Wazalendo and the northern portion controlled by the M23-RDF coalition.[190] On 16 January, three civilians were shot in Masisi Territory, with one dying instantly and two critically injured and hospitalized.[192] In Ngungu, FARDC forces regrouped and moved toward Numbi in an attempt to reclaim the lost area.[192] On 17 January, one civilian was killed and two others injured by gunfire in Masisi-center. That morning, M23 forces advanced toward Kami-Lwanguba, Mashaki, Kironge, and Busekere, capturing a significant portion of Buabo while moving toward Kilambo. FARDC forces remained positioned in Luashi and around Kahongole, near Kahanga and Kasura. Meanwhile, Wazalendo units were also present in Buabo.[192] On 18 January, President Félix Tshisekedi reaffirmed Kinshasa’s refusal to engage in dialogue with M23, stating, “Legitimizing these criminals would be an insult to the victims and to international law”.[193] Tshisekedi criticized Kigali for its continued provocations, violations of agreements, and active support for M23, emphasizing that these actions compromised the credibility of the peace process outlined in the Luanda Agreement.[193]

On 19 January, the M23-RDF coalition annexed the mineral-rich towns of Lumbishi and Changue in Kalehe Territory.[194] On 20 January, the coalition launched a series of bombings targeting hills overlooking Sake in the Kamuronza groupement of Masisi Territory, which targeted FARDC and Wazalendo positions, primarily affected the locality of Kimoka near the Lushagala displaced persons camp. Despite the intensity of the attacks, the coalition was repelled.[194] However, later that evening, M23 forces captured Minova after intense fighting in Masisi Territory. Minova became the first significant urban center in South Kivu to fall to M23.[195] The occupation exacerbated an already precarious humanitarian situation, inflating the prices of essential commodities and displacing thousands more. Reports from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicated that 178,079 internally displaced persons sought refuge across seven health areas surrounding Minova, contributing to the swelling count of 700,000 displaced persons already registered in the Buzi groupement.[191] By 21 January, rebel forces had deployed across multiple locations within the town, commandeering positions previously held by FARDC and Wazalendo forces. Strategic vantage points such as Katale, Kachiazo, and the hills overlooking Minova were occupied to ensure dominion over Lake Kivu.[195] M23 forces then moved toward Kasunyu, a route leading to both Goma and Rwanda, effectively cutting off a critical supply route to Goma. The rebels also advanced toward Kalungu, located 7 kilometers from Minova, with the potential to reach Nyabibwe, another mining hub. The axis also pointed toward Kavumu, home to a regional airport.[195][196] Bweremana was taken by M23 following an artillery assault against FARDC forces. The situation rapidly escalated into a humanitarian crisis, compelling numerous residents to flee to safer locations, such as Burora and Nyamoma.[197] FARDC announced that they are continuing their fight against the M23 rebels and RDF on multiple fronts in the eastern region of the country, asserting that they are containing “the enemy” in the areas of Lubero, Sake, and Nyiragongo, while admitting to “breakthroughs” by M23 in Bweremana and Minova.[197]

By 22 January, M23 had entrenched itself within Minova and Kalungu in the Buzi groupement and expanded its dominion to Makelele and Butale in the Mbinga-Nord groupement.[198] OCHA concurrently reported that the violence led to large-scale population displacement, with over 178,000 people newly displaced from Bweremana, Minova, and Kalungu, and 125 injured people evacuated to Goma for advanced medical care. Meanwhile, Actualite.cd reported that at least 18 civilians, predominantly farmers, lost their lives during M23’s assault on Bweremana and Minova.[198][199] Goma experienced an electricity outage due to a SNEL (Société Nationale d’Électricité) failure on the 70 kV high-voltage line linking Bukavu to Goma, with SNEL informing customers that the situation was “beyond its control”.[200] South Africa dispatched Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs Angie Motshekga to the DRC, facilitating an appraisal of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) contingent embedded within the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) combatting M23.[201] On 23 January, intensified clashes erupted as the M23-RDF coalition launched a pre-dawn offensive against FARDC and Wazalendo positions near Sake, encompassing strategic corridors such as the Sake-Kirotshe, Sake-Mushaki, and Sake-Kitshanga roads.[202] The SADC Force, stationed in Sake, sustained casualties, including seven fatalities among South African personnel and over ten injuries.[201] MONUSCO mobilized reinforcements to fortify defenses around Sake and Goma but remained absent in Minova due to mandate restrictions.[203] Meanwhile, in Nyiragongo Territory, residents of Rusayo in the Mudja groupement reported incessant artillery and small arms fire. Simultaneous attacks by M23-RDF forces targeted Wazalendo and FARDC positions in Kilimanyoka and Kanyamahoro, approximately 20 kilometers north of Goma.[204] FARDC and Wazalendo successfully counterattacked, repelling M23 forces attempting to entrench themselves on Nditi Hill, near the Virunga National Park. Two civilians died in a bombing incident in the Turunga village by M23 and RDF coalition.[204][205] In Lubero Territory, three civilians, including a woman and a child, were wounded when a bomb fired by M23 from the hills surrounding the town of Alimbongo exploded in Lubango, 45 kilometers away from Lubero-centre.[206] In Kalehe Territory, two civilians were killed and several others wounded after M23’s heavy bombing by Sukhoi planes on Nyundo hill in the Chondo village.[207]

On the morning of 24 January, around 4 a.m., M23 launched explosives at multiple FARDC and Wazalendo resistance positions, particularly targeting Kanyamahoro, far from Kibati, heading towards Kibumba.[208] United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the actions of M23, calling for an immediate cessation of their advance, the withdrawal from occupied territories, and adherence to the 31 July 2024 ceasefire agreement, stating, “All actors must uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and cease all forms of support to armed groups, whether domestic or foreign”.[209] That evening, the military governor of North Kivu, Major General Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, was shot at approximately 9:00 p.m. in Sake. Cirimwami was subsequently evacuated to Kinshasa, where his death was confirmed.[210] Five MONUSCO peacekeepers sustained injuries, while four others had been wounded the previous day during combat in the same region.[211] CBCA Hospital in Ndosho admitted over 256 wounded individuals, including 90 civilians with severe injuries from gunfire and shelling.[212] Nicolas de Rivière, France’s Ambassador to the UN, reaffirmed France’s support for the sovereignty and Kinshasa’s request for an emergency open session of the United Nations Security Council.[213] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan advocated for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, expressed support for Angola’s mediation efforts, and affirmed his readiness to support any initiative promoting peace in the African Great Lakes region.[213] The German Foreign Ministry urgently called for Rwanda and M23 to immediately cease their military actions.[213] French politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon accused Rwanda of orchestrating an “invasion” of the DRC, asserting, “Rwanda is organizing the annexation of the neighboring province into Congolese territory”.[213] President João Lourenço condemned the occupation of Sake and Minova by the M23-RDF coalition, declaring, “These irresponsible actions by the M23 and its supporters are worsening the humanitarian situation, particularly around Goma, and threatening regional security”.[214] He assured the integrity and security of the troops of the Enhanced Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism (MVA-R) deployed in Goma as part of regional peace initiatives.[214]

On 25 January, fighting broke out between FARDC supported by Wazalendo and M23 supported by RDF advanced in the Masisi Territory’s Mweso axis in the Bashali Chiefdom and the Sake axis in the Bahunde Chiefdom, with FARDC and Wazalendo attempting to repel M23 and the RDF coalition while trying to halt their advance toward Goma, beginning the battle of the city on its outskirts.[215] In Mweso, at least two civilians, a woman and a child, who had been shot, died from their injuries shortly after being admitted to Mweso General Referral Hospital (Hôpital Général de Référence de Mweso).[215] Three Malawian Defence Force (MDF) soldiers, part of the regional mission SAMIDRC, were killed in Sake,[216] while nine SANDF soldiers lost their lives after succeeding in halting the M23 advance toward Goma and pushing the rebels back.[217] Six UN peacekeepers, from South Africa and Uruguay, were killed in M23 attacks.[11][218]

Goma under siege and escalation of the conflict

Attacks on displacement camps, civilian casualties, press attacks, and infrastructure disruptions

On 26 January at approximately 11:00 a.m., a bomb struck the Rusayo 1 and Rusayo 2 camps for displaced persons in Nyiragongo Territory, killing ten people, including women and children, while numerous injuries were reported.[219] On the same day, Actualite.cd reported that over 90 war-wounded, primarily suffering gunshot wounds, from various locations in Kalehe Territory and others from Goma hospital, had been receiving treatment by the ICRC at the Bukavu Provincial General Referral Hospital (Hôpital Général Provincial de Référence de Bukavu) since 1 January.[220] Three Sky News journalists, a reporter from Radio France Internationale/Agence France-Presse, and a journalist from Sake FM were attacked in Kihisi in Nyiragongo Territory while covering the dire situation of fleeing populations.[221] In response to these developments, Congolese government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya Katembwe criticized the African Union Commission for referring to M23 as a “political-military opposition”, emphasizing that the group is a terrorist organization supported by Rwanda. The government accused the African Union of creating confusion and instead urged a stronger denunciation of M23’s actions.[222][223] On the same day, M23 deployed reinforcements around Goma, advancing closer to the city and consolidating its strategic positions.[224]

The United Nations Special Representative in the DRC, Bintou Keita, briefed the Security Council on the severity of the situation. She noted that M23 had doubled the territory under its control since 2012.[224] MONUSCO expressed its readiness to assist the DRC in filing a formal complaint with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) over airspace violations involving M23, including incidents of GPS jamming at the Goma International Airport.[225] Amid the unrest, thunderous artillery blasts echoed throughout Goma and nearby Nyiragongo Territory, halting daily activities as residents sheltered indoors.[226] In the Mapendo neighborhood, opportunistic looters exploited the chaos to ransack businesses and deserted residences.[226] Congolese authorities confirmed that the border crossing points with Rwanda, including the small and large barriers, operated normally until their routine closure at 3:00 p.m. Meanwhile, sporadic gunfire in Nyiragongo Territory continued to displace masses, as refugees from Rutshuru fled to Goma to escape the ongoing bombardments.[227] Displacement camps in Nyiragongo Territory were targeted, with four bombs striking two locations, resulting in over ten fatalities, including women and children, and injuring numerous others.[227] FARDC deployed tanks at strategic spots in Goma, including the Birere Roundabout, and rotated troops to strengthen the northern front. At Goma International Airport, Romanian military instructors coordinated with FARDC forces and Wazalendo units to bolster security amid rising tensions.[227] M23 issued an ultimatum demanding the surrender of FARDC forces and imposing a 48-hour deadline, which led to some soldiers relinquishing their arms before the deadline expired.[228] Goma’s infrastructure faced severe challenges, including water and electricity outages, blocked roads, and persistent GPS interference, which threatened both civilian and humanitarian air operations.[229] Some residents fled to Bukavu, using boats to cross the Lake Kivu.[227]

Battle for Goma, military operations, and civil unrest in Kinshasa

Main article: Battle of Goma (2025)

Further information: 2025 Kinshasa riots

Early on 27 January, M23 announced on X that they had captured Goma, although there were still reports of fighting throughout the city.[230] Videos shared online showed M23 rebels patrolling the streets, and reports emerged of heavy shelling and a mass jailbreak from Goma’s prison, which housed 4,767 inmates and was reportedly set ablaze.[228][231] It was later reported that hundreds of female inmates were raped and burned alive during the Munzenze prison jailbreak.[232] M23 and RDF fighters advanced into strategic neighborhoods such as Majengo, Mabanga, and areas surrounding Goma International Airport. RVA (Régie des Voies Aériennes) personnel remained trapped at the airport.[233] Looting erupted in neighborhoods like Mapendo, Majengo, and the Office district.[233] Patrick Muyaya urged residents to remain indoors, avoid acts of vandalism and theft, and resist Rwanda’s alleged propaganda efforts.[234] Civilians sought refuge in MONUSCO bases, while local authorities, including the police mayor of Goma, remained in the city. Cross-border tensions escalated as stray gunfire reportedly struck Gisenyi in Rwanda, leading to five casualties.[235] Rwanda deployed tanks along the border.[236] M23 forces solidified control over northern Goma, with their visible activity in major neighborhoods signaling their tightening grip.[233] By mid-afternoon, Mount Goma—a strategic site hosting the provincial branch of Radio-Télévision nationale congolaise (RTNC)—fell under M23 control.[236][237] A trainee doctor working in the maternity ward at the provincial hospital near Mount Goma was shot during crossfire.[238] The World Food Programme (WFP) suspended its activities, cutting off essential food aid to 800,000 people.[236] By 7:00 p.m. that evening, FARDC reclaimed control of the RTNC station.[239] Vital Kamerhe, President of the National Assembly, announced that FARDC and Wazalendo forces “continue to hold certain positions in the city”.[240] On the same day, Agence France-Presse reported that the battle for Goma resulted in at least 17 fatalities and 367 injuries.[241]

On 28 January, large-scale civil unrest erupted in Kinshasa during the morning hours, as crowds gathered outside embassies, including those of Kenya, the US, Belgium, Rwanda, the Netherlands, Uganda, and France, demanding stronger international action and the immediate withdrawal of the M23-RDF coalition.[242][243][244][245] Outside the U.S. embassy, demonstrators torched tires and criticized Western nations for their perceived indifference, advocating instead for intensified Russian involvement.[242] Outside the Kenyan embassy, tensions escalated into property damage, looting, and break-ins, prompting the evacuation of two diplomatic personnel.[244] Congolese security forces quickly intervened, setting up security cordons around the embassies. Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner expressed remorse, affirming that measures were underway to restore order and assess damages.[244] Amidst the mounting unrest, SANDF responded to a video alleging its troops had surrendered to M23 rebels, clarifying that the white flag shown signified a temporary agreement with the M23 to recover casualties and provide medical assistance, rather than a surrender.[242] South Africa confirmed that four additional SANDF soldiers had been killed, bringing the total number of South African peacekeepers killed since the conflict escalated to 13.[246] Meanwhile, the ICRC reported an attack and looting of one of its warehouses in Goma and noted the worsening security situation in Sake, while its medical personnel at Ndosho Hospital in Goma faced an overwhelming influx of casualties, treating 198 patients despite the facility’s original capacity of 147 beds.[247] In response to the crisis, Germany suspended planned development aid negotiations with Rwanda, calling for an immediate withdrawal of M23-RDF forces from Congolese territory.[248] That evening, Brigadier General Evariste Somo Kakule was elevated to the rank of Major General and appointed as the new military governor of North Kivu.[249]

Offensive in Kalehe Territory, diplomatic tensions, advances toward Nyabibwe and humanitarian crisis

At dawn on 29 January, the M23-RDF coalition commenced an incursion into Kalehe Territory, launching coordinated offensives on Kiniezire and Mukwidja in Kalehe district capturing the towns.[250] In Kiniezire, intense skirmishes erupted between the coalition and FARDC-Wazalendo forces, whereas Mukwidja was seized without resistance.[251] Later that evening, prolonged firefights and bombings were reported in Turunga village within the Munigi groupement of the Bukumu Chiefdom, while movements of Wazalendo and other militant factions from Goma toward the chiefdom’s Mudja groupement had been reported since the preceding day, accompanied by sporadic gunfire.[252] During the same timeframe, over 300 men—allegedly “Romanian mercenaries” hired by the DRC to counter the rebel offensive—surrendered to M23 forces and, bereft of an alternative escape route, eventually handed themselves over to MUNUSCO peacekeeping units in Goma, who arranged for their repatriation via Kigali, Rwanda.[253][254][255] President Cyril Ramaphosa paid tribute to the 13 SANDF soldiers killed in the conflict, explicitly blaming M23 and “Rwandan army militias” for the clashes involving FARDC and SAMIDRC.[256] He also stressed that South Africa’s mission in the DRC “is not a declaration of war against any country or state”.[256] In response, President Paul Kagame cautioned that “South Africa is not positioned to act as a mediator or peacemaker”, warning against direct confrontation, stating that “If South Africa prefers confrontation, Rwanda will address the matter as such at any time”.[256] Meanwhile, President Félix Tshisekedi called for a national mobilization, urging citizens to rally behind FARDC against what he called “Rwanda’s barbaric aggression”.[257]

The next day, on 30 January at around 5:00 a.m., the M23-RDF coalition, having advanced from Mukwidja, confronted FARDC troops in Kalangala village. The village, strategically positioned between Mukwidja and Nyabibwe, lies 6 km from Mukwidja and 56 km from the administrative town of Kalehe.[258] That evening, the country’s electoral commission, CENI, revealed that between 28 and 29 January, the coalition had transported election-related materials—including vehicles, motorcycles, and electoral kits—from Goma to Rwanda and had detained several officials from North Kivu’s CENI Provincial Executive Secretariat.[259] Concurrently, Agence France-Presse reported an alarming escalation in the death toll, reporting that “more than 100 people” had been killed, nearly a thousand wounded, and upwards of 500,000 civilians forcibly displaced since the onset of January.[260] Meanwhile, La Croix affirmed that the M23-RDF coalition had commandeered Goma International Airport and had asserted near-total control over the city.[261] The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC, Bruno Lemarquis, issued an urgent plea for the immediate reinstatement of airport operations, cautioning that its prolonged closure or restricted accessibility would severely hinder humanitarian relief efforts.[262] Simultaneously, Deputy Prime Minister Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita declared that FARDC would not retreat or engage in talks near Kigali, stating, “we will stand and fight; there will be no other withdrawal”.[263]

FARDC counteroffensive and expansion into Kalehe Territory

On 31 January, at approximately 1:00 p.m., FARDC launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming Mukwidja, Sanzi, Muganzo, and adjacent localities.[264] Clashes persisted in Ukana and Nyamigisha, while Lieutenant Jérémie Meya Gbe, spokesperson for FARDC’s Sukola North-South Kivu military campaign, confirmed that clashes had spread beyond Nyabibwe.[264] FARDC intensified efforts to thwart further M23 incursions toward Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu. That evening, authorities in Bukavu inaugurated a recruitment initiative for volunteers willing to enlist in the battle against M23.[265] Many youths expressed readiness to enlist with the Wazalendo militia to defend national sovereignty against what was described as “Rwandan aggression”.[265] UPDF announced its intent to “strengthen its defenses” in eastern DRC.[266] Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric provided an alarming update on the humanitarian crisis, disclosing that “more than 700 people” had been killed and 2,800 wounded within a mere five-day span of intensified conflict, with casualty figures based on assessments conducted collaboratively by the World Health Organization (WHO), its affiliated partners, and the Congolese government between 26 and 30 January.[267][268]

On 1 February, Colonel Alexis Rugabisha, commander of FARDC’s 12th Brigade, was killed in combat against M23-RDF forces on the Kanyanja axis near Kiniezire, after leading a counteroffensive that successfully expelled M23 militants from Nyabibwe toward the periphery of Minova, before ultimately succumbing to battlefield injuries.[269][270][271] That same day, EAC convened a virtual summit, chaired by President William Ruto, calling for an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire in eastern DRC and urging Kinshasa to engage in direct dialogue with all stakeholders, including M23.[272] While President Paul Kagame participated in the summit, his Congolese counterpart, Félix Tshisekedi, abstained, with his office citing scheduling constraints.[272] Muyaya dismissed the EAC’s stance, asserting that the regional bloc was failing to acknowledge Rwanda’s role in the conflict.[272] Muyaya questioned why Rwanda had not been asked to engage in dialogue with FDLR if they truly sought a peaceful resolution.[272] The following day, the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) announced that two of its soldiers had been killed and four others wounded in clashes with the M23-RDF coalition between 24 and 28 January in Sake and Goma.[273] On 3 February, M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire but warned that it would continue to defend its positions if attacked.[270][271] Despite this announcement, reports indicated that M23 was reinforcing its positions with additional troops and equipment in Kalehe Territory.[270][271] FARDC forces subsequently retook Mambasa, the capital of Bamate Chiefdom in Lubero Territory, forcing M23 to retreat to the village of Nduta near Alimbongo.[274] Meanwhile, protests erupted in Butembo, where residents organized two marches—one covering 19 kilometers to Musienene and another spanning 45 kilometers to Lubero-center—in support of FARDC and in opposition to M23’s presence in the region.[274] Casualties mounted, with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reporting a staggering toll of at least 900 fatalities and approximately 2,880 injuries.[275] In response to the worsening security situation, Congolese ministers Jean-Pierre Bemba and Ève Bazaiba traveled to Kisangani, where they gathered several hundred young volunteers to enlist in FARDC’s ranks.[276] Meanwhile, President Cyril Ramaphosa called for the cessation of M23’s territorial expansion and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Congolese territory.[277]

On 4 February, Deputy Administrator of Kalehe Territory, Archimède Karhebwa, reported that M23-RDF forces had advanced into Nyamasasa and engaged in further clashes with FARDC.[270][271] While he stated that Bukavu remained “spared from immediate danger”, rebel forces continued their progression, capturing Murambi and Kabugizi villages before moving into Luhefu and Kisale.[271] In Mukwija, M23 reportedly forced Catholic priests to vacate a local convent before consolidating their presence in the area.[271] Meanwhile, European Council President António Costa revealed that he had held discussions with both President Tshisekedi and President Kagame regarding the crisis.[278] Costa expressed optimism that constructive talks would occur in Dar es Salaam under the auspices of the SADC and the EAC during the forthcoming International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), scheduled to convene on 7 and 8 February.[278] On 5 February, M23-RDF forces mounted an offensive against Nyabibwe, a strategic locality positioned along National Road No. 2 leading to Bukavu. Fighting erupted around 3:00 a.m., with the rebels breaching FARDC’s defensive lines on the Nyanganwa-Chanjé axis.[279] Within hours, M23 secured Nyabibwe, establishing a foothold in the area by midday and preparing to advance toward Kalehe-Ihusi.[279] FARDC’s military justice system issued an arrest warrant against Corneille Nangaa, accusing him of failing to prevent or suppress acts of torture committed under his authority.[280] An official directive mandated Nangaa’s immediate arrest and transfer to Congolese authorities for prosecution.[280] That same day the head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma, Vivian van de Perre, said M23 may have had a sudden rethink after 2,000 extra reinforcements from Burundi arrived in Bukavu and a nearby airport was used by the Congolese air force.[232] On 6 February, M23 rebels were halted in Bushushu village of Kalehe Territory after capturing Nyamukubi and Lushebere.[281] On 7 February, the Fonds de Promotion de l’Industrie (FPI) reported that its facilities in Goma had been looted by M23-RDF forces.[282] The perpetrators forced entry, absconding with a secure vault containing $7,500 and 4 million Congolese francs, alongside an FPI transport vehicle, with the misappropriated assets purportedly transported into Rwanda.[282] Two vehicles belonging to the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) were commandeered. The FPI also noted that numerous executives of state-owned enterprises had gone into hiding due to mounting threats to their safety.[282]

Calls for ceasefire; strategic decisions; and further advances

On 8 February, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) denounced M23 and RDF, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities, a full withdrawal from unlawfully occupied territories, and adherence to established humanitarian corridor agreements.[283] That same day, M23 launched a bombing attack in Ndoluma, near the Lubero front line, killing 14 people, including civilians.[284] A SADC-EAC summit convened, attended by regional leaders, where President Tshisekedi participated via videoconference from the African Union City in Kinshasa.[285] The DRC delegation called for Rwanda’s condemnation, the withdrawal of its troops, and the reopening of Goma International Airport to facilitate humanitarian aid.[286] The summit mandated the EAC-SADC Chiefs of Defence Forces to convene within five days to provide technical guidance on enforcing a ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian assistance, securing Goma and its surroundings, reopening critical supply routes, and ensuring safe navigation on Lake Kivu.[287] It also ordered a joint ministerial meeting to be held within 30 days to evaluate military measures, implement a coordination framework, and allocate financial resources for ongoing security interventions,[288] and reaffirmed the merger of the Luanda and Nairobi peace efforts into a unified framework.[289] President Ramaphosa endorsed the summit’s resolutions, emphasizing that they would pave the way for the withdrawal of SAMIDRC troops.[290]

On 10 February, Congolese Deputy Minister of National Defense and Veterans, Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita, visited Beni, where he led a security council meeting and addressed FARDC troops stationed on the front lines.[291] That evening, M23 launched a bomb attack in Ndoluma, Lubero, killing a civilian and several FARDC soldiers.[292] The following day, at approximately 1:00 a.m., unidentified armed men assassinated Chief Prosper Kimanuka Musakura and his three children in Kiziba II, a village in the Mudja groupement of Bukumu Chiefdom, which had been under M23-RDF control since late January.[293][294] Later that afternoon, M23-RDF forces launched artillery strikes on FARDC positions in Kivisire, situated 15 kilometers from Mambasa.[292] The same day, OCHA reported that since 29 January, about 30,000 people had fled villages along the Minova coast, relocating to Idjwi Territory, Kalehe center, Katana, Kavumu, Mudaka, and Bukavu, while others moved to Bunyakiri, west of Kalehe center, and Kalungu, to the north.[295] OCHA also documented severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence and looting, particularly in Ihusi.[295] In Goma, many displaced persons faced difficulties returning home due to restrictions on crossing Lake Kivu between Nzulo (North Kivu) and Bugulube (South Kivu).[295] On 12 February, M23 recaptured Kalehe center and Ihusi after heavy clashes with FARDC, forcing government troops to withdraw to avert encirclement. The rebels advanced further toward Chibanda, Kasheke, and Kabamba, consolidating control over much of Kalehe Territory’s coastal areas, from Minova to Kalehe center.[296] The high plateau region, including Buloho Chiefdom, remained under FARDC control.[296] Meanwhile, in Goma, three suspected armed bandits were burned alive by civilians following accusations of murder.[297] On 13 February, M23 forces moved into Chofi, five kilometers from Kalehe center, and clashed with FARDC in Luzira and Kasheke in Kabare Territory.[298] Simultaneously, fighting erupted in Kivisire, about ten kilometers from Mambasa.[299] That same day, revolutionary Goma-based musician Delphin Katembo Vinywasiki, known as Delcat Idengo, was assassinated—allegedly targeted for opposing M23 after escaping Munzenze prison when Goma fell to the rebels in late January.[300][301][302][303][304] The European Parliament urged Rwanda to withdraw its troops from the DRC and called for a suspension of the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains, citing concerns over Rwanda’s alleged mineral exploitation in M23-controlled areas, and recommended freezing budgetary support to Rwanda until it ceases its interference in the conflict.[305] In a bid to de-escalate tensions, a delegation from the Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO) and Église du Christ au Congo (ECC) visited Kagame in Kigali as part of a broader initiative for regional peace.[306] Prior to this meeting, the delegation held discussions in Kinshasa with Tshisekedi and other political figures, including Vital Kamerhe and Martin Fayulu. They also met with Nangaa in Goma the preceding day, advocating for an immediate ceasefire, the reopening of Goma’s airport and port, and the establishment of a humanitarian corridor.[306]

Advances on Bukavu and surrounding regions

See also: 2025 Bukavu offensive

On 14 February, M23 occupied Kalehe and Kabare territories, seizing Kabamba and Katana. Fighting in Kabamba, a locality bordering Kalehe Territory, lasted through the night before the Congolese army withdrew to Katana around 9:00 a.m.[307] M23 then advanced toward Kavumu, forcing FARDC to retreat to Kavumu Airport.[307] As a result, many civilians fled to Bukavu, while others remained trapped in their homes as clashes continued.[308][307] Human Rights Watch urged the African Union (AU) to take decisive action and support the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution on the DRC.[309] By midday, M23 had successfully overrun Kavumu Airport, approximately 30 kilometers from Bukavu, despite continued resistance from FARDC.[308] Civilian movement remained restricted, with some venturing onto the streets despite ongoing insecurity.[308] Later that day, M23 reportedly entered Bukavu itself,[310] where widespread looting occurred, particularly in the industrial zone, affecting Datco, Pharmakina, and WFP facilities.[311] It was later reported that M23 executed a significant number of children during the occupation, though the precise number of casualties remained unverified.[312][313][314] Amid the ongoing conflict, the Bukavu High Court sentenced 212 soldiers to death, convicting them of murder, attempted murder, sexual violence, and dereliction of duty in the face of the adversary during the M23 incursion.[315] An additional 70 soldiers were acquitted and released. Meanwhile, in Munich, Tshisekedi, attending the Security Conference, excoriated Rwanda for what he called a “disguised aggression” against the DRC, asserting that “the M23 is a screen behind which the Rwandan army hides” and accused former President Joseph Kabila of being “the real sponsor” behind the rebellion, alleging that he had formed an alliance with Kigali to destabilize the nation.[316] The EU expressed concern over the continued advance of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)-M23 coalition in Bukavu, warning that violations of the DRC’s territorial integrity would not go unanswered.[317] ICRC reported increased casualties following M23’s advance into Bukavu, with sporadic gunfire and looting recorded.[318] Two fatalities and fourteen injured people were admitted to Hôpital Provincial Général de Référence de Bukavu (HPGRB).[318]

On 15 February, sporadic gunfire and widespread looting persisted in Bukavu, though M23 did not advance beyond Kavumu Airport.[319] That evening, M23 convened a meeting in Miti, approximately 27 kilometers from Bukavu.[319] FARDC troops were sporadically sighted in certain neighborhoods, though their strategic positioning remained uncertain.[319] French President Emmanuel Macron called for M23’s “immediate withdrawal” from Bukavu and Kavumu Airport following discussions with Tshisekedi.[320] France concurrently signaled its willingness to impose new multilateral sanctions on actors contributing to the armed conflict.[321] Belgium followed suit, condemning the M23-RDF offensive and demanding the rebels’ immediate withdrawal.[320] That night, FARDC and Wazalendo forces regained near-total control of the city, forcing M23 to retreat in large numbers.[322] On 16 February, a resurgent M23-AFC and RDF force re-entered Bukavu around 6:00 a.m., positioning themselves in key locations, including Independence Square (Place de l’Indépendance).[323][324] M23’s deputy coordinator, Bertrand Bisimwa, officially announced on X the group’s entry into Bukavu.[323] Demonstrations erupted across the city, including outside the Governorate, as residents cautiously emerged from their homes.[324] Some attempted to attend places of worship despite widespread power outages affecting parts of the city.[324] The Congolese government issued an advisory urging residents to remain indoors to avoid potential harm and assured citizens that efforts were underway to restore order and national sovereignty.[325] The United Kingdom condemned the rebels’ advance, calling for an immediate ceasefire, while international organizations—including the United Nations and various humanitarian agencies—called for urgent intervention to forestall a large-scale humanitarian crisis.[326] The following day, Bukavu was eerily quiet, described as a “ghost town” with economic activities at a halt. Streets were strewn with debris as residents cautiously assessed the aftermath and sought to resume normal life.[327] Meanwhile, Burundian authorities reported that approximately 10,000 Congolese refugees had entered the country, with some crossing via Gatumba and others navigating the Ruzizi River into Bubanza and Cibitoke provinces.[328]

Humanitarian situation and renewed offensives in Lubero, Butembo and Kamanyola

See also: 2025 Butembo offensive

By 18 February, the humanitarian situation worsened, as the Red Cross of the DRC reported 26 deaths and disclosed that between 14 and 17 February, the HPGRB had received 39 individuals wounded by firearm projectiles.[329][330] The number of wounded swiftly escalated to 176.[331] The OHCHR estimated that approximately 330,000 children had been forced out of school, with many at risk of never returning.[332] The ferry service between Bukavu and Goma, which had been suspended by M23 at the end of January 2025, was reinstated at 6:00 a.m., which allowed the evacuation of diverse groups of civilians from the embattled city.[333] Concurrently, at approximately 4:00 a.m., M23 and RDF forces initiated renewed offensives in Lubero, launching assaults on FARDC’s entrenched positions along the strategic highlands of Vutsorovya, Alimbongo, Tchulo, and Mambasa, which flank National Road 2 en route to Butembo.[334] Intense fighting persisted throughout the afternoon, with heavy and light artillery fire engulfing multiple villages, including Lubango, Kipese, and Kitsombiro—an important FARDC rear base.[334] The skirmishes induced large-scale civilian displacement, with many residents fleeing toward Butembo via Lubero. Others who had initially sought refuge in Lubango and Kipese continued their journey toward Butembo.[334] At the Lubero front, the clashes unfolded approximately 40 kilometers from Lubero, where the Ugandan army maintains a major base in Mulo as part of joint operations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).[334] In Masisi Territory, recurrent armed engagements between Wazalendo and M23 were reported, particularly in Mweso. Masisi and Mweso’s health zones were among the hardest hit, with Masisi’s General Reference Hospital coming under gunfire since 16 February, injuring a Ministry of Public Health employee.[335]

By the later part of 18 February, M23-RDF forces had seized control of Ndoluma, a locality known for its livestock husbandry, after intense fighting led to the withdrawal of FARDC from Mutongo, Mambasa and Kanyambi.[336] Ndoluma’s telecommunications infrastructure was also damaged.[336] Meanwhile, in the Kamanyola groupement, M23 took control following clashes with the Burundian National Defence Force (FDNB), while FARDC retreated to Uvira—a border city situated 75 kilometers away along the periphery of Lake Tanganyika, adjacent to Burundi.[337] The Kamanyola’s takeover led to a new wave of displacement, leaving only 20% of the local population behind.[337] Belgium reassessed its diplomatic and developmental cooperation with Rwanda and initiated the suspension of bilateral financial assistance.[338] In retaliation, Rwanda unilaterally abrogated the 2024–2029 bilateral aid agreement with Belgium, denouncing Brussels for allegedly conspiring with Kinshasa to hinder its access to international development financing.[338] Meanwhile, the United Kingdom summoned the Rwandan High Commissioner following M23’s territorial advances.[339] Concurrently, UPDF contingents deployed under the auspices of Operation Shujaa—a joint military effort with FARDC against ADF in Beni and Irumu territories—arrived in Bunia and established its headquarters at the Rwampara military center, southeast of Bunia, within the Tséré groupement of Irumu Territory.[340] This deployment became controversial due to inflammatory pronouncements by the Ugandan Chief of Defence Forces Muhoozi Kainerugaba, a known sympathizer of M23.[340] Days before the deployment, Kainerugaba issued “threatening” messages via X, vowing that UPDF forces would advance into Bunia to combat CODECO in Djugu Territory and issued an ultimatum, warning that all armed factions operating within Bunia had 24 hours to surrender, failing which they would be considered enemies and subjected to UPDF military action.[340]

Conflict in Uvira and adjacent areas

See also: 2025 Uvira offensive

As M23 troops advanced toward Uvira, reports surfaced of armed altercations between FARDC and Wazalendo from 18 February into the early hours of 19 February, resulting in at least 17 fatalities.[341][342] Wazalendo fighters blocked FARDC units from retreating to Kalemie with weapons and ammunition, demanding full disarmament and summarily executing those who defied the directive.[341] Escaping soldiers turned on civilians, looting homes, stealing valuables, and causing destruction. Those who attempted to resist were met with lethal force.[341] More than 500 detainees, including civilian and military prisoners, escaped from Mulunge Prison in Uvira.[343] A widely circulated video on social media showed hundreds of FARDC soldiers boarding a boat at Kalundu Port in Uvira en route to Kalemie.[341] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported receiving a large number of injured people while simultaneously dealing with widespread looting, which hampered emergency medical response, including ambulance services.[342] The violence led to the shutdown of banks, pharmacies, markets, and medical facilities.[344] Civilians fled in all directions, with some escaping into Burundi, others seeking refuge in remote plateaus, and many heading toward Kalemie and Moba,[341] while political and administrative officials, along with a large portion of the police and military personnel, fled to neighboring areas such as Burundi, Kalemie, and Tanzania.[344] Meanwhile, AFC-M23, captured Sange in Bafuliiru Chiefdom, with rebel convoys advancing along National Road 5 (RN5), approximately 35 kilometers from Uvira.[345] Residents, fearing potential violence, fled into the mountains.[345] In Lubero, AFC-M23 secured Kitsombiro by approximately 9:00 a.m., following intense clashes that had earlier led to the fall of Ndoluma. FARDC regrouped at Katondi, 5 kilometers north of Kitsombiro, establishing defensive lines with the intent of launching a counteroffensive.[346] Fighting between FARDC and M23 persisted between Katondi and Kitsombiro, with reports suggesting that attempted to displace M23 toward the outskirts. Despite these efforts, M23 retained its dominance over the battlefield as night approached.[346] In Fizi Territory, Michel Rukunda, alias Makanika, a Twirwaneho militia leader aligned with M23 and AFC, was killed in Minembwe by a Congolese military drone.[347][1] The Congolese government accused Rwanda of trying to overthrow Tshisekedi, while Kayikwamba called the UN to implement “robust sanctions” against Rwanda and the AFC-M23 rebel faction.[348] Meanwhile, a Facebook post widely shared on social media reported clandestine M23 recruitment operations in Kisangani.[349] In response, Major General Timothée Mujinga, commander of the 31st Military Region, dismissed these claims as “unfounded rumors” and “false information”, affirming that the Congolese National Police (PNC) and FARDC remained fully operational to safeguard civilian security and property.[349]

On 20 February, multiple FARDC battalions were observed moving through Uvira from the Ruzizi Plain toward Kalundu Port, ostensibly preparing to embark for Kalemie.[350] Within Uvira, segments of the city remained under Wazalendo dominion, while most residents remained sequestered in their homes.[350] In Lubero Territory, M23 rebels attempted an offensive but were pushed back by FARDC forces in Katondi, forcing them to retreat to the outskirts without being fully dislodged.[351] Unable to engage on National Road No. 2, they took an alternate route through Kasima, arriving in Kipese by nightfall, which serves as a gateway to Butembo.[352] In Walungu Territory, M23 rebels advanced toward the administrative center of Walungu from Cisheke and Kashanja.[353] Simultaneously, in Masisi, an MSF employee was wounded when gunfire struck the organization’s base.[354] That same day, the United States sanctioned Rwandan General James Kabarebe and M23 spokesman Laurence Kanyuka.[355] During the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in South Africa, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy condemned Rwanda’s military operations in the DRC and warned of potential diplomatic repercussions if Rwanda continued to violate Congolese territorial integrity.[356] On 21 February, looting incidents were reported in combat zones around Butembo, particularly along the Lubero front, where M23 and FARDC forces had engaged in successive clashes.[357] Some retreating FARDC soldiers were accused of ransacking properties in villages they passed through.[357] That day, Twirwaneho captured Minembwe and its airfield.[1] The UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2773 demanding that M23 rebels immediately cease their offensive. The resolution, spearheaded by France’s permanent representative to the UN, also called upon Rwandan forces to halt their support for the M23 insurgency and withdraw from Congolese territory.[358][359][360]

Humanitarian impact and continued conflict

On 23 February 2025, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye met with Tshisekedi at N’djili International Airport in Kinshasa for a private discussion. No official statement was issued following their exchange.[361] On the same day, M23 and RDF forces killed over a dozen civilians in Goma.[362] Despite launching a new offensive in Kasinjwe, behind Kipese toward Masereka, M23 forces were repelled by FARDC and Wazalendo units stationed in Masereka. The frontline remained unchanged, with M23 forces holding Kipese and Kitsombiro, while FARDC maintained control over routes leading to Lubero and Lukanga, key pathways to Butembo.[363] On 24 February, at a high-level session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Suminwa accentuated the escalating death toll, stating that more than 7,000 people had been killed since January and that approximately 450,000 people were left homeless following the destruction of 90 displacement camps.[364][365][366] The DRC also welcomed Resolution 2773,[367] and on that day, the European Union suspended defense consultations with Rwanda and initiated a review of its memorandum of understanding on strategic raw materials, citing concerns over Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict,[368] although a second wave of sanctions was blocked by Luxembourg‘s veto.[369] The UK also took measures, announcing a £14.6 million aid package for conflict-affected populations in eastern DRC while freezing bilateral aid to Rwanda, except for humanitarian aid.[370][371] The UK further suspended military training assistance to the RDF and initiated a review of export licenses for military equipment intended for Rwanda. British officials urged the DRC to consider an inclusive dialogue involving the M23, a proposal firmly rejected by the Congolese government.[370][371]

On 25 February, fighting in Uvira between FARDC and Wazalendo left 20 dead and 60 injured,[372] while SANDF disclosed that military personnel wounded in late January skirmishes with M23 in Goma had been medically evacuated to South Africa for treatment, though the exact number was undisclosed. SANDF units under the SAMIRDC framework maintained their operational presence in Goma.[373] Simultaneously, MSF reported that between 19 and 20 February, 34 out of 47 healthcare facilities across North Kivu had suffered varying degrees of operational incapacitation due to the incessant violence, with Goma’s main hospitals overwhelmed by an influx of casualties.[374] In Mwenga Territory, FARDC and Wazalendo battled Twirwaneho forces, now under the command of Charles Sematama, whose alliance with Burundian Tutsi RED-Tabara rebels enabled them to seize Mikenge.[375] In Sange, FARDC and Wazalendo clashed over Mugenyi II, resulting in seven deaths as FARDC attempted to reoccupy a former MONUSCO base after withdrawing to Uvira amid the M23 advance.[376] In Rutshuru Territory, three civilians were killed in Kibirizi, Bwito Chiefdom, by M23 and AFC forces.[377] On 26 February, reports emerged of forced recruitment efforts by AFC-M23 forces targeting finalist and pre-finalist students in Kamanyola, Goma, and Nyiragongo Territory. Fearing conscription, many parents removed their children from schools, while others attempted to flee the affected areas.[378] Within Nyiragongo Territory, on the periphery of Goma, at least fifteen people died in an inferno that erupted during an M23-RDF operation near Don Bosco Ngangi, while at least five other civilians were shot in their homes during the incursion.[379] In Uvira, FARDC’s Operation Sukola 2 in South Kivu was launched to track down deserters and soldiers accused of harassment and misconduct amid the ongoing conflict.[380] Meanwhile, in Kalehe Territory, two village chiefs were assassinated during the night of 25–26 February: Joseph Birikunguba Bitamenyeka Kanyere, the chief of Batayo village, was murdered in Mulunguzi—an area under Wazalendo control—while Bahati Cirhahola Jackson, the chief of the sub-village of Nyamutwe in Kasheke, was executed in an M23-controlled zone.[381]

On 27 February, multiple explosions occurred during an M23-AFC meeting at Place de l’Indépendance in Bukavu as Nangaa was concluding a high-profile session, resulting in at least 13 fatalities and 70 injuries.[382][383][384] M23’s official casualty figures reported 11 deaths and 65 injuries.[385] Tshisekedi denounced the attack, labeling it a “heinous terrorist act” and attributing culpability to “a foreign army illegally present on Congolese soil”, albeit without explicitly identifying Rwanda or the M23-AFC alliance.[386] Meanwhile, M23 denied responsibility for the attack and accused the Congolese government of orchestrating the attack.[385] Reports also emerged from the Groupe de Travail Thématique Mines et Hydrocarbures (GTTMH) of South Kivu’s civil society, alleging that M23-AFC forces looted the CJX Minerals processing entity on the night of 19–20 February.[387] The group reported that M23-AFC troops abducted security personnel, disabled surveillance cameras, and facilitated the transfer of mineral resources to Rwanda for sale to companies such as Traxys and Sunrise.[387] The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Rwandan ambassador to demand clarification on Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict,[388] and UN peacekeeping officials visited Kinshasa to discuss the implementation of Resolution 2773.[389] On 28 February, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel explained his veto of a second wave of EU sanctions, emphasizing that a sustainable political solution, mediated by local and regional actors, was essential for resolving the crisis.[369] Bettel further stated that should the joint SADC-EAC ministerial meeting scheduled for Harare yield no progress, the EU would contemplate additional sanctions targeting Rwanda.[369] On 1 March, an alliance comprising Twirwaneho, RED-Tabara, and the Android coalition, allied with M23, attacked Wazalendo positions in Bilalombili village near Mikenge, where displaced populations from Mikenge and surrounding areas had sought refuge.[390] Several houses were burned, though the extent of the damage was not immediately clear.[390] In Walungu Territory, M23 advanced to Bwahungu and Muzinzi after capturing Walungu center and Kashanja, following battles against FARDC and Wazalendo forces.[391] On the same day, M23-AFC claimed to have handed over a group of FDLR fighters to the RDF at the Grande Barrière border post in Rubavu District.[392] FARDC’s spokesperson Major General Sylvain Ekenge dismissed this claim, describing it as a fabricated plot aimed at discrediting the FARDC and SADC forces.[392] Ekenge argued that the detainees had been presented by Rwandan media on 22 January 2025, accusing Rwanda of faking their capture to justify military action in eastern DRC and further stating that these FDLR detainees had been held at Gitarama central prison in Rwanda and dressed in new FARDC military uniforms from the depot to mislead the public into believing they had been captured in Goma.[392][393][394]

Diplomatic developments and clashes

On 3 March, Canada suspended export permits, government-to-government business pursuits, private-sector support, and participation in international events hosted by Rwanda or proposed by Kigali.[395][396] It also pledged 15 million Canadian dollars in humanitarian aid for crisis-affected populations in the DRC.[395][396] That same day, the OHCHR reported that M23 rebels had abducted at least 130 sick and wounded people from CBCA Ndosho Hospital and Heal Africa Hospital in Goma—116 from CBCA and an additional 15 from Heal Africa.[397][398] Germany similarly suspended new development aid to Rwanda and initiated a reassessment of its extant financial commitments.[399][400][401] On 5 March, heavy fighting in Mikenge saw Wazalendo forces, led by Kakobanya Nakalambi, reclaim the village from M23-allied militias Twirwaneho, RED-Tabara, and Android, forcing their retreat to Kalinga, six kilometers away in Mwenga Territory.[402] That same day, during a public speech in Kikwit, Congolese Deputy Prime Minister of Transport and Communication Channels, Jean-Pierre Bemba, called on Congolese youth to join FARDC in defending the country “against its aggressors” and accused Joseph Kabila of backing M23, the AFC, and the Mobondo militia, which was engaged in conflicts in western DRC.[403][404] Meanwhile, the scheduled SADC-EAC ministerial meeting in Harare was postponed indefinitely.[405]

On the night of 7 March, after five days of occupation, M23 fighters withdrew from Kasugho, located at the foot of the Tayna Gorilla Reserve, 45 kilometers west of Lubero, and moved toward Bunyatenge, a gold-rich area six hours away on foot.[406] The withdrawal occurred without confrontation. The civil society reported that the UPDF, which had been stationed on the Lubero-Kasugho route, took over Kasugho, while local officials claimed it was now under Wazalendo control.[406] Some believe M23’s retreat was to accommodate the Ugandan army, as General Kainerugaba had posted on X that M23 should pull back 20 kilometers south from Lubero (Kitsombiro, Kipese, Kasugho) to open up Ugandan-influenced zones.[406] However, their movement toward Bunyatenge complicates the situation, as the town’s strategic gold reserves and proximity to Mbwavinywa—home to Forces Patriotiques Populaires-Armee du People (FPP-AP) headquarters led by Kasereka Kasiyano, known as General Kabidon, a key Wazalendo leader and strong Kinshasa ally.[406] That same day, in Mbwavinywa, a village near Bunyatenge in southern Lubero Territory, General Kabidon declared that the Front Commun de la Résistance (FCR)—a coalition of the FPP-AP and Mapenzi’s Nduma Défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R)—had formally aligned with M23 and AFC units.[407] FARDC’s spokesperson for the northern front, Colonel Mak Hazukay, condemned Kabidon’s defection, characterizing it as a betrayal motivated by mining interests.[408] On 8 March, Justice Minister Constant Mutamba announced a $9 million bounty for wanted individuals, including $5 million for Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, and Makenga.[409][410][411] With the occupation of Goma by M23 rebels and the mass escape of prisoners from the central prison of Munzenze, the security situation continued to degenerate precipitously. Between 8–9 March, Goma experienced a surge in violence that left three dead. The first incident occurred in Katindo, where M23 rebels attacked a group playing cards, fatally shooting a young man as he attempted to flee.[412] In Majengo, Jackson Kilimandjaro Mutondwe, son of former deputy Valérien Nzanzu Kenda Kenda, was killed at home by unknown assailants. The third victim was found lifeless on Mutakato Avenue in Mabanga Sud.[412] According to Actualite.cd, at least 53 violent deaths were recorded in Goma and Nyiragongo throughout February 2025.[412] On 9 March, Nyabiondo, long an APCLS stronghold under Janvier Karairi, fell to M23 and AFC rebels after intense two-day clashes with FARDC and Wazalendo. APCLS reportedly withdrew before the takeover.[413] The fighting displaced locals to villages in Masisi Territory, with many fleeing to Kashebere in the Luberike groupement in Walikale Territory, 12 kilometers from Nyabiondo. M23, having seized key areas in Masisi Territory, advanced toward resource-rich Walikale, coveted for its minerals.[413] On 10 March, FARDC and Wazalendo elements of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) engaged M23 forces in Kaziba Chiefdom, the second in Walungu Territory affected after Ngweshe Chiefdom.[414] M23 advanced from Nyangezi through the Nyanfunzu escarpments to Mushenyi, a strategic gateway to Kaziba Chiefdom, where it clashed with FARDC and Wazalendo units in Cibanda groupement.[414] Later that night, M23 and AFC forces seized the chiefdom’s capital Lwanguku, targeting the royal court, where gunfire was reported to persist. Reports suggested that the rebels had entered the town center but had not secured full dominance over the entire chiefdom.[415]

Amid escalating violence, Tshisekedi met with Lourenço in Luanda on 11 March to discuss the deteriorating security situation. Angola offered to mediate talks between the Congolese government and M23;[416][417][418] however, Kinshasa insisted that any discussions be conducted within the framework of UNSC Resolution 2773, which aligns with the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, as well as the resolutions from the Dar es Salaam summit.[419] The Congolese government reiterated its stance that M23’s involvement should be addressed within this framework.[419] That same day, HRW reported that since M23 and AFC captured Goma in January, they had systematically threatened, detained, and attacked journalists, critics, and activists.[420] HRW further noted that M23 fighters in North and South Kivu had issued death threats through audio recordings of phone calls, messages, and speeches, targeting independent media and civil society organizations.[420] Over 200 activists had sought protection as a result, as the rebels also employed intimidation tactics to restrict the population’s access to information and suppress dissent, making it increasingly difficult for journalists to report on the situation in Goma.[420] On 12 March, M23 and AFC forces arrived in Idjwi Territory, a historically demilitarized zone, disembarking from maritime vessels without encountering resistance and subsequently convening a meeting.[421] With the annexation of Idjwi, M23 and AFC consolidated their control over seven of South Kivu’s eight territories—Kabare, Walungu, Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga, and now Idjwi—leaving only Shabunda Territory unaffected at this juncture.[421] On the same day, France suspended new development aid projects in Rwanda and pledged to improve humanitarian assistance for approximately seven million displaced individuals affected by the conflict.[422] Concurrently, following the capture of Kaziba Chiefdom, M23 and AFC forces advanced toward Rurambo and Kigarama in Bafuliiru Chiefdom, where they met resistance from Ruma Hondwa’s Wazalendo faction.[3] The fighting in Rurambo and Kigarama persisted into 13 March, but Hondwa’s faction ultimately withdrew after Fuliiru rebel leader Rushaba and his Wazalendo faction defected to M23 and AFC.[3] Shortly thereafter, Rushaba’s Wazalendo unit from Masango welcomed M23 and AFC fighters in Kashama, ceding several strategic locations to facilitate their movement into the area.[3] Rushaba’s defection was seen as a blow to the Task Force—a coalition of Congolese and Burundian forces allied with Wazalendo fighters. Having previously fought alongside Nyamusaraba and Burundian forces within the Task Force, Rushaba’s shift in loyalty triggered new clashes in Kashama before he joined M23 and AFC in battling the Task Force in Kigarama.[3] Concurrently, the SADC declared the cessation of its military intervention, announcing a phased withdrawal of its SAMIDRC troops, and its alignment with the SADC-EAC summit’s resolutions on merging the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes while welcoming UNSC Resolution 2773.[423][424][425] In Goma, M23 and AFC rebels raided CBCA Ndosho hospital at night, shooting a man and causing widespread panic.[426]

On 14 March, due to rising tensions in Walikale, Alphamin Bisie Mining (ABM), the DRC’s largest tin producer, located 180 km northwest of Goma, 60 km from Walikale, and 32 km from the Walikale-Kisangani road, ceased its operations.[427][428][429] That same day, the EU Council announced delayed sanctions against nine individuals linked to the ongoing violence but withheld their names, with EU foreign ministers scheduled to approve the sanctions on 17 March in Brussels.[430][431][432] M23 forces in Cirunga, Kabare Territory‘s capital, killed a suspected Wazalendo combatant who attempted to push them out near the central prison on 14 March afternoon.[433] Meanwhile, G7 foreign ministers from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US, along with the EU’s High Representative, met in Quebec from 12–14 March, condemning the M23 offensive and the subsequent violence, displacement, and human rights abuses, while calling for support for EAC and SADC-led mediation, accountability for all armed groups’ abuses, and a peaceful, inclusive resolution.[434] On 15 March, Lourenço urged a ceasefire from midnight on 16 March, including ending attacks on civilians and territorial advances, to foster peace talks in Luanda between the Congolese government and M23.[435] However, instead of observing the ceasefire, M23 and AFC occupied the Ntea village in the Ihana groupement, Walikale Territory.[436] Simultaneously, Wazalendo forces took control of Kaziba Chiefdom and the localities of Kigarama and Rurambo in the Uvira highlands.[437] M23 and AFC elements advancing from Kaziba Chiefdom reached as far as Marungu and Kahololo, areas that serve as strongholds for the Twirwaheno, Android, and RED-Tabara coalition, while also housing IDP camps that were placed under the protection of the Twirweneho following the departure of MONUSCO.[437] In Fizi Territory, Trésor Ebuela wa Seba, also known as Ebuela Mtetezi, leader of the Wazalendo FPDC-ML faction, was killed in a confrontation with another Wazalendo faction.[438][439] Intelligence sources reported that two Wazalendo military convoys from Maniema, led by a commander identified as Brauni and en route to reinforce Uvira under General William Yakutumba, were intercepted by Commander Toronto’s Wazalendo forces in Lutete, north of Baraka.[438] The ensuing clashes lasted for several hours, resulting in the deaths of Mtetezi and several others. Some sources alleged that Mtetezi had facilitated M23-AFC advances in Fizi Territory’s highlands and intended to align with M23-RDF-AFC, though his associates denied these claims.[438] On 16 March, M23 and AFC forces captured Kibua, situated over 80 km from Walikale, defying the ceasefire call.[436]

Diplomatic ramifications and Walikale offensive

See also: 2025 Walikale offensive

The following day, 17 March, the two factions expanded their territorial control by seizing Mpofi in the Utunda groupement, 52 km from Walikale. Armed clashes continued in Mutakato village within the Banabangi groupement, leading to the mass displacement of Walikale’s population.[436][440] Displaced persons traveled along the RN3 road towards Kisangani, with villages along the Kisangani axis, including Losso, Mungele, Tingi Tingi, Lubutu, Mubi, Ndjingala, Lobu, and Makana, receiving thousands of refugees from Walikale.[440] That day, Belgium announced reciprocal diplomatic measures after Rwanda decided to sever diplomatic ties and expel Belgian diplomats within 48 hours. Rwanda justified the move by accusing Belgium of neocolonial ambitions, a violent historical role, and hostility toward Kigali in the DRC conflict while also accusing it of sheltering groups promoting genocidal ideology.[441] Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévôt called the decision “disproportionate” and regretted that “when we disagree with Rwanda, it prefers not to engage in dialogue”. In response, Belgium summoned Rwanda’s chargé d’affaires, declared Rwandan diplomats persona non grata, and suspended government cooperation agreements.[441] Meanwhile, as previously scheduled, the EU imposed targeted sanctions on Rwandan officials and M23 leaders. Sanctioned RDF officers include Ruki Karusisi, commander of special forces in eastern DRC; Eugène Nkubito, 3rd Division commander in North Kivu since 2022; and Pascal Muhizi, 2nd Division commander in eastern DRC since 2023.[442][443] Among M23 rebels, the EU sanctioned leader Bisimwa, already under UN sanctions, along with recruitment head Désiré Rukomera, Colonel John Imani Nzenze, deputy finance chief Jean-Bosco Nzabonimpa Mupenzi, and finance leader-turned-North Kivu governor Jean Bahati Musanga, while also listing Francis Kamanzi, CEO of Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board, for exploiting conflict minerals and Gasabo Gold Refinery for illegally importing gold from M23-controlled areas.[442][443] In response, AFC and M23 rescinded their participation in the Angolan-mediated Luanda talks, decrying the sanctions as impediments to dialogue and accusing international institutions of “sabotaging” peace efforts while claiming the measures strengthened Tshisekedi’s alleged “warmongering” stance.[444][445][446] A joint SADC-EAC ministerial meeting held in Harare adopted a roadmap awaiting approval at a subsequent summit, with immediate measures set to be implemented within 30 days, including military-level dialogue for an unconditional ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, reopening of Goma and Kavumu airports, and evacuation of conflict zones.[447] A Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), comprising SADC and EAC representatives with possible reinforcements from the ICGLR and MONUSCO, was established to monitor compliance, while a technical assessment team of 12 to 16 experts evaluated the security, humanitarian, and infrastructural situation in North and South Kivu.[447] Medium-term measures (30-120 days) focus on confidence-building, negotiations, and mediation, with a permanent ceasefire declaration and an enhanced MONUSCO role advocated. Notably, the SADC-EAC statement did not explicitly acknowledge Rwanda’s involvement in supporting M23.[447] Meanwhile, the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region (ICG), led by Germany and including Belgium, Denmark, the EU, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, reaffirmed support for Angola’s de-escalation efforts while also calling for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2773 and the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and M23 forces from the DRC.[448] In Walikale, FARDC and Wazalendo forces, reinforced by troops from Bunia, halted the M23 and AFC advance, forcing the rebels to retreat to Mpofi.[449]

On 18 March, M23 and AFC engaged Wazalendo forces in clashes at Kembe, located between Ruvungi and Mpofi along the Walikale road. Fighting continued until midday, with Wazalendo launching offensives from Kibua while M23 and AFC attempted to reinforce their position in Mpofi.[450] On the humanitarian front, the Congolese Red Cross, cited by Amnesty International, reported the recovery of 406 bodies, including 110 civilians, in South Kivu between 17 February and 13 March.[451] In Bukavu alone, 43 bodies, including 29 civilians, were collected. Amnesty International attributed the escalating violence and civilian casualties primarily to M23 operations in the region.[451] During a Doha meeting mediated by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, with Tshisekedi and Kagame also welcoming progress in the Luanda and Nairobi processes, the EAC-SADC summit, and pledging to continue talks for a lasting resolution.[452][453][454] On 19 March, M23 and AFC rebels overran FARDC defensive positions in Ngora, 12 km from Walikale, advancing to Mubanda, just 4 km from Walikale’s threshold, while FARDC troops moved along the Kisangani axis.[455] Later that evening, M23 and AFC captured Walikale after conducting a two-pronged offensive strategy—one contingent engaging Wazalendo forces in Kembe and Kigoma, while the other advanced via Ngora to Mubanda, thus cutting off FARDC’s frontline contingents along the Masisi-Walikale transit corridor.[456] That same day, UNJHRO published its January 2025 human rights report, documenting 309 violations across the DRC, affecting 808 victims (550 men, 114 women, 95 individuals of unknown gender and age, and 49 children).[457] North Kivu accounted for 60% of reported abuses, followed by Ituri and South Kivu (13.9% each). North Kivu recorded eight victims of conflict-related sexual violence (three attributed to M23, three to FDLR, and two to FARDC), while South Kivu had three cases (two linked to Nyatura Wazalendo and one to FARDC).[457] M23 was identified as the primary perpetrator of serious violations against children, accounting for 69% of cases, followed by Nyatura (12%) and Mai-Mai Mazembe (7%).[458] Meanwhile, in Fizi Territory, Wazalendo, led by self-proclaimed General Kakobanya Nakalambi, clashed with the Twirwaheno, Android, and RED-Tabara coalition, allied with M23, in Mikenge, Mwenga Territory, leaving five Twirwaneho fighters dead and several others injured.[459]

By 20 March, M23 and AFC secured key positions in Walikale, including Kigoma airfield, Nyalusukulabure military camp, the unit podium, the territorial office, and Kirima height in Kisima. Some residents fled, while others sought refuge at Walikale General Hospital and the MSF base.[460] China reaffirmed its support for the DRC’s sovereignty, condemned M23’s occupation, and urged an immediate withdrawal while also expressing readiness to ratify a bilateral security cooperation agreement with the DRC.[461] Meanwhile, in Fizi Territory, Wazalendo combat units clashed with Twirwaneho, Android, and RED-Tabara contingents in Kawera village, six kilometers from Minembwe, as part of an assertive campaign to reclaim strategic footholds.[462] On 21 March, a small white twin-engine aircraft with an undetermined registration number landed at Kigoma airfield for 30 minutes before departing. The previous afternoon, another unidentified aircraft had flown over Walikale without landing.[463] Two people, including a police officer, succumbed to gunshot wounds at Walikale General Hospital following engagements between the M23-AFC coalition and the FARDC-Wazalendo alliance.[464] Explosions were reported across Walikale as Wazalendo launched a counteroffensive, while a Sukhoi military jet conducted an airstrike targeting Kigoma airfield.[465] M23 and AFC rebels issued a three-day ultimatum for those sheltering at the general hospital and MSF base to return home. Many residents fear this is an attempt to use them as human shields, believing Wazalendo’s resistance is far from over.[466] In Uvira Territory, Wazalendo forces led by self-proclaimed General Ilunga Rusesema and General Jean Nalube clashed with RDF troops attempting to cross into Muravya. Fighting was reported in Marimba, Rubarati, and surrounding villages.[467] Concurrently, Twirwaneho and M23 fighters stationed in Kahololo sought to advance toward Muravya via Masango but encountered resistance from Wazalendo. In a separate maneuver, M23 and RDF forces attempted to cross from Kageregere toward Muranvia-Minembwe.[467] In Minembwe, Wazalendo engaged with the Twirwaneho-RED Tabara-Android coalition near Mulira and Kakenge, following Wazalendo’s recapture of several villages in the Mutambala sector.[468] The strategic village of Kawera was retaken by Wazalendo, which continued its advance toward Minembwe, reclaiming Kivumu, Irumba, and Nyagishasha.[468] In Masisi Territory, Charles Kalibiri, the village chief of Malehe within the Kamuronza groupement, was executed at point-blank range by unidentified assailants in the Birere 1 neighborhood in Sake.[469]

Withdrawal fallout, uncertain peace efforts, and ongoing counteroffensives

On 22 March, M23 and AFC declared their withdrawal from Walikale and nearby areas, three days after seizing control. They cited efforts to “promote conditions for peace initiatives and political dialogue”.[470][471] Their communique alluded to the unilateral ceasefire proclamation of 22 February, yet warned that any FARDC offensive against their positions or civilians within their controlled territories would nullify the withdrawal. However, M23 and AFC fighters remained stationed in four out of Walikale’s six neighborhoods.[471] In response, Kayikwamba remarked, “We are all being tested by our words and actions. Many promises, commitments, and concessions have been made. We will see if M23 truly withdraws and prioritizes dialogue, peace, and human lives, which have not been a priority so far”.[472] She stressed the need for “concrete actions”, reaffirming the DRC’s commitment to peace through dialogue while urging M23 to consider civilian welfare.[472] FARDC pledged to monitor the withdrawal east of Kibati in alignment with the 18 March joint declaration by Qatar, the DRC, and Rwanda.[473] While refraining from launching offensives, FARDC encouraged Wazalendo to support de-escalation and ongoing peace negotiations but maintained the right to intervene if the ceasefire, civilians, or territorial integrity were threatened.[473] That same day, amid prolonged hostilities and stalled diplomatic efforts, Kayikwamba stated that the government was open to direct negotiations with M23 to halt violence against civilians, declaring, “Given the evolution of the conflict and the ineffectiveness of previous ceasefires, we deemed it appropriate to engage in direct discussions with the M23 if this can help stop the violence”.[474] In Walungu Territory, M23 forces clashed with Wazalendo in Nyangezi, Kamina Hill, and Namurambira as Wazalendo attempted to retake the Munya center.[475] The intense fighting resulted in mass displacement, with residents reporting explosions throughout the region.[475] In Kisangani, four children fleeing clashes between the FARDC and M23 and AFC rebels in Walikale died when a tree fell on them during heavy rain in Mika Forest.[476] On 23 March, M23 rebels were spotted advancing through the forest of the Bilo Bilo village near Mubi.[473] Rwanda welcomed M23’s repositioning from Walikale and Kinshasa’s halt of FARDC and Wazalendo offensives, reaffirming its commitment to regional stability.[477] Meanwhile, Ituri’s military governor, General Johnny Luboya Nkashama, faced public threats from Muhoozi, who called him “very stupid” and accused him of opposing UPDF operations. Muhoozi warned of his imminent arrest and suggested the UPDF would capture Kisangani if M23 delayed.[478] FARDC Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Jules Banza Mwilambwe arrived in Kisangani to inspect military units in the 3rd defense zone.[479] In Walikale, M23 rebels killed a civilian and looted an abandoned FARDC ration depot at Kigoma airfield.[479]

On 24 March, an unidentified white twin-engine aircraft again landed and departed from Kigoma airfield, its origin unclear as Walikale remained under M23 control.[480] Lourenço stated that Angola had exhausted efforts to mediate disputes fueling instability in eastern DRC and would defer the matter to the AU to appoint a new mediator.[481][482][483] A joint SADC-EAC virtual summit, co-chaired by Kenyan President William Ruto and Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa, adopted the 17 March ministerial report and ordered its implementation, while leaders reaffirmed commitments from the 8 February EAC-SADC summit, the 14 February AU Peace and Security Council meeting, and UNSC Resolution 2773, stressing the need for coordinated efforts to address the crisis.[484] In Goma, a 13-year-old girl’s body was found floating in Lake Kivu, and four other bodies—including that of 24-year-old Bisimwa Marie Wani—were discovered in different neighborhoods as analysts believe some victims found in Congolese Republican Guard uniforms had been moved and dressed in fatigues to obscure their identities.[485] On 25 March, Wazalendo temporarily occupied Katana in Kabare Territory before retreating soon after.[486] In Walikale, the Congolese Red Cross collected at least 30 bodies, mostly civilians and soldiers.[487][488] By 26 March, M23 and AFC rebels had fortified their positions both aerially and terrestrially. A plane carrying additional M23 and AFC rebels landed at Kigoma airfield, while FARDC reinforcements arrived by land, strengthening positions in Boboro, 24 km from Walikale, with more troops from Biruwe.[489][490] Three people were killed and three others injured during clashes between M23-AFC and Wazalendo forces in Luchembe village, which straddles Buleusa and Rusamabu in the Ikobo groupement of Walikale Territory.[491] M23 and AFC then seized Buleusa, while Wazalendo held Rusamabu, forcing many residents to flee to Miriki in southern Lubero Territory.[491] On 27 March, the FARDC carried out airstrikes on Kigoma airfield after an aircraft landed, using drones and a Sukhoi fighter jet. The bombardment targeted M23 and AFC assets, destroying an aircraft and a vehicle.[490][492] Bintou Keita cautioned the UNSC that M23 and AFC were expanding their operations further into North and South Kivu with potential incursions into Tshopo and Maniema and urged the reopening of Goma and Kavumu airports to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries and MONUSCO troop rotations.[493][494]

The following day, on 28 March, SADC chiefs of staff and AFC-M23 leaders convened at Goma’s Serena Hotel to negotiate the immediate withdrawal of the SADC regional force, SAMIDRC, from Goma.[495][496] Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire and the unconditional withdrawal of SAMIDRC as M23 and AFC agreed to ensure the safe departure of SADC troops along with their arms and equipment while surrendering any FARDC weaponry in their possession and the meeting included a joint evaluation of Goma International Airport for reopening as SADC pledged to undertake necessary repairs.[495][496] From 28–29 March, four young girls were reportedly raped by armed men in civilian clothes in Goma’s Kasika neighborhood of Karisimbi commune.[497] On 30 March, Wazalendo attacked M23-AFC’s position at Walikale’s administrative office, destroying it and advancing to the Nyalusukula military camp near Walikale hospital before withdrawing.[498] On the southern axis, M23 and AFC forces patrolling the Walikale-Nyasi road clashed with Wazalendo in Kampala, situated six kilometers from Walikale,[498] resulting in the fatalities of seven rebels and one Muzalendo fighter, with two others injured.[499] In response, M23 and AFC scaled back their patrol operations in Walikale, shifting their focus to securing Kangambili, Nyabangi, and Cité Belge—routes commonly exploited by Wazalendo for their operations.[499] In Goma’s Karisimbi commune, three bodies were found, all killed by gunfire.[500] On 31 March, bandits broke into several homes in Ndosho, stealing phones and money. A young woman was fatally shot.[500] On 1 April, Wazalendo units from APCLS, led by Janvier Karairi, attacked Masisi from the Nyabiondo-Bukombo axis but were forced to retreat due to logistical setbacks, leaving Masisi under M23-AFC control.[501] In Goma’s Katindo neighborhood, phone credit seller Oswald Nshuti was fatally shot, and his money stolen. Another body was found on 2 April in Majengo, Karisimbi.[500] M23-AFC rebels withdrew from Walikale between 1–3 April,[502] though some sources suggest that Wazalendo’s offensive on 2 April had already compelled their retreat before FARDC forces entered on 3 April.[503] FARDC and Wazalendo redeployed to Walikale, securing Kigoma airfield, the territorial administrative office, and Nyalusukula military camp, enabling displaced persons to return.[502] On 3 April gunfire erupted in Walikale hitting the MSF base as the skirmish stemmed from an internal Wazalendo dispute where one faction attempted to loot while another opposed them resulting in five Wazalendo fighters injured two in serious condition and one civilian casualty.[504][503] In response to the crisis, France committed €3 million in emergency assistance for eastern DRC.[505] Meanwhile, former Sankuru Governor Joseph-Stéphane Mukumadi formally declared his allegiance to M23-AFC rebels.[506]

Analysis

Rwandan role

Main article: Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda conflict

Further information: Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda relations

As a result of the M23 advances in 2022, Bintou Keita, top UN official for the DRC, described the group as having “conducted itself as a conventional army, rather than an armed group,” and warned that the group’s capabilities exceeded that of MONUSCO.[507] According to United Nations Security Council researchers, the presence of individuals in Rwandan uniforms among the rebels has been proven through photos and drone footage, partially explaining the M23 forces’ increased professionalism.[28] Congolese researcher Josaphat Musamba concurred, arguing that it was “clear that there is support” behind M23’s resurgence. Congo Research Group director Jason Stearns stated that, though there was “no certainty” about Rwanda backing the M23 offensive, the rebels’ firepower and various frontline reports made Rwandan involvement “very likely”. Regardless of Rwanda’s possible role in the offensive, analysts cautioned that M23 had never been just a Rwandan pawn, and always maintained its own agenda.[508]

In early August 2022, a report for the UN by independent researchers provided further evidence about Rwandan support for M23, including photos and videos showcasing Rwandan soldiers moving into Congolese territory and M23 troops armed with Rwandan weaponry.[5][509] In October, a Rwandan soldier surrendered to MONUSCO at Kiwanja; the Congolese government regarded this as a further proof of Rwandan support for the rebel offensive.[38] By January 2023, the United States, several European countries, and UN experts believed that Rwanda was supporting M23.[21]

By 2025 it was estimated that 4000 to 7000 RDF soldiers were fighting in Congo and had suffered significant casualties. Satellite images also showed significant expansion in the Kanombe military cemetery in Kigali, where at least 600 graves have been dug since the beginning of the offensive.[510]

Economic and commercial interests

M23 troops in the mining town of Bunagana

Critics argue that both M23 and Rwanda have opportunistically exploited the presence of the FDLR as a pretext for broader political and economic ambitions in eastern DRC,[511][74][512][513] particularly since the FDLR no longer poses a substantial military threat to Rwanda.[81][61][514][68] A December 2023 UNSC-commissioned report revealed that since October 2023, RDF soldiers had been deployed in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, and Masisi territories, with RDF and M23 receiving support from 250 e-x FDLR combatants under Rwanda’s Defence Intelligence Directorate.[515] There is substantial evidence suggesting that rebel factions backed by Rwanda and Uganda—including M23—control strategic yet informal supply chains that transport valuable minerals from the Kivu region to both countries.[516] The corridor from Bunagana on the Ugandan border, through Kanyabayonga to Goma on the Rwandan border, encompasses a lucrative mining belt containing some of the world’s largest deposits of coltan, a mineral essential for the production of electronic devices.[516][54] The DRC is also the world’s largest producer of cobalt, a key component in electric vehicle batteries, which are in high demand globally.[517]

Bibatama Mining Concession, the largest coltan mine in the African Great Lakes region and a major contributor to the country’s mining economy, accounting for 15% of global coltan production, has been under M23 control since April 2024.[518]

In 2021, U.S. data indicated that Rwanda accounted for 15% of the world’s tantalum supply, a derivative of coltan ore, despite producing only modest amounts domestically.[519] In March 2023, Congolese Finance Minister Nicolas Kazadi reported that the country was losing approximately $1 billion annually due to minerals being illicitly smuggled into Rwanda. He noted that Rwanda’s 2022 mineral exports—including gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten—were valued at nearly $1 billion, despite the country having limited known reserves.[519][520][521] The U.S. also purchased 36% of its tantalum imports from Rwanda—more than from any other country—while only 7% came from the DRC, a major tantalum producer. Rwanda has utilized an international network of elites to facilitate the smuggling, sale, and monetization of DRC minerals through militarized trade routes.[519] Kigali has received institutional backing to commercialize these minerals via an industry-led compliance framework and companies such as AVX Corporation, KEMET Corporation, and Global Advanced Metals, which manufacture electronic components. These firms have been accused of knowingly purchasing minerals of illicit origin.[519] Due diligence teams from major technology companies—including Apple, Intel, Sony, Motorola, and Lockheed Martin—have also been informed that minerals sourced from Rwanda were likely smuggled from the DRC, often under conditions of violent exploitation.[519] Despite this, these minerals continue to be integrated into global supply chains for products ranging from laptops to aircraft. Rwanda, in turn, has cultivated an image as a stable and efficient trading hub within the mineral sector.[519]

In a separate but related case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in February 2022 that Uganda must pay $325 million to the DRC in reparations for its role in conflicts between 1998 and 2003, which included the deaths of thousands of civilians in Ituri Province, the funding of rebel groups, and the illicit extraction of natural resources such as gold, diamonds, and timber.[522][54] Since then, gold has since become Uganda’s leading export, with much of it reportedly originating from DRC mines.[523] Similarly, while the DRC accounted for 40% of the world’s coltan output in 2019,[54][524][525] substantial amounts are reportedly funneled illicitly into Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.[526] UN investigations have found that while most of the DRC’s contraband coltan is routed through Rwanda, a notable portion is also transported via Bunagana and Rutshuru into Uganda and through Uvira into Burundi.[54]

European Union agreements and controversy

In October 2023, the European Union (EU) signed a partnership with the DRC and Zambia to develop raw material supply chains, including infrastructure investment and sustainable resource extraction. The EU stated that securing a stable supply of critical minerals was essential for meeting its green energy and climate goals.[527][528] In February 2024, the EU announced a similar agreement with Rwanda, aiming to “nurture sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials”.[529] The EU’s investments in Rwanda’s mineral sector between 2021 and 2024 amounted to $260 million. The agreement recognized Rwanda as a key player in global tantalum production, as well as a producer of tin, tungsten, gold, niobium, and potentially lithium and rare earth elements.[528] The EU further praised Rwanda’s regulatory environment, stating that it could serve as a hub for mineral processing and value addition. The announcement was met with immediate criticism from the Congolese government and civil society organizations. President Félix Tshisekedi described the deal as a “provocation of very, very bad taste”, arguing that it would legitimize mineral smuggling and exploitation.[528][530][531][532] He asserted that the agreement effectively allowed Rwanda to profit from “the blood of our compatriots”.[530][531][533] DRC Foreign Minister Christophe Lutundula accused the EU of complicity in the “looting and aggression” against the DRC, citing other EU-Rwanda agreements on security and military cooperation.[528][534][535][536] Notably, Rwandan President Paul Kagame himself acknowledged that Rwanda serves as a transit point for smuggled Congolese minerals. He stated that minerals from the DRC pass through Rwanda to destinations including Brussels, Tel Aviv, Russia, and Dubai.[528]

Geopolitical and economic rivalry between Rwanda and Uganda

In November 2020, the Ugandan construction company Dott Services, a co-financier and developer of road networks linking Uganda and the DRC, entered a joint venture with the Congolese state-owned mining company Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (Sakima).[54] This agreement granted Dott Services access to strategic mining sites in Maniema Province, an area rich in tin, tantalum, gold, and tungsten. Under the terms of the deal, Dott Services secured a 70% ownership stake, with Sakima retaining 30%. Additionally, Dott Services is committed to establishing a mineral processing facility alongside its infrastructure projects.[54] The company is widely believed to have close ties to Uganda’s political elite.[54]

Rwanda has also sought to assert its influence in the region’s mining sector. In June 2021, Kagame and Tshisekedi signed an agreement allowing Dither Ltd—a company reportedly linked to the Rwandan military—to refine gold mined by Sakima.[54] The stated objective of the agreement was to curb revenue streams for armed groups operating in the mining sector. However, the DRC suspended the deal in June 2022, citing Rwanda’s alleged support for the resurgent M23 rebellion.[54] Ugandan officials have argued that Rwanda’s increasing support for M23 was motivated, at least in part, by the disruption of its economic ventures in the DRC. During the M23 offensive in Bunagana on 23 March 2022, Ugandan soldiers intervened to safeguard Dott Services personnel and assets. The incident heightened tensions between Uganda and Rwanda, which accused the other of leveraging M23 for economic gain.[54] In Kampala, officials alleged that Rwandan-backed M23 elements orchestrated the attack to disrupt Uganda’s operations in the DRC. Conversely, in Kigali, officials accused Uganda of using M23 affiliates to seize the border town, a crucial transit hub for Dott Services.[54]

Motives of M23

Stearns argued that the new M23 offensive was possibly aimed at enforcing the group’s inclusion in a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme. Previous attempts of M23 at becoming part of this process, including after the 2013 agreement, failed due to considerable opposition by the Congolese public. One of the issues hampering any attempts to achieve M23’s complete demobilisation is the fact that several members of the rebel group are known to have committed various war crimes over several years of involvement in insurgencies, even before M23 itself had emerged. This makes their integration into the Congolese security forces or rewarding them with amnesties difficult to justify in the DR Congo.[508]

Notes

References

Works cited

- “Easing the Turmoil in the Eastern DR Congo and Great Lakes” (PDF). Crisis Group Africa Briefing (181). Nairobi, Brussels: International Crisis Group. 25 May 2022. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 May 2022. Retrieved 13 June 2022.

Further reading

- Dahir, Abdi Latif (17 June 2022). “Congo Closes Border With Rwanda After Soldier Is Killed in Gunfight”. The New York Times. Retrieved 18 December 2023.

- Vogel, Christoph; Hoffmann, Kasper (22 May 2022). “What M23’s on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC’s precarious search for peace”. The Conversation. Retrieved 18 June 2022.

- Walsh, Declan; Bashizi, Arlette (17 December 2023). “The Overlooked Crisis in Congo: ‘We Live in War’”. The New York Times. Retrieved 18 December 2023.

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=M23_campaign_(2022–present)&oldid=1283792696”

Russian invasion of Ukraine

A request that this article title be changed to Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–present) is under discussion. Please do not move this article until the discussion is closed.

It has been suggested that this article be split into a new article titled 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Discuss) (March 2025)

This article is about the invasion that began in 2022. For other invasions that took place on the territory of Ukraine, see List of invasions and occupations of Ukraine.

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which had started in 2014.[16] The invasion, the largest and deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II,[17][18][19] has caused hundreds of thousands of military casualties and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties. As of 2025, Russian troops occupy about 20% of Ukraine. From a population of 41 million, about 8 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced and more than 8.2 million had fled the country by April 2023, creating Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II.

In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine’s borders and issued demands to the West including a ban on Ukraine ever joining the NATO military alliance.[20] After repeatedly denying having plans to attack Ukraine, on 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a “special military operation“, saying that it was to support the Russian-backed breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, whose paramilitary forces had been fighting Ukraine in the war in Donbas since 2014. Putin espoused irredentist and imperialist views challenging Ukraine’s legitimacy as a state, baselessly claimed that the Ukrainian government were neo-Nazis committing genocide against the Russian minority in the Donbas, and said that Russia’s goal was to “demilitarise and denazify” Ukraine.[21][22][23][24] Russian air strikes and a ground invasion were launched on a northern front from Belarus towards the capital Kyiv, a southern front from Crimea, and an eastern front from the Donbas and towards Kharkiv. Ukraine enacted martial law, ordered a general mobilisation, and severed diplomatic relations with Russia.

Russian troops retreated from the north and the outskirts of Kyiv by April 2022, after encountering stiff resistance and logistical challenges. The Bucha massacre was uncovered after their withdrawal. In the southeast, Russia launched an offensive in the Donbas and captured Mariupol after a destructive siege. Russia continued to bomb military and civilian targets far from the front, and struck the energy grid during winter months. In late 2022, Ukraine launched successful counteroffensives in the south and east, liberating most of Kharkiv Oblast. Soon after, Russia illegally annexed four partly-occupied provinces. In November, Ukraine liberated Kherson. In June 2023, Ukraine launched another counteroffensive in the southeast but made few gains. After small but steady Russian advances in the east in the first half of 2024, Ukraine launched a cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August, where North Korean soldiers were sent to assist Russia. The United Nations Human Rights Office reports that Russia is committing severe human rights violations in occupied Ukraine. The direct cost of the war for Russia has been over $450 billion USD.[25][26][27]

The invasion was met with widespread international condemnation. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding a full Russian withdrawal. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to halt military operations, and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed sanctions on Russia and its ally Belarus and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland declared Russia a terrorist state. Protests occurred around the world, with anti-war protesters in Russia being met by mass arrests and greater media censorship. The Russian attacks on civilians have led to allegations of genocide.[28][29][30][31] War-related disruption to Ukrainian agriculture and shipping contributed to a world food crisis, war-related local environmental damage has been described as ecocide and the war has heavily disrupted global climate policy. The International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into crimes against humanity, war crimes, abduction of Ukrainian children, and genocide against Ukrainians. The ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova and for four Russian military officials.

Background

Further information: Russia–Ukraine relations

Post-Soviet relations

US president Clinton, Russian president Yeltsin, and Ukrainian president Kravchuk after signing the Trilateral Statement (1994). Russia and the US agreed to uphold Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the newly independent Russian Federation and Ukraine maintained cordial relations. In return for security guarantees, Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994 and gave up the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union.[32] Russia, the US and UK thus agreed in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[33] In 1999, Russia signed the Charter for European Security, affirming the right of each state “to choose or change its security arrangements” and to join alliances.[34] In 2002, Putin said that Ukraine’s relations with NATO were “a matter for those two partners”.[35] In 2005, Putin said that if Ukraine wanted to join NATO, “we will respect their choice, because it is their sovereign right to decide their own defence policy, and this will not worsen relations between our countries”.[36]

Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008 and took control of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, demonstrating Russia’s willingness to use military force to attain its political objectives.[37] Political scientist Paul D’Anieri says the United States “was accused of appeasement and naivete” over its reaction to the invasion.[38]

Ukrainian revolution

Main article: Revolution of Dignity

Protesters at a rally on Independence Square, 19 January 2014

In 2013, Ukraine’s parliament overwhelmingly approved finalising an association agreement with the European Union (EU),[39] which had been negotiated for several years. Russia did not raise any concerns about the agreement until mid-2013, when it became clear that Ukraine would no longer be able to maintain the same level of relations with Russia.[40] Russia put pressure on Ukraine to reject the agreement and imposed economic sanctions on the country.[41] Kremlin adviser Sergei Glazyev warned in September 2013 that if Ukraine signed the EU agreement, Russia would no longer acknowledge Ukraine’s borders.[42]

In November, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from signing the agreement,[43] choosing closer ties to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union instead. This coerced withdrawal triggered a wave of protests known as Euromaidan, culminating in the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014. Almost 100 protesters were killed. Despite signing an agreement, Yanukovych fled. Parliament voted to remove him and he ended up in Russia.

Russian intervention in Crimea and Donbas

Main article: Russo-Ukrainian War

Ukraine, with the annexed Crimea in the south and two Russia-backed separatist republics in Donbas in the east up to the 2022 invasion

On 27 February 2014, Russian soldiers with no insignia occupied the Ukrainian territory of Crimea,[44] starting the war with Ukraine.[45][46] At first, Russia denied that the soldiers were theirs, but Putin later admitted that they were Russian special forces.[47] Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, after a widely-condemned and disputed referendum held under occupation. Historians liken the annexation to Nazi Germany’s Anschluss of Austria.[48][49]

Pro-Russian protests immediately followed in the Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. Separatists proclaimed the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). The War in Donbas began in April 2014 when armed Russian paramilitaries led by Igor ‘Strelkov’ Girkin seized Sloviansk and other settlements, and the Ukrainian military began an operation against them.[50][51][52] Russia covertly supported the separatists with its own troops, tanks and artillery.[53] The International Criminal Court judged that the war was both a national and international armed conflict involving Russia,[54] and the European Court of Human Rights judged that Russia controlled the DPR and LPR from 2014 onward.[55] Ukraine’s parliament declared the Donbas region to be occupied by Russia.[56]

Russian-backed separatist forces during the War in Donbas in 2015

The annexation of Crimea and the Donbas war sparked a wave of Russian nationalism. Analyst Vladimir Socor called Putin’s 2014 speech following the annexation a “manifesto of Greater-Russia irredentism“.[57] Putin began referring to “Novorossiya” (New Russia), a former Russian imperial territory that covered much of southern Ukraine.[58] Russian-backed forces were influenced by Russian neo-imperialism[59] and sought to create a new Novorossiya.[60] Putin referred to the Kosovo independence precedent and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a justification for military intervention in Ukraine.[61][62][63][64]

When the conflict began in 2014, Ukraine was officially a neutral country[65] and said it was not seeking NATO membership.[66][67] Because of Russia’s occupation of Crimea and its invasion of the Donbas, Ukraine’s parliament voted in December 2014 to revoke the country’s neutral status and to seek Ukraine’s membership in NATO.[68][69] In 2016, President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that it would take 20–25 years for Ukraine to join NATO.[70]

The Normandy Format meeting on 9 December 2019 would be the first and only meeting between President Zelenskyy and President Putin.[71]

The Minsk agreements, signed in September 2014 and February 2015, aimed to resolve the conflict, but ceasefires and further negotiations repeatedly failed.[72]

The West‘s weak response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014 led Russia to believe that the West would not react strongly to the 2022 invasion.[73][74][75] Several political scientists said this encouraged further Russian aggression.[76][77][78]

Economic aspects

Economic interests were also a motive for Russia’s attack on Ukraine and its annexation of the southeast. Control of lithium deposits in the Donbas and Ukraine’s grain wealth would give Russia a “monopoly on the world market”.[79] In 2022, Russian General Vladimir Ovchinsky confirmed that the “Russian special operation” aimed to seize Ukrainian lithium deposits.[25][80]

The US government estimates that Russia’s economic losses from the war and Western sanctions will amount to around $1.3 trillion by 2025, and Russia’s direct financial spending on the invasion is estimated at $250 billion (as of late 2024) – costs that Russia could not have foreseen. According to a study published in mid-2022 by Canadian think tank SecDev, Russia seized energy reserves, metals and minerals worth at least $12.4 trillion in the Donbas, including 41 coal fields (63 percent of Ukraine’s coal reserves), 27 natural gas fields, 9 oil fields, 6 iron ore deposits, two titanium ore deposits, a strontium deposit, a uranium deposit, a gold deposit and a large limestone quarry. The total value of raw material stocks in Ukraine is estimated at over $26 trillion.[25] The value of lithium and rare earths in Ukraine is estimated at $11.5 trillion.[80] In January 2024, the Russian occupation government in Donetsk Oblast granted the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources permission to mine lithium in the Shevchenko deposit near Kurakhovo, which is estimated to be worth hundreds of billions of US dollars.[25]

The Russian elite, especially Russian generals, had invested assets and property in Ukraine for money laundering purposes before the invasion.[79]

Prelude

Main articles: Prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership, and Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Russian military build-up around Ukraine as of 3 December 2021

There was a large Russian military build-up near Ukraine’s borders in March and April 2021,[81] and again in both Russia and Belarus from October 2021 onward.[82] Russia said it was only holding military exercises. Members of the Russian government, including Putin, repeatedly denied having plans to attack or invade Ukraine, issuing denials up until the day before the invasion.[83][84][85]

While Russian troops massed on Ukraine’s borders, Russia’s proxy forces launched thousands of attacks on Ukrainian troops in the Donbas.[86] Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which also includes Ukraine and Russia, reported more than 90,000 ceasefire violations throughout 2021; the vast majority in Russian-controlled territory.[87]

In July 2021, Putin published an essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“, in which he called Ukraine “historically Russian lands” and claimed there is “no historical basis” for the “idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians”.[88][89] Days before the invasion, Putin claimed that Ukraine never had “real statehood” and that the creation of modern Ukraine was a mistake.[90] Putin was accused of promoting Russian imperialism,[91] historical revisionism and disinformation.[92][93]

Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on 12 January 2022

In December 2021, Russia issued an ultimatum to the West, which included demands that NATO end all activity in its Eastern European member states and ban Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining the alliance.[20][94][95] Russia’s government said NATO was a threat and warned of a military response if it followed an “aggressive line”.[96] Some of the demands had already been ruled out by NATO. A senior US official said the US was willing to discuss the proposals, but added that there were some “that the Russians know are unacceptable”.[94] Eastern European states willingly joined NATO for security reasons, and the last time a country bordering Russia had joined was in 2004. Ukraine had not yet applied, and some members were wary of letting it join.[97] Barring Ukraine would go against NATO’s “open door” policy, and against treaties agreed to by Russia itself.[98] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg replied that “Russia has no say” on whether Ukraine joins, and “has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbours”.[99] NATO underlined that it is a defensive alliance, and that it had co-operated with Russia until the latter annexed Crimea.[98] It offered to improve communication with Russia, and to negotiate limits on missile placements and military exercises, as long as Russia withdrew troops from Ukraine’s borders,[100] but Russia did not.

Western leaders vowed that heavy sanctions would be imposed should Putin choose to invade rather than to negotiate.[101] French President Emmanuel Macron[102] and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met Putin in February 2022 to dissuade him from an invasion. According to Scholz, Putin told him that Ukraine should not be an independent state.[103] Scholz told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to declare Ukraine a neutral country and renounce its aspirations to join NATO. Zelenskyy replied that Putin could not be trusted, as he had broken agreements before.[104] Ukraine had been a neutral country in 2014 when Russia occupied Crimea and invaded the Donbas.[65][105] On 19 February, Zelenskyy made a speech at the Munich Security Conference, calling for Western powers to end their “appeasement” towards Putin and give a clear time-frame for when Ukraine could join NATO.[106] Political analysts Taras Kuzio and Vladimir Socor agree that “when Russia made its decision to invade Ukraine, that country was more remote than ever not only from NATO membership but from any track that might lead to membership”.[95]

Luhansk power station after being shelled by Russian-backed forces in the Donbas, 22 February 2022

Shortly before the invasion, Russia’s proxy forces stepped up attacks on Ukrainian forces and civilians in the Donbas.[107][108] Separatist leaders warned that Ukraine was about to launch an offensive, but they gave no evidence, and The Guardian noted that it would be “exceedingly risky” for Ukraine to assault the Donbas while Russian troops were massed on its borders.[108] Ukraine and Western leaders accused Russia of staging false flag attacks and of trying to provoke retaliation, to give Russia a pretext for invading.[107][108] On 17 February, Russian proxy forces shelled a kindergarten in Ukrainian-held territory, then blamed the strike on Ukraine.[108] Zelenskyy said that his military would not respond to the provocations.[107]

Invasion plans

Tanks of Russian-backed forces heading towards the ceasefire line, 23 February 2022

According to the Royal United Services Institute, Russia’s invasion plan involved defeating Ukraine within ten days and capturing or killing its government, followed by “mopping up” operations; establishing filtration camps for Ukrainians; setting up occupation regimes; trying and executing people involved in the Revolution of Dignity; and lastly annexation.[109][110][111][112] The decision to invade was reportedly made by Putin and a small group of war hawks or siloviki in Putin’s inner circle, including national security adviser Nikolai Patrushev and defence minister Sergei Shoigu.[113]

Putin’s invasion announcement

Main article: On conducting a special military operation

Putin’s address to the nation on 24 February 2022. Minutes after Putin’s announcement, the invasion began.

On 21 February, Putin announced that Russia recognised the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic as independent states. The following day, Russia announced that it was sending troops into the territories as “peacekeepers”,[114] and the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force abroad.[115]

Before 5 a.m. Kyiv time on 24 February, Putin, in another speech, announced a “special military operation“, which effectively declared war on Ukraine.[116][117] Putin said the operation was to “protect the people” of the Russian-controlled breakaway republics. He baselessly claimed that Russians in the Donbas had “been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime” for eight years.[22] Putin said that Russia was being threatened: he baselessly claimed that Ukrainian government officials were neo-Nazis under Western control, that Ukraine was developing nuclear weapons, and that a hostile NATO was building up its forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine.[118][119] He said Russia sought the “demilitarisation and denazification” of Ukraine, and denied the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state.[119][90] Putin said he had no plans to occupy Ukraine.[118]

The invasion began within minutes of Putin’s speech.[116]

Events

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For a more comprehensive list, see List of military engagements during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia since 2014 (Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol) and 2022 (others). The 2022 annexation created a strategic land bridge between Crimea and Russia.

The invasion began at dawn on 24 February.[116][120] It was described as the biggest attack on a European country and the first full-scale war in Europe since the Second World War,[121] and was Russia’s largest combined arms operation since the Soviet Union‘s Battle of Berlin in 1945.[citation needed] Russia launched a simultaneous ground and air attack.[122][123] Missiles struck targets throughout Ukraine,[124] and Russian troops invaded from the north, east, and south.[125] Russia did not officially declare war.[126] Immediately after the invasion began, Zelenskyy declared martial law in Ukraine in a first video speech.[127] The same evening, he ordered a general mobilisation of all Ukrainian males between 18 and 60 years old,[128] prohibiting them from leaving the country.[129]

Remnants of a destroyed Russian column on 27 February in Bucha

The “first stage” of the invasion was conducted on four fronts, including one towards western Kyiv from Belarus by the Russian Eastern Military District, one deployed towards eastern Kyiv from Russia by the Central Military District (northeastern front), comprised the 41st Combined Arms Army and the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army,[130] one deployed towards Kharkiv, and a fourth, southern front originating in occupied Crimea and Russia’s Rostov oblast with an eastern axis towards Odesa and a western area of operations toward Mariupol.[130] The Russian invasion was unexpectedly met by fierce Ukrainian resistance.[131] In Kyiv, Russia failed to take the city and was repulsed in the battles of Irpin, Hostomel, and Bucha. The Russians tried to encircle the capital, but its defenders under Oleksandr Syrskyi held their ground, effectively using Western Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to thin Russian supply lines and stall the offensive.[132]

By 7 April, Russian troops deployed to the northern front by the Russian Eastern Military District pulled back from the Kyiv offensive, reportedly to resupply and redeploy to the Donbas region in an effort to reinforce the renewed invasion of southeastern Ukraine. The northeastern front, including the Central Military District, was similarly withdrawn for resupply and redeployment to southeastern Ukraine.[130][133] On 26 April, delegates from the US and 40 allied nations met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to discuss the formation of a coalition that would provide economic support in addition to military supplies and refitting to Ukraine.[134] Following Putin’s Victory Day speech in early May, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said no short term resolution to the invasion should be expected.[135]

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with members of the Ukrainian Army on 18 June 2022

Ukraine’s reliance on Western-supplied equipment constrained operational effectiveness, as supplying countries feared that Ukraine would use Western-made matériel to strike targets in Russia.[136] Military experts disagreed on the future of the conflict; some suggested that Ukraine should trade territory for peace,[137] while others believed that Ukraine could maintain its resistance due to Russian losses.[138]

Initial invasion (24 February – 7 April 2022)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (24 February – 7 April 2022).

Animated map of the Russian invasion from 24 February to 7 April 2022

The invasion began on 24 February, launched out of Belarus to target Kyiv, and from the northeast against the city of Kharkiv. The southeastern front was conducted as two separate spearheads, from Crimea and the southeast against Luhansk and Donetsk.

Kyiv and northern front

Further information: Capture of Chernobyl, Battle of Kyiv (2022), Bucha massacre, Siege of Chernihiv, and Battle of Sumy

See also: Russian occupation of Sumy Oblast

Russian president Vladimir Putin meeting with Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu in April 2022, after Russia’s defeat at the Battle of Kyiv

The Antonov An-225 Mriya, the largest aircraft ever built, was destroyed during the Battle of Antonov Airport.

Russian tried to seize Kyiv quickly with a probative spearhead on 24 February, from Belarus south along the west bank of the Dnipro River, with Spetsnaz infiltrating into the city supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north, but failed.[139][140] The apparent intent was to encircle the city from the west, supported by two separate axes of attack from Russia along the east bank of the Dnipro: the western at Chernihiv, and from the east at Sumy. These were likely intended to encircle Kyiv from the northeast and east.[122][123]

Russian forces advanced into Chernihiv Oblast on 24 February, besieging its administrative capital within four days of fighting. On 25 February Ukrainian forces lost control over Konotop.[141][142] As street fighting took place in the city of Sumy, just 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russo-Ukrainian border, Ukrainian forces claimed that on 28 February that 100 Russian armoured vehicles had been destroyed and dozens of soldiers captured following a Bayraktar TB2 drone and artillery attack on a large Russian column near Lebedyn in Sumy Oblast.[143] Russian forces also attacked Okhtyrka, deploying thermobaric weapons.[144] Travelling along highways, Russian forces reached Brovary, an eastern suburb of Kyiv, on 4 March.[123][122]

The United States contacted Zelenskyy and offered to help him flee the country, lest the Russian Army attempt to kidnap or kill him on seizing Kyiv; Zelenskyy responded that “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.”[145] By early March, Russian advances along the west side of the Dnipro were limited by Ukrainian defences.[123][122] As of 5 March, a large Russian convoy, reportedly 64 kilometres (40 mi) long, had made little progress toward Kyiv.[146] Advances from Chernihiv largely halted as a siege began there. Russian forces continued to advance on Kyiv from the northwest, capturing Bucha, Hostomel and Vorzel by 5 March,[147][148] though Irpin remained contested as of 9 March.[149] By 11 March, the lengthy convoy had largely dispersed and taken cover.[150] On 16 March, Ukrainian forces began a counter-offensive to repel Russian forces.[151] Unable to achieve a quick victory in Kyiv, Russian forces switched their strategy to indiscriminate bombing and siege warfare.[152][153]

On 25 March, a Ukrainian counter-offensive retook several towns to the east and west of Kyiv, including Makariv.[154][155] Russian troops in the Bucha area retreated north at the end of March. Ukrainian forces entered the city on 1 April, and recaptured the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel, and uncovered evidence of war crimes in Bucha.[156][157] The Pentagon confirmed on 6 April that the Russian army had left Chernihiv Oblast, but Sumy Oblast remained contested;[158] NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said that the Russian “retraction, resupply, and redeployment” of their troops from the Kyiv area should be interpreted as an expansion of Putin’s plans for Ukraine, by redeploying and concentrating his forces on eastern Ukraine.[133] On 7 April, the governor of Sumy Oblast said that Russian troops were gone, but had left behind rigged explosives and other hazards.[159]

Southern and eastern front

Further information: Siege of Mariupol, 2022 bombing of Odesa, Battle of Kherson, Battle of Enerhodar, Battle of Kharkiv (2022), Battle of Izium, and Millerovo air base attack

See also: Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast, Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Russian occupation of Kharkiv Oblast

Russian bombardment on the outskirts of Kharkiv, 1 March 2022

A destroyed Russian BMP-3 near Mariupol, 7 March 2022

On 24 February, Russian forces took control of the North Crimean Canal, allowing Crimea to obtain water from the Dnieper, which had been cut off since 2014.[160] On 26 February, the siege of Mariupol began as the attack moved east linking to separatist-held Donbas.[144][161] En route, Russian forces entered Berdiansk and captured it.[162] On 25 February, Russian units from the DPR were fighting near Pavlopil as they moved on Mariupol.[163] By evening, the Russian Navy began an amphibious assault on the coast of the Sea of Azov 70 kilometres (43 mi) west of Mariupol. A US defence official said that Russian forces were deploying thousands of marines from this beachhead.[164]

In the east, Russian troops attempted to capture Kharkiv, less than 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russian border,[165] and met strong Ukrainian resistance. On 25 February, the Millerovo air base was attacked by Ukrainian military forces with OTR-21 Tochka missiles, which according to Ukrainian officials, destroyed several Russian Air Force planes and started a fire.[166] On 1 March, Denis Pushilin, head of the DPR, announced that DPR forces had almost completely surrounded the city of Volnovakha.[167] On 2 March, Russian forces were repelled from Sievierodonetsk during an attack against the city.[168] On the same day, Ukrainian forces initiated a counter-offensive on Horlivka,[169] controlled by the DPR.[170] Izium was captured by Russian forces on 1 April[171] after a monthlong battle.[172] On 25 March, the Russian defence ministry said it would seek to occupy major cities in eastern Ukraine.[173] On 31 March, PBS News reported renewed shelling and missile attacks in Kharkiv, as bad or worse than before, as peace talks with Russia were to resume in Istanbul.[174]

The Russian 22nd Army Corps approached the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on 26 February[175] and besieged Enerhodar. A fire began,[176][177] but the Ukrainian military said that essential equipment was undamaged.[178] A third Russian attack group from Crimea moved northwest and captured the bridge over the Dnieper.[179] On 2 March, Russian troops took Kherson; this was the first major city to fall to Russian forces.[180] Russian troops moved on Mykolaiv and attacked it two days later. They were repelled by Ukrainian forces.[181]

After renewed missile attacks on 14 March in Mariupol, the Ukrainian government said more than 2,500 had died.[182] By 18 March, Mariupol was completely encircled and fighting reached the city centre, hampering efforts to evacuate civilians.[183] On 20 March, an art school sheltering around 400 people, was destroyed by Russian bombs.[184] The Russians demanded surrender, and the Ukrainians refused.[185] On 27 March, Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna said that “(m)ore than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed.”[186] Putin told Emmanuel Macron in a phone call on 29 March that the bombardment of Mariupol would only end when the Ukrainians surrendered.[187] On 1 April, Russian troops refused safe passage into Mariupol to 50 buses sent by the United Nations to evacuate civilians, as peace talks continued in Istanbul.[188] On 3 April, following the retreat of Russian forces from Kyiv, Russia expanded its attack on southern Ukraine further west, with bombardment and strikes against Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.[189][190] On 31 March, Russia reported a helicopter strike against an oil supply depot approximately 35 kilometres (22 mi) north of the border in Belgorod, and accused Ukraine of the attack; Ukraine denied responsibility.[191][192] By 7 April, the renewed massing of Russian invasion troops and tank divisions around the towns of Izium, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk prompted Ukrainian government officials to advise the remaining residents near the eastern border of Ukraine to evacuate to western Ukraine within 2–3 days, given the absence of arms and munitions previously promised to Ukraine by then.[193]

Southeastern front (8 April – 5 September 2022)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (8 April – 28 August 2022).

Animated map of the Russian invasion from 7 April to 5 September 2022

By 17 April, Russian progress on the southeastern front appeared to be impeded by opposing Ukrainian forces in the large, heavily fortified Azovstal steel mill and surrounding area in Mariupol.[194]

On 19 April, The New York Times confirmed that Russia had launched a renewed invasion front referred to as an “eastern assault” across a 480-kilometre (300 mi) front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk, with simultaneous missile attacks again directed at Kyiv in the north and Lviv in western Ukraine.[195] As of 30 April, a NATO official described Russian advances as “uneven” and “minor.”[196] An anonymous US Defence official called the Russian offensive “very tepid”, “minimal at best”, and “anaemic.”[197]

By 30 May, disparities between Russian and Ukrainian artillery were apparent, with Ukrainian artillery being vastly outgunned, in terms of both range and number.[136] In response to US President Joe Biden‘s indication that enhanced artillery would be provided to Ukraine, Putin said that Russia would expand its invasion front to include new cities in Ukraine. In apparent retribution, Putin ordered a missile strike against Kyiv on 6 June after not directly attacking the city for several weeks.[198] On 10 June 2022, deputy head of the SBU Vadym Skibitsky stated that during the Sievierodonetsk campaign, the frontlines were where the future of the invasion would be decided:[199]

This is an artillery war now, and we are losing in terms of artillery. Everything now depends on what [the west] gives us. Ukraine has one artillery piece to 10 to 15 Russian artillery pieces. Our western partners have given us about 10% of what they have.

On 29 June, Reuters reported that US Intelligence Director Avril Haines, in an update of past US intelligence assessments on the Russian invasion, said that US intelligence agencies agree that the invasion will continue “for an extended period of time … In short, the picture remains pretty grim and Russia’s attitude toward the West is hardening.”[200] On 5 July, BBC reported that extensive destruction by the Russian invasion would cause immense financial damage to Ukraine’s reconstruction economy, with Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal telling nations at a reconstruction conference in Switzerland that Ukraine needs $750B for a recovery plan and Russian oligarchs should contribute to the cost.[201]

In June 2022 the chief spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Defence Igor Konashenkov revealed that Russian troops were divided between the Army Groups “Centre” commanded by Colonel General Aleksander Lapin and “South” commanded by Army General Sergey Surovikin.[202] On 20 July, Lavrov announced that Russia would respond to the increased military aid being received by Ukraine from abroad as justifying the expansion of its special military operation to include objectives in both the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.[203]

Russian Ground Forces started recruiting volunteer battalions from the regions in June 2022 to create a new 3rd Army Corps within the Western Military District, with a planned strength estimated at 15,500–60,000 personnel.[204] Its units were deployed to the front around the time of Ukraine’s 9 September Kharkiv oblast counteroffensive, in time to join the Russian retreat, leaving behind tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and personnel carriers: the 3rd Army Corps “melted away” according to Forbes, having little or no impact on the battlefield along with other irregular forces.[205]

Fall of Mariupol

Further information: Siege of Mariupol

On 13 April, Russian forces intensified their attack on the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, and the remaining Ukrainian personnel defending it.[206] By 17 April, Russian forces had surrounded the factory. Ukrainian prime minister Denys Shmyhal said that the Ukrainian soldiers had vowed to ignore the renewed ultimatum to surrender and to fight to the last soul.[194] On 20 April, Putin said that the siege of Mariupol could be considered tactically complete, since the 500 Ukrainian troops entrenched in bunkers within the Azovstal iron works and estimated 1,000 Ukrainian civilians were completely sealed off from any type of relief.[207]

After consecutive meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy, UN Secretary-General Guterres on 28 April said he would attempt to organise an emergency evacuation of survivors from Azovstal in accordance with assurances he had received from Putin on his visit to the Kremlin.[208] On 30 April, Russian troops allowed civilians to leave under UN protection.[209] By 3 May, after allowing approximately 100 Ukrainian civilians to depart from the Azovstal steel factory, Russian troops renewed their bombardment of the steel factory.[210] On 6 May, The Daily Telegraph reported that Russia had used thermobaric bombs against the remaining Ukrainian soldiers, who had lost contact with the Kyiv government; in his last communications, Zelenskyy authorised the commander of the besieged steel factory to surrender as necessary under the pressure of increased Russian attacks.[211] On 7 May, the Associated Press reported that all civilians were evacuated from the Azovstal steel works at the end of the three-day ceasefire.[212]

A children’s hospital in Mariupol after a Russian airstrike

After the last civilians evacuated from the Azovstal bunkers, nearly two thousand Ukrainian soldiers remained barricaded there, 700 of them injured. They were able to communicate a plea for a military corridor to evacuate, as they expected summary execution if they surrendered to Russian forces.[213] Reports of dissent within the Ukrainian troops at Azovstal were reported by Ukrainska Pravda on 8 May indicating that the commander of the Ukrainian marines assigned to defend the Azovstal bunkers made an unauthorised acquisition of tanks, munitions, and personnel, broke out from the position there and fled. The remaining soldiers spoke of a weakened defensive position in Azovstal as a result, which allowed progress to advancing Russian lines of attack.[214] Ilia Somolienko, deputy commander of the remaining Ukrainian troops barricaded at Azovstal, said: “We are basically here dead men. Most of us know this and it’s why we fight so fearlessly.”[215]

On 16 May, the Ukrainian General staff announced that the Mariupol garrison had “fulfilled its combat mission” and that final evacuations from the Azovstal steel factory had begun. The military said that 264 service members were evacuated to Olenivka under Russian control, while 53 of them who were “seriously injured” had been taken to a hospital in Novoazovsk also controlled by Russian forces.[216][217] Following the evacuation of Ukrainian personnel from Azovstal, Russian and DPR forces fully controlled all areas of Mariupol. The end of the battle also brought an end to the Siege of Mariupol. Russia press secretary Dmitry Peskov said Russian President Vladimir Putin had guaranteed that the fighters who surrendered would be treated “in accordance with international standards” while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an address that “the work of bringing the boys home continues, and this work needs delicacy—and time.” Some prominent Russian lawmakers called on the government to deny prisoner exchanges for members of the Azov Regiment.[218]

Fall of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk

Main article: Battle of Donbas (2022–present)

Further information: Battle of Popasna, Kramatorsk railway station attack, Battle of Sievierodonetsk (2022), and Battle of Lysychansk

Military control around Donbas as of 11 September 2024: pink highlights areas held by the DNR, LNR, and Russia, yellow highlights areas held by the Ukrainian government.

A Russian missile attack on Kramatorsk railway station in the city of Kramatorsk took place on 8 April, reportedly killing at least 61 people[219] and injuring as many as 87 to 300.[220] On 11 April, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine expected a major new Russian offensive in the east.[221] American officials said that Russia had withdrawn or been repulsed elsewhere in Ukraine, and therefore was preparing a retraction, resupply, and redeployment of infantry and tank divisions to the southeastern Ukraine front.[222][223] Military satellites photographed extensive Russian convoys of infantry and mechanised units deploying south from Kharkiv to Izium on 11 April, apparently part of the planned Russian redeployment of its northeastern troops to the southeastern front of the invasion.[224]

On 18 April, with Mariupol almost entirely overtaken by Russian forces, the Ukrainian government announced that the second phase of the reinforced invasion of the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts had intensified with expanded invasion forces occupying of the Donbas.[225]

On 22 May, the BBC reported that after the fall of Mariupol, Russia had intensified offensives in Luhansk and Donetsk while concentrating missile attacks and intense artillery fire on Sievierodonetsk, the largest city under Ukrainian control in Luhansk Oblast.[226]

On 23 May, Russian forces were reported entering the city of Lyman, fully capturing the city by 26 May.[227][228] Ukrainian forces were reported leaving Sviatohirsk.[229] By 24 May, Russian forces captured the city of Svitlodarsk.[230] On 30 May, Reuters reported that Russian troops had breached the outskirts of Sievierodonetsk.[231] By 2 June, The Washington Post reported that Sievierodonetsk was on the brink of capitulation to Russian occupation with over 80 per cent of the city in the hands of Russian troops.[232] On 3 June, Ukrainian forces reportedly began a counter-attack in Sievierodonetsk. By 4 June, Ukrainian government sources claimed 20% or more of the city had been recaptured.[233]

On 12 June, it was reported that possibly as many as 800 Ukrainian civilians (as per Ukrainian estimates) and 300–400 soldiers (as per Russian sources) were besieged at the Azot chemical factory in Sievierodonetsk.[234][235] With the Ukrainian defences of Sievierodonetsk faltering, Russian invasion troops began intensifying their attack upon the neighbouring city of Lysychansk as their next target city in the invasion.[236] On 20 June it was reported that Russian troops continued to tighten their grip on Sievierodonetsk by capturing surrounding villages and hamlets surrounding the city, most recently the village of Metelkine.[237]

On 24 June, CNN reported that, amid continuing scorched-earth tactics being applied by advancing Russian troops, Ukraine’s armed forces were ordered to evacuate the Sievierodonetsk; several hundred civilians taking refuge in the Azot chemical plant were left behind in the withdrawal, with some comparing their plight to that of the civilians at the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol in May.[238] On 3 July, CBS announced that the Russian defence ministry claimed that the city of Lysychansk had been captured and occupied by Russian forces.[239] On 4 July, The Guardian reported that after the fall of the Luhansk oblast, that Russian invasion troops would continue their invasion into the adjacent Donetsk Oblast to attack the cities of Sloviansk and Bakhmut.[240]

Kharkiv front

Main article: Battle of Kharkiv (2022)

Further information: Russian occupation of Kharkiv Oblast

Saltivka residential area after the battle of Kharkiv on 19 May 2022

On 14 April, Ukrainian troops reportedly blew up a bridge between Kharkiv and Izium used by Russian forces to redeploy troops to Izium, impeding the Russian convoy.[241]

On 5 May, David Axe writing for Forbes stated that the Ukrainian army had concentrated its 4th and 17th Tank Brigades and the 95th Air Assault Brigade around Izium for possible rearguard action against the deployed Russian troops in the area; Axe added that the other major concentration of Ukraine’s forces around Kharkiv included the 92nd and 93rd Mechanised Brigades which could similarly be deployed for rearguard action against Russian troops around Kharkiv or link up with Ukrainian troops contemporaneously being deployed around Izium.[242]

On 13 May, BBC reported that Russian troops in Kharkiv were being retracted and redeployed to other fronts in Ukraine following the advances of Ukrainian troops into surrounding cities and Kharkiv itself, which included the destruction of strategic pontoon bridges built by Russian troops to cross over the Seversky Donets river and previously used for rapid tank deployment in the region.[243]

Kherson-Mykolaiv front

Further information: 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, 2022 bombing of Odesa, and 2022 Transnistria attacks

See also: Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast

Ukrainian soldiers in reclaimed Vysokopillia in September 2022 during the 2022 Kherson counteroffensive

Missile attacks and bombardment of the key cities of Mykolaiv and Odesa continued as the second phase of the invasion began.[195] On 22 April 2022, Russia’s Brigadier General Rustam Minnekayev in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolaiv–Odesa front after the siege of Mariupol further west to include the breakaway region of Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova.[244] The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine called this plan imperialism and said that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine and also that the statement admitted that “the goal of the ‘second phase’ of the war is not victory over the mythical Nazis, but simply the occupation of eastern and southern Ukraine.”[244] Georgi Gotev of EURACTIV noted on 22 April that Russian occupation from Odesa to Transnistria would transform Ukraine into a landlocked nation with no practical access to the Black Sea.[245] Russia resumed its missile strikes on Odesa on 24 April, destroying military facilities and causing two dozen civilian casualties.[246]

Explosions destroyed two Russian broadcast towers in Transnistria on 27 April that had primarily rebroadcast Russian television programming, Ukrainian sources said.[247] Russian missile attacks at the end of April destroyed runways in Odesa.[248] In the week of 10 May, Ukrainian troops began to dislodge Russian forces from Snake Island in the Black Sea approximately 200 kilometres (120 mi) from Odesa.[249] Russia said on 30 June 2022 that it had withdrawn its troops from the island, once their objectives had been completed.[250]

On 23 July, CNBC reported a Russian missile strike on the Ukrainian port of Odesa, swiftly condemned by world leaders amid a recent UN- and Turkish-brokered deal to secure a sea corridor for exports of grains and other foodstuffs.[251] On 31 July, CNN reported significantly intensified rocket attacks and bombing of Mykolaiv by Russians, which also killed Ukrainian grain tycoon Oleksiy Vadaturskyi.[252]

Zaporizhzhia front

See also: Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast

French president Emmanuel Macron called the Russian missile attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk on 28 June 2022 a “war crime”

Russian forces continued to fire missiles and drop bombs on the key cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia.[195] Russian missiles destroyed the Dnipro International Airport on 10 April 2022.[253] On 2 May, the UN, reportedly with the cooperation of Russian troops, evacuated about 100 survivors from the siege of Mariupol to the village of Bezimenne near Donetsk, from whence they would move to Zaporizhzhia.[254] On 28 June, Reuters reported that a Russian missile attack on the city of Kremenchuk northwest of Zaporizhzhia detonated in a public mall and caused at least 18 deaths. France’s Emmanuel Macron called it a “war crime.”[255]

Ukrainian nuclear agency Energoatom called the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant “extremely tense”, although it was still operated by its Ukrainian staff. As many as 500 Russian soldiers controlled the plant; Kyiv’s nuclear agency said they were shelling nearby areas and storing weapons and “missile systems” there. Almost the entire country went on air raid alert. “They already shell the other side of the river Dnipro and the territory of Nikopol,” Energoatom president Pedro Kotin said.[256] Russia agreed on 19 August to allow IAEA inspectors access to the Zaporizhzhia plant after a phone call from Macron to Putin. As of July 2023, access to the plant remained limited and required extensive negotiation.[257]

Russia reported that 12 attacks with explosions from 50 artillery shells had been recorded by 18 August at the plant and the company town of Enerhodar.[258] Tobias Ellwood, chair of the UK’s Defence Select Committee, said on 19 August that any deliberate damage to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant that could cause radiation leaks would be a breach of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which an attack on a member state of NATO is an attack on them all. US congressman Adam Kinzinger said the following day that any radiation leak would kill people in NATO countries, an automatic activation of Article 5.[259][260]

Ukrainian civilians killed by the Russian Armed Forces during the Zaporizhzhia civilian convoy attack in September 2022

Shelling hit coal ash dumps at the neighbouring coal-fired power station on 23 August, and the ash was on fire on 25 August. The 750 kV transmission line to the Dniprovska substation, the only one of the four 750 kV transmission lines still undamaged and cut by military action, passes over the ash dumps. At 12:12 p.m. on 25 August, the line was cut off due to the fire, disconnecting the plant and its two operating reactors from the national grid for the first time since its startup in 1985. In response, backup generators and coolant pumps for reactor 5 started up, and reactor 6 reduced generation.[261]

Incoming power was still available across the 330 kV line to the substation at the coal-fired station, so the diesel generators were not essential for cooling reactor cores and spent fuel pools. The 750 kV line and reactor 6 resumed operation at 12:29 p.m., but the line was cut by fire again two hours later. The line, but not the reactors, resumed operation again later that day.[261] On 26 August, one reactor restarted in the afternoon and another in the evening, resuming electricity supplies to the grid.[262] On 29 August 2022, an IAEA team led by Rafael Grossi went to the plant to investigate.[263] Lydie Evrard and Massimo Aparo were also on the team. No leaks had been reported at the plant before their arrival, but shelling had occurred days before.[264]

Russian annexations and occupation losses (6 September – 11 November 2022)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (29 August – 11 November 2022).

Animated map of the Russian invasion from 5 September 2022 to 11 November 2022

On 6 September 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region, beginning near Balakliia, led by General Syrskyi.[265] An emboldened Kyiv launched a counteroffensive 12 September around Kharkiv successful enough to make Russia admit losing key positions and for The New York Times to say that it dented the image of a “Mighty Putin”. Kyiv sought more arms from the West to sustain the counteroffensive.[266] On 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilisation and Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said 300,000 reservists would be called.[267] He also said that his country would use “all means” to “defend itself.” Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelenskyy, said that the decision was predictable and that it was an attempt to justify “Russia’s failures.”[268] British Foreign Office Minister Gillian Keegan called the situation an “escalation”,[269] while former Mongolian president Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj accused Russia of using Russian Mongols as “cannon fodder.”[270]

Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

Main article: Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

In late September 2022, Russian-installed officials in Ukraine organised referendums on the annexation of the occupied territories of Ukraine. These included the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic in Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, as well as the Russian-appointed military administrations of Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Denounced by Ukraine’s government and its allies as sham elections, the elections’ official results showed overwhelming majorities in favour of annexation.[271]

On 30 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced the annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament.[272] Ukraine, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations all denounced the annexation as illegal.[273]

Zaporizhzhia front

See also: Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant crisis and Zaporizhzhia residential building airstrike

Damage to a residential building in Zaporizhzhia following an airstrike on 9 October 2022

An IAEA delegation visited the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant on 3 September, and on 6 September reported damage and security threats caused by external shelling and the presence of occupying troops in the plant.[274] On 11 September, at 3:14 a.m., the sixth and final reactor was disconnected from the grid, “completely stopping” the plant. Energoatom said that preparations were “underway for its cooling and transfer to a cold state.”[275]

In the early hours of 9 October 2022, Russian Armed Forces carried out an airstrike on a residential building in Zaporizhzhia, killing 13 civilians and injuring 89 others.[276]

Kherson counteroffensive

Main articles: 2022 Kherson counteroffensive and Liberation of Kherson

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, participating in reraising the Ukrainian flag in Kherson a few days after the city’s liberation

On 29 August, Zelenskyy advisedly vowed the start of a full-scale counteroffensive in the southeast. He first announced a counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in the south concentrating on the Kherson-Mykolaiv region, a claim that was corroborated by the Ukrainian parliament as well as Operational Command South.[277]

On 4 September, Zelenskyy announced the liberation of two unnamed villages in Kherson Oblast and one in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian authorities released a photo showing the raising of the Ukrainian flag in Vysokopillia by Ukrainian forces.[278] Ukrainian attacks also continued along the southern frontline, though reports about territorial changes were largely unverifiable.[279] On 12 September, Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian forces had retaken a total of 6,000 square kilometres (2,300 sq mi) from Russia, in both the south and the east. The BBC stated that it could not verify these claims.[280]

In October, Ukrainian forces pushed further south towards the city of Kherson, taking control of 1,170 square kilometres (450 sq mi) of territory, with fighting extending to Dudchany.[281][282] On 9 November, defence minister Shoigu ordered Russian forces to leave part of Kherson Oblast, including the city of Kherson, and move to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.[283] On 11 November, Ukrainian troops entered Kherson, as Russia completed its withdrawal. This meant that Russian forces no longer had a foothold on the west (right) bank of the Dnieper.[284]

Kharkiv counteroffensive

Main article: 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive

Retained by Ukraine

Retaken by Ukraine

Occupied by Russia

Map of the Kharkiv front as of 4 April 2025

Ukrainian forces launched another surprise counteroffensive on 6 September in the Kharkiv Oblast near Balakliia led by General Syrskyi.[265] By 7 September, Ukrainian forces had advanced some 20 kilometres (12 mi) into Russian occupied territory and claimed to have recaptured approximately 400 square kilometres (150 sq mi). Russian commentators said this was likely due to the relocation of Russian forces to Kherson in response to the Ukrainian offensive there.[285] On 8 September, Ukrainian forces captured Balakliia and advanced to within 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) of Kupiansk.[286] Military analysts said Ukrainian forces appeared to be moving towards Kupiansk, a major railway hub, with the aim of cutting off the Russian forces at Izium from the north.[287]

On 9 September, the Russian occupation administration of Kharkiv Oblast announced it would “evacuate” the civilian populations of Izium, Kupiansk and Velykyi Burluk. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said it believed Kupiansk would likely fall in the next 72 hours,[288] while Russian reserve units were sent to the area by both road and helicopter.[289] On the morning of 10 September, photos emerged claiming to depict Ukrainian troops raising the Ukrainian flag in the centre of Kupiansk,[290] and the ISW said Ukrainian forces had captured approximately 2,500 square kilometres (970 sq mi) by effectively exploiting their breakthrough.[291] Later in the day, Reuters reported that Russian positions in northeast Ukraine had “collapsed” in the face of the Ukrainian assault, with Russian forces forced to withdraw from their base at Izium after being cut off by the capture of Kupiansk.[292]

By 15 September, an assessment by UK‘s Ministry of Defence confirmed that Russia had either lost or withdrawn from almost all of their positions west of the Oskil river. The retreating units had also abandoned various high-value military assets.[293] The offensive continued pushing east and by 1 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces had liberated the key city of Lyman.[294]

Winter stalemate, attrition campaign and 1st military surge (12 November 2022 – 7 June 2023)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (12 November 2022 – 7 June 2023).

Further information: Russian Winter Offensive in Ukraine (2022–2023), Battle of Vuhledar, and Battle of Marinka (2022–2023)

Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers shaking hands near Leopard 2 tanks provided by Poland to Ukraine

After the end of the twin Ukrainian counteroffensives, the fighting shifted to a semi-deadlock during the winter,[295] with heavy casualties but reduced motion of the frontline.[296] Russia launched a self-proclaimed winter offensive in eastern Ukraine, but the campaign ended in “disappointment” for Moscow, with limited gains as the offensive stalled.[295][297] Analysts variously blamed the failure on Russia’s lack of “trained men”, and supply problems with artillery ammunition, among other problems.[295][297] Near the end of May, Mark Galeotti assessed that “after Russia’s abortive and ill-conceived winter offensive, which squandered its opportunity to consolidate its forces, Ukraine is in a relatively strong position.”[298]

On 7 February, The New York Times reported that Russians had newly mobilised nearly 200,000 soldiers to participate in the offensive in the Donbas, against Ukraine troops already wearied by previous fighting.[299] The Russian private military company Wagner Group took on greater prominence in the war,[300] leading “grinding advances” in Bakhmut with tens of thousands of recruits from prison battalions taking part in “near suicidal” assaults on Ukrainian positions.[297]

In late January 2023, fighting intensified in southern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, with both sides suffering heavy casualties.[301] In nearby southern parts of Donetsk Oblast, an intense, three-week Russian assault near the coal-mining town of Vuhledar was called the largest tank battle of the war to date, and ended in disaster for Russian forces, who lost “at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers” according to Ukrainian commanders. The British Ministry of Defence stated that “a whole Russian brigade was effectively annihilated.”[302][303]

In late 2022, as Russian casualties exceeded 50,000, the Russian army introduced barrier troops. The U.K. defence ministry stated that these are units that threaten to shoot their own retreating soldiers in order to compel offensives. In March 2023, Russian soldiers filmed a video addressed to President Putin where they stated that after suffering casualties, they attempted to return to their headquarters but their superiors denied them evacuation. They stated that barrier troops were placed behind them threatening to “destroy them”.[304] In particular, Storm-Z units have been reported to be “kept in line” by barrier troops.[305]

Battle of Bakhmut

Main article: Battle of Bakhmut

View of western Bakhmut during the battle, 5 April 2023

Following defeat in Kherson and Kharkiv, Russian and Wagner forces focused on taking the city of Bakhmut and breaking the half year long stalemate that prevailed there since the start of the war. Russian forces sought to encircle the city, attacking from the north via Soledar. After taking heavy casualties, Russian and Wagner forces took control of Soledar on 16 January 2023.[306][307] By early February 2023, Bakhmut was facing attacks from north, south and east, with the sole Ukrainian supply lines coming from Chasiv Yar to the west.[308]

On 3 March 2023, Ukrainian soldiers destroyed two key bridges, creating the possibility for a controlled fighting withdrawal from eastern sectors of Bakhmut.[309] On 4 March, Bakhmut’s deputy mayor told news services that there was street fighting in the city.[310] On 7 March, despite the city’s near-encirclement, The New York Times reported that Ukrainian commanders were requesting permission from Kyiv to continue fighting against the Russians in Bakhmut.[311]

On 26 March, Wagner Group forces claimed to have fully captured the tactically significant Azom factory in Bakhmut.[312] Appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services on 29 March, General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that, “for about the last 20, 21 days, the Russia have not made any progress whatsoever in and around Bakhmut.” Milley described the severe casualties being inflicted upon the Russian forces there as a “slaughter-fest.”[313]

By the beginning of May, the ISW assessed that Ukraine controlled only 1.89 square kilometres (0.73 sq mi) of the city, less than five percent.[314] On 18 May 2023, The New York Times reported that Ukrainian forces had launched a local counteroffensive, taking back swathes of territory to the north and south of Bakhmut over the course of a few days.[315] On 20 May 2023, the Wagner Group claimed full control over Bakhmut, and a victory in the battle was officially declared by Russia the next day,[316] following which Wagner forces retreated from the city in place of regular Russian units.[317]

2023 Ukrainian counteroffensives (8 June 2023 – 1 December 2023)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (8 June 2023 – 31 August 2023) and Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 September – 30 November 2023).

Further information: 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive

Flood in Kherson Oblast on 10 June 2023 caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023

In June 2023, Ukrainian forces gradually launched a series of counteroffensives on multiple fronts, including Donetsk Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and others.[318] On 8 June 2023, counteroffensive efforts focused near settlements such as Orikhiv, Tokmak, and Bakhmut.[319] Counteroffensive operations faced stiff resistance from Russia,[320] and the American think tank Institute for the Study of War described the Russian defensive effort as having “an uncharacteristic degree of coherency.”[321] By 12 June, Ukraine reported its fastest advance in seven months, claiming to have liberated several villages and advanced a total of 6.5 km. Russian military bloggers also reported that Ukraine had taken Blahodatne, Makarivka and Neskuchne, and were continuing to push southward.[322] Ukraine continued to liberate settlements over the next few months, raising the Ukrainian flag over the settlement of Robotyne in late August.[323]

A tank in Rostov-on-Don belonging to the Wagner Group decorated with flowers during the Wagner Group rebellion in the summer of 2023

On 24 June, the Wagner Group launched a brief rebellion against the Russian government, capturing several cities in western Russia largely unopposed before marching towards Moscow.[324] This came as the culmination of prolonged infighting and power struggles between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defence.[325] After about 24 hours, the Wagner Group backed down[326] and agreed to a peace deal in which Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin would go into exile in Belarus, and his forces would be free from prosecution.[324] On 27 June, the UK’s Ministry of Defence reported that Ukraine were “highly likely” to have reclaimed territory in the eastern Donbas region occupied by Russia since 2014 among its advances. Pro-Russian bloggers also reported that Ukrainian forces had made gains in the southern Kherson Oblast, establishing a foothold on the left bank of the Dnipro river.[327]

In August, The Guardian reported that Ukraine had become the most mined country in the world, with Russia laying millions of mines attempting to thwart Ukraine’s counteroffensive. The vast minefields forced Ukraine to extensively de-mine areas to allow advances. Ukrainian officials reported shortages of men and equipment as Ukrainian soldiers unearthed five mines for every square metre in certain places.[328]

School lessons of pupils in Kharkiv Metro due to the danger of Russian shelling

Following Russia pulling out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the conflict on the Black Sea escalated with Ukraine targeting Russian ships. On 4 August, Ukrainian security service sources reported that the Russian landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak had been hit and damaged by an unmanned naval drone. Video footage released by Ukraine’s security services appeared to show the drone striking the ship, with another video showing the ship seemingly listing to one side.[329] On 12 September, both Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian naval targets in Sevastopol had been struck by unconfirmed weaponry, damaging two military vessels, one of them reportedly a submarine.[330] Ukraine also reported that several oil and gas drilling platforms on the Black Sea held by Russia since 2015 had been retaken.[331]

Ukrainian soldiers in recaptured Klishchiivka on 17 September 2023

In September 2023, Ukrainian intelligence estimated that Russia had deployed over 420,000 troops in Ukraine.[332]

On 21 September, Russia began missile strikes across Ukraine, damaging the country’s energy facilities.[333] On 22 September, the US announced it would send long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine,[334] despite the reservations of some government officials.[335] The same day, the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence launched a missile strike on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea, killing several senior military officials.[336][337]

In mid-to-late October 2023, Ukrainian marines—partly guided by defecting Russian troops—crossed the Dnipro River (the strategic barrier between eastern and western Ukraine), downstream of the destroyed Kakhovka Dam, to attack the Russian-held territory on the east side of the river. Despite heavy losses due to intense Russian shelling and aerial bombardment, disorganisation, and dwindling resources, Ukrainian brigades invading the Russian-held side of the river continued to inflict heavy casualties on Russian forces well into late December.[338][339]

On 1 December 2023, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the Ukrainian counter-offensive was not successful, citing slower than expected results.[340] Zelenskyy also stated that it will be easier for Ukraine to regain the Crimean peninsula than the Donbas region in the east of the country, because the Donbas is heavily militarised and there are frequent pro-Russian sentiments.[341] In December 2023, multiple international media outlets described the Ukrainian counteroffensive as having failed to regain any significant amount of territory or meet any of its strategic objectives.[340][342][343]

Battle of Avdiivka

Main article: Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024)

See also: Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 December 2023 – 31 March 2024)

Damaged buildings in Avdiivka during fighting over the city in January 2024

In October 2023, it was reported that there was a growth of mutinies among Russian troops due to the large number of losses in Russian offensives around Avdiivka with a lack of artillery, food, water and poor command also being reported.[344] By November, British intelligence said that recent weeks had “likely seen some of the highest Russian casualty rates of the war so far.”[345]

On 17 February 2024, Russia captured Avdiivka, a longtime stronghold for Ukraine that had been described as a “gateway” to nearby Donetsk.[346][347][348] ABC News stated that Russia could use the development to boost morale with the war largely at a stalemate close to its second anniversary.[349] Described by Forbes journalist David Axe as a pyrrhic Russian victory, the Russian 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies ended up with 16,000 men killed, tens of thousands wounded and around 700 vehicles lost before seizing the ruins of Avdiivka.[350]

Ukraine’s shortage of ammunition caused by political deadlock in the US Congress and a lack of production capacity in Europe contributed to the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka, and was “being felt across the front” according to Time. The shortage resulted in Ukraine having to ration its units to fire only 2,000 rounds per day, compared to an estimated 10,000 rounds fired daily by Russia.[351]

Russian offensives and Ukrainian incursion (April 2024 – present)

See also: Eastern Ukraine campaign § Russian spring and summer campaign (April 2024–present)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 April – 31 July 2024), Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 August – 31 December 2024), and Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 January 2025 – present).

Russian spring and summer offensives

Main articles: Battle of Ocheretyne and Northern Kharkiv front of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2024–present)

View of Vovchansk during the 2024 Kharkiv offensive, June 2024

On 10 May 2024, Russia began a renewed offensive in Kharkiv Oblast. Russia managed to capture a dozen villages, and Ukraine had evacuated more than 11,000 people from the region since the start of the offensive by 25 May. Ukraine said on 17 May that its forces had slowed the Russian advance, and by 25 May Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian forces had secured “combat control” of areas where Russian troops entered the northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian officials said that they were “advancing in every direction” and that the goal was to create a “buffer zone” for embattled border regions.[352][353] The White House said on 7 June that the offensive had stalled and was unlikely to advance further.[354]

Following the Russian success in the battle of Avdiivka, their forces advanced northwest of it to form a salient, and by mid-April 2024 reached the settlement of Ocheretyne, capturing it in late April[355][356] and further expanding the salient in the succeeding months.[357] Russian forces also launched an offensive towards the city of Chasiv Yar in early April,[358] a strategically important settlement west of Bakhmut, and by early July had captured its easternmost district.[359][360] Another offensive in the direction of the city of Toretsk was launched on 18 June,[361] with the goal of capturing the city,[362] and according to Ukrainian military observer and spokesperson Nazar Voloshyn, flanking Chasiv Yar from the south.[363] Russian forces advanced to expand the salient northwest of Avdiivka in July, and on 19 July, made a breakthrough allowing them to begin advancing towards the operationally significant city of Pokrovsk.[364][365]

Ukrainian offensive into Russia

Main article: Kursk front of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Ukrainian soldiers at Kursk Oblast in August 2024

On 6 August 2024, Ukraine launched their first direct offensive into Russian territory, the largest of any pro-Ukrainian incursion since the invasion’s inception, into the bordering Kursk Oblast.[366] The main axis of the initial advance centred in the direction of the town of Sudzha, located 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the border,[367] which was reported by President Zelenskyy to have been captured on 15 August.[368] Ukraine, taking advantage of the lack of experienced units and defences along the border with Kursk Oblast, was able to quickly seize territory in the opening days of the incursion.[369] The incursion caused Russia to divert thousands of troops from occupied Ukrainian territory to counter the threat,[370][371] though not from Donetsk Oblast.[371]

Despite repeated deadlines set by Putin to push out Ukrainian troops, Russian forces had still not yet done so by the end of January 2025, with advances in Donetsk Oblast being prioritized over the Kursk salient. However, by February 2025, Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast were described by the ISW as not being fully protected from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, with troops, armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems being pulled away from Ukrainian sectors to reinforce the Russian forces in Kursk.[372][373]

Late 2024 and early 2025 Russian advances

Main articles: Velyka Novosilka offensive, Battle of Kurakhove, Battle of Toretsk, Pokrovsk offensive, and Battle of Chasiv Yar

Russian troops continued advancing in eastern Ukraine, notably at a faster pace than prior to the Kursk offensive,[374] including towards the strategically important city of Pokrovsk, where their number of forces had instead been increased.[375][376][377]

In late August 2024, Russian forces seized the city of Novohrodivka, southeast of Pokrovsk, bringing them within 8 kilometres of the city,[374] while capturing Krasnohorivka[378] and Ukrainsk,[379] near Pokrovsk and west of Donetsk city, in early September.[379] In late September, a Russian assault on the long-held city of Vuhledar began,[380] leading to its fall on 1 October.[381] Ukraine’s 72nd Mechanised Brigade had defended the city for over two years, and said that the Russians had suffered “numerous losses” as they stormed the elevated city. Following the Russian capture, the city with a pre-war population of about 14,000 was described as a “sprawling ruin”.[382]

On 30 October, Ukrainian Major General Dmytro Marchenko was reported to have said “our front has crumbled” due to a dwindling ammunition supply, problems with military recruitment, and poor leadership. He said Zelensky’s victory plan was too heavily focused on seeking more Western support. Briefings from Western officials had also become more pessimistic about Ukraine’s military situation.[383][384] According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, more than 100,000 criminal cases for desertion were initiated by the end of November 2024.[385]

In early 2025, Russian forces advanced in eastern Ukraine.[386][387] Russia continued attacks on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[388] In February 2025, Ukraine’s government approved a one-year contract for volunteers aged 18–24 who are currently not subject to mobilization.[389]

Battlespaces

Further information: Northern Ukraine campaign, Eastern Ukraine campaign, and Southern Ukraine campaign

Command

Further information: Order of battle for the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Putin with Shoigu, Gerasimov, Belousov, Yevkurov and commanders of military districts of Russia on 15 May 2024

Zelenskyy with Ukrainian servicemen defending the city of Bakhmut in December 2022

The supreme commanders-in-chief are the heads of state of the respective governments: President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine. Putin has reportedly meddled in operational decisions, bypassing senior commanders and giving orders directly to brigade commanders.[390]

US general Mark Milley said that Ukraine’s top military commander in the war, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, “has emerged as the military mind his country needed. His leadership enabled the Ukrainian armed forces to adapt quickly with battlefield initiative against the Russians.”[391] Russia began the invasion with no overall commander. The commanders of the four military districts were each responsible for their own offensives.[392]

After initial setbacks, the commander of the Russian Southern Military District, Aleksandr Dvornikov, was placed in overall command on 8 April 2022,[393] while still responsible for his own campaign. Russian forces benefited from the centralisation of command under Dvornikov,[394] but continued failures to meet expectations in Moscow led to multiple changes in overall command:[392]

- commander of the Eastern Military District Gennady Zhidko (Eastern Military District, 26 – 8 May October 2022)

- commander of the southern grouping of forces Sergei Surovikin (early October 2022 – 11 January 2023)

- commander-in-chief of the Russian Armed Forces Valerii Gerasimov (from 11 January 2023)

Russia has suffered a remarkably large number of casualties in the ranks of its officers, including 12 generals.[395]

Missile attacks and aerial warfare

Main article: Aerial warfare in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: List of aircraft losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War

A street in Kyiv following Russian missile strikes on 10 October 2022

Aerial warfare began the first day of the invasion. Dozens of missile attacks were recorded across both eastern and western Ukraine,[122][123] reaching as far west as Lviv.[166]

By September 2022, the Ukrainian air force had shot down about 55 Russian warplanes.[396] In mid-October, Russian forces launched missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, intended to knock out energy facilities.[397] By late November, hundreds of civilians had been killed or wounded in the attacks,[398] and rolling blackouts had left millions without power.[399]

In December 2022, drones launched from Ukraine allegedly carried out several attacks on Dyagilevo and Engels air bases in western Russia, killing 10 and heavily damaging two Tu-95 aircraft.[400]

Crimea attacks

Main article: Crimea attacks (2022–present)

On 31 July 2022, Russian Navy Day commemorations were cancelled after a drone attack reportedly wounded several people at the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.[401] On 9 August 2022, large explosions were reported at Saky Air Base in western Crimea. Satellite imagery showed at least eight aircraft damaged or destroyed. Initial speculation attributed the explosions to long-range missiles, sabotage by special forces or an accident;[402] Ukrainian general Valerii Zaluzhnyi claimed responsibility on 7 September.[403]

The base is near Novofedorivka, a destination popular with tourists. Traffic backed up at the Crimean Bridge after the explosions with queues of civilians trying to leave the area.[404] A week later Russia blamed “sabotage” for explosions and a fire at an arms depot near Dzhankoi in northeastern Crimea that also damaged a railway line and power station. Russian regional head Sergei Aksyonov said that 2,000 people were evacuated from the area.[405] On 18 August, explosions were reported at Belbek Air Base north of Sevastopol.[406] On the morning of 8 October 2022 the Kerch Bridge, linking occupied Crimea to Russia, partially collapsed due to an explosion.[407] On 17 July 2023, there was another large explosion on the bridge.[408]

Russian attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure

Main articles: Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure (2022–present) and Attacks on civilians in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Fires on a combined heat and power plant in Kyiv after Russian missile strikes on 10 October 2022

Since fall of 2022, Russia has carried out waves of strikes on Ukrainian electrical and water systems.[409] On 6 October the Ukrainian military reported that 86 Shahed 136 kamikaze drones had been launched by Russian forces in total, and between 30 September and 6 October Ukrainian forces had destroyed 24 out of 46 launched in that period.[410] On 8 October, it was announced that General of the Army Sergey Surovikin would be commanding all Russian forces in Ukraine on the strength of his novel air assault technique.[411]

On 16 October 2022, The Washington Post reported that Iran was planning to supply Russia with both drones and missiles.[412] On 18 October the US State Department accused Iran of violating Resolution 2231 by selling Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones to Russia,[413] agreeing with similar assessments by France and the United Kingdom. Iran denied sending any arms to Russia for the Ukraine war.[414] On 22 October France, Britain and Germany formally called for a UN investigation.[415] On 1 November, CNN reported that Iran was preparing to send ballistic missiles and other weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine.[416]

On 15 November 2022, Russia fired 85 missiles at the Ukrainian power grid, causing major power outages in Kyiv and neighboring regions.[417]

On 21 November, CNN quoted an intelligence assessment that Iran had begun to help Russia produce Iran-designed drones in Russia.[418]

On 31 December, Putin in his New Year address called the war against Ukraine a “sacred duty to our ancestors and descendants” as missiles and drones rained down on Kyiv.[419]

On 10 March 2023, The New York Times reported that Russia had used new hypersonic missiles in a massive missile attack on Ukraine. Such missiles are more effective in evading conventional Ukrainian anti-missile defences that had previously proved useful against Russia’s conventional, non-hypersonic missile systems.[420]

The strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure were part of Russia’s ‘Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets’ (SODCIT) military doctrine, said the UK Defence Ministry, intended to demoralise the population and forcing the Ukrainian leadership to capitulate.[421] According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),[422]

Russian strikes had cumulatively destroyed 9 gigawatts (GW) of Ukraine’s domestic power generation by mid-June 2024. Peak consumption during the winter of 2023 was 18 GW, which means that half of Ukraine’s production capacity has been destroyed.

On 8 July 2024, Russia used a Kh-101 missile[423] to kill at least two people and injure at least 16 people at the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv.[424][425][426] Also hit the same night were facilities in Pokrovsk and Kryvyi Rih.[427] At least 20 civilians were killed in Kyiv that night.[428]

Naval blockade and engagements

Main article: Naval warfare in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: List of ship losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War

Commemorative stamp about the phrase Russian warship, go fuck yourself!

The Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva was sunk on 14 April 2022, reportedly after being hit by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles.

Ukraine lies on the Black Sea, which has ocean access only through the Turkish-held Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. On 28 February 2022, Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention and sealed off the straits to Russian warships that were not registered to Black Sea home bases and returning to their ports of origin. It specifically denied passage through the Turkish Straits to four Russian naval vessels.[429] On 24 February, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced that Russian Navy ships had begun an attack on Snake Island.[430] The guided missile cruiser Moskva and patrol boat Vasily Bykov bombarded the island with deck guns.[431] The Russian warship identified itself and instructed the Ukrainians on the island to surrender. Their response was “Russian warship, go fuck yourself!”[432] After the bombardment, a detachment of Russian soldiers landed and took control of Snake Island.[433] Russia said on 26 February that US drones had supplied intelligence to the Ukrainian navy to help it target Russian warships in the Black Sea. The US denied this.[434]

By 3 March, Ukrainian forces in Mykolaiv scuttled the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, the flagship of the Ukrainian navy, to prevent its capture by Russian forces.[435] On 24 March, Ukrainian officials said that a Russian landing ship docked in Berdiansk—initially reported to be the Orsk and then its sister ship, the Saratov—was destroyed by a Ukrainian rocket attack.[162][436] In March 2022, the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) sought to create a safe sea corridor for commercial vessels to leave Ukrainian ports.[437] On 27 March, Russia established a sea corridor 80 miles (130 km) long and 3 miles (4.8 km) wide through its Maritime Exclusion Zone, for the transit of merchant vessels from the edge of Ukrainian territorial waters southeast of Odesa.[438][439] Ukraine closed its ports at MARSEC level 3, with sea mines laid in port approaches, pending the end of hostilities.[440][failed verification]

The Russian cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, was, according to Ukrainian sources and a US senior official,[441] hit on 13 April by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles, setting the ship afire. The Russian Defence Ministry said the warship had suffered serious damage from a munition explosion caused by a fire, and that its entire crew had been evacuated.[442] Pentagon spokesman John Kirby reported on 14 April that satellite images showed that the Russian warship had suffered a sizeable explosion onboard but was heading to the east for expected repairs and refitting in Sevastopol.[443] Later the same day, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that the Moskva had sunk while under tow in rough weather.[444] On 15 April, Reuters reported that Russia launched an apparent retaliatory missile strike against the missile factory Luch Design Bureau in Kyiv where the Neptune missiles used in the Moskva attack were manufactured and designed.[445] On 5 May, a US official confirmed that the US gave “a range of intelligence” (including real-time battlefield targeting intelligence)[446] to assist in the sinking of the Moskva.[447]

On 1 June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserted that Ukraine’s policy of mining its own harbours to impede Russian maritime aggression had contributed to the food export crisis, saying: “If Kyiv solves the problem of demining ports, the Russian Navy will ensure the unimpeded passage of ships with grain to the Mediterranean Sea.”[448] On 30 June 2022, Russia announced that it had withdrawn its troops from the island in a “gesture of goodwill.”[250] The withdrawal was later confirmed by Ukraine.[449]

On 26 December 2023, Ukraine’s air force attacked the Russian landing ship Novocherkassk docked in Feodosia. Ukraine said it was destroyed—unlikely to sail again. Russian authorities confirmed the attack, but not the loss, and said two attacking aircraft were destroyed. Independent analysts said the ship’s loss could hamper future Russian attacks on Ukraine’s coast.[450][451][452] On 31 January 2024, Ukrainian sea drones struck the Russian Tarantul-class corvette Ivanovets in the Black Sea, causing the ship to sink.[453][454] Two weeks later on 14 February, the same type of Ukrainian sea drones struck and sank the Russian landing ship Tsezar Kunikov.[455][456]

Ukrainian resistance

Main article: Ukrainian resistance during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: 2022 protests in Russian-occupied Ukraine and Fabian strategy

Civilians in Kyiv preparing Molotov cocktails, 26 February 2022

Ukrainian civilians resisted the Russian invasion by volunteering for territorial defence units, making Molotov cocktails, donating food, building barriers like Czech hedgehogs,[457] and helping to transport refugees.[458] Responding to a call from Ukravtodor, Ukraine’s transportation agency, civilians dismantled or altered road signs,[459] constructed makeshift barriers, and blocked roadways.[460] Social media reports showed spontaneous street protests against Russian forces in occupied settlements, often evolving into verbal altercations and physical standoffs with Russian troops.[461] By the beginning of April, Ukrainian civilians began to organise as guerrillas, mostly in the wooded north and east of the country. The Ukrainian military announced plans for a large-scale guerrilla campaign to complement its conventional defence.[462]

People physically blocked Russian military vehicles, sometimes forcing them to retreat.[461][463] The Russian soldiers’ response to unarmed civilian resistance varied from reluctance to engage the protesters,[461] to firing into the air, to firing directly into crowds.[464] There have been mass detentions of Ukrainian protesters, and Ukrainian media has reported forced disappearances, mock executions, hostage-taking, extrajudicial killings, and sexual violence perpetrated by the Russian military.[465] To facilitate Ukrainian attacks, civilians reported Russian military positions via a Telegram chatbot and Diia, a Ukrainian government app previously used by citizens to upload official identity and medical documents. In response, Russian forces began destroying mobile phone network equipment, searching door-to-door for smartphones and computers, and in at least one case killed a civilian who had pictures of Russian tanks.[466]

As of 21 May 2022, Zelenskyy indicated that Ukraine had 700,000 service members on active duty fighting the Russian invasion.[467] Ukraine withdrew soldiers and military equipment back to Ukraine over the course of 2022 that had been deployed to United Nations peacekeeping missions like MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[468]

Foreign involvement

Main article: Foreign involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Support for Ukraine

Further information: List of military aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War, International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and International Legion (Ukraine)

Countries that have delivered military aid to Ukraine

Heavy weaponry

Light weaponry

Non-lethal materiel

Non-materiel

Ukraine

In response to the invasion, many countries have supplied military aid to Ukraine including weaponry, equipment, training, and logistical support. Western and other countries imposed limited sanctions on Russia in the prelude to the invasion and applied new sanctions when the invasion began, intending to cripple the Russian economy;[469][470] sanctions targeted individuals, banks, businesses, monetary exchanges, exports, and imports.[469]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Western leaders at the NATO Summit in Vilnius on 12 July 2023

Military assistance has mostly been co-ordinated through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, whose more than fifty countries include all 32 member states of NATO.[471] From January 2022 to January 2024, $380 billion in aid to Ukraine was tracked by the Kiel Institute.[472] European countries have provided the most aid in total (military, financial and humanitarian).[473] Estonia and Denmark have provided the most military aid as a share of GDP.[474] The European Union co-ordinated the supply of military aid for the first time.[475] Meanwhile, the United States has provided the most military assistance to Ukraine,[473] and has set aside $175 billion to help the country.[474] Most of the US military aid has been old American weaponry and equipment from reserve stockpiles, while most of the US funding earmarked for Ukraine stays in the US economy and supports US industries, subsidizing the manufacture of weapons and military equipment.[474][476] Bulgaria supplied Ukraine with over one third of the ammunition needed in the early phase of the invasion and a plurality of needed fuel.[477]

Although India has maintained a neutral stance on the invasion,[478] reports indicate that artillery shells made by Indian manufacturers were sold to European countries and then diverted to Ukraine. Indian officials have not intervened despite objections from Russia.[479]

Most of Ukraine’s supporters ruled out sending troops to the country in the early months of the invasion.[480] President Emmanuel Macron of France later said in 2024 that sending troops was a possibility.[481]

The Russian government has threatened retaliation against countries supplying military aid to Ukraine, and said it meant NATO was waging a “proxy war” against Russia.[482] Russia’s government has not followed through on its threats, despite most of its “red lines” being crossed.[483] President Putin said that if military aid stopped, Ukraine would not survive for long.[484]

Support for Russia

Countries sending weaponry to Russia[needs update]

Russia

Ukraine

Belarus

See also: Belarusian involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to stage part of the invasion, and to launch Russian missiles into Ukraine.[485] Belarus airspace was used by Russia, including for radar early warning and control missions, until 2023, when a Russian Beriev A-50 surveillance plane was damaged by drones.[486] Because of its active involvement, Belarus is considered a co-belligerent[487][488] in this invasion, as contrasted to non-belligerent states, which have “a wide range of tools available to non-belligerent actors without reaching the threshold of warfighting”.[489] Political scientist Matthew Frear considers Belarus a co-combatant, with “Lukashenko repeatedly stated his support for Putin’s military actions”,[490] while 2023 issue of IISS‘s “Armed Conflict Survey” journal classified it as not a direct co-combatant.[491] Belarus provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and later, according to the 2024 issue of “Armed Conflict Survey”, Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.[492]

Iran

See also: Iran and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

In June 2023, US military intelligence suggested Iran was providing both Shahed combat drones and production materials to develop a drone manufactory to Russia.[493] In February 2024, a Reuters report indicated that Iran sent ballistic missiles to the Russian military.[494] According to the US and Ukraine, Iranian troops have been stationed in Crimea to assist Russia in launching drone attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.[495][496] The Institute for the Study of War assessed that these are likely Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or IRGC-affiliated personnel.[497] Iran has denied sending arms to Russia for use against Ukraine.[414]

North Korea

This section may be too long and excessively detailed. Please consider summarizing the material. (January 2025)

See also: North Korean involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

North Korea has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles and launchers although US authorities did not mention the specific models. Based on debris left by missiles on 30 December 2023 attacks against Ukrainian targets show parts common to KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25 missiles.[498][499] In October 2024, Ukraine and South Korea claimed that North Korean engineers had been deployed to the battlefield to help with the launch of these missiles, and had suffered some casualties.[1][500][501]

Later the same month, a White House spokesperson said that the United States was “concerned” about reports that North Korean soldiers were fighting for Russia in Ukraine.[502][503][504] A day later, Zelensky announced that Ukrainian intelligence believed there were 10,000 North Korean troops preparing to join Russian forces on the front line.[505] The North Korean government rejected these claims and stated that none of their soldiers were fighting for Russia.[506][507][508]

The US later said it had seen evidence that North Korea had sent 3,000 soldiers to Russia for possible deployment to Ukraine, determining that the soldiers had been transported from North Korea by ship in early-to-mid October and were undergoing training at three military bases in eastern Russia. The US added that the alleged North Korean deployment could be further evidence that the Russian military was having problems with manpower.[509] On 28 October, NATO chief Mark Rutte confirmed earlier Ukrainian intelligence that North Korean troops had been deployed to Kursk Oblast to support Russia against the 2024 Kursk Offensive, and the Pentagon reported an increased number of 10,000 North Korean soldiers sent to train in Russia and fight in the war.[510][511][512]

Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov with North Korean Defence Minister No Kwang-chol on 29 November 2024

On 7 November, the Ukrainian defence minister reported that North Korean troops had been engaged in battle on 5 November.[513] On 13 November, both the US State Department and South Korea confirmed that North Korean troops had begun engaging in combat against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[514][515][516] The Pentagon could not confirm the claims.[517] On 24 November, the Ukrainian chief of general staff confirmed that North Korean troops have been engaged in battle.[518] On 2 December the Pentagon stated that it has no evidence of North Korean troops engaged in combat, but noted that North Korean soldiers had been integrated into Russian units.[519] A representative of the Ukrainian intelligence directorate confirmed that North Korean troops have been integrated into Russian units held in reserve but said that North Korean troops are unlikely to be engaged in combat on the front line and are still engaged in training. The presence of North Korean troops in Kursk is seen as enabling Russia in its fight against Ukraine.[520] On 16 December, the US confirmed that North Korean troops had been killed and injured in combat in Russia’s Kursk oblast.[521] By 18 December, the number of killed and wounded North Korean soldiers had reportedly reached “a couple hundred”,[522] while South Korea reported 100 North Koreans dead and 1000 injured.[523] Writing in December 2024 for the Lieber Institute‘s Articles of War publication, US Army JAG officers Steve Szymanski and Joshua C.T. Keruski stated that North Korea had become a party to an international armed conflict with Ukraine as of the 5 November 2024 engagement.[524]

Zelenskyy also showcased footage which he said showed Russian troops burning the faces of killed North Korean soldiers in an attempt to conceal their presence on the battlefield.[525][526][527][528][529]

In January 2025 two North Korean servicemen were taken prisoner while fighting in Kursk Oblast. Intelligence debriefings indicate that North Korean soldiers have been issued with false military papers stating that they are Russians hailing from Tuva.[530]

Others

See also: China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine and India and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Most of the Global South countries took a neutral position towards the war and maintained good relations with Russia.[531]

Politico reported in March 2023 that Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer Norinco shipped assault rifles, drone parts, and body armor to Russia between June and December 2022, with some shipments via third countries including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.[532] According to the United States, Chinese ammunition has been used on battlefields in Ukraine.[533] In May 2023, the European Union identified that Chinese and UAE firms were supplying weapon components to Russia.[534] In April 2024, China was reported to have provided Russia with geospatial intelligence, machine tools for tanks, and propellants for missiles.[535] In September 2024, Reuters reported documents indicating Russia had established a weapons programme in China to develop and produce long-range attack drones, with assistance from local specialists, for use in the invasion of Ukraine.[536]

Russia imports sensitive electronics, machinery, auto parts, and defence equipment from India.[537] Trade like oil sales has surged since 2022, boosting revenue for Russian state-owned companies. To bypass sanctions and manage its currency surplus, Russia pays in rupees, supporting both civilian and military needs.[538][539]

Casualties

This section may be too long and excessively detailed. Please consider summarizing the material. (January 2025)

Further information: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War § Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present), and List of deaths during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Photos of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Russian casualties next to a Z marked armored vehicle

Casualties after two shells hit a two-story building of a kindergarten in Okhtyrka, causing about 50 people to be hospitalised

Russia-Ukraine War death toll compared to other modern European wars

Russian and Ukrainian sources have both been said to inflate the casualty numbers for opposing forces and downplay their own losses for the sake of morale.[540] Leaked US documents say that “under-reporting of casualties within the [Russian] system highlights the military’s ‘continuing reluctance’ to convey bad news up the chain of command.”[541] Russian news outlets have largely stopped reporting the Russian death toll.[542] Russia and Ukraine have admitted suffering “significant”[543] and “considerable” losses, respectively.[544][545]

The numbers of civilian and military deaths have been as always impossible to determine precisely.[546] Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that neither it nor independent conflict monitors were able to verify Russian and Ukrainian claims of enemy losses and suspected that they were inflated.[547] On 12 October 2022, the independent Russian media project iStories, citing sources close to the Kremlin, reported that more than 90,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, seriously wounded, or gone missing in Ukraine.[548]

While combat deaths can be inferred from a variety of sources, including satellite imagery of military action, measuring civilian deaths can be more difficult. On 16 June 2022, the Ukrainian Minister of Defence told CNN that he believed that tens of thousands of Ukrainians had died, adding that he hoped the total death toll was below 100,000.[549] By the end of June 2024, about 20,000 Ukrainians had lost limbs.[550] In the destroyed city of Mariupol alone, Ukrainian officials believe that at least 25,000 have been killed,[551][552] and bodies were still being discovered in September 2022.[553] The mayor said over 10,000 and possibly as many as 20,000 civilians died in the siege of Mariupol and that Russian forces had brought mobile cremation equipment with them when they entered the city.[554][555] Researcher Dan Ciuriak from C. D. Howe Institute in August 2022 estimates the number of killed Mariupol civilians at 25,000,[556] and an investigation by AP from the end of 2022 gives a number of up to 75,000 killed civilians in Mariupol area alone.[557][558] AFP says that “a key gap in casualty counts is the lack of information from Russian-occupied places like the port city of Mariupol, where tens of thousands of civilians are believed to have died”.[559] According to a study by Human Rights Watch and two other organisations, there were at least 8,034 excess deaths in Mariupol between March 2022 and February 2023.[560] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reports similar issues and believed that the true civilian casualty numbers were significantly higher than it has been able to confirm.[561]

In the Russian military during the invasion, Russia’s ethnic minorities have been suffering disproportionately high casualties. In October 2022, the Russian regions with the highest death tolls were Dagestan, Tuva and Buryatia, all minority regions. In February 2024, six out of ten Russian regions with the highest mortality rates in Ukraine were located in Siberia and the far east, and ethnic minorities continuing outsized casualty rates prompted analysts to warn that the situation will lead to long-term destructive impacts on these communities.[562][563][564][565][566] According to Western officials, about 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in Ukraine every day in May and June 2024,[567] which climbed to 1,500 killed or wounded daily by November 2024, when 45,690 casualties were estimated that month.[568] Newsweek estimated that on the bloodiest day in November 2024 the ratio of killed Russian men (1,950) exceeded the average daily male birth rate in Russia (1,836).[569] Latvia-based news outlet Meduza estimated that up to 140,000 Russian soldiers had died in the war by the end of June 2024.[570]

The Russian invasion became the deadliest European war in the last 80 years,[571] surpassing the death toll of the Bosnian War.[572] Ukrainian average mortality rate was 8.7/1000 people in 2020,[573] and jumped to 18.6/1000 in 2024, whereas Russia’s mortality rate that same year was 14/1000, ranking them as #1 and #9, respectively, on the list of countries with the highest mortality rates.[574] In August 2024, Haaretz estimated 172,000 people had died in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[575] In February 2025, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft estimated 250,000 dead.[576] In September 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that there were now one million Ukrainians and Russians who were killed or wounded.[577] The Journal took note of how the number of casualties impacts the two countries’ shrinking prewar populations.[577]

Confirmed casualties

Numbers

Time period

Source

Ukrainian civilians

12,654 killed, 27,836 wounded

24 February 2022 – 21 February 2025

United Nations (OHCHR)[578]

Ukrainian forces (NGU)

501 killed, 1,697 wounded

24 February 2022 – 12 May 2022

National Guard of Ukraine[579]

Ukrainian forces (ZSU)

46,000 killed, 380,000 wounded

24 February 2022 – 16 February 2025

Office of the President of Ukraine[580]

Ukrainian forces

65,542 killed (incl. non-combat,[581]

confirmed by names)

24 February 2022 – 17 February 2025

UALosses project[582]

Russian forces

(DPR/LPR excluded)

90,019 killed (conf. by names)

24 February 2022 – 24 January 2025

BBC News Russian and Mediazona[583]

Russian forces

(Donetsk & Luhansk PR)

21,000–23,500 killed

24 February 2022 – 30 September 2024

BBC News Russian[583]

Estimated and claimed casualties

Numbers

Time period

Source

Ukrainian civilians

12,000 killed (confirmed),[e] 28,000 captive

24 February 2022 – 17 June 2024

Ukrainian government[584][585]

1,911 killed, 6,834 wounded

(in DPR/LPR areas)

17 February 2022 – 12 August 2024

DPR[f] and LPR[588][589]

13,287 killed, 19,464 injured

24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023

Benjamin J. Radford et al.[590]

Ukrainian forces

80,000 killed, 400,000 wounded

24 February 2022 – before September 2024

WSJ citing confidential Ukrainian estimate[577]

57,500+ killed, 250,000+ wounded

24 February 2022 – 10 October 2024

United States estimate[591]

Russian forces

115,000 killed, 500,000 wounded

24 February 2022 – 10 October 2024

US estimate[591]

404,700–564,000 killed and wounded

24 February 2022 – 18 October 2024

BBC News Russian[583]

914,000+ killed and wounded

24 February 2022 – 30 March 2025

Ukrainian MoD estimate[592]

700,000 killed and wounded

24 February 2022 – 10 November 2024

UK Ministry of Defence estimate[593]

War crimes and attacks on civilians

Main articles: War crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Attacks on civilians in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Russian war crimes

Dead bodies following the Bucha massacre

During the invasion, the Russian military and authorities have been responsible for deliberate attacks against civilian targets[594] (including strikes on hospitals and on the energy grid), massacres of civilians, abduction and torture of civilians, sexual violence,[595] forced deportation of civilians, and torture and murder of Ukrainian prisoners of war. They have also carried out many indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas, including with cluster bombs, in once instance killing 61 people in the Kramatorsk railway station attack.[596][597][598][219] According to Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Ukrainian intelligence, Russia before the start of the invasion of Ukraine had created ‘execution lists’ of Ukrainian teachers, journalists, scientists, writers, priests, politicians and was preparing for a genocide of Ukrainians, also the plans included locations of mass graves and mobile crematoriums.[599]

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, by December 2023, about 78% of confirmed civilian casualties had been killed in Ukrainian-controlled territory, while 21% had been killed in Russian-occupied territory.[600] Over 12,300 civilians have been killed since the start of the invasion.[601] Russia has deliberately targeted Ukrainian civilians with drones, such as in the Kherson terror campaign dubbed the human safari.[602][603][604] A representative from the Kherson military administration said nearly half of the 547 casualties reported from 1 July to 9 September 2024 were caused by drones.[605]

The UN Human Rights Office reports that Russia is committing severe human rights violations in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, crackdown on protests and freedom of speech, enforced Russification, indoctrination of children, and suppression of Ukrainian language and culture.[606] Ukrainians have been coerced into taking Russian passports and becoming Russian citizens. Those who refuse are denied healthcare and other rights,[606] and can be imprisoned as a “foreign citizen”. Ukrainian men who take Russian citizenship are drafted to fight against the Ukrainian army.[607]

Russian forces have reportedly used banned chemical weapons during the war, usually tear gas grenades.[608][609] In April 2024, a Daily Telegraph investigation concluded that “Russian troops are carrying out a systematic campaign of illegal chemical attacks against Ukrainian soldiers”.[610]

Prisoners of war

Main article: Prisoners of war in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

A 25 August 2022 report by the Humanitarian Research Lab of the Yale School of Public Health identified some 21 filtration camps for Ukrainian “civilians, POWs, and other personnel” in the vicinity of Donetsk oblast. Imaging of one camp, Olenivka prison, found two sites featuring disturbed earth consistent with “potential graves.”[611] Kaveh Khoshnood, a professor at the Yale School of Public Health, said: “Incommunicado detention of civilians is more than a violation of international humanitarian law—it represents a threat to the public health of those currently in the custody of Russia and its proxies.” Conditions described by freed prisoners include exposure, insufficient access to sanitation, food and water, cramped conditions, electrical shocks and physical assault.[611]

An OHCHR report released in November 2022 documented abuses on both sides. The report was based on interviews with prisoners who spoke of abuses and ill-treatment.[612]

In March 2023, UN human rights commissioner Volker Türk reported that more than 90% of the Ukrainian POWs interviewed by his office said they had been tortured or ill-treated, including ″welcoming beatings″ on their arrival in penitentiary facilities, which Russia despite several requests did not give UN staff access to.[613]

In April 2023, several videos started circulating on different websites purportedly showing Russian soldiers beheading Ukrainian soldiers.[614][615]

In March 2024, the United Nations issued a report saying Russia may have executed more than 30 recently captured Ukrainian prisoners of war over the winter months. The UN Human Rights Office verified three incidents in which Russian servicemen executed seven Ukrainian servicemen. According to the same report, 39 of 60 released Ukrainian prisoners of war also “disclosed that they had been subjected to sexual violence during their internment, including attempted rape, threats of rape and castration, beatings or the administration of electric shocks to genitals, and repeated forced nudity, including during interrogations and to check for tattoos”.[616]

In October 2024, the EEAS released a statement describing the increasing frequency of Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners, with at least 177 prisoners dying in Russian captivity since the beginning of the war. The statement also included the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)‘s confirmation of systematic use of a wide range of different methods of torture used by Russians against Ukrainian prisoners.[617]

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have also been accused of executions and other abuses of Russian prisoners of war, but the number of such allegations has been significantly lower.[618]: para. 105 [619][620][621]

Abduction of Ukrainian children

Main article: Child abductions in the Russo-Ukrainian War

In June 2024, an investigation by the Financial Times identified four Ukrainian children on a Russian government-linked adoption website that had been abducted from state care homes. The children’s Ukrainian background was not mentioned. One child was shown with a new Russian name and age that differed from their Ukrainian documents, another was shown using a Russian version of their Ukrainian name. 17 other matches identified by the Financial Times on the adoption website were also confirmed as Ukrainian children in a recent New York Times investigation. Ukrainian authorities estimate that nearly 20,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly taken from occupied territories to Russia since the full-scale invasion began. Wayne Jordash, president of humanitarian law firm Global Rights Compliance, described forcibly transferring or deporting children as war crimes, adding that when done as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, Russia is also committing crimes against humanity.[622][623]

International arrest warrants

Further information: International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Russian leaders

Putin and Mongolian president Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh standing in front of the statue of Genghis Khan in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 3 September 2024. Mongolia was the first ICC member state to openly defy the court’s arrest warrant for Putin

The International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into possible crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes committed in Ukraine.[624] On 17 March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest, charging him with individual criminal responsibility in the abduction of children forcibly deported to Russia.[625] It was the first time that the ICC had issued an arrest warrant for the head of state of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council[625] (the world’s five principal nuclear powers).[626] Moscow has denied any involvement in war crimes, a response Vittorio Bufacchi of University College Cork says “has bordered on the farcical,”[627] and its contention that the images coming out of Bucha were fabricated “a disingenuous response born by delusional hubris, post-truth on overdrive, (that) does not merit to be taken seriously.” Even the usually fractured United States Senate came together to call Putin a war criminal.[628]

One of several efforts to document Russian war crimes concerns its repeated bombardment of markets and bread lines, destruction of basic infrastructure and attacks on exports and supply convoys, in a country where deliberate starvation of Ukrainians by Soviets the Holodomor still looms large in public memory.[629] Forcible deportation of populations, such as took place in Mariupol, is another area of focus, since,[630]

forced deportations and transfers are defined both as war crimes under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol II and Article 8 of the Rome Statute—and as crimes against humanity—under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. As both war crimes and crimes against humanity, they have several mechanisms for individual accountability, the International Criminal Court and also, at the individual state level, universal jurisdiction and Magnitsky sanctions legislation.

The ICC also issued arrest warrants for military officials Sergey Kobylash, Viktor Sokolov, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov.[631][632]

Impacts

Humanitarian impact

Main article: Humanitarian impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Further information: World food crises (2022–present)

The humanitarian impact of the invasion has been extensive and has included negative impacts on international food supplies and the 2022 food crises.[633] An estimated 6.6 million Ukrainians were internally displaced by August 2022, and about the same number were refugees in other countries.[634] The invasion has devastated the cultural heritage of Ukraine,[635] with over 500 Ukrainian cultural heritage sites, including cultural centres, theatres, museums, and churches, affected by “Russian aggression.” Ukraine’s Minister of Culture Oleksandr Tkachenko called it cultural genocide.[636] Deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites in this way is considered a war crime.[637]

The Russian attacks on civilians, causing mass civilian casualties and displacement, have been characterised as genocide and democide.[28][29][30][31] On 15 September 2023, a UN-mandated investigative body presented their findings that Russian occupiers had tortured Ukrainians so brutally that some of their victims died, and forced families to listen as they raped women next door.[638][31] The commission has previously said that violations committed by Russian forces in Ukraine, including the use of torture, may constitute crimes against humanity.[639]

A report by Physicians for Human Rights described Russian violence against the Ukrainian health care system as being a prominent feature of Russia’s conduct during the war, documenting 707 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system between 24 February and 31 December 2022. Such attacks are considered war crimes.[640]

Refugee crisis

This section may be too long and excessively detailed. Please consider summarizing the material. (January 2025)

Main articles: Ukrainian refugee crisis and Transnational repression by Russia

Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protesting against the war, 6 March 2022

Protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, organised by political youth organisations in Helsinki, Finland, 26 February 2022

The war caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s;[641][642] the UN described it as the fastest growing such crisis since World War II.[643] As Russia built up military forces along the Ukrainian border, many neighbouring governments and aid organisations prepared for a mass displacement event in the weeks before the invasion. In December 2021, the Ukrainian defence minister estimated that an invasion could force three to five million people to flee their homes.[644]

In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently reached over eight million by 31 January 2023.[645][646] On 20 May 2022, NPR reported that, following a significant influx of foreign military equipment into Ukraine, a significant number of refugees were seeking to return to regions in Ukraine which were relatively isolated from the invasion front in southeastern Ukraine.[647] By 3 May, another 8 million people were displaced inside Ukraine.[648]

Most refugees were women, children, elderly, or disabled.[649] Most male Ukrainian nationals aged 18 to 60 were denied exit from Ukraine as part of mandatory conscription,[650] unless they were responsible for the financial support of three or more children, single fathers, or were the parent/guardian of children with disabilities.[651] Many Ukrainian men, including teenagers, opted to remain in Ukraine voluntarily to join the resistance.[652]

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees as of 13 May 2022, there were 3,315,711 refugees in Poland, 901,696 in Romania, 594,664 in Hungary, 461,742 in Moldova, 415,402 in Slovakia, and 27,308 in Belarus, while Russia reported it had received over 800,104 refugees.[645] By 13 July 2022, over 390,000 Ukrainian refugees had arrived in the Czech Republic, where the average refugee was a woman accompanied by one child. These refugees were twice as likely to have a college degree as the Czech population as a whole.[653] Turkey has been another significant destination, registering more than 58,000 Ukrainian refugees as of 22 March 2022.[654] The EU invoked the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history, granting Ukrainian refugees the right to live and work in the EU for up to three years.[655] Britain has accepted 146,379 refugees, as well as extending the ability to remain in the UK for three years with broadly similar entitlements as the EU, three years residency and access to state welfare and services.[656]

According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia has engaged in “massive deportation” of over 1.3 million Ukrainian civilians, potentially constituting crimes against humanity.[657] The OSCE and Ukraine have accused Russia of forcibly moving civilians to filtration camps in Russian-held territory, and then into Russia. Ukrainian sources have compared this policy to Soviet-era population transfers and Russian actions in the Chechen War of Independence.[658] For instance, as of 8 April 2022, Russia claimed to have evacuated about 121,000 Mariupol residents to Russia.[658] Also, on 19 October, Russia announced the forced deportation of 60,000 civilians from areas around the line of contact in Kherson oblast.[659] RIA Novosti and Ukrainian officials said that thousands were dispatched to various centres in cities in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine,[660] from which people were sent to economically depressed regions of Russia.[661] In April, Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council secretary Oleksiy Danilov said that Russia planned to build “concentration camps” for Ukrainians in western Siberia, and likely planned to force prisoners to build new cities in Siberia.[662][g]

Long-term demographic effects

Ukrainian refugees entering Romania, 5 March 2022

Both Russia and Ukraine faced the prospect of significant population decline even before the war, having among the lowest fertility rates worldwide and considerable emigration. It is the first time that two countries with an average age above 40 have gone to war against each other.[664] Russia had a fighting-age (18-to-40-year-old) male population more than four times higher than Ukraine’s and slightly higher birth rates, while the willingness to fight was more pronounced in Ukraine.[665]

Several sources have pointed out that the war is considerably worsening Ukraine’s demographic crisis, making significant shrinking very likely.[666] A July 2023 study by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies stated that,[667]

regardless of how long the war lasts and whether or not there is further military escalation, Ukraine is unlikely to recover demographically from the consequences of the war. Even in 2040 it will have only about 35 million inhabitants, around 20% fewer than before the war (2021: 42.8 million) and the decline in the working-age population is likely to be the most severe and far-reaching.

The study took different scenarios, from a “best case” (end of the war in 2023 without much further escalation) to a “worst case” (end of the war in 2025 with further escalation) into account. Flight from war affected especially the southern and eastern regions and especially educated women of child-bearing age and their children. With an estimate of more than 20% of refugees not returning, study author Maryna Tverdostup concluded that long-term shrinking will significantly impair the conditions for reconstruction.[667]

Civilians from occupied Crimea drafted into the Russian army during the 2022 Russian mobilization

The war in Ukraine and the associated emigration, lower birth rates and war-related casualties further deepened the demographic crisis of Russia.[668] Many commentators predict that the situation will be worse than during the 1990s.[669] The UN is projecting that the decline that started in 2021 will continue, and if current demographic conditions persist, Russia’s population would be 120 million in fifty years, a decline of about 17%.[670][671]

Since February 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russians have emigrated; estimates range from 370,000 to over 820,000. Combined with mobilisation, this possibly removed roughly half a million to one million working-age males from Russia’s population.[672] Studies report that this will have a demographic effect, especially in Russia, that lasts much longer than the conflict, and Putin’s time in office.[673]

According to BBC:[674]

They come from different walks of life. Some are journalists like us, but there are also IT experts, designers, artists, academics, lawyers, doctors, PR specialists, and linguists. Most are under 50. Many share western liberal values and hope Russia will be a democratic country one day. Some are LGBTQ+. Sociologists studying the current Russian emigration say there is evidence that those leaving are younger, better educated and wealthier than those staying. More often they are from bigger cities.

Bodies of Russian soldiers in a trench

According to Johannes Wachs, “The exodus of skilled human capital, sometimes called brain drain, out of Russia may have a significant effect on the course of the war and the Russian economy in the long run.”[675] According to a survey, around 15 percent of those who left returned to Russia, either permanently or to settle their affairs.[676]

In November 2023, at the World Russian People’s Council, Putin urged Russian women to have eight or more children amid increasing Russian casualties in the invasion.[677]

In July 2024, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army Roland Walker said that with the current way of fighting, it would take Russia five years to control the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that Russia claims as its own, and it would cost Russia from 1.5 to 1.8 million casualties.[678] He said there are “no winners” in Russia’s invasion, adding “it is an utter devastation for both sides and lost generations.”[679]

Environmental impact

Main article: Environmental impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

An explosion due to the shelling of a tank of nitric acid during the battle of Sievierodonetsk, 31 May 2022

Based on a preliminary assessment, the war has inflicted $51 billion in environmental damage in Ukraine; according to a report by the Yale School of the Environment, some 623,000 tonnes (1.4 billion pounds) of petrochemicals have burned as a result of shelling, while nearly 1,500 tonnes (3.2 million pounds) of pollutants have leaked into bodies of water. Hazardous chemicals have contaminated around 28 hectares (70 acres) of soil, and likely made agricultural activities temporarily impossible.[680] Around 30% of Ukraine’s land is now littered with explosives and more than 2.4 million hectares (5.9 million acres) of forest have been damaged.[681]

According to Netherlands-based peace organisation PAX, Russia’s “deliberate targeting of industrial and energy infrastructure” has caused “severe” pollution, and the use of explosive weapons has left “millions of tonnes” of contaminated debris in cities and towns.[682] In early June 2023, the Kakhovka Dam, under Russian occupation, was damaged, causing flooding and triggering warnings of an “ecological disaster.”[683]

The Ukrainian government, international observers and journalists have described the damage as ecocide.[684] The Ukrainian government is investigating more crimes against the environment and ecocide (a crime in Ukraine).[685] Zelenskyy has met with prominent European figures (Heidi Hautala, Margot Wallstrom, Mary Robinson and Greta Thunberg) to discuss the environmental damage and how to prosecute it.[686]

According to an investigation by NGL Media published in April 2024, Russia has completely destroyed over 60,000 hectares (150,000 acres) of Ukrainian forests. The investigation stated that long-term ecological consequences may include lowering of the groundwater level, reduction of biodiversity, worsening of air quality, fire outbreaks, and rivers and ponds drying up.[687]

The war has severely disrupted climate policy all over the world and increased CO2 emissions.[688][689] The effects have been strongly felt in Asia,[690][691][692] Europe,[693] and the US.[694] Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency talking about the prospects of COP 28 noted:[695]

… the geopolitical situation, with many nations at loggerheads over the war in Ukraine, and still frosty relations between the US and China, would make for a difficult summit. […] The most important challenge [to limiting temperature rises to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) above pre-industrial levels] is the lack of international cooperation.

Nuclear risk

Main article: Nuclear risk during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Senior Russian politicians—including Putin, Sergey Lavrov, and Dmitry Medvedev—have made statements widely seen as nuclear blackmail. They have implied that Russia may use nuclear weapons if certain “red lines” are crossed, such as helping Ukraine to strike back at Russia itself.

Four days into the invasion, Putin put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert, raising fears that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.[696] In April, Putin “seemed to hint at the use of nuclear weapons against any nation that directly intervenes”, and Sergei Lavrov said there was a “real” danger of a third world war.[697] CIA director William Burns said that “desperation” in the face of defeat could lead Putin to order a nuclear strike.[698] In September, the United States warned Russia’s government that the country would suffer “catastrophic” consequences if it used nuclear weapons against Ukraine.[699][700] Addressing the United Nations, President Biden accused Putin of making “overt, reckless and irresponsible” nuclear threats and said Russia would not win a nuclear war: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought“.[701] In March 2023, Putin announced plans to install Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.[702]

By 2024, most of the Russian government’s “red lines” had been crossed without nuclear weapons being used in response.[703]

IAEA inspectors recording damage at Zaporizhzhia NPP

The invasion had an impact on Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Russian forces seized Chernobyl on the first day, leading to a huge spike in radiation levels.[704] Russia also seized Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. The plant has been damaged by shelling, Russian military equipment has been placed there, and safety protocols have been breached, leading to a nuclear safety crisis. Ukraine described the crisis as nuclear terrorism by Russia.[705] In response to what he called “completely irresponsible actions”, Zelenskyy suggested that there should be outside control over Russia’s nuclear plants.[706] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued stark warnings and said it was the first time a military conflict occurred amid nuclear plants. It called for a demilitarised zone around Zaporizhzhia NPP.[707]

Economic impact

Main article: Economic impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukraine

Ukrainian Minister of Economic Development and Trade Yulia Svyrydenko announced that for 2022 Ukraine had a 30.4% loss in their GDP.[708] The International Monetary Fund predicted that Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) would suffer a decrease from a minimum of 10% to a maximum of 35%;[709] the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also predicted that the invasion would cause a 20% decrease of Ukraine’s GDP.[710] The Ukrainian statistics service said that the GDP of Ukraine in 2023 grew by 5.3%.[711]

Ukraine began issuing war bonds on 1 March 2022, and the following day the Ukrainian government announced that they had raised 6.14 billion hryvnias.[712] A ban was placed in May 2022 by the European Commission on grain sales in the countries of: Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia with the only exception being if they were transiting through those countries with the ban being lifted in September 2023.[713]

The war has caused a major humanitarian crisis in Ukraine: the United Nations Development Programme calculated in March 2022 that a prolonged conflict would cause 30% of the Ukrainian population to fall below the poverty line, while a further 62% would be at risk of also falling into poverty within a year.[714]

Russia

The Russian economic ministry said that for 2022 the GDP contracted by 2.1%[715] and for 2023 Russia’s government said the GDP grew by 3.6%.[716]

A price cap was placed on Russian oil by the Group of 7 (G7) at $60 on 5 December 2022.[717] The United States banned all imports of Russian oil on 8 March 2022.[718] The European Union placed an embargo on oil products from Russia on 5 February 2023.[717] Other countries that embargoed Russian oil included Five Eyes partners Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.[719] Russia itself issued a ban on foreign diesel sales starting on 21 September 2023, before being lifted on 6 October.[720]

On 27 April 2024, it was reported that Russia was planning increases in personal income taxes and corporate taxes to help pay for the war.[721]

In January 2025, it was reported that, since early 2022, Russia had used a two-prong strategy to finance the extremely large costs of the war. In addition to the official Russian government defense budget —direct financial expenditure for waging the war in Ukraine was estimated at US$250 billion through June 2024 for military spending through normal channels,[25] with the military budget rising to over 20% of annual GDP—an additional off-budget financing mechanism was employed to fund the war with over US$200 billion of debt funding obtained from preferential bank loans made to defence contractors and war-related businesses, loans that had been compelled by the Russian government.[26][27]

Peace efforts

Main article: Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Attendees at the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit

Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place on 28 February, 3 March, and 7 March 2022, on the Belarus–Ukraine border, with further talks held on 10 March in Turkey and a fourth round of negotiations beginning 14 March.[722] The talks ended without agreement.

Russian President Putin made recognition of Russian sovereignty over the   annexed territories (pictured) a condition for peace talks with Ukraine.[723]

As of 2025, Ukraine’s main peace terms are that Russia withdraw its troops, that Ukrainian prisoners be released, that Russian leaders be prosecuted for war crimes, and that Ukraine be given security guarantees to prevent further aggression. Russia’s main terms are that Russia must keep all the land it occupies, that it also be given all of the provinces that it claims but does not fully control, that Ukraine end plans to join NATO, and that sanctions against Russia be lifted.[724]

Several Western-based analysts say that allowing Russia to keep the land it seized would “reward the aggressor while punishing the victim” and set a dangerous precedent.[725] They predict that this would allow Russia to re-arm and encourage it “to continue its imperialist campaign of expansionism” against Ukraine and its other neighbors, and embolden other expansionist regimes.[725][726][727][728]

After Donald Trump became US president in 2025, there was a major shift in US policy. The Trump administration began negotiations with Russia and separately with Ukraine.

Further information: Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine § 2025 developments

International reactions

Main article: Reactions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: Protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine

UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 vote on 2 March 2022 condemning the invasion of Ukraine and demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian troops

In favour

Against

Abstained

Absent

Non-member

The invasion received widespread international condemnation from governments and intergovernmental organisations.[729] On 2 March 2022 and on 23 February 2023, 141 member states of the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution saying that Russia should immediately withdraw. Seven, including Russia, voted against the measure.[730] Political reactions to the invasion included new sanctions imposed on Russia, which triggered widespread economic effects on the Russian and world economies.[731] Sanctions forced Russia to reorient its oil exports to non-sanctioning countries such as India, rely more on LNG (which was not subject to European Union sanctions), and shift its coal exports from Europe to Asia.[732] Most European countries cancelled nuclear cooperation with Russia.[733]

Over seventy sovereign states and the European Union delivered humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and nearly fifty countries plus the EU provided military aid.[734] Economic sanctions included a ban on Russian aircraft using EU airspace,[735] a ban of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, and a ban on certain Russian media outlets.[736] Reactions to the invasion have included public response, media responses, peace efforts, and the examination of the legal implications of the invasion.

Some countries, particularly in the Global South, saw public sympathy or outright support for Russia, due in part to distrust of US foreign policy.[737] Protests and demonstrations were held worldwide, including some in Russia and parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia.[738] Calls for a boycott of Russian goods spread on social media platforms,[739] while hackers attacked Russian websites, particularly those operated by the Russian government.[740] Anti-Russian sentiment against Russians living abroad surged after the invasion.[741] In March 2022, Russian President Putin introduced prison sentences of up to 15 years for publishing “fake news” about Russian military operations,[742] intended to suppress any criticism related to the war.[743]

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2023, 31 percent of the world’s population live in countries that are leaning towards or supportive of Russia, 30.7 percent live in neutral countries, and 36.2 percent live in countries that are against Russia in some way.[744]

A number of supranational and national parliaments passed resolutions declaring Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism.[745] By October 2022, three countries—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—had declared Russia a terrorist state.[746] On 1 August 2023, Iceland became the first European country to close its embassy in Russia as a result of the invasion of Ukraine.[747]

The invasion prompted Ukraine,[748] Finland and Sweden to officially apply for NATO membership.[749] Finland became a member of NATO on 4 April 2023,[750] followed by Sweden on 7 March 2024.[751]

A documentary film produced during the siege of Mariupol, 20 Days in Mariupol, won the Oscar for best documentary in 2024.[752]

See also

- 2020s portal

- Current events portal

- Europe portal

- Politics portal

- Russia portal

- Ukraine portal

- List of invasions in the 21st century

- Outline of the Russo-Ukrainian War

- 2020s in military history

- List of conflicts in territory of the former Soviet Union

- List of conflicts in Europe

- List of interstate wars since 1945

- List of invasions and occupations of Ukraine

- List of ongoing armed conflicts

- List of wars between Russia and Ukraine

- List of wars: 2003–present

- Russian emigration following the Russian invasion of Ukraine

- Red lines in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Notes

References

Bibliography

- D’Anieri, Paul (23 March 2023). Ukraine and Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-31550-0. OCLC 1350843759.

- Ramani, Samuel (13 April 2023). Putin’s War on Ukraine: Russia’s Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution. Hurst Publishers. ISBN 978-1-80526-003-5.

- Wallensteen, Peter (2023). Understanding Conflict Resolution. Los Angeles: SAGE. ISBN 9781529613209. OCLC 1370602224.

Further reading

- Borshchevskaya, Anna (2022). Putin’s War in Syria. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-0755634637

- D’Anieri, Paul (31 October 2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-48609-5 – via Google Books.

- Harding, Luke. Invasion: The Inside Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival. 2022. Vintage Press. ISBN 9780593685174

- Marples, David R., ed. (2022). The War in Ukraine’s Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future. Central European University Press. ISBN 978-9633865972.

- Menon, Rajan; Rumer, Eugene B. (6 February 2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post–Cold War Order. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-53629-5. OCLC 1029335958 – via Google Books.

- “The Cost of War to Ukraine”. The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Royal United Services Institute. Retrieved 8 October 2023.

- Schwirtz, Michael; Troianovski, Anton; Al-Hlou, Yousur; Froliak, Masha; Entous, Adam; Gibbons-Neff, Thomas (16 December 2022). “Putin’s War: The Inside Story of a Catastrophe”. The New York Times.

- Smith, Christopher M. (15 March 2022). Ukraine’s Revolt, Russia’s Revenge. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-3925-8. OCLC 1287616684 – via Google Books.

- Trofimov, Yaroslav (2024). Our Enemies Will Vanish. The Russian Invasion and Ukraine’s War of Independence. Penguin Random House. ISBN 9780593655184.

- Watling, Jack; Reynolds, Nick (22 April 2022). Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion (PDF) (Report). Royal United Services Institute.

- Wiegrefe, Klaus (15 February 2022). “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Is Vladimir Putin Right?”. Der Spiegel. ISSN 2195-1349. Archived from the original on 15 February 2022. Retrieved 31 May 2022.

- Wood, Elizabeth A.; Pomeranz, William E.; Merry, E. Wayne; Trudolyubov, Maxim (15 December 2015). Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-80138-6. OCLC 1008637056 – via Google Books.

External links

Russian invasion of Ukraine at Wikipedia’s sister projects

- Media from Commons

- News from Wikinews

- Quotations from Wikiquote

- Texts from Wikisource

- Data from Wikidata

- Discussions from Meta-Wiki

- The UN and the war in Ukraine at the United Nations

- Think Tank reports on the invasion of Ukraine at the Council of the European Union

- Russian invasion of Ukraine at Google News

- Ukraine conflict updates at the Institute for the Study of War

- Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine at the Institute for the Study of War

- Interactive Time-lapse: Russia’s War in Ukraine at the Institute for the Study of War

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine&oldid=1283775664”

Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 January 2025 – present)

This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by adding missing items with reliable sources.

This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 1 January 2025 to the present day.

January 2025

1 January

Damaged building in Kyiv after the 1 January attack

A drone attack in Kyiv killed two people and injured at least six others, and also damaged the main building of the National Bank of Ukraine.[1]

Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that Russia had lost some 38,000 soldiers in Kursk, while 700 others were captured and over 1,000 pieces of equipment destroyed.[2]

2 January

One person was killed in a Russian airstrike on Stepnohirsk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[3]

Geo-located footage confirmed Russia’s control over the village of Vozdvyzhenka in Donetsk Oblast.[4]

A Ukrainian strike against Ivanovskoye in Kursk Oblast reportedly killed seven Russian servicemen.[5]

Ukrainian authorities announced an investigation following reports that hundreds of soldiers had defected from the 155th Mechanized Brigade during training in France.[6]

3 January

One person was killed in a Russian drone strike in Kyiv Oblast.[7] One person was killed in a missile attack on Chernihiv.[8]

Russian captain Konstantin Nagayko was critically wounded in an explosion in Ivanovo Oblast, Russia according to the HUR. He was a battery commander in the 112th Missile Brigade, 1st Tank Army of the Western Military District of Russia, the unit accused of killing 59 civilians in the 2023 Hroza missile attack in Kharkiv Oblast.[9]

A Ukrainian military observer said that Russian forces captured the village of Shevchenko [uk], west of Stari Terny, and the Kurakhove Power Station.[10] Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces captured the village of Vovkove, south of Pokrovsk.[5]

4 January

A drone attack caused a two-hour suspension of operations at Pulkovo Airport in Saint Petersburg.[11] The drones attacked the seaport at Ust-Luga, damaging a window. Four drones were downed over Leningrad Oblast with “electronic warfare and firearms” according to the local governor.[12]

Alexander Martemyanov, a Russian freelance reporter, was killed by a Ukrainian drone while returning from reporting in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast. Four other media workers were also injured according to RIA Novosti.[13][14]

The Russian defense ministry claimed to have shot down eight US-made ATACMS missiles and 72 UAVs launched by Ukraine in Russian territory, with some drones being shot down in Leningrad and Kursk Oblasts.[15]

Russian forces claimed to have captured the village of Vodiane Druhe, east of Pokrovsk.[5]

The 155th Mechanized brigade was effectively disbanded, with remaining elements assigned to other brigades.[16]

5 January

Russian drone Gerbera, shot in Ukraine

Ukrainian forces launched a renewed offensive “in several directions” in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repulsed attacks in two of these directions. The Russian Defense ministry said that at 09:00 Moscow Time, Ukrainian forces started attacking from their bases in Sudzha towards the villages of Berdin and Bolshoye Soldatskoye consisting of two tanks, one counter-obstacle vehicle, and 12 armoured fighting vehicles.[17][18] Later Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces captured the settlements of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka.[19]

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces likely captured the villages of Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka near Pokrovsk and the village of Petropavlivka near Stari Terny.[19]

The HUR issued a report claiming that the Ukrainian Kraken Unit killed the chief of staff of the Storm Ossetia Battalion, Sergei Melnikov, and his driver using drones along the Vasylivka-Tokmak highway in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[20][21][22]

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed 3,800 North Korean soldiers have been killed or wounded out of the original 12,000 sent to fight Ukrainian forces.[23]

6 January

One person was killed in a Russian drone strike on a bus in Kherson.[24]

Russian forces claimed to have taken Kurakhove.[25][26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces took the village of Russkoye Porechnoye in Kursk Oblast.[27]

Ukraine claimed to have destroyed or damaged two Russian Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile systems and one OSA anti-aircraft vehicle using sea-launched aerial drones in occupied Kherson Oblast.[28]

The SBU said it had discovered a Russian plot to bomb a military installation in Kyiv Oblast by hiring a 16-year-old boy to deliver explosives, leading to the arrest of four suspects.[29]

7 January

Ukrainian forces conducted a “precision strike” on the headquarters of the Russian 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade in Belaya, Kursk Oblast.[30]

In Kursk Oblast, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured the hamlets of Staraya Sorochina [ru], Kositsa [ru] and Berdin, and the villages of Russkoye Porechnoye, Makhnovka and Novosotnitskii [ru].[31]

8 January

Street of Zaporizhzhia after the bombing

Thirteen people were killed in a Russian airstrike on an industrial facility in Zaporizhzhia.[32]

Ukrainian forces attacked the Kristal oil depot in Engels, Saratov Oblast,[33] supplying fuel to the Engels-2 air base and Russian strategic bombers based there.[34] Approximately 800,000 tons of jet fuel was reportedly destroyed by the fire.[35]

Ukrainian special forces destroyed various Russian equipment in Donetsk Oblast with drones, including a Pole-21 Electronic Warfare System, which is used to disrupt GPS signals.[36] Ukrainian forces also claimed to have bombed a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army in Khartsyzk.[37]

Two paratroopers from the Ukrainian 79th Separate Air Assault Brigade reportedly captured 14 Russian soldiers after throwing grenades at their dugout.[38]

9 January

Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian forces had established a bridgehead across the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast near Dvorichna.[39]

In Kursk Oblast, geo-located footage showed that Russian forces captured the hamlets of Alexandriya, Kursk Oblast [ru] and Leonidovo, Kursk Oblast [ru]. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured the village of Pogrebki [ru].[40]

At the Ramstein meeting, Norway pledged a military aid package of 2 billion euros for Ukraine over 2025. Canada pledged $330 million in military aid, while the US announced an aid package of $500 million. The UK announced it, and other allies, would send 30,000 fpv drones to Ukraine. Germany would deliver 6 IRIS-T launchers as well.[41][42][43]

Zelenskyy claimed North Korea lost 4,000 soldiers killed and wounded.[44]

10 January

Russian-installed authorities in Donetsk Oblast claimed that three people were killed in Ukrainian airstrikes in Donetsk city and Svitlodarsk.[45] The Ukrainian military claimed it had carried out a strike on a command post of the Russian 3rd Army Corps in Svitlodarsk.[46]

A Ukrainian drone and Neptune missile attack hit a Russian ammunition depot in the village of Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast, according to the HUR. Other drone attacks were reported in Leningrad Oblast,[47] with one strike causing a fire at an industrial area in Gatchina that burned 1,900 square meters.[48]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence said that the Polish-trained Ukrainian Legion had received 1,300 applications from Ukrainians living abroad wanting to join, including women.[49]

Russian forces claimed to have captured the villages of Baranivka, Donetsk Oblast [uk], east of Pokrovsk and Yasenove, southwest of Pokrovsk.[50]

11 January

Russian officials claimed that three people were injured after a drone crashed into an apartment in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast.[51]

Zelenskyy claimed that two North Korean soldiers had been captured in Kursk Oblast.[52]

Ukrainian drones attacked the Russian port of Novorossiysk, causing a massive fire.[53]

An oil-processing plant in Tatarstan, Russia was struck by Ukrainian drones, prompting evacuations.[54]

Syrskyi ordered the transfer of additional Ukrainian Air Force personnel to ground infantry units, reportedly numbering 5,000 soldiers.[55]

A Ukrainian military observer claimed that Russian forces took the village of Hryhorivka, north of Chasiv Yar.[50] Russian forces captured the village of Neskuchne, south of Velyka Novosilka.[50][56]

12 January

Russian forces claimed to have taken the villages of Yantarne, ten kilometers southwest of Kurakhove, Kalynove, Kharkiv Oblast [uk] along the Oskil River,[57] and Zelene, Donetsk Oblast [uk], south of Pokrovsk.[58]

Russian-installed authorities in Kherson Oblast claimed that one person was killed and three others were injured in Ukrainian drone strikes.[59]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces crossed the international border into Sumy Oblast and advanced south of the village of Prokhody [uk].[58]

13 January

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces had captured the village of Pishchane, south of Pokrovsk, and severed two highways leading east (to Kostiantynivka) and west (to Mezhova) out of Pokrovsk.[56]

Russia accused Ukraine of using drones to inflict minor damage on infrastructure of the TurkStream gas pipeline near Gaikodzor, Krasnodar Krai.[60]

Ukraine received its first RCH 155 from Germany.[61]

South Korean intelligence claimed that 300 North Koreans had been killed and 2,700 wounded in Kursk Oblast.[62]

Lithuania announced 4,500 drones would be sent to Ukraine.[63]

Reuters, citing unnamed industry sources, reported that the Pokrovs’ke coal mine had halted production due to the approaching front line. The mine was Ukraine’s sole coking coal-producing facility, from which 3.5 million tons of coke were produced in 2023.[64]

An unidentified North Korean surface to air missile system similar to the Russian Tor missile system was destroyed by a Russian drone in what appeared to be a friendly fire incident.[65][self-published source?]

14 January

NASA‘s FIRMS detected fire at an Engels fuel depot on 14 January 2025 07:26:00 (UTC)

Drones attacked the town of Aleksin in Tula Oblast. Ten explosions were heard. Other attacks occurred in Bryansk Oblast, Belgorod Oblast and Crimea.[66]

Ukrainian drones attacked the Kristal oil depot in Engels after a fire that burnt for five days was extinguished. However the regional governor said only that an “industrial facility” had been hit.[67]

Drones struck the Kazanorgsintez industrial facility in Kazan, Tatarstan, causing a fire.[68]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces had captured Terny in Donetsk Oblast.[69]

Ukrainian drones struck a distillery in the village of Novaya Lyada, Tambov Oblast. Local officials claimed a drone hit a tree and exploded.[70]

15 January

Russia launched another missile attack on energy infrastructure across Ukraine, causing power grid shutdowns.[71] Two critical infrastructure facilities in Lviv Oblast were struck.[72]

Lukoil‘s oil refinery in Volgograd caught fire. Local officials blamed the fire on “technical issues”. However locals reported an explosion before the fire and speculated “something fell onto the plant”.[73]

Zelenskyy announced a prisoner exchange with Russia that resulted in the release of 25 Ukrainians for the same number of Russian POWs.[74][75]

The Liskinskaya oil depot in Liski, Voronezh Oblast caught fire after a drone attack, according to Alexander Gusev, the local governor.[76]

A Russian air defense captain was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the shooting-down of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter that was mistaken for a Ukrainian drone over Crimea in October 2023 that killed three people.[77]

16 January

Russian media said that drones targeted a gunpowder factory in Kuz’mino-Gat village, Tambov Oblast. Air defence was activated and locals reported “aircraft-type UAVs”.[78] The Ukrainian military claimed it launched a drone strike on the Liskinskaya oil depot in Voronezh Oblast[79] and destroyed radar equipment belonging to an S-400 air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.[80]

The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine received a 155-mm DITA self-propelled artillery howitzer from the Czech Republic.[81]

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Kyiv and announced £4.5 billion (€5.34 billion) in aid, including 150 artillery barrels made in the UK and 15 additional Gravehawk air defence systems.[82]

The United States declassified that it had provided substantial support for Ukraine’s drone industry, beginning in late 2022 including $1.5 billion in support for drone production sent in September 2024.[83]

17 January

NASA‘s FIRMS detected fire at a Lyudinovo fuel depot on 17 January 2025 23:48:00 (UTC)

Four people were killed in a Russian missile attack on Kryvyi Rih.[84]

Russian forces captured the village of Vremivka, west of Velyka Novosilka, and were confirmed to have captured Yasenove, southwest by south (SWbS) of Pokrovsk.[85]

Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, with falling debris causing a fire.[86]

According to the HUR, partisans burned down two communications towers in Krasnodar.[87]

18 January

Destruction in Kyiv after the attack

A Russian missile strike on Kyiv damaged residential buildings, the Lukianivska metro station and the oldest McDonald’s outlet in Ukraine, killing three people.[88][89]

Ukrainian forces confirmed their withdrawal from the Chasivoyarsk Refractory Plant in Chasiv Yar, adding that they launched an airstrike against Russian forces inside the facility.[90]

Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Uzlovaya, Tula Oblast, according to the HUR and the local governor.[91]

Geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had entered Velyka Novosilka from the east.[92]

The SBU arrested two people in Kyiv and Kharkiv on suspicion of leading a spy network for Russia. One of the suspects was an engineer of the Kyiv Metro.[93]

19 January

Zelenskyy signed a decree imposing sanctions on 18 pro-Russian Ukrainian individuals, including politicians Yuriy Boyko, Nestor Shufrych, and Yevhen Murayev.[94]

The Ukrainian military launched an investigation into its 156th Mechanized Brigade following “a number of significant shortcomings” that were raised over its leadership and performance during inspections.[95]

Syrskyi claimed that Russian forces had suffered 434,000 casualties, including 150,000 killed, in 2024, which he said was “more than the previous two years of the war combined”.[96]

20 January

NASA‘s FIRMS detected extensive fire at a Liski fuel depot on 19 January 2025 23:09:00 (UTC)

The Liskinskaya oil depot was struck by Ukrainian drones again.[97]

The Russian-installed governor of Kherson Oblast claimed that two people were killed in a Ukrainian cluster munitions attack on a school near Bekhtery [uk].[98]

A drone attack was reported in Kazan, causing a fire in the Aviastroitelny district and the closure of Kazan International Airport and Begishevo Airport in Nizhnekamsk.[99]

Two Ukrainian generals and a colonel were detained by the State Bureau of Investigation for alleged negligence that led to Russia seizing territory in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[100] The SBI also detained the commander of the 155th Mechanized Brigade for failing to report desertions from the unit and other violations.[101]

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces captured the village of Kotlyne [uk] near Pokrovsk.[102]

21 January

Ukrainian drones struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant. Seven explosions were reported and air defence was activated according to locals. The Ukrainian military also claimed an attack on a command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast.[103][104]

Former television host Max Nazarov [ru] was arrested by Ukrainian authorities on suspicion of spreading pro-Russian propaganda on his YouTube channel.[105]

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces captured the village of Nikolayevo-Darino in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces claimed to have captured the village of Zelenyi Hai in eastern Kharkiv Oblast.[106]

The SBU arrested the Ukrainian army’s chief psychiatrist, identified by local media as Oleh Druz, on corruption charges linked to his involvement in a panel that determined “whether individuals were fit for military service.” Authorities found $152,000 (£124,000) and €34,000 in cash in his house as well as other assets valued at $1 million (£813,000).[107]

22 January

Russian forces captured the village of Novovasylivka in Donetsk Oblast.[108] Russian forces also claimed to have taken the village of Zapadne, four kilometers west of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast.[109]

Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of residents from the border village of Terezovka [ru] in Belgorod Oblast amid Ukrainian attacks.[110]

The SBU arrested a lawyer from Dnipro on suspicion of aiding a Russian missile strike on the city in December 2023 that killed six people.[111]

23 January

One person was killed in a Russian missile attack on Zaporizhzhia.[112]

Authorities ordered the evacuation of children and their families from 16 settlements in the Kupiansk area amid Russian attacks that left one person dead.[113]

In Russia, a fire broke out at the Ryazan oil refinery during a drone strike, with ten drones reportedly shot down over the facility.[114]

North Korean forces began deploying MLRS disguised as civilian trucks in Kursk Oblast.[115]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces captured the village of Solone, Donetsk Oblast [uk], southwest of Pokrovsk.[116]

24 January

Residential building in Hlevakha (Kyiv Oblast) after the attack

Three people were killed in Russian drone strikes on Kyiv Oblast.[117]

Ukraine launched 121 drones over thirteen regions in Russia, which the latter claimed to have destroyed, including six in Moscow Oblast and one over Moscow city. Vnukovo and Domodedovo airports were closed. A power station in Kursk and a power plant was destroyed in Ryazan,[118] while the Kremniy El microchip plant microchip factory in Bryansk Oblast was damaged.[119]

Ukrainian authorities ordered the mandatory evacuation of children from more than 20 settlements in the areas of Komar and Kryvorizhzhia in Donetsk Oblast due to Russian attacks.[120]

The remains of 757 Ukrainian soldiers killed in action were repatriated to Ukraine in exchange for the remains of 49 Russian soldiers.[121]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a stop on all US foreign aid awards for 90 days, with the exception of Israel and Egypt. According to Politico it “appears to include funding for military assistance to Ukraine”.[122]

Ukrainian defense minister Rustem Umerov announced the non-renewal of the tenure of Maryna Bezrukova as head of the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), despite the DPA’s board voting to extend her tenure, amid a dispute over the ministry’s procurement of weapons. However, Bezrukova refused to leave her position, while Umerov also removed two members of the DPA board for supporting Bezrukova.[123]

25 January

The Russian-installed head of Kherson Oblast claimed that three people were killed in a Ukrainian cluster munitions attack on Oleshky.[124]

The SBU arrested a military cadet in Lviv Oblast on suspicion of spying for Russia.[125]

Russian forces claimed to have captured the village of Novoandriivka, south of Pokrovsk.[126]

A boat-mounted Vampire missile equipped with APKWS shot down a Russian Kh-59 cruise missile over the Black Sea.[127]

26 January

Russian forces claimed to have taken Velyka Novosilka[128] and Nadiivka, south of Pokrovsk.[129]

The Ryazan oil refinery was struck again by drones, causing a fire.[130] Thirty-two Ukrainian drones struck 5 regions in Russia according to Russian officials. Russian air defences claimed to have downed all 32 over Belgorod, Kursk, Oryol and Tver oblasts.[131] The Ukrainian Air Force claimed more than 200 Shahed drones were destroyed in a drone attack on a warehouse in Oryol Oblast.[132]

Zelenskyy announced Brigadier-General Andriy Hnatov would be replaced by Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the commander of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group operating in the Eastern front. Drapatyi will remain as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces.[133][134]

27 January

The EU renewed sanctions against Russia.[135][136]

The Ryazan Oil Refinery ceased operations due to Ukrainian drone strikes, according to Reuters.[137]

North Korean soldiers withdrew from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast due to heavy losses, according to Ukrainian soldiers.[138]

Ukrainian forces claimed to have destroyed an S-400 missile system during a “precision strike” at an undisclosed date and location unknown.[139][self-published source?]

28 January

Museum of retro cars in Mezhyhirya (Kyiv Oblast), damaged by drone attack on 28 January

Two people were killed in a Russian missile attack on Mykolaiv.[140]

Debris from a Russian drone damaged 36 cars of a vintage car museum in Kyiv Oblast as well as residential buildings.[141]

Russia claimed to have taken Dvorichna in Kharkiv Oblast, located across the Oskil River.[142] The Ukrainian General Staff posted a map confirming Russia’s control over Novoandriivka, Uspenivka and Slovianka on the Pokrovsk front.[143]

Two Ukrainians working with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) were detained by the SBU for spying on Ukrainian F-16 fighter jets.[144]

Dmytro Klymenkov was dismissed as Ukrainian deputy defense minister amid a dispute over the ministry’s procurement of weapons.[145]

29 January

The Lukoil Kstovo Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast was heavily damaged after a fire broke out during a wave of drone attacks that also targeted Smolensk, Tver, and Bryansk Oblasts.[146] No casualties were reported by Gleb Nikitin, governor of Nizhny Novgorod, however drone debris started a fire in an enterprise at the Kstovo industrial zone.[147] Russian officials also claimed that the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant was also targeted.[148] The governor of Belgorod Oblast claimed that two people were killed while two others were injured after a drone struck a house. Flights were also suspended at Kazan and Pulkovo airports.[149] The Russian defense ministry reported that two drones were shot down in Murmansk Oblast.[150]

The Moscow Times, citing multiple sources from Russia, Ukraine and other European countries, reported that Russian forces had taken Chasiv Yar.[151] Ukrainian military officials denied the claim.[152]

Ukrainian media reported that the HUR carried out a cyberattack on the Russian gas firm Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazprom Neft.[153]

Israel transferred some 90 Patriot missiles to the United States, which were then to be transferred along with supporting equipment to Ukraine.[154]

Bloomberg reported that Russian oil shipments through the port of Ust-Luga were suspended due to an overnight strike by Ukrainian drones. The SBU claimed the Andreapol oil pumping station was struck. The is part of the Baltic Pipeline System-II run by Transneft, a Russian state owned company. A fire and oil spill were reported.[155] Fixed-wing UAVs that dropped FAB-250 bombs were used in the attack, indicating the usage of reusable drones instead of a “kamikaze-type”.[156]

30 January

Residential building in Sumy after the attack

Nine people were killed in a Russian missile attack on Sumy.[157]

A Russian drone strike on an evacuation vehicle in Pokrovsk injured three people including a British volunteer.[158]

31 January

Bristol Hotel in Odesa after the attack

Seven people were injured and historic buildings (including the Bristol Hotel and the Philharmonic Theater) were damaged in a Russian missile attack on Odesa.[159]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed a Russian command post in Rylsk, Kursk Oblast in an airstrike.[160]

According to Russian locals an oil refinery in Volgograd was targeted by Ukrainian drones, causing a fire and an explosion.[161]

Sweden announced a military aid package worth 13.5 billion Swedish kronor ($1.23 billion) for Ukraine, the largest aid package thus far from Sweden.[162]

February 2025

1 February

Residential building in Poltava after the attack

A Russian missile attack on a residential building in Poltava killed at least 14 people.[163] Energy infrastructure in the city was struck in a separate attack.[164] One person was killed in a Russian drone attack on Kharkiv, while three police officers were killed in a separate attack in Sumy Oblast.[165]

One person was killed in the bombing near a military enlistment office in Rivne that was blamed on Russia by the SBU.[166]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the village of Krymske, northeast of Toretsk.[167]

An airstrike was launched on a boarding school in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast, killing four people according to Ukrainian authorities.[168] Over 100 Russian civilians were “evacuated” by Ukraine to Sumy Oblast, making it the largest movement of civilians into Ukraine since the start of the incursion.[169]

2 February

Ukrainian drone attacks killed two persons in Belgorod Oblast, including one in the village of Malinovka, according to governor Vyacheslav Gladkov.[170]

Sergey Yefremov, the deputy governor of Primorsky Krai and commander of the “Tigr” Battalion of the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, was killed in Kursk Oblast.[171][172]

3 February

Russian air defence claimed to have downed 70 drones over Volgograd, Rostov and Astrakhan Oblasts, targeting oil facilities in these regions. An oil refinery in Volgograd was set on fire. In Astrakhan, Governor Igor Babushkin confirmed that a “fire broke out” while Ukraine said it had targeted a gas processing plant there. No casualties were reported.[173]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have inflicted significant losses during a strike by the Ukrainian Air Force on a Russian command post near Novoivanovka, Kursk Oblast.[174]

Armen Sargsyan, founder of the Arbat Battalion [ru] that had fought in Ukraine, was killed along with a bodyguard by a bomb left in the lobby of the Aliye Parusa residential complex in Moscow.[175][176][177]

The SBU arrested a man in Sarny, Rivne Oblast on suspicion of plotting to blow up a railway line on behalf of Russia.[178]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces had taken the villages of Zelene Pole [uk] and Tarasivka near Pokrovsk.[177]

Prominent Russian soldier and veteran of the Russo-Georgian War, Tasbolat Ibrashev was killed fighting in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast. Ibrashev was famous in the Russian army for single-handedly stopping a Georgian military column in 2008.[179]

4 February

Administrative building in Izium after the strike

A Russian missile attack on Izium killed at least five people and injured at least 55 others.[180]

Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov resigned as commander of the Ukrainian Operational Command South following his appointment as a liaison to the NATO military aid coordination center for Ukraine based in Germany.[181]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the village of Sribne, Donetsk Oblast [uk], south of Pokrovsk.[182]

Zelenskyy said that 45,100 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since the full-scale invasion by Russia, while 390,000 soldiers had been wounded. He also claimed that 300,000 to 350,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, 600,000 to 700,000 wounded and 50,000 to 70,000 missing in the war so far.[183][184]

5 February

NASA‘s FIRMS detected fire at a Novominskaya refinery on 4 February 2025 23:11:00 (UTC)

The Russian governor of Krasnodar Krai claimed Ukrainian drones set fire to an oil storage tank at an oil depot, adding that the fire was quickly extinguished and no injuries reported. Russia claimed to have downed four drones overnight.[185] Ukrainian drones struck a “mini-refinery” in the village of Novominskaya. A Buk-M3 was also reported damaged by Ukrainian drones in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[186]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces had taken the village of Novomlynsk [uk] in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and Baranivka, north of Ocheretyne.[187] A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces had taken the village of Zapadne in Kharkiv Oblast while a Russian source claimed that Russian forces had crossed the Oskil river near the village of Topoli.[184]

Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner exchange mediated by the UAE that saw the release of 150 POWs held by each side.[188]

Ukraine imposed sanctions on 57 ship captains involved in the illegal export of Russian oil to bypass price caps. It also imposed sanctions on 55 Russian officials and figures involved in illegal excavations and removal of artifacts from occupied areas of Ukraine, including officials of the Hermitage and Pushkin Museums.[189]

6 February

The governor of Belgorod Oblast claimed that three people were killed in a Ukrainian drone strike near the village of Logachevka.[190]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have struck the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base in Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire.[191]

Russian forces captured the village of Dachne, west of Kurakhove, and Fyholivka, west of the Oskil River.[192]

Ukrainian forces launched a new offensive in Kursk Oblast, capturing the settlements of Kolmakov and Fanaseyevka.[192] Russia claimed to have repulsed the offensive southeast of Sudzha, in the villages of Ulanok and Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Russia claimed Ukrainian forces deployed “two mechanized battalions, tanks, and armored vehicles” in the attack.[193]

The first Mirage 2000-5s fighter jets sent by France arrived in Ukraine,[194] as well as another round of F-16s from the Netherlands.[195]

Vadym Sukharevsky, commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, said that the Ukrainian laser Tryzub (Trident) was being used operationally and “already striking certain targets at certain altitudes.”[196]

The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed a Russian KAB bomb was shot down over Zaporizhzhia Oblast, possibly with “experimental weapons”.[197]

7 February

Three people were killed in a Russian airstrike on Myropillia, Sumy Oblast.[198]

Russian forces claimed to have taken Toretsk, which the Ukrainian military denied.[199][200]

President Zelenskyy said that North Korean troops had been redeployed to Kursk Oblast. Approximately 60,000 soldiers have currently been deployed against Ukrainian units in Kursk.[201]

Two Russian Valdai radars used to intercept drones headed to Moscow were destroyed by the HUR using explosives near Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast.[202]

8 February

Russian forces claimed to have intercepted a Ukrainian drone over an oil refinery in Kumylzhensky District, Volgograd Oblast, and shot down a total of 36 drones over Krasnodar Krai and Rostov, Volgograd, and Belgorod Oblasts.[203] Ukrainian officials said that drones were used to attack two military airfields, the Russian Southern Military District headquarters and S-400 missiles located in Rostov-on-Don.[204]

Russian authorities were reported to have discovered a plot in which a shipment of FPV drone headsets loaded with explosives were sent to Russian soldiers. Each headset had 10-15 grams of explosives and were programmed to detonate on activation. Officials compared it to the 2024 Lebanon electronic device attacks by Israel.[205] Subsequent reports claimed eight Russian FPV pilots lost their eyesight due to explosions between 4 and 7 February. The first explosion was reported on 4 February in Belgorod Oblast, subsequent explosions occurred in Kursk, Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.[206]

Ukrainian forces claimed to have shot down a Russian Su-25 fighter jet using an Igla missile and damaged an Mi-8 helicopter sent to rescue the pilot in a drone strike, forcing it to retreat near Toretsk.[207]

9 February

Russian forces claimed to have taken the village of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, ten kilometers north of Chasiv Yar.[208]

Russian forces claimed that 14 buildings were damaged in a drone attack on Rostov-on-Don.[209]

10 February

Russian forces claimed to have recaptured the settlement of Fanaseyevka in Kursk Oblast.[210]

The Afipsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai was attacked by Ukrainian drones. A high-rise building in Krasnodar city was also damaged.[211]

An F-16AM was spotted flying low over Ukraine. The F-16 was not equipped with air to air missiles but with a “full loadout” of Small Diameter Bombs. This is the first footage of a Ukrainian F-16 being used on a strike mission, instead of for air defence.[212]

Russian forces set up netting over the road between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar, installing a two-kilometer tunnel made up of poles with mesh netting being placed over the most vulnerable section of road to protect against drones.[213]

11 February

Ukrainian drones struck Saratov Oblast setting fire to the Saratov oil refinery, according to locals. Explosions were also reported around the perimeter of Engels-2 air base.[214]

The Deputy Head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine Pavlo Palisa said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine would no longer create new Brigades.[215]

12 February

Office building in Kyiv after the attack

One person was killed in a Russian missile attack on Kyiv. Other strikes damaged infrastructure in the Holosiivskyi, Podilskyi, Sviatoshynskyi and Obolonskyi districts.[216]

Five people were injured by Russian shelling on 13 villages in Sumy Oblast.[217]

A Russian attack drone was intercepted by an APKWS-fired Vampire missile over Ukrainian airspace.[218]

The Ukrainian 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade claimed to have destroyed a Russian Smerch-2 anti-submarine rocket launcher in the Lyman sector of the Donetsk front.[219]

SBU head Vasyl Malyuk announced that the chief of its counter-terrorism department, Col. Dmytro Kozyura had been arrested on suspicion of working for Russia since 2018.[220]

US President Donald Trump said negotiations to end the Ukraine war will start immediately after holding a telephone call with Russian president Vladimir Putin.[221]

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces had taken the village of Makiivka in Luhansk Oblast.[222]

13 February

Destroyed house in Kramatorsk after an attack on 13 February

The Novolipetsk Steel mill in Lipetsk was targeted by Ukrainian drones in a “massive raid”, according to the local governor Igor Artamonov. Drone debris damaged a power station injuring an employee and cutting power to several districts of Lipetsk city.[223]

Two Russian drones believed to have been deployed in an attack on Reni crashed over the border in Moldova.[224]

Zelenskyy imposed sanctions on multiple oligarchs and individuals including former president Petro Poroshenko, Viktor Medvedchuk, Kostyantyn Zhevago, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Gennadiy Bogolyubov on suspicion of “high treason” and “assisting a terrorist organization”, particularly their role in compromising national security through unfavorable business agreements with Russia.[225]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the village of Berezivka, near Pokrovsk.[226]

14 February

The strike on Chernobyl New Safe Confinement

Zelenskyy said that a Russian drone attack significantly damaged the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement covering Reactor No. 4 of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which was installed following the 1986 disaster.[227] Russia denied responsibility,[228] while the International Atomic Energy Agency said that radiation levels at the site remained normal.[229]

The governor of Belgorod Oblast claimed that one person was killed in a Ukrainian drone attack in Kukuyevka.[230]

The remains of 757 Ukrainian soldiers killed in action were repatriated in an exchange which also saw the repatriation of the remains of 45 Russian soldiers.[231]

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said that the prohibited CS gas was found in samples supplied to it by Ukraine from frontline areas.[232]

The Ukrainian Air Force bombed a Russian drone base in the border village of Elizavetovka, Kursk Oblast.[233]

The first Russian TOS-2 MLRS was destroyed by artillery fire in the “Pokrovsk region”.[234]

15 February

Russian officials claimed that a drone strike in Kaluga Oblast caused a fire at an industrial facility in Dzerzhinsky District,[235] while another series of drone strikes hit an oil refinery and an apartment building in Volgograd.[236]

16 February

Ukrainian forces claimed to have retaken the village of Pishchane near Pokrovsk.[237]

Zelenskyy said that more than 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and that nearly 380,000 others had been injured since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022.[238]

The Czech-led artillery initiative delivered 1.6 million rounds of “large-caliber ammunition”. Czech President Petr Pavel said Ukraine has “sufficient resources to cover Ukraine’s need” until April 2025.[239]

The Ukrainian 65th Mechanized Brigade claimed to have destroyed a Tor missile system and two Buk missile systems using drones during fighting in Zaporizhzhia Oblast over the course of one day.[240]

Trump said he would allow European countries to buy US weapons on behalf of, or transfer them to, Ukraine.[241]

17 February

The governor of Krasnodar Krai claimed that one person was injured while 12 homes were damaged following a wave of Ukrainian drone attacks on the region.[242] Russian forces claimed to have “neutralized” a Neptune-MD over the Sea of Azov and 90 drones across the Black Sea, Crimea, Krasnodar Krai and in Bryansk, Belgorod, Krasnodar, Rostov and Kursk Oblasts. The Ilya oil refinery was reported to be on fire after locals reported hearing explosions.[243][244] A drone also hit the Kropotkinskaya pumping station in Krasnodar Krai, part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium running from Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk.[245] According to an official the attack had reduced the flow through the pipeline which will affect Chevron and Exxon. The operator stopped the pipeline while damage was investigated. They claimed seven drones were involved but an unclear number struck the pipeline.[246]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces retook the village of Sverdlikovo [ru] in Kursk Oblast.[247] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured the village of Novosilka in southern Donetsk Oblast.[247]

Over 10,000 Ukrainians, aged 18 to 24, have applied to join the Ukrainian military according to a spokesperson for the Ukrainian MoD. The “special contracts” contain free higher education, interest free mortgages and an annual salary of Hr 1 million ($24,000).[248]

The Ukrainian 156th Mechanized Brigade received some 100 BTR-60s from Bulgaria which had been overhauled and modernised with new engines, radios, optics and anti-drone netting.[249]

18 February

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces had retaken the village of Yampolivka [uk], near Terny.[250]

In Donetsk, Ukrainian drones destroyed a S-350 missile system, believed to be the third of the war so far destroyed. Only six are known to be in service.[251]

Russia and the United States began official discussions in Saudi Arabia on ending the war in Ukraine.[252]

The HUR said a new turbofan jet-powered Shahed-238, called Geran-3 by the Russians and with a range of over 2,500 kilometers and a maximum speed of 600 km/h is in production.[253]

19 February

Drones struck the Syzran oil refinery in Samara Oblast. Locals reported three explosions and the governor, Vyacheslav Fedorishchev, confirmed a fire broke out at the refinery without casualties.[254]

The Ukrainian military said that it had destroyed a North Korean-built M-1978 Koksan artillery system for the first time.[255]

The Romanian parliament passed a bill allowing its military to shoot down Russian drones entering Romanian airspace from Ukraine after Romanian military units were unable to do so due to Romania and Russia not being at war.[256]

Putin said that Russian forces had crossed the international border into Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast, which was denied by Ukraine.[257]

Zelenskyy said that Ukraine was “running dangerously low” of Patriot missiles. Citing a call with a “field commander”, Zelenskyy is seeking a licence to build Patriot missiles in Ukraine and an additional 20 Patriot systems.[258]

20 February

Residential building in Kherson after bombing on 20 February

The FSB claimed to have killed an alleged Ukrainian operative accused of plotting to assassinate an unidentified official in Saratov Oblast.[259]

The HUR claimed that an explosion in Russian-occupied Berdiansk killed the deputy head of the city administration, Yevgeny Bogdanov.[260]

Russian forces captured the village of Novoocheretuvate, northwest of Velyka Novosilka.[261] Russian sources claimed that the village of Basivka in Sumy Oblast had been captured.[262]

An electrical substation that powered the Novovelichkovskaya oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai was attacked by SBU drones, causing a fire and a shutdown of the refinery.[263]

Two people were killed in a Russian bombing of Kherson.[264]

21 February

Russia claimed to have taken the village of Nadiivka in Donetsk Oblast, located ten kilometers from the border with Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[265]

Russian forces seized the village of Ulakly following the closure of the pocket west of Kurakhove.[261]

Geolocated footage confirmed the Russian recapture of Fanaseyevka in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Cherkasskaya Konopelka had been recaptured.[266]

22 February

One person was killed in a Russian drone strike in Kyiv Oblast.[267] Two others were killed in Russian airstrikes in Kostiantynivka.[268]

Russian sources claimed that Topoli in Kharkiv Oblast had been recaptured. Russia claimed to have recaptured the village of Novoliubivka near the Zherebets River in Luhansk Oblast.[266]

23 February

Russia launched its largest single drone attack on Ukraine for the war, with Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesman Yurii Ihnat counting 267 drones and claiming that 138 of them had been intercepted. Two people were killed in Kherson, while a third person died in a missile attack in Kryvyi Rih.[269]

Russian forces recaptured the settlement of Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast.[270]

24 February

Two people were killed in Russian airstrikes in Sumy Oblast.[271]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have set fire on the Ryazan oil refinery following a drone strike.[272] The local governor Pavel Malkov confirmed falling debris set fire to an “industrial facility in the region”.[273]

An Italian defence analyst identified Italian-made B1 Centauro tank destroyers headed to Ukraine in a convoy, however the Italian government is yet to confirm their delivery.[274]

25 February

One person was killed in a Russian attack on Kramatorsk.[275]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have repelled a Russian attack near the village of Novenke in Sumy Oblast.[276]

Ukrainian forces destroyed a S-300VM missile system in Zaporizhzhia Oblast using a bomber drone.[277]

Ireland donated four Giraffe Mk IVs in its first delivery of military equipment to Ukraine.[278]

Geolocated footage confirmed that Russian forces had captured Andriivka in Donetsk Oblast.[279]

26 February

Burning house in Kriukivshchyna after the attack

Ukrinform journalist Tetiana Kulyk was killed along with her husband in a Russian drone strike on their residence in Kriukivshchyna, Kyiv Oblast.[280] Five others were killed and 11 people were injured in separate attacks in Kostiantynivka.[281][282]

Ukrainian forces claimed to have retaken Kotlyne, near Pokrovsk.[283]

Russian officials claimed that 128 drones were shot down over Crimea, the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, Krasnodar Krai and in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts.[284] Sochi Airport suspended flights, explosions were reported in Anapa and the governor of Krasnodar Krai, Veniamin Kondratyev, reported three private homes were damaged across the area.[285] In Crimea explosions were reported in Kerch, where the Crimean Bridge was temporarily closed to traffic. Local partisans reported Russian military personnel were trying to avoid reporting for duty due to ongoing drone attacks.[286] The Ukrainian military claimed that it had targeted Saky and Kacha air bases in Crimea as well as the port of Tuapse in Krasnodar Krai.[287]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces had retaken the settlements of Pogrebki and Orlovla in Kursk Oblast.[279]

The Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian drone command post attached to the 19th Motor Rifle Division in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[288] A Russian command post attached to the 14th Army Corps in Ivanivka, Kherson Oblast, was struck by an HUR bomber drone.[289]

27 February

Russian officials claimed that one person was killed in a drone strike in Belgorod Oblast.[290]

South Korean intelligence claimed that North Korea is sending an unspecified number of additional soldiers to fight in Kursk Oblast, alongside Russian forces.[291]

Syrskyi visited Novopavlivka, in Donetsk Oblast. He claimed the Russian advance had been slowed and Ukrainian forces had “regrouped”.[292] Russian forces are in places 4.5 km (2.8 miles) from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[293]

Russian forces claimed to have retaken the settlements of Nikolskiy [ru][294] and Novaya Sorochina north and northwest of Sudzha.[295]

Geolocated footage confirmed that Russian forces had captured the village of Skudne, north of Velyka Novosilka[295] and the village of Zaporizhzhia, southwest of Pokrovsk.[296]

Dozens of Ukrainian drones struck a Russian ammunition dump in Kurchatov, Kursk Oblast according to unofficial sources. A fire and secondary detonations were reported. The Russian defense ministry said that 22 drones were shot down over Krasnodar Krai and Oryol, Kursk, Bryansk, and Smolensk Oblasts.[297]

28 February

See also: 2025 Trump–Zelenskyy meeting

The Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed a Russian thermobaric munitions depot near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast.[298]

The FSB arrested two church officials on suspicion of trying to kill a Russian Orthodox bishop, Tikhon Shevkunov, who is close to Putin. The HUR denied the accusations saying they were “absurd” and “lies”.[299]

Russian forces launched nine drone strikes in the Kyivskyi, Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi Districts of Kharkiv, damaging a medical facility and civilian infrastructure and injuring seven people.[300]

A car bomb seriously wounded a Russian FSB officer in Mariupol.[301]

March 2025

1 March

Russian forces captured the village of Burlatske, near Velyka Novosilka.[302][303]

The MSC Levante F in 2022.

One person was killed in a Russian drone strike in Odesa Oblast.[302] In the evening, a ballistic missile attack was made on the port of Odesa, injuring two port employees and damaging the Swiss-owned and Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel MSC Levante F.[304]

Ukrainian forces were attacked with a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile at a training ground in Cherkaske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties.[305]

2 March

One person was killed in a Russian drone strike in Kherson.[306]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the town of Zhuravka after crossing into Sumy Oblast.[303] Russian forces also claimed to have taken the town of Pryvline, northwest of Velyka Novosilka.[303]

British prime minister Keir Starmer announced a £1.6 billion agreement allowing Ukraine to purchase over 5,000 Lightweight Multirole Missiles.[307]

Czech citizens raised 70 million koruna ($3 million) to purchase an UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for Ukraine.[308]

3 March

The Ufimsky refinery plant in Ufa was set on fire by Ukrainian drones.[309]

Kongsberg Gruppen announced a plan to build hundreds of NASAMS missiles in Ukraine.[310]

The US government suspended all military aid to Ukraine, including what was approved under President Biden.[311]

4 March

Drones struck an oil refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast. Locals reported explosions and a fire.[312] Further attacks were reported in Rostov Oblast with an “industrial complex” and oil pipeline in the village of Sokhranovka being set on fire by drones, according to the regional governor Yury Slyusar.[313]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have killed 30 Russian soldiers in an airstrike on a military facility near Troitskoye, Kursk Oblast.[314]

Russian forces claimed to have captured the town of Kurilovka, southwest of Sudzha.[315]

A S-400 missile system in Crimea caught fire in unknown circumstances, engulfing its antenna.[316]

5 March

Destroyed hotel in Kryvyi Rih

Five people were killed in a Russian missile attack on Kryvyi Rih.[317][318]

The Ukrainian military said it carried out an airstrike on the command post of the 17th Tank Regiment of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast.[319]

CIA Director John Ratcliffe confirmed that the US paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[320]

Russian forces claimed to have crossed the international border into Kharkiv Oblast and captured the Nekhoteyevka international border crossing checkpoint east of Kozacha Lopan.[315]

6 March

Disposal of Russian air-dropped bomb FAB-500 in Slatyne (Kharkiv Oblast)

Norway announced that it would increase its military aid to Ukraine from $3.2 billion in 2024 to $7.7 billion for 2025.[321]

7 March

Maxar Technologies stopped supplying the Ukrainian government with satellite images after a request from the US Executive Office.[322]

Mirage 2000 fighter jets sent by France to Ukraine were used in combat against Russian air attacks for the first time.[323]

Russian forces made a breakthrough south of Sudzha threatening to encircle Ukrainian units in the area and were also advancing in the villages of Zhuravka and Novenke.[324][325][326] Russian forces also recaptured the town of Staraya Sorochina.[327]

Ukraine received $1 billion from the British government, the first payment of money to Ukraine secured from the profits from seized Russian assets.[328]

Russian forces carried out a missile and drone attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[329]

Major General and commander of Ukraine’s Operational Command North, Dmytro Krasylnykov told Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne that he was dismissed from his post for “unclear reasons”.[330]

8 March

Building in Dobropillia after the attack

Eleven people were killed in a Russian attack on Dobropillia, Donetsk Oblast, while three others were killed in a drone attack in Bohodukhiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[331][332]

The Kirishi oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast was struck by falling drone debris, damaging a storage tank according to governor Aleksandr Drozdenko.[331]

In Kursk Oblast, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had recaptured the settlements of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye[333] and Lebedivka,[334] while Russian forces further claimed to have retaken the settlements of Kubatkin, Viktorovka, Martynovka and Nikolayevka.[333] Geolocated footage also confirmed Russian control over Novenke in Sumy Oblast.[334]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the town of Kostyantynopil in Donetsk Oblast.[333]

9 March

Atesh said it burned down a relay cabinet near Stolbove, Crimea, that services a railway connecting Crimea and Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[335]

Ukrainian drones hit an oil refinery in Chuvashia in the first such attack in the Russian autonomous republic.[336]

Geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had captured the settlements of Malaya Loknya and Novaya Sorochina in Kursk Oblast, as well as Kostyantynopil in Donetsk Oblast.[334]

10 March

Ukrainian drones struck the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast. Locals reported several explosions in the city.[337]

The SBU arrested a resident of Kharkiv on suspicion of plotting attacks on soldiers on behalf of Russia.[338]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the towns of Bogdanovka, Mirny and Kolmakov in Kursk Oblast.[339]

11 March

Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin claimed Russian air defences shot down 69 drones over Moscow. Flights from Domodedovo and Zhukovsky airports were restricted.[340][341] Three people were killed and 20 were injured. Sobyanin said it was the “most massive” attack on Moscow. Several high rise buildings were damaged by falling debris and over 20 cars were destroyed by a fire in a parking lot. The Ukrainian general staff claimed to have targeted various oil refinery and pipelines in Moscow and Oryol.[342][343] Russian air defense further reported to have shot down 337 drones in other regions, including 91 over Moscow Oblast, 126 over Kursk Oblast, and 38 over Bryansk Oblast.[341]

Russian forces recaptured the towns of Bondarevka, Zamostye, Makhnovka, Kazachya Loknya, Knyazhiy 2 and Knyazhiy 1 in Kursk Oblast. Russian millbloggers further claimed that Russian forces took the towns of Kolmakov and Dmitryukov.[344]

Russian forces captured a fully intact Ukrainian M1A1 Abrams tank in Kursk Oblast.[345]

The SBU accused Russian intelligence of recruiting two teenagers to carry out bomb attacks in Ivano-Frankivsk that killed one of the teenagers and injured the other along with two bystanders.[346]

12 March

Four Syrian nationals were killed in a Russian missile attack on the port of Odesa which damaged the Barbados-flagged bulk carrier MJ Pinar, which was loading wheat bound for Algeria.[347]

The governor of Kursk Oblast claimed that four people were killed in a Ukrainian attack on a feed mill in Kozyrevka.[348] The governors of Rostov and Voronezh Oblast claimed that infrastructure facilities were set on fire by drone attacks.[349]

After talks between US and Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the US restarted military aid to Ukraine as well as intelligence support.[350] Maxar also confirmed that it had restored Ukrainian access to its satellite images.[351]

According to DeepState‘s map, Ukrainian forces lost control of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast.[352] Russian forces also captured Dniproenerhiia in Donetsk Oblast.[353]

The Ukrainian 43rd Separate Artillery Brigade claimed to have destroyed a Russian S-400 battery in an undisclosed location.[354]

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that the SAMP/T downed a Russian Sukhoi military aircraft without providing further details.[355]

13 March

Russia claimed that its air defences shot down 77 drones, while its operation to retake Kursk Oblast entered its last phase.[356]

Russian forces claimed to have captured and cleared the towns of Sudzha, Podol, Goncharovka, Zaoleshenka, Rubanshchina and Molovoi in Kursk Oblast.[357]

HUR drones struck a Russian drone factory in Obukhovo, Kaluga Oblast. Explosions and a fire were reported at an industrial site.[358]

The Defence Council of Sumy Oblast announced a mandatory evacuation from eight settlements in Yunakivka and Myropillia hromadas of Sumy Raion.[359]

The former leader of the Right Sector‘s Odesa Branch, Demyan Hanul, was assassinated in Odesa.[360]

The US started resupplying Ukraine with GLSDBs due to a shortage of ATACMS missiles.[361]

It was reported that a captured Crimean Tatar, who fought in the Ukrainian Army, died in a Russian penal colony in Dimitrovgrad, Russia.[362]

14 March

The Tuapse Refinery fire was detected by NASA‘s FIRMS

The governor of Krasnodar Krai stated that the Tuapse Refinery was struck by Ukrainian drones, causing a 1,000 square meter fire[363] that took until 17 March to extinguish.[364] The mayor of Moscow claimed that four drones were shot down in a separate attack near the capital.[365] The attack was believed to have been conducted by a R-360 Neptune missile.[366]

Yan Petrovsky, and former commander of the Russian paramilitary Rusich Group who was arrested in Finland in 2023, was sentenced by a court in Helsinki to life imprisonment for war crimes committed in Ukraine.[367]

Russian forces likely captured the town of Goncharovka in Kursk Oblast.[368]

15 March

Lyceum in Bohodukhiv (Kharkiv Oblast) after drone attack on 15 March

Ukraine said that it downed 130 drones launched by Russia in overnight strikes, while Russia claimed that it intercepted 126 drones fired by Ukraine.[369]

One person was killed in a Russian attack on Nikopol.[370]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the town of Stepove in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[371]

The Russian MoD claimed to have shot down an Ukrainian MiG-29.[372]

Ukraine claimed that Aster-30 missiles for SAMP/T are at a “critical low” and the two batteries they operate will soon become “inoperable”.[373]

16 March

Andriy Hnatov was appointed as Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, replacing Anatoliy Barhylevych.[374]

17 March

Russian forces claimed to have taken the towns of Mali Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[375]

The governor of Astrakhan Oblast claimed that an oil refinery was set on fire by drones.[376]

Germany announced an aid package to Ukraine consisting of 10,000 rounds for Gepard air defence, 5,000 155 mm rounds, 2,000 122 mm rounds and ammunition for various fighting vehicles supplied by Germany, and 24 MRAPs.[377]

Zelenskyy signed a law allowing the Ukrainian military to operate overseas in times of martial law.[378]

18 March

Ukrainian Lieutenant General Serhii Naiev said that Ukrainian forces withdrew from an unknown frontline sector in Donetsk Oblast to preserve its forces and obtain better positions.[379]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have destroyed a command post of the Russian 20th Army‘s 3rd Motor Rifle Division near Demidovka, Belgorod Oblast.[380]

Putin ordered Russian forces to halt attacks targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure for 30 days after his phone call with Trump.[381]

Russian forces shot down seven Russian drones headed for Ukrainian energy facilities connected to “Ukraine’s military-industrial complex” over Mykolaiv Oblast. Six were shot down by a Russian Pantsir missile system and the last by a Russian fighter jet.[382]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Sumy Oblast into the villages of Demidovka, Grafovka, and Prilesye in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces later claimed to have repelled the attack.[383]

19 March

Russian authorities reported that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged an oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai, while Russia launched 145 drones and six missiles into Ukraine.[384] A number of hospitals in Sumy Oblast were attacked by Russian drones,[385] while one person was killed in a separate attack on a residential building.[386]

Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner exchange that saw the release of 175 POWs from their respective sides.[387]

Zelenskyy announced that additional F-16s had arrived in Ukraine from an undisclosed country.[388]

20 March

Russia claimed that it downed 132 drones launched by Ukraine.[389] Explosions were reported near the Engels-2 air base.[390] Ukrainian intelligence stated that a warehouse with guided bombs and missiles was destroyed. The governor of Saratov Oblast, Roman Busargin, confirmed that the attack “left an airfield on fire” and nearby residents had to be evacuated.[391] Fifty drones were reportedly used, targeting ammunition storage at the air base. Satellite images showed several large craters. Reports stated that three service personnel were wounded, while two were killed. Some 120 civilians were evacuated and some 180 private homes were damaged due to the shockwave from the explosion. Clinical Hospital No. 1 in Engels was damaged by falling debris. Five civilians were reported injured.[392] Ukrainian intelligence claimed that the attack on Engels-2 destroyed some 96 cruise missiles.[393]

Russian forces launched over 20 drones overnight and attacked Kropyvnytskyi, injuring 10 people including four children.[394]

The HUR claimed that two Russian officers were killed in a car bombing in Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast.[395]

Two people were injured in a car bombing in Rivne.[396]

21 March

Three people were killed in a Russian drone strike on Zaporizhzhia.[397]

The Sudzha gas pumping and metering station in Kursk Oblast was shelled, with Russia and Ukraine trading responsibility over the attack.[398] DTEK reported that Russian drone strikes caused power outages in at least three districts in Odesa.[399]

The governor of Belgorod Oblast claimed that one person was killed in a Ukrainian drone strike in Dobrino.[400]

The UK government and the Irish subsidiary of the French company Thales signed a contract to manufacture 5,000 NLAWs for the Ukrainian army.[401]

22 March

Ukrainian drones struck the Russian Promsintez explosives factory in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast. The local governor, Vyacheslav Fedorishev, said that the attack resulted in “no damage or casualties”, while one drone was shot down. However, footage on Telegram showed explosions in the area of the factory.[402]

23 March

Three people were killed in a Russian drone strike on Kyiv, while three others were killed in a separate attack in Dobropillia.[403]

Ukrainian drones attacked an oil refinery in Volgograd. According to Russian sources the drones were shot down as they approached the facility.[404] The governor of Rostov Oblast claimed that one person was killed in a drone attack on a car.[403]

Ukraine said it had retaken the settlement of Nadiia in Luhansk Oblast following a 30-hour operation.[405]

Atesh claimed to have destroyed a transformer cabinet on a railway line in Smolensk Oblast to disrupt the transport of military cargo toward Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts.[406]

The website of Ukrainian Railways was hit by a massive cyberattack.[407]

24 March

The Ukrainian military claimed to have launched missile strikes that destroyed two Russian Ka-52 and two Mi-8 helicopters at a landing site in Belgorod Oblast. The landing site was struck by “missile strikes”, including rockets fired from HIMARS.[408]

Three Russian journalists working for Izvestia and Zvezda were killed in a strike on their car in the Kupiansk sector, according to Izvestia. The head of the Luhansk People’s Republic, Leonid Pasechnik, and the Investigative Committee of Russia said that they were killed along with three civilians in Kreminna.[409]

25 March

The Ukrainian Air Force claimed to have killed 30 Russian soldiers during a “precise strike” in Kondratovka in Kursk Oblast.[410]

The United States said it had brokered an agreement for Russia and Ukraine to stop military action in the Black Sea and ensure safe navigation of shipping following negotiations in Saudi Arabia.[411]

Russian millbloggers claimed that Russian forces cleared the villages of Demidovka and Popovka in Belgorod Oblast. The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces took the town of Myrne, northeast of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast.[412]

The SBU arrested a Ukrainian soldier on suspicion of providing coordinates of Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast for Russian intelligence.[413]

26 March

Russia’s Channel One said that one of its film crew hit a landmine in Belgorod Oblast near the Ukrainian border, killing journalist Anna Prokofieva and injuring a cameraman.[414]

A court in Rostov-on-Don convicted 23 members of the Azov Brigade, including 11 in absentia, of terrorism charges related to the war in Ukraine, and sentenced them to up to 23 years’ imprisonment.[415]

The French government announced a 2 billion euros ($2.1 billion) military aid package for Ukraine. Including missiles for Mirage-2000 fighters, MILAN anti-tank missiles, AMX-10 RC light tanks, VAB troop carriers and Mistral missiles.[416]

27 March

The Ukrainian Air Force said that Russia fired 86 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile in overnight attacks.[417]

Ukrainian commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russia had lost more than 55,000 soldiers during the fighting in Kursk, with 970 soldiers surrendering to Ukrainian forces, 22,200 killed and 31,800 as “sanitary casualties”.[418]

The Ukrainian military claimed to have killed the commander of the 1st Battalion of the Russian 9th Motor Rifle Regiment in an attack on a command and observation post somewhere between Viktorovka and Uspenovka in Kursk Oblast.[419] It also claimed to have killed between 15 to 40 Russian soldiers in an airstrike on the Pogar border checkpoint in Bryansk Oblast.[420]

28 March

Burning hotel-restaurant complex in Dnipro after the attack

Four people were killed in a Russian drone attack on Dnipro.[421]

Soldiers from the Ukrainian 101st Territorial Defense Brigade planted and detonated anti-tank mines beneath a high rise building in Toretsk containing Russian soldiers from an “assault group”.[422]

Russia and Ukraine traded blame for another attack on the Sudzha gas metering station in Kursk Oblast.[423][424]

The remains of 909 Ukrainian soldiers killed in action were repatriated from Russia in exchange for those of 43 Russian personnel.[425]

Russian forces claimed to have taken the town of Krasne Pershe, northeast of Kupiansk.[426]

29 March

Two people were killed in a Russian drone strike on Kharkiv.[427] Ukraine also accused Russia of inflicting casualties on patients being treated at a military hospital during the attack.[428]

Russia claimed to have taken the villages of Shchebraki in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Panteleimonivka in Donetsk Oblast, and Veselivka in Sumy Oblast.[429][430] Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces took the town of Preobrazhenka in Donetsk Oblast.[431]

30 March

Geo-located footage confirms Russian control of Veselivka in Sumy Oblast.[432]

31 March

The SBU arrested three people, including a Russian national, on suspicion of facilitating Russian attacks on Kyiv.[433]

The Moscow Metro was targeted by a suspected cyberattack involving its website displaying messages shown during the 23 March cyberattack on Ukrainian Railways.[434]

Geolocated footage provided by the Russian defense ministry showed that Russian forces took the town of Gogolevka in Kursk Oblast.[432] Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces took the town of Rozlyv in the Kurakhove sector of Donetsk Oblast.[435]

April 2025

1 April

Russian-installed officials in Donetsk Oblast claimed that 15 people were injured in a Ukrainian drone strike in Horlivka.[436]

The SBU announced the arrest in Poland and extradition of a person accused of being a pro-Russian propagandist linked to a disinformation network operated by oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk.[437]

2 April

Four people were killed in a Russian missile attack on Kryvyi Rih.[438] One person was killed in a drone strike in Zaporizhzhia city.[439]

Geo-located footage showed that Russian forces took the town of Oleksandropil in Donetsk Oblast and Lobkove in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[440]

3 April

Three people were killed in a Russian drone strike on Kharkiv.[441]

The Russian defense ministry claimed that Russian forces took the town of Vesele, northwest of Velyka Novosilka.[442]

See also

- 2025 in Russia

- 2025 in Ukraine

- Outline of the Russo-Ukrainian War

- List of wars involving Russia

- List of wars involving Ukraine

References

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Timeline_of_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine_(1_January_2025_–_present)&oldid=1283855908”

Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

A civil war between two major rival factions of the military government of Sudan began during Ramadan on 15 April 2023. The two opponent factions consist of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies (collectively the Janjaweed coalition) under the Janjaweed leader Hemedti. Minor factions have also participated in the fighting, allying with either major combatant or remaining opposed to both; these include the Darfur Joint Protection Force; the SLM (al-Nur) under Abdul Wahid al-Nur; and the SPLM-N under Abdelaziz al-Hilu. Fighting has been concentrated around the capital city of Khartoum (the largest and initial battle of the war) and the Darfur region.[26][27][28]

As of 14 November 2024, at least 61,000 people had been killed in Khartoum State alone, of which 26,000 were a direct result of the violence.[29] As of 5 February 2025, over 8.8 million were internally displaced and more than 3.5 million others had fled the country as refugees,[25] and many civilians in Darfur have been reported dead as part of the Masalit massacres.[30]

The war began with attacks by the RSF on government sites as airstrikes, artillery, and gunfire were reported across Sudan. The cities of Khartoum and Omdurman were divided between the two warring factions, with al-Burhan relocating his government to Port Sudan as RSF forces captured most of Khartoum’s government buildings. Attempts by international powers to negotiate a ceasefire culminated in the Treaty of Jeddah in May 2023, which failed to stop the fighting and was ultimately abandoned.[31]

Over the next few months, a stalemate occurred, during which the two sides were joined by rebel groups who had previously fought against Sudan’s government. By mid-November, the Minni Minnawi and Mustafa Tambour factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement officially joined the war in support of the SAF, alongside the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).[3][5] In contrast, the Tamazuj movement joined forces with the RSF, while the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North attacked SAF positions in the south of the country.[7][32][33]

In October 2023, momentum began to swing toward the RSF, as the paramilitary defeated army forces in Darfur and made gains in Khartoum State, Kordofan, and Gezira State. Since February 2024, the SAF has made gains in Omdurman. Since June 2024, the RSF has made gains in Sennar State. Further negotiations between the warring sides have produced no significant results, while many countries have provided military or political support for either al-Burhan or Hemedti.[34][35] In February 2025, the SAF made notable gains in Khartoum and Khartoum North (alternatively referred to as Bahri).[36] In March 2025, the SAF retook Khartoum, including the Presidential Palace and the airport, from the RSF.[37][38]

In August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed famine conditions in parts of North Darfur.[39]

Background

Main articles: History of Sudan and Coups d’état in Sudan

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced 20 military coup attempts, the most of any African nation.[40] Sudan has usually been ruled by the military, interspersed with short periods of democratic parliamentary rule.[41][42]

Two civil wars – the first from 1955 to 1972 and the second, 1983 to 2005 – between the central government and the southern regions, which led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, killed 1.5 million people, and a conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people and killed more than 200,000 others.[43]

War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF

By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan’s western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social strife due to racial and ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion against government rule, against which president and military strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to use forceful action. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by widespread state-sponsored acts of violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-Bashir.[44] The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7 million forcibly displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far from peaceful.[45]

To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a collection of Arab militias that were drawn from camel-trading tribes which were active in Darfur and portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and he also announced that the RSF would be placed under the command of the Janjaweed’s commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti.[46][47][48][49] The RSF perpetrated mass killings, mass rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages. They were accused of committing ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples.[48] Leaders of the RSF have been indicted for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC),[50] but Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities.[45]

In 2017, a new law gave the RSF the status of an “independent security force”.[48] Hemedti received several gold mines in Darfur as patronage from al-Bashir, and his personal wealth grew substantially.[49][50] Bashir sent RSF forces to quash a 2013 uprising in South Darfur and deployed RSF units to fight in Yemen and Libya.[47] During this time, the RSF developed a working relationship with the Russian private military outfit Wagner Group.[51] These developments ensured that RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and came to possess thousands of armed pickup trucks which regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum.[51] The Bashir regime allowed the RSF and other armed groups to proliferate to prevent threats to its security from within the armed forces, a practice known as “coup-proofing“.[52]

Political transition

Main article: Sudanese transition to democracy

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, Commander of the Rapid Support Forces

In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir’s regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese Revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression.[53] In April 2019, the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d’état, ending his three decades of rule; the army established the Transitional Military Council, a junta.[49][50][53] Bashir was imprisoned in Khartoum; he was not turned over to the ICC, which had issued warrants for his arrest on charges of war crimes.[54] Protests calling for civilian rule continued; in June 2019, the TMC’s security forces, which included both the RSF and the SAF, perpetrated the Khartoum massacre, in which more than a hundred demonstrators were killed[55][47][49][53] and dozens were raped.[47] Hemedti denied orchestrating the attack.[49]

In August 2019, in response to international pressure and mediation by the African Union and Ethiopia, the military agreed to share power in an interim joint civilian-military unity government (the Transitional Sovereignty Council), headed by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, with elections to be held in 2023.[44][53] In October 2021, the military seized power in a coup led by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti. The Transitional Sovereignty Council was reconstituted as a new military junta led by al-Burhan, monopolizing power and halting Sudan’s transition to democracy.[54][56]

Origins of the SPLM-N and the SLM

The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group active in Darfur, primarily composed of members of non-Arab ethnic groups[57] and established in response to their marginalization by the Bashir regime.[58][59] Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum.[60][61][62] By 2023 the three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, ceasing hostilities and receiving political appointments, but the SLM-al-Nur refused to sign and kept fighting.[63][64]

The SPLM-N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile a few months later.[65] In 2017, the SPLM-N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace while Agar did not agree with this.[66] During the Sudanese Revolution, al-Hilu’s faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire.[67] In 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar’s faction,[62] with Agar later joining the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Khartoum. Al-Hilu held out until he agreed to sign a separate peace agreement with the Sudanese government a few months later.[68] Further steps to consolidate the agreement stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate to draft a ‘revolutionary charter’ and remove the military from power.[69]

Prelude

In the months after the 2021 coup the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta return power to civilian authorities.[70] Tensions arose between al-Burhan and Hemedti over al-Burhan’s restoration to the office of old-guard Islamist officials who had dominated the Omar al-Bashir government. Hemedti saw the appointment of these officials as a signal that al-Burhan was attempting to maintain the dominance of Khartoum’s traditional elite over Sudanese politics. This was a danger to the RSF’s political position, as said elites were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic background as a Darfuri Arab.[71] Hemedti’s expression of regret over the October 2021 coup signalled a widening divide between him and al-Burhan.[56]

Tensions between the RSF and the SAF began to escalate in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit members across Sudan.[70] Throughout February and early March the RSF built up in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, until a deal was brokered on 11 March and the RSF withdrew.[70][72] As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, but these negotiations were delayed and halted by political disagreements.[73] Chief among the disputes was the integration of the RSF into the military: the RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years.[74][75] Other contested issues included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan’s commander-in-chief, al-Burhan.[76]

On 11 April 2023, RSF forces deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum.[77] Government forces ordered them to leave and were refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum.[77] On 13 April, RSF forces began their mobilization, raising fears of a potential rebellion against the junta. The SAF declared the mobilization illegal.[78]

Course of the war

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023), Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2024), and Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2025).

See also: List of engagements during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

April–May 2023

Battle of Khartoum

Main article: Battle of Khartoum (2023–2025)

On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport.[74][79] There were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster, Sudan TV, which was later captured by RSF forces.[80] Bridges and roads in Khartoum and its hinterland were closed by RSF command.[81] The next day saw a SAF counteroffensive, with the army retaking Merowe Airport alongside the headquarters of Sudan TV and the state radio.[80]

The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country’s airspace as fighting began.[82] Telecommunications provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total Internet outage attributed to attacks on the electricity grid.[83][84] Sudanese international trade began to break down, with Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, announcing a pause on new shipments to the country.[85]

With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, his deputy Malik Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government.[63]

Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat with the Republican Guard. Ultimately al-Burhan managed to evade capture or assassination, but his base at the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters was placed under RSF siege, rendering him unable to leave Khartoum.[63][86] In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of forcing the RSF to start the war by scheming to bring deposed leader Omar al-Bashir back to power.[81] He called for the international community to intervene against al-Burhan, claiming that the RSF was fighting against radical Islamic militants.[87]

Following the first few days of war the SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border.[88] Although a ceasefire was announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country.[89][90] Combat was described as particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair.[91] Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina.[92][93]

By the beginning of May the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF’s combat capabilities and repelled its advances in multiple regions.[94] The Sudanese police deployed its Central Reserve Forces in the streets of Khartoum in support of the SAF, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters.[95] The SAF announced it was launching an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery.[96] Air strikes and ground offensives against the RSF over the next few days caused significant damage to infrastructure, but failed to dislodge RSF forces from their positions.[97][98]

Following further threats to his life from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, vowing to continue fighting.[99][100] On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council and replaced him with former rebel leader and council member Malik Agar.[101] With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day running of the country.[63]

Treaty of Jeddah

Main article: Treaty of Jeddah (2023)

International attention to the conflict resulted in the United Nations Human Rights Council calling a special session to address the violence, voting to increase monitoring of human rights abuses.[102] On 6 May, delegates from the SAF and the RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for what was described by Saudi Arabia and the United States as “pre-negotiation talks”.[103] After diplomatic lobbying from the Saudis and Americans the warring sides signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, vowing to ensure the safe passage of civilians, protect relief workers, and prohibit the use of civilians as human shields.[104] The agreement did not include a ceasefire, and clashes resumed in Geneina, causing more casualties.[104] The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths expressed frustration at the lack of commitment from both sides to end the fighting.[105]

The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies.[106][107][108] Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to the RSF were accused of atrocities against non-Arab residents.[109] A temporary ceasefire was signed and faced challenges as fighting persisted in Khartoum, and the agreed-upon ceasefire time saw further violence.[110] Between 28 and 97 people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May.[111]

June–September 2023

The RSF took control of the National Museum of Sudan in June.

Continued fighting in Khartoum

As June began, Khartoum witnessed tank battles resulting in casualties.[112][113] The RSF took control of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex.[114][115] Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan’s population.[116][117]

By July, al-Burhan was still trapped at the Army Headquarters and unable to leave, and to break him out the SAF elected to send a column of troops to lift the siege of the base. This force was ambushed by the RSF and defeated, with the paramilitary claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90 vehicles, along with the column’s commander.[118]

In response to the escalating violence in Khartoum, the SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and artillery bombardment, leading to heightened civilian casualties often numbering in the dozens per strike.[119][120][121] Shelling by the RSF also increased in intensity, leading to many civilian casualties in turn.[122][123]

Heavy fighting continued in Khartoum throughout August, with clashes breaking out across the city. The RSF laid siege to the SAF’s Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding neighbourhoods.[124][125] The SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was beaten back after the RSF shipped in reinforcements.[126] One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum and Khartoum North was also destroyed by the SAF, in an attempt to deny the RSF freedom of movement.[127]

On 24 August an SAF operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there.[128][129]

Diplomatic efforts

Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, leading to further clashes. The SAF and RSF engaged in mutual blame for incidents, while the Sudanese government took action against international envoys.[130] The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked and evacuations from an orphanage were carried out amid the chaos.[131] Amidst the turmoil, Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, leading to challenges for Sudanese refugees seeking entry.[132][133]

With al-Burhan out of Khartoum for the first time since the start of the war, he was able to fly to Egypt and hold a meeting with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.[134] Following this visit al-Burhan went on a tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda.[135] He then proceeded to New York City as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization.[136][137]

SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) involvement

The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) broke a long-standing ceasefire agreement in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding with an attack by the RSF. The SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks,[32][7] while the rebels claimed to have attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers at the hands of the SAF and vowed to free the region from “military occupation”.[67] More than 35,000 were displaced by the fighting.[67] Speculation arose as to whether the attacks were part of an unofficial alliance between al-Hilu and the RSF or an attempt by al-Hilu to strengthen his position in future negotiations concerning his group.[138] Civil society organizations supporting the SPLM-N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible attacks by the RSF.[139]

Al-Hilu’s faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of several SAF bases.[140][141] In response the SAF brought in artillery and heavily bombarded SPLM-N positions.[140] Further attacks by the group largely petered out after this, with an assault on Kadugli in September being pushed back by the SAF.[142]

In February 2025, the SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) signed the Sudan Founding Charter drafted by the RSF-led Government of Peace and Unity, officially allying itself with the RSF.[143]

Darfur front

In Darfur, fighting and bloodshed were particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and extensive destruction occurred.[144] RSF forces engaged in frequent acts of violence against the Masalit population of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing.[145] On 4 August the RSF claimed that it had taken full control over all of Central Darfur.[146]

A United Nations investigation discovered numerous mass graves in Darfur that contained Masalit civilians.[147] The RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of having killed lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders.[148] The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by armed men in June, hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview.[149] The SAF, for their part, conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many civilians, especially in Nyala,Sudan.[150]

Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one or the other of the warring parties. A faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined the conflict in support of the SAF.[3] In contrast the controversial Tamazuj rebel group formally declared its alliance with the RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti’s.[33][151]

As September arrived both sides made offensives in Darfur. The RSF took control of several towns in West Darfur and also attacked the market of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur.[152] SAF offensives saw success in Central Darfur, with the army retaking parts of Zalingei from the RSF.[153] Fighting in Darfur also began to increasingly spill over into North Kordofan, with the SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba.[154] Both sides made withdrawals to end the month, with the RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while the SAF withdrew from Tawila.[155][156]

October–December 2023

SAF collapse in Darfur

By the end of November, Al-Fashir was the last of the five state capitals in Darfur under SAF control.

By October 2023, the SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute shortages in supplies due to RSF-imposed sieges and had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances.[157] On 26 October, the RSF captured Nyala, Sudan’s fourth-largest city, after seizing control of the SAF’s 16th Infantry Division headquarters.[158] The fall of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed the RSF to receive international supplies more easily and concentrate its forces on other Sudanese cities.[159] After Nyala’s fall, RSF fighters turned their focus to Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur. The SAF’s 21st Infantry Division, stationed in Zalingei, fled the city without a fight and allowed the RSF to take it over.[160]

In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the surrender of the SAF garrison in the city to prevent bloodshed.[161] The army rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF assault on the city and causing civilians to flee across the border into Chad.[162] The RSF besieged the headquarters of the SAF’s 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to surrender.[163] The base was captured two days later when the 15th withdrew from the area before fleeing to Chad.[164] Those left behind, numbering in the hundreds, were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF media with signs of abuse.[164] Witnesses later reported mass atrocities perpetrated by the RSF in the city shortly after its seizure, with a local rebel group claiming up to 2,000 people were massacred in Geneina’s satellite town of Ardamata.[165] With Geneina’s fall, Ed Daein and Al-Fashir were the last remaining capitals in Darfur under government control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure.[161][164]

The RSF stormed and plundered the town of Umm Keddada, east of Al-Fashir, after the SAF garrison withdrew.[165] SAF troops in Al-Fashir itself were reported to be running low on food, water, and medicine due to the city being under siege, and external forces noted the SAF seemed incapable of stopping the RSF advance.[166][167] Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces taking control of the city after seizing the headquarters of the SAF’s 20th Infantry Division.[168] SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area.[169] In response to RSF gains in Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF.[5]

Peace negotiations stall

Attempts by other nations and international organisations to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since the failure of the Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah to attempt to negotiate peace.[170] This new round of talks was a failure, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire. Instead, the warring factions agreed to open channels for humanitarian aid.[171] On 3 December negotiations were indefinitely suspended due to the failure of both the SAF and the RSF to open up aid channels.[172]

With the failure of the talks in Jeddah, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hosted a peace summit in early December. Earlier attempts by IGAD to open negotiations had floundered after the SAF had accused Kenyan President William Ruto of supporting the RSF.[173] IGAD’s talks appeared to make more progress than the Jeddah negotiations, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person at some point in the future.[174]

RSF crossing of the Nile

Further information: Battle of Wad Madani

The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route.[175][176] In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a “vital” oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah.[177] Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it.[178] The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil infrastructure.[179][180] By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan’s government had largely relocated to Port Sudan.[181]

The Shambat Bridge in Khartoum was destroyed on 11 November.[182]

The RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman. Days of fighting culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, which connected Khartoum North to Omdurman over the Nile; the bridge’s destruction severed a critical RSF supply chain.[182] This effectively cut the RSF off from its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage.[183] In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya.[184] As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, and all SAF resistance ceased in the village the following day.[185][186]

On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM-N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of 4 people and the destruction of the village.[8] The RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the then-neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, issued a statement condemning this attack and denouncing it as “tribal violence”.[187] On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time.[187]

Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State on 15 December, advancing toward its capital Wad Madani.[188][189] Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state’s east and entering the Butana region.[190] After several days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani’s eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile and entering the city.[190] The army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over.[191]

The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives.[191] The city’s fall allowed the RSF to capture most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina.[192] Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State.[192] Over the next few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances but had not attacked Sennar City by the year’s end.[193]

Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF was reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize.[194] Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against ‘colonialism’, which was viewed by observers as a reference to the United Arab Emirates support of the RSF.[195]

January–April 2024

Hemedti travels abroad

Following the fall of Wad Madani efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress, as the SAF’s weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December.[191][196] A day before the meeting was due, it was cancelled as Hemedti recanted his desire to attend.[197]

Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with several African national leaders.[198] One visit that was particularly promoted was his visit to Rwanda, where he met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial.[195] On the tour Hemedti also met with former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors and negotiate further with the SAF.[199] This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters.[198]

On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts, declaring that war crimes committed by the RSF precluded negotiation.[200] On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming summit on 18 January. Hemedti agreed to attend, but Burhan refused to do so. On 16 January, the Sudanese government suspended its ties with IGAD, accusing the body of violating Sudanese sovereignty.This effectively marked the end of IGAD’s attempts to mediate peace talks.[201]

Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira

As 2024 began the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the Nuba Mountains and pushing toward Dalang.[202] On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang, meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias.[195][203] During the fighting the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM-N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and the paramilitary retreated from the city.[204] RSF fighters withdrawing from Dalang entered the city of Muglad in West Kordofan, easily taking control as the city had no organised SAF presence. West Kordofan had been relatively free of fighting for several months due to a local truce brokered by leaders of the Messiria tribe, but as tensions escalated rumours spread that the RSF was planning an attack on the encircled city of Babanusa and the SAF 22nd Infantry Division garrisoning it.[204]

In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17 January east of El Manaqil, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its defences. Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians based on perceived loyalty.[205] On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25 January, the RSF gained control of the city centre and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division.[206]

Until March 2024, the RSF maintained its position in Gezira State but was unable to break through.[207] The RSF is recruiting in Gezira State to try to capture territory in El-Gadarif from the SAF.[208] The JEM, which has allied with the SAF, helped the SAF build up its forces in El-Gadarif for a counteroffensive to try to retake Wad Madani. In April 2024, the SAF and its allies began the counteroffensive, attacking from the east and west of Wad Madani in an attempt to retake it.[209] Clashes were reported in Al-Madina Arab on 15 April.[210]

In December 2024, the SAF launched an offensive in southern Gezira. The SAF was able to make small progress, which involved recapturing the town of Wad el-Haddad, a town on the border of Sennar State. It also was able to recapture Um al-Qura, but the RSF reoccupied the village.[211]

In January 2025, the SAF made the first major military operation of 2025. The army was able to make large gains in Gezira and some gains in North Kordofan. On 8 January, the SAF had recaptured Haj-Abdallah after a tense battle that inflicted losses on the RSF. The SAF stated that seven RSF vehicles were destroyed.[212] A day later, the SAF attacked RSF positions in Al-Shabarga in the southeastern part of the state, led by field commander Bassam Abu Satour, leading to the RSF’s withdrawal and the SAF recapturing the city, while in the western part of the state, the SAF took control of the villages Mahla, Tahla, and Al-Kumar Al-Jaaliyeen.[213] On 10 January, the SAF recaptured Um al-Qura while the Sudan Shield Forces took Wad al-Abyad.[214] These successful offensives led to the SAF retaking control of Wad Madani on 11 January from three fronts.

A sketch map of Omdurman with Khartoum and Khartoum North. The White Nile flowing from the south is joined by the Blue Nile flowing from the east.

After advancing in Gezira and Khartoum, the SAF launched a military operation in North Kordofan for the first time, after being on the defensive in Darfur and Kordofan from the start of the war. The SAF’s “Sayyad Force”, captured the entirety of the Umm Ruwaba district.[215]

By the start of February, the SAF had recaptured Al-Hasaheisa, Tambul, and Rufa’a. This left the RSF in control of only northwestern Gezira.[215]

The SAF then liberated the town of Er Rahad on 19 February, and by 23 February, the SAF lifted the almost two-year siege of El Obeid.[216][217]

SAF gains in Omdurman

The SAF gained ground in Omdurman in February 2024, linking up their forces in the northern part of the city and relieving a 10-month siege of their forces in the city centre. The SAF also took control of the Al-Hilal Stadium.[218] As of February 2024, the Omdurman front is the only area in Sudan where the SAF has carried out a sustained offensive operation and represents the first breakthrough for the SAF.[218]

On 12 March, the SAF defeated an attempted RSF counteroffensive in Omdurman and took control of the headquarters of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation.[219] The RSF maintains its control of Khartoum and continues to threaten Khartoum North.[220]

As of April 2024, fighting in Khartoum State is ongoing, with the RSF in control of the southern and western parts of Omdurman and the SAF in control of the northern and eastern parts of Omdurman, with the RSF controlling the majority of Khartoum and Khartoum North. The SAF continued to prepare an offensive to relieve its surrounded bases in Khartoum North.[221]

As of March 2025, SAF controls majority of the city. On 29 March, SAF forces announced the control of the Libya Market in Omdurman and seized weapons and equipment left behind by the RSF.[222] On the same day, SAF launched new offensives into the city of Ombada, west of Omdurman.[223]

April 2024–present

Fighting in Darfur

On 15 April, during the Battle of El Fasher, at least nine civilians were killed in a renewed offensive by the RSF on the city of Al-Fashir in North Darfur.[224] The Joint Darfur Force declared war on the RSF and allied with the SAF.[225][226]

The fighting in El Fasher has diverted SAF resources from other areas, hampering planned counter-offensives to retake Khartoum and Wad Madani. In particular, the SAF has been using its limited aviation resources to carry out airstrikes in North Darfur and resupply El Fasher using airdrops.[227]

Since April 2024, the conflict had been escalating in El Fasher, while the civilians remained trapped with no safety or food. In a June 2024 report, the International Crisis Group said the intensifying battle could lead to mass slaughter, and that there was a need for all sides to de-escalate. The report said the UN and the US should broker the de-escalation and must put pressure on the RSF and its main supporters, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Crisis Group said the UAE should push the RSF to stand down, and urged all parties to allow the civilians to flee, open the region for aid delivery and resume national peace talks.[228]

On 14 June 2024, the SAF announced that it had killed Ali Yaqoub Gibril, a top RSF commander, in El Fasher. The United States had sanctioned Yagoub in May 2024 for endangering civilians in Darfur.[229] In June 2024, The New York Times reported that more than 40 villages had been burned in El Fasher since April 2024.[230]

Fighting is ongoing in El Fasher, which remains the SAF’s last holdout in Darfur.[231] As of September 2024, the RSF has advanced into central areas of El Fasher, with the SAF’s territorial control at its lowest point since intense fighting began in May 2024.[232]

Fighting in Kordofan

As of May 2024, fighting is ongoing in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The RSF is conducting an offensive to attempt to take control of West Kordofan.[233] Fighting was also reported in North Kordofan.[234]

On 20 June 2024, the RSF captured Al-Fulah, the capital of West Kordofan, after the SAF withdrew from the city after several hours of fighting. The SAF retreated to Babanusa, its one remaining base in Kordofan.[235]

Fighting along the Nile

Further information: Sennar offensive

Map of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers

In May 2024, the RSF launched attacks against the SAF between Khartoum State and River Nile State, as well as in White Nile State near the border with Gezira State. The SAF prepared its forces in River Nile State, ahead of a potential invasion of Khartoum Bahri.[236] In June 2024, the RSF was still in control of Khartoum and Khartoum North, though the SAF controlled one enclave in each that it supplies by airdrop.[237]

In late June 2024, the RSF began an assault in the areas surrounding the city of Sennar. RSF forces struck out to the west of the city, causing the SAF to bring in reinforcements in anticipation of an attack on Sennar itself.[238] Instead RSF forces avoided Sennar and attacked south towards Singa, the capital of Sennar State, capturing the lightly defended town on 29 June.[238][239] This prevented the SAF from reinforcing Sennar from the south, placing the city under increased pressure.[238]

Following the fall of Singa, SAF resistance collapsed across much of southern Sennar, which led to the RSF occupying the towns of Dinder, Mazmoun and Wad an-Nail with minimal SAF resistance.[240] A united force consisting of the Gedaref-based 2nd SAF Infantry Division and a battalion of the JEM assaulted and retook Dinder on 1 July, but were driven out again by the RSF over the next few days.[241]

On 20 July, the RSF announced the death of Brigadier General Abdel Rahman Al-Bishi, its head of operations in Sennar and Blue Nile States, with Sudanese media reporting that he had been killed in a SAF airstrike.[242]

On 3 August, the RSF launched its first attack on Blue Nile State since the beginning of the war, with the group and the SAF contesting control over Al-Tadamun.[243] On 15 August 2024, the Galgani massacre was carried out by the RSF, which killed at least 108 people,[244] including at least 24 women and children.[245]

SAF offensives

As September 2024 came, for the first time since the start of the war the balance of power seemed to be tipping towards the SAF. On 26 September, the SAF launched a major offensive against RSF positions in Khartoum.[246] The attack on the city came from three fronts striking from the south, east and west of the capital.[247] SAF airstrikes, which killed four and wounded 14, began at dawn followed by clashes within the city. The SAF reportedly captured three key bridges connecting Khartoum to other nearby cities, including the Omdurman Bridge which had previously acted as a line of separation between government and RSF control.[248][249] Faced with an elusive enemy, the SAF became bogged down in urban fighting, with RSF snipers routinely paralyzing infantry advances.[247]

October 2024 was the deadliest month for Sudanese civilians since the war began. In Khartoum, the RSF have relentlessly shelled areas controlled by the SAF, which has amounted to daily indiscriminate bombardments of civilian areas. Escalating SAF airstrikes on RSF positions have caused dozens of civilian deaths.[247] In October 2024, the SAF also launched a counteroffensives in the states of Sennar and Gezira, which were successfully recaptured from the RSF.[250] Starting on 20 October 2024, the RSF carried out the 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres, which killed at least 300 people and wounded at least 200 more.[251]

According to a report by the French newspaper Le Monde, as of November 2024 the war in Sudan has possibly entered its most dangerous phase since it began in April 2023. Both the SAF and RSF have officially ruled out settling the civil war through negotiations, with the only option on the table being total war. During the recent rainy season which brought a lull in the fighting, each side rearmed and restructured their forces.[247] Many ordinary Sudanese, extending to the most serious critics of the SAF, have increasingly supported the SAF in response to RSF war crimes and atrocities. The SAF has become increasingly dependent on Islamist networks, as these movements have mobilized many civilians from popular resistance brigades. The Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion in particular is presently fighting on the Khartoum front lines against the RSF and has consequently gained popularity.[252] On 23 November, the SAF retook Singa following an offensive.[253][254]

The SAF retook Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State on 11 January 2025.[255] On 8 February 2025, the SAF regained control of nearly all of Khartoum North as it intensified its offensive, and was preparing to retake the capital of Khartoum itself.[256]

On 24 February 2025, the RSF claimed responsibility for downing a Russian-made Ilyushin aircraft in Nyala. Meanwhile, the RSF declared a rival government in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which the SAF-aligned administration refused to recognize.[257][258]

March 2025 Offensive

On 20 March 2025, the SAF announced it was within 500 metres of the Presidential Palace[259] and captured it on the next day.[260] On 22 March, the SAF also recaptured the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan and the General Intelligence Service in Khartoum.[261] It also retook Tuti Island, situated at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, after advancing through the Tuti Bridge.[262] On 26 March, they retook Khartoum International Airport and Jebel Aulia, regarded as the RSF’s last stronghold in the capital,[263] with al-Burhan proclaiming the liberation of Khartoum later in the day.[264]

Casualties and war crimes

Further information: War crimes during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

According to a report published by Le Monde in November 2024, the war may have killed over 150,000 civilians through the combined tolls of bombardments, massacres, starvation and disease.[247] A November 2024 report from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated more than 61,000 deaths in Khartoum State alone, for the period between April 2023 and June 2024.[265]

Early in the conflict, doctors on the ground warned that reported figures did not include all casualties as people could not reach hospitals due to difficulties in movement.[266] Soon after the war broke out, a spokesperson for the Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as saying that the number of casualties “was not small”.[81] The Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed on 20 June 2023 that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in fighting in West Darfur alone,[267] while a Masalit tribal leader told the Sudanese news outlet Ayin Network on 22 July 2023 that more than 10,000 people had been killed in the state.[268] Sudanese prosecutors recorded over 500 missing persons cases across the country, some of which were enforced disappearances, and were mostly blamed on the RSF.[269] On 2 May 2024, a US Senate hearing on the war estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 people had died, but considered that to be an underestimation by a factor of 10 to 15 times, saying the real death toll could be as high as 150,000.[23] As of 27 May 2024, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data reported 17,044 fatalities.[270]

On 29 March 2025, the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms said that it had recorded 50,000 missing persons cases since the beginning of the war.[271]

Darfur

In Geneina, West Darfur, ethnic clashes that began in the last week of April 2023 had killed at least 1,100 people,[272] while the Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in the city.[267] In July 2023, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina’s residents had fled.[268]

Massacres were recorded in towns such as Tawila[273] and Misterei,[111] while a mass grave was discovered in Geneina containing the bodies of 87 people killed in clashes.[147] Several intellectuals, politicians, professionals and nobility were assassinated. Most of these atrocities were blamed on the RSF and allied Arab militias. The UK government,[274] witnesses and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to ethnic cleansing or even genocide, with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims.[273] Mujeebelrahman Yagoub, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees in West Darfur called the violence worse than the War in Darfur in 2003 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[275]

Foreign casualties

Foreign casualties in the Sudanese civil war

Country

Deaths

Ref.

Ethiopia

15

[276]

Syria

15

[277]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

10

[278]

Eritrea

9

[279]

United States

2

[280]

India

1

[281]

Turkey

1

[282]

Civilians, including 15 Syrians,[277] 15 Ethiopians[276] and nine Eritreans[279] have been killed across the country. An Indian national working in Khartoum died after being hit by a stray bullet on 15 April.[281] Two Americans were killed, including a professor working in the University of Khartoum who was stabbed to death while evacuating.[280][283] A two-year-old girl from Turkey was killed while her parents were injured after their house was struck by a rocket on 18 April.[282] Ten students from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were killed in an SAF airstrike on the International University of Africa in Khartoum on 4 June.[278] The SAF claimed that the Egyptian assistant military attaché was killed by RSF fire while driving his car in Khartoum, which was denied by the Egyptian ambassador.[284]

Two Greek nationals trapped in a church on 15 April sustained leg injuries when caught in crossfire while trying to leave.[285][286] A Filipino migrant worker[287] and an Indonesian student at a school in Khartoum were injured by stray bullets.[288] On 17 April, the European Union Ambassador to Sudan, Aidan O’Hara of Ireland, was assaulted by unidentified “armed men wearing military fatigues” in his home, he suffered minor injuries and was able to resume working on 19 April.[289][290] On 23 April, a French evacuation convoy was shot at, injuring one person.[291] The French government later confirmed the casualty to be a French soldier.[292] An employee of the Egyptian embassy was shot and injured during an evacuation mission.[293][294]

Evacuation of foreign nationals

Main article: Evacuation of foreign nationals during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Repatriations through the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism

The outbreak of violence has led foreign governments to monitor the situation in Sudan and move toward the evacuation and repatriation of their nationals. Among some countries with several expatriates in Sudan are Egypt, which has more than 10,000 citizens in the country,[295] and the United States, which has more than 16,000 citizens, most of whom are dual nationals.[296] Efforts at extraction were hampered by the fighting within the capital Khartoum, particularly in and around the airport. This has forced evacuations to be undertaken by road via Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which lies about 650 km (400 miles) northeast of Khartoum.[297] from where they were airlifted or ferried directly to their home countries or third ones. Other evacuations were undertaken through overland border crossings or airlifts from diplomatic missions and other designated locations with direct involvement of the militaries of some home countries. Some transit hubs used during the evacuation include the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti, which hosts military bases of the United States, China, Japan, France, and other European countries.[298]

War crimes

This section is an excerpt from War crimes during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present).[edit]

The conflict was marked by heavy indiscriminate shelling, gunfire, and airstrikes on markets and populated residential neighbourhoods, causing a high number of fatalities. Hospitals were targeted during aerial bombings and artillery fire, and medical supplies were looted. These attacks severely impacted Sudan’s healthcare system, disrupting medical services and leaving the majority of the hospitals in conflict-affected states out of service. The UN declared Sudan the most dangerous country for humanitarian workers after South Sudan.[299]

In Geneina, West Darfur, the RSF and Arab militias killed more than 15,000 non-Arab people.[300] On 22 July, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina’s residents had fled. Massacres against the Masalit were recorded in towns such as Tawila, Sirba, Ardamata, Kutum, and Misterei, while a mass graves were discovered around Geneina. The UK[301][302] and US[303][304] governments, witnesses, and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to ethnic cleansing[302][305] or even genocide,[306][307][308][309] with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims. The RSF and Arab militias are also accused of widespread robberies, looting food meant to feed 4.4 million people, and sexual violence against Sudanese and foreign women, particularly Masalit and non-Arab women. NGOs estimate that the actual figure of sexual violence victims could be as high as 4,400.[310] The UN was urged to start an inquiry, and governments were encouraged to allocate resources to aid survivors.

The RSF and Arab militias in Sudan are also accused of targeted torture and killings of intellectuals, politicians, professionals, and tribal leaders. Notable victims include Adam Zakaria Is’haq, a physician and human rights advocate, and Khamis Abakar, the governor of West Darfur, who was kidnapped, tortured, and executed.[311] The RSF also targeted the families of their opponents, such as Mustafa Tambour‘s family. The SAF and RSF are accused of threatening, attacking, and killing journalists and activists during the conflict. The Sudanese Journalists Syndicate documented over 40 violations in May 2023 alone. Several journalists were injured or killed, and 13 newspapers ceased operations. Humanitarian workers were also targeted, with 18 killed and many others detained.

The International Criminal Court[312][313] and Amnesty International[314] are investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the war. The SAF accused the RSF of perpetrating these crimes. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF commander) established a committee to investigate these allegations. Several countries proposed a motion to the UN Human Rights Council for an investigation into the atrocities. The UN Human Rights Council voted to adopt a resolution creating a fact-finding committee on these crimes. Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan have called for measures to protect civilians.

Sexual violence

The war has led to widespread sexual violence, including those against children. As of early 2024, UNICEF reported at least 221 cases of children, some as young as one, being raped by armed groups. Sexual violence has been used as a weapon of war, violating international laws protecting children. The conflict has caused over 20,000 deaths and displaced more than 14 million people, with parts of the country facing famine. Both sides of the conflict have been accused of committing atrocities, including sexual violence and forced child marriages. UNICEF has called on all parties to protect civilians, particularly children, and ensure that services for survivors are available and safeguarded.[315]

Foreign involvement

In July 2024 Amnesty International reported that large numbers of recently manufactured weapons and ammunition were being transported into Sudan from China, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, the UAE and Serbia.[316][317]

Chad

See also: Chad–Sudan relations

On 7 June 2023, Hissein Alamine Tchaw-tchaw, a Chadian dissident who belongs to the same ethnic group as Hemedti and claims to be the leader of the Movement for the Fight of the Oppressed in Chad (MFOC), which is fighting the government of President Mahamat Déby, posted a video showing his participation in an RSF attack on the Yarmouk munitions factory in Khartoum.[318]

On 17 November 2023, the SLM-Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accused the Chadian government of supporting the RSF, and “supplying it with military equipment and mercenaries by opening its territory and airspace”.[319] A report from Africa Analyst alleged that Chadian soldiers belonging to a joint Chadian-Sudanese command under Osman Bahr intercepted a shipment of military equipment intended for the RSF on its way from N’Djamena and gave it instead to the JEM, which the latter denied.[320] The Economist linked Chad’s junta receiving financial support from the UAE in exchange for allowing it to support the RSF through Amdjarass airport.[321][322]

Following accusations by SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta of Chadian government support for the RSF, the Chadian government unsuccessfully demanded an apology from the Sudanese ambassador and expelled four Sudanese diplomats from the country on 17 December.[323]

On 5 November 2024, the government of Sudan filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights demanding reparations from Chad for their support of the RSF, accusing Chad of violating international law.[324]

China

See also: China–Sudan relations

On 9 January 2025 China donated emergency food aid (1,250 tonnes) to be allocated to all states.[325] Amnesty International’s 2024 report highlighted China as a supplier of weapons fueling the conflict, breaching the Darfur arms embargo. Recently-manufactured Chinese arms have been traced to both the SAF and the RSF, although China’s official stance avoids acknowledging direct support to either faction.[326] China initially adhered to non-interference, evacuating citizens and calling for peace without taking sides. This mirrored its approach in past conflicts, prioritizing stability to protect economic interests.[327] China’s Sudan strategy ties into the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to secure Red Sea trade routes and infrastructure links. The civil war delayed these ambitions, reinforcing China’s preference for a stable, cooperative government in Khartoum. Unlike Russia, which has militarily backed the RSF, or the US, which pursues sanctions and mediation, China prioritizes economic continuity over ideological alignment.[328]

Egypt

See also: Egypt–Sudan relations

On 15 April, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe,[329][330] and a military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force.[331] Initially, no official explanation was given for the Egyptian soldiers’ presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia.[332] Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to conduct exercises with the Sudanese military.[74] Around that time, the SAF reportedly encircled RSF forces in Merowe airbase. As a result, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that it was following the situation as a precaution for the safety of its personnel.[81] The RSF later stated that it would cooperate in repatriating the soldiers to Egypt.[331] On 19 April, the RSF stated that it had moved the soldiers to Khartoum and would hand them over when the “appropriate opportunity” arose.[333] Of the captured Egyptian troops, 177 were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated.[334][335]

On 16 April 2023, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a warning against any foreign interference.[336] According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF.[337] The Wall Street Journal said that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military.[338] On 17 April, satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed and two others had been damaged or destroyed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was among the destroyed aircraft.[339] After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military before the outbreak of hostilities.[74]

Eritrea

See also: Eritrea–Sudan relations

Eritrea is seen as an ally of the SAF, providing military support in Sudan’s eastern borders. During a state visit to Asmara in November 2024, al-Burhan thanked President Isaias Afwerki for Eritrea’s support to the SAF. Eritrea’s support is seen as a counterbalance to Eritrean opposition groups and their possibility of growing in influence under the advance of the RSF in Sudan’s eastern border. President Afwerki has implied Eritrea’s military readiness to respond in the case of an RSF advance to its borders.[340][341]

Ethiopia

See also: Ethiopia–Sudan relations

Ethiopia initially supported the RSF, which was seen as an ally who helped Ethiopia fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in the Tigray War.[342] Ethiopia was also supportive of the RSF to counter Egyptian influence in Sudan.[343] However, in July 2024, Primer Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Port Sudan and met with al-Burhan, signaling a shifting position on the conflict.[343] RSF’s Hemedti had previously paid a visit to Ethiopia in December 2023 to push for talks with the SAF.[344]

Iran

See also: Iran–Sudan relations

A June 2024 BBC investigation revealed that Iran violated the UN arms embargo by supplying drones to both sides.[345] Analysts see this move as part of Iran’s strategy to counter UAE influence in Sudan and secure access to the Red Sea.[346][347] Although Sudanese officials denied receiving Iranian aid,[346] multiple sources—including Reuters—confirmed its impact on the battlefield.[348]

Kenya

See also: Kenya–Sudan relations

The SAF rejected Kenya’s mediation role in July 2023, accusing President William Ruto of having ties to RSF leader Hemedti and offering refuge to RSF members.[349][350] SAF Lt. Gen. Yasir Alatta escalated tensions by calling Ruto a mercenary and challenging him to deploy troops.[351] Sudan later threatened to quit IGAD unless Ruto was removed as head of its mediation committee.[352] Kenya denied the accusations, calling them baseless and reaffirming its neutrality.[353][354] In retaliation, Anonymous Sudan attacked Kenyan websites in late July.[355]

Tensions deepened in February 2025 when Kenya hosted a meeting in Nairobi where the RSF and its allies signed a charter to form a parallel Sudanese government without the SAF’s participation. Sudan condemned the move, accusing Kenya of undermining its sovereignty. Analysts noted a shift in Kenya’s stance following Ruto’s January 2025 UAE visit and economic agreement, suggesting a possible Emirati influence behind Kenya’s actions.[356][357]

Libyan National Army

See also: Libya–Sudan relations

The Egypt-backed Libyan National Army, under the command of Khalifa Haftar, dispatched aircraft to fly military supplies to the RSF before the outbreak of hostilities.[358][338] Haftar and the LNA collaborated with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, to conduct these flights.[358]

Haftar’s support for a different faction in Sudan than the Egyptian government was commented on by The New Arab, which viewed it as a sign of Egyptian weakness due to economic malaise and reliance on Haftar to police Eastern Libya, which constitutes a security concern for the Egyptian government. The New Arab also viewed the LNA’s role in the conflict as signifying a shift in its diplomatic orientation, from being primarily backed by Egypt to being primarily backed by the United Arab Emirates.[359]

Russia

See also: Russia–Sudan relations

For much of the Sudanese civil war Russia has sent weapons to both the RSF and SAF. This began to shift during mid-2024, with the Russian government beginning to favour the SAF, concurrent with Russia–SAF discussions around the construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan.[360][361]

Wagner Group

See also: Wagner Group activities in Africa

According to CNN, Wagner supplied surface-to-air missiles to the RSF, picking up the items from Syria and delivering some of them by plane to Haftar-controlled bases in Libya to be then delivered to the RSF, while dropping other items directly to RSF positions in northwestern Sudan.[362] American officials said that Wagner was offering to supply additional weapons to the RSF from its existing stocks in the Central African Republic.[363] On 6 September, Wagner reportedly deployed a convoy of more than 100 vehicles carrying weapons to the RSF garrison in al-Zurug from Chad.[364] SAF Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta also accused the Wagner Group of bringing in mercenaries from several African nations to fight alongside the RSF.[365]

The head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin,[366] and the RSF denied the allegations.[367]

As relations between the Russian government and the SAF improved during mid-2024, the latter publicly claimed that the Wagner Group was no longer operating in Sudan. This claim was contradicted by a diplomatic source and eyewitnesses speaking to Middle East Eye.[360]

Saudi Arabia

See also: Saudi Arabia–Sudan relations

Saudi Arabia has provided military support and financial aid (though it officially denies it)[368] to the SAF, as it seeks to counterbalance the UAE’s influence in Sudan, which supports the RSF.[369] In response, Sudan has provided military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen.[369] In March 2025, al-Burhan visited Saudi Arabia in his first trip outside Sudan since the SAF retook Khartoum. There, he thanked Saudi support for Sudanese unity and the fight against the RSF.[370]

South Sudan

See also: South Sudan–Sudan relations

Since the outbreak of renewed violence in Sudan in 2023, South Sudan has adopted a mediatory role, urging peace and engaging with IGAD and the AU, though with limited success due to the conflict’s complexity and multiple factions. South Sudan is deeply concerned about spillover effects—such as refugee flows and economic instability—and recognizes that its own fragile stability is tied to Sudan’s fate.[371][372] Tensions escalated further with a February 2025 alliance between Sudan’s RSF and the SPLM-N, a rebel group near the South Sudanese border. Experts warn this could pull South Sudan into the conflict, especially if the Sudanese army supports rival South Sudanese militias in response. With shared borders, historical ties, and existing political tensions between South Sudan’s leaders (President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice President Riek Machar), the risk of both wars merging is high. The strategic location of the RSF-SPLM-N alliance also boosts smuggling and military operations, weakening Sudan’s army and increasing regional instability. If unchecked, experts fear the two conflicts could become indistinguishable, worsening humanitarian crises in both countries.[373][374]

Turkey

See also: Sudan–Turkey relations

Turkey appears to be engaging with both sides, notably through Baykar, owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s son-in-law, selling $120 million worth of weapons, 6 TB2 drones, 3 ground control stations, 600 warheads to the SAF in 2023, violating US and EU sanctions.[375][376] Meanwhile, Arca Defense, another Turkish company, had extensive contact with RSF’s procurement officer, though it denies selling weapons, adding complexity to Turkey’s role.[377] Turkey’s interests include expanding military and diplomatic ties in the Horn of Africa, offering to mediate between Sudan and the UAE in December 2024.[378]

In January 2025, the Somali government agreed to host SAF troops at Camp TURKSOM for training, as part of a Turkish-led effort to bolster military support to the SAF.[379][380]

Ukraine

See also: Sudan–Ukraine relations

On 19 September 2023, CNN reported that it was “likely” that Ukrainian special forces were behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner Group-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8 September.[364] Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither confirm or deny Ukraine’s involvement in the conflict,[381] but said that Ukraine “will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals … sooner or later”.[382]

On 6 November 2023, the Kyiv Post released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces attacking Wagner Group personnel in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication.[383] Two months later on 30 January 2024, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces had launched three drone strikes targeting the Wagner Group and other Russian organisations in Sudan as well as their Sudanese partners in the preceding weeks.[384] The Kyiv Post released a report on 5 February 2024 with a video showing the aftermath of an attack allegedly by Ukrainian special forces on a Wagner Group unit which had purportedly suffered several deaths and the capture of at least one member of the unit who was seen being interrogated on camera.[385]

United Arab Emirates

See also: Sudan–United Arab Emirates relations

The UAE has faced mounting accusations of providing military support to RSF,[365][386] including covert arms transfers, drone supply, and logistics routed through Chad, Libya, CAR,[387][387] and South Sudan.[388][389] Reports by major outlets like the Wall Street Journal,[390] New York Times,[321] and BBC,[345] along with diplomatic sources and satellite evidence, suggest Emirati cargo planes delivered weapons disguised as aid, with operations coordinated through Amdjarass airport in Chad.[391]

Despite UAE denials,[392][393][394] Sudan expelled Emirati diplomats,[395] accused the UAE at the UN of aiding genocide,[396][397] and submitted complaints to the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.[398][399] The UAE is alleged to be using humanitarian cover (e.g., Red Crescent hospitals) for military purposes, including drone operations and weapon bunkers near the border.[400][401][402] Sudan claims these actions aim to maintain Emirati influence and gold interests in Sudan, backed by historical investments and ongoing port and agriculture projects.[403][404][405]

The UAE’s ties to the RSF date back to the Yemen war in 2018. Its involvement is said to include cooperation with Wagner Group for arms deliveries and financing RSF logistics from within the Emirates.[406][407] A 2024 crash of an arms plane linked to UAE firms and the presence of UAE passports at RSF sites intensified scrutiny.[408][409]

The U.S. and UK have called on the UAE to halt support,[410][411] with U.S. lawmakers introducing multiple bills to block arms sales to Abu Dhabi.[412][413] The EU[414][415][416] and Human Rights Watch[417] also demanded accountability. However, Emirati diplomatic efforts continue, such as hosting a humanitarian conference and pledging aid—moves Sudan sees as attempts to sanitize its image.[418][419] International legal action is now underway, with the International Court of Justice set to hold hearings in April 2025 on Sudan’s genocide case against the UAE.[420]

United Kingdom

See also: Sudan–United Kingdom relations

In June 2024, The Guardian reported that according to multiple sources, UK government officials “attempted to suppress criticism” of the United Arab Emirates and its alleged role in supplying arms to the RSF.[421] Furthermore, the UK is the UN Security Council’s “penholder”[422] for Sudan.[421] In early 2023, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office initiated secret talks between the RSF and the UK.[423]

Sudan’s Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council Malik Agar criticized the British government during a December 2024 meeting with the Head of the UK Office for Sudan. Agar said that “If Britain wants to end the suffering of the Sudanese people, it must communicate with the UAE to stop the logistical support it provides to the militia”. Agar also denounced the UK’s penholder status for Sudan on the United Nations Security Council, and demanded a change in the UK’s foreign policy towards Sudan as a prerequisite for improving bilateral ties.[424]

United States

See also: Sudan–United States relations

On 20 January 2025, the Trump administration froze USAID payments for 90 days, redirecting most funds to military aid.[425][426] A court ordered the freeze lifted on 13 February, but the administration cancelled nearly 10,000 aid contracts instead. The judge later demanded payments by 26 February, but Chief Justice John G. Roberts paused the order pending a Supreme Court ruling by 28 February.[427]

Humanitarian impact

Main article: Humanitarian impact of the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Humanitarian crisis

The humanitarian crisis following the fighting was further exacerbated by the violence occurring during a period of high temperatures, and drought starting during the fasting month of Ramadan. Civilians were unable to venture outside of their homes to obtain food and supplies for fear of getting caught in the crossfire. A doctors’ group said that hospitals remained understaffed and were running low on supplies as wounded people streamed in.[428] The World Health Organization (WHO) recorded around 26 attacks on healthcare facilities, some of which resulted in casualties among medical workers and civilians.[429] The WHO said 80% of hospitals in conflict areas were out of service[430] with 32 forcibly evacuated by soldiers or caught in the crossfire.[431] This included about half of Khartoum’s 130 medical facilities and all hospitals in West Darfur.[432] Outbreaks of diseases such as measles, cholera and diarrhea were reported across the country.[433] In August 2024 cholera was declared an epidemic in the country and as of 8 September 2024, there were 5,692 cases of cholera including 185 deaths.[434]

In April 2023, the United Nations reported that shortages of basic goods, such as food, water, medicines and fuel have become “extremely acute”.[435] The delivery of badly-needed remittances from overseas migrant workers was also halted after Western Union announced in the same month that it was closing all operations in Sudan until further notice.[436] The World Food Programme said that more than $13 million worth of food aid destined for Sudan had been looted in the twenty days since the fighting broke out.[437] The looting of the WFP’s warehouses in El-Obeid on 1 June led to the loss of food aid meant to feed 4.4 million people.[438] An estimated 25 million people, equivalent to more than half of Sudan’s population, were said to be in need of aid in June 2023.[439] On 25 July, Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami said attacks on humanitarian facilities had led to more than 50 warehouses looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen.[440]

In September 2023, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that 1,200 children had died from disease outbreaks in refugee camps in White Nile State since May.[441] In Central Darfur, the head of the Hamidiya refugee camp said at least 43 children had died in the camp since July.[442] UNICEF also estimated that the conflict had led to the number of children being out of school in Sudan to rise from seven million prior to the fighting to 19 million in October 2023.[443] By 2024, the war’s economic costs had surpassed all prior armed conflicts since Sudanese independence in 1956 due to extensive destruction of infrastructure, particularly in urban areas such as the capital city of Khartoum.[444]

The dramatic decrease in agricultural activity (“cereal production in 2023 was nearly halved”) caused increases in food prices, and the conflict led to infrequent aid convoys. According to an army official cited by Al Jazeera, as of 29 March 2024, “70 aid trucks have been stuck in North Kordofan since October”. The UN estimated that 25 million people still needed aid, with 5 million facing famine and 18 million enduring “acute food insecurity”. Mobile networks being cut for nearly two months compounded the problems for those being helped by remittances from relatives abroad.[445] According to the United Nations, both the SAF and RSF are posing obstacles to food aid because they want to prevent food from getting to areas controlled by the other.[445]

In June 2024, Amnesty International’s report, “New Weapons Fuelling the Sudan Conflict”, stated that the constant flow of foreign weapons is fueling the war and breaching the Darfur arms embargo. The organization found that the recently manufactured or transferred weapons and ammunition were being imported in large quantities into Sudan from China, the UAE, Russia and Turkey. The weapons supply has impacted the war by causing massive civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Both warring sides were using Chinese-manufactured advanced drone jammers, mortars and anti-material rifles. The RSF was also reported to be using recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE.[317]

Famine

Main article: 2024 Sudan famine

On 1 August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) concluded that IPC Phase 5 famine conditions are prevalent and ongoing in parts of North Darfur, including the Zamzam camp south of El Fashe and that there was a high risk of similar conditions throughout internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.[39][446]

In late January 2025, the new administration of US President Donald Trump froze foreign aid for 90 days with waivers supposed to be available for urgent and life-saving aid. However, the waiver process has been slow to get rolling.[447]

By February 2025, famine had taken hold in at least five regions, with over 600,000 people at risk of starvation. The World Food Programme reported that 80% of emergency food kitchens had shut down due to U.S. aid cuts. In North Darfur, MSF and WFP suspended operations at Zamzam camp, which houses around 500,000 people. Cholera outbreaks have surged due to the collapse of Sudan’s healthcare infrastructure.[425][448][426][449]

Refugees

Main article: Sudanese refugee crisis (2023–present)

Sudanese refugee camp in Chad, 16 May 2023.

As of February 2025, over 12.3 million residents of Sudan have been displaced due to the fighting. The United Nations said that the conflict had produced more than 8.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), while more than 3.5 million had fled the country.[25] This makes Sudan the largest host of IDPs globally.[450] The International Organization for Migration estimated that 31% of IDPs originated from Khartoum state, followed by 18% from South Darfur state and 15% from North Darfur state.[25] In November 2023, the UN said the conflict created the largest child displacement crisis in the world.[451] 53% of people who have been internally displaced due to the conflict are children.[25]

Of those who fled abroad, more than 160,000 were Masalit who fled to Chad to escape ethnically based attacks by the RSF and allied militias.[452] Fighting between the SAF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) reportedly displaced more than 35,000 people in Blue Nile State alone, with 3,000 fleeing to Ethiopia,[67] while more than 83,000 were displaced in South Kordofan.[453] As of August, more than 400,000 people had fled to Chad, making it the largest single destination of refugees from the conflict, while others fled to other neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic, Egypt, and South Sudan.[454]

Criticism was levelled at diplomatic missions operating in Sudan for their slow response in helping Sudanese visa applicants whose passports were left behind in embassies following their closure during evacuation efforts, preventing them from leaving the country.[455]

The UN estimated that economic activity in Sudan fell by more than a third during the first three weeks of the conflict.[456] In July, Sudanese economists estimated the total amount of damage brought by the conflict at $9 billion, or an average of $100 million per day, while the value of property and goods looted was estimated at another $40 billion, with the most affected areas being Khartoum and South Darfur.[457] The exchange rate of the US dollar against the Sudanese pound in the black market rose to SDG730 in September, while it reached SDG625 at the official rate. This later reached SDG1250 in February 2024. The formal economy was described as being in a “near standstill”.[458][456] Gold production was also reduced to just 2 tons from the previous year’s output of 18 tons.[459] Sudanese minister for minerals Mohamed Bashir Abu Nammu accused the RSF of looting around 15 tons of silver and 1,273 kilograms of gold from the Sudan Gold Refinery at the start of the conflict.[460]

In February 2024, finance minister Gibril Ibrahim said that the Sudanese economy had contracted by 40 per cent in 2023 due to the fighting, with an additional decline of 28 per cent expected in 2024. He added that state revenues had also decreased by 80 per cent.[461] Sudanese port authorities estimated that international trade had fallen by 23 per cent in 2023. The Sudanese finance ministry was unable to set a national budget for 2023 or 2024 and stopped issuing quarterly reports. It also raised the exchange rate for imports and exports from SDG650 to SDG950. The fighting also rendered more than 60 per cent of Sudan’s agricultural land out of service, according to Fikra for Studies and Development.[458]

In May 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that both the RSF and SAF were using revenue from the sale of gum arabic, which is primarily grown in Sudan, to finance their operations.[462]

The suspension of USAID funding in 2025 significantly reduced cash assistance, which grassroots emergency response groups relied on to sustain food kitchens. The crisis also impacted neighboring countries, with over two million Sudanese refugees facing deteriorating conditions.[425][448]

Disinformation

Throughout the Sudan conflict, both the SAF and RSF waged aggressive disinformation campaigns, using social media to manipulate public opinion, spread false narratives, and bolster their own images.[463][463][464] The RSF ran digital propaganda teams from Khartoum and Dubai, using verified social media accounts to distribute misleading content.[465] The SAF used Twitter for morale-boosting and to counter RSF claims, though some of its posts were proven false.[466][467]

Widespread disinformation included recycled footage from video games, past conflicts like Ukraine and Libya, and even archaeological props misrepresented as war crimes.[468] For instance, SAF posted a video allegedly showing recent air operations, which was actually from the video game Arma 3.[469] The SAF also circulated altered images, including a fabricated photo of Hemedti hospitalized in Nairobi.[470][471]

The RSF shared footage of a SAF and Egyptian Air Force warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF found to be that of an Su-25 fighter jet that crashed in Mali,[472] and the other of a Libyan aircraft taken outside Sudan in 2020.[473]

The RSF also sent bulletins to UK politicians with the help of Dubai-based Capital Tap Holdings, aiming to counter what it called “disproportionate” disinformation.[474] Facebook removed RSF pages in August 2024, citing policy violations. The RSF blamed SAF for instigating the ban and said it was negotiating with Meta to restore its accounts.[475]

The conflict’s information space has been further destabilized by false claims against organizations like the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate[476] and by deepfake-like imagery. Disinformation experts, including Kyle Walter of Logically, warned that generative AI may be fueling the sophistication of fake content, undermining trust in all sources of information.[474]

Sanctions

United States

In response to ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Sudan, U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order on 4 May 2023 authorizing sanctions against actors destabilizing the country.[477] The first sanctions followed in June, targeting companies linked to both the SAF and RSF, along with visa restrictions on unnamed individuals.[478]

Subsequent rounds of sanctions included RSF leaders Abdelrahim Dagalo and Abdel Rahman Jumma (accused of killing West Darfur’s governor), Islamist leader Ali Karti,[479] firms in Sudan and Russia, and former Bashir regime officials involved in RSF support or coup plots.[480] In May 2024, more RSF commanders were sanctioned for violence in North and Central Darfur.[481][482]

Facing growing pressure from U.S. lawmakers, the Biden administration considered declaring RSF atrocities as genocide and tightening sanctions—especially due to the UAE’s alleged role in smuggling Sudanese gold to fund the RSF.[483][484][485] On 7 January 2025, the U.S. officially labeled RSF actions as genocide and imposed sanctions on Hemedti, seven RSF-linked companies, and UAE-based Capital Tab Holding LLC. However, critics said the measures came too late and would have limited impact.[486][487] In response, the UAE began lobbying in Washington to avoid direct sanctions.[488]

Other countries

On 12 July 2023, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on firms linked to the SAF and the RSF for providing funds and weapons in the conflict.[489] On 15 April 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on two individuals and four entities linked to the SAF and the RSF.[490] On 23 June 2024, the European Union imposed sanctions on six entities for manufacturing and procuring weapons for the SAF and the RSF.[491]

On 6 March 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on al-Burhan and Hemedti, due to “an unwillingness on the part of the leaders to negotiate an end to the war”.[492]

In popular culture

- Sudan, Remember Us, a 2024 documentary film directed by Hind Meddeb[493]

- Khartoum (2025 film), a 2025 documentary film by several Sudanese filmmakers[494]

- The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, a 2003 book by Douglas H. Johnson.[495] The book provides insights into the historical roots of the conflict and the ongoing struggles in South Sudan, including the reasons for the continued fighting.

- Sudan’s Unfinished Democracy: The Promise and Betrayal of a People’s Revolution, a book by Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch, Raga Makawi, and Alex de Waal.[496] It examines the 2019 uprising that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir, the subsequent fragile regime, and the events leading to the 2021 military coup and the current conflict.

See also

- Africa portal

- Sudanese Civil War, an index of three major civil wars that occured in Sudan’s history, as well as other separate conflicts in Sudan.

- New Sudan

- Janjaweed (Janjaweed Coalition)

- Human rights in Sudan

- War in Darfur

- Darfur genocide

- 2021 Sudan coup d’état

- Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023)

- Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2024)

- Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2025)

- Genocide of Indigenous peoples § Darfur

- Genocides in history (21st century) § Darfur

- List of civil wars

- List of conflicts in Africa

- List of ethnic cleansing campaigns

- List of genocides

- List of ongoing armed conflicts

- List of wars: 2003–present

- Sudanese National Forces Coordination

References

External links

- Media related to Sudanese civil war (2023–present) at Wikimedia Commons

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sudanese_civil_war_(2023–present)&oldid=1283866478”

Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2025)

This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by adding missing items with reliable sources.

The following is a timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023–present) in 2025.

This timeline is a dynamic and fluid list, and as such may never satisfy criteria of completeness. Moreover, some events may only be fully understood and/or discovered in retrospect.

January

1 January

The Joint Darfur Force (JDF) said it had killed 462 Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighters including six commanders in a failed attack on Al-Malha, North Darfur. In addition, three vehicles were destroyed. The remaining unit under Ali Rizqallah Al-Safana retreated. The JDF also called on the RSF to surrender to the JDF or the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).[1]

2 January

The SAF claimed that RSF brigadier general Ibrahim Delib was killed along with 32 RSF fighters, including a Mauritanian national, after a drone being launched by the group misfired in El Fasher.[2]

4 January

Two people were killed by RSF shelling on the Saudi Hospital in El Fasher.[3] Four others were killed by RSF shelling in Omdurman.[4]

5 January

Ten people were killed in an SAF airstrike in Khartoum.[5]

The SAF and the JDF claimed to have deflected an RSF assault on El Fasher that came from the east and southeast of the city. The JDF also intercepted a weapons convoy for the RSF, arresting both Sudanese and Libyan nationals.[6]

7 January

The United States officially declared that the RSF had committed genocide and imposed sanctions on Hemedti.[7]

The SAF retook the administrative center of Ombadda as well as Al-Shagla and the western section of the Al-Fitaihab neighborhood of Omdurman from the RSF. It also claimed to have freed three captive officers in Al-Fitaihab in a special operation that left more than 20 RSF militants dead, including a commander.[8]

Four people were killed in an SAF airstrike on the Fata Borno IDP camp in Kutum, North Darfur.[9]

8 January

The SAF retook the town of Haj Abdallah in Gezira State, 58 kilometers from Wad Madani, and the village of Mahalla, 13 kilometers from Wad Madani, from the RSF.[10]

9 January

The SAF retook the town of Al-Shabarqa in Gezira State, 13 kilometers east of Wad Madani, from the RSF.[11]

10 January

The SAF retook the town of Um al-Qura in Gezira State, 40 kilometers east of Wad Madani, from the RSF, while the SAF-allied Sudan Shield Forces retook Wad al-Abyad, 20 kilometres from the Hantoub bridge.[12]

At least 26 people were killed in an attack by the Sudan Shield Forces on the village of Tayba in Gezira State.[13]

11 January

The SAF retook Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State.[14]

Sixteen people were killed by RSF shelling on the Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur.[15]

12 January

The SAF retook the Al-Rawad residential complex in Khartoum from the RSF.[16]

13 January

At least 120 people were killed by shelling in western Omdurman.[17]

The Merowe Dam power station was damaged by RSF drones, causing a fire at the facility and power outages as far as Shendi, Port Sudan, Atbara and Omdurman.[18]

The SAF retook Karkaraia and Hajar al-Jawad, on the road between Dalang and Kadugli in South Kordofan, from the SPLM-N (al-Hilu).[19]

Thirteen people were killed by the SAF and allied militias in an attack on the informal settlement of Kambo Tayba in Gezira State.[20]

14 January

The JDF claimed to have killed hundreds of RSF militants, destroyed 262 vehicles, and captured 21 militants and 67 vehicles during clashes in Al-Malha and Halaf in North Darfur.[21]

At least 18 people were killed in attacks by the Sudan Shield Forces on the Shukaba camp and Camp 16 in Gezira State.[22]

15 January

At least 120 people were killed in an RSF attack on a civilian convoy being escorted by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) near Kabkabiya, North Darfur.[23]

Nine people were killed in attacks by the SAF and the RSF on members of the Kanabi community, who mostly originate from Darfur, in Abu Gouta, Gezira State.[24] Fifteen people were killed in an RSF attack on the village of Al-Khizan in Abu Gouta.[25]

The Sultan Ali Dinar Palace Museum in El Fasher was shelled by the RSF, causing a fire that heavily damaged the structure and destroyed its contents and furniture.[26]

16 January

Senior US officials reported that the SAF had recently used chemical weapons against the RSF in rural areas at least twice.[27] The US also sanctioned SAF chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan for the army’s conduct in the war.[28]

The RSF said that it attacked fighters and vehicles in Kabkabiya belonging to the JDF between the SLM-Al Nur and the GSLF. The RSF called for a joint committee to investigate the incident.[29]

18 January

Forty people were killed in an RSF attack on the village of Jebel Hilla in North Darfur.[30]

Six drones struck the Al-Shawak power station in Gedaref State, injuring civil defence personnel and causing blackouts across the state and in Kassala State. Other drones hit the Gedaref state water station while another crashed near a bus station along the Gedaref-Kassala-Port Sudan highway.[31]

The SAF reached the Al-Shukri junction in Shambat, Khartoum Bahri, while the RSF retreated by one kilometer southwards to the Hassan Ibrahim Malik University City.[32] At least three people were killed by RSF shelling in Omdurman.[33]

The RSF claimed to have taken Al-Hallaf, Drishaqi and Mao in North Darfur.[34]

20 January

At least 11 people were killed by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk IDP camp in El Fasher.[35]

A coalition of SAF and allied forces claimed to have repelled two RSF incursions from Libya in North Darfur near the tri-border area with Chad and Libya, killing a total of over 950 fighters, destroying 61 vehicles, and capturing 78 others that were equipped with advanced weaponry.[36]

21 January

The Sudanese Revolutionary Front expelled the United Popular Front from its member groups after the UPF accused the alliance of being unduly influenced by the RSF.[37]

SAF units besieged at the Signal Corps garrison in Khartoum Bahri launched their first major offensive since September 2024, forcing the RSF to withdraw east towards the Kafouri neighborhood. The SAF also retook Abboud Park in Khartoum Bahri and the Juwayriyah School and the African Council Schools in Al Safiya district.[38]

The RSF issued a 48-hour ultimatum for the SAF to withdraw from El Fasher.[39]

22 January

The SAF launched an offensive towards the El-Jeili oil refinery and retook the Rotana Mills southeast of the facility.[40]

23 January

The El-Jeili oil refinery caught fire with smoke being seen from Omdurman and Khartoum Bahri. The SAF claimed that the RSF had set fire to the facility, while the RSF claimed that it caught fire due to incendiary barrel bombs dropped by the Sudanese Air Force.[41]

Two people were killed by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk IDP camp.[42]

An indefinite strike was launched by employees of the Bashair Hospital in Khartoum after an RSF member opened fire inside the facility the previous day.[43]

24 January

At least 70 people were killed in an RSF drone strike on the maternity ward of the Saudi Hospital in El Fasher that also destroyed its emergency department.[44][45]

The SAF claimed to have broken the siege around the Signal Corp’s base in Khartoum. The RSF denied the claims.[46] The SAF also claimed to have broken the siege around its General Headquarters in Khartoum and retook the El-Jeili oil refinery.[47]

The SAF and allied militias repelled an RSF attack on El Fasher following the expiration of the latter’s ultimatum for the SAF to withdraw. The JDF claimed it had killed more than 400 RSF militants, destroyed more than 25 vehicles and captured 30 others.[48]

Ayub Osman Nahar resigned as an advisor to Hemedti, saying that he refused to be part of the RSF’s atrocities against civilians and accusing the group of burning villages and killing civilians in North Darfur and Gezira State.[49]

27 January

The SAF claimed to have pushed into parts of eastern Khartoum near the Al-Rabat College in Burri district, advanced through large portions of the Al-Azba, Kafouri, Ad Babaker, and Ramallah neighborhoods of Khartoun North, and continued their advances towards the El Mek Nimr Bridge. They also claimed to have deployed troops to hold several neighborhoods under their control.[50]

More than 100 people were killed in an RSF attack on the village of Broush in North Darfur.[51]

28 January

The SAF claimed to have seized the RSF’s Medical Directorate located in the former SAF Paratroopers base in Shambat, as well as the Blue and Bashir Towers in Khartoum Bahri.[52]

The RSF announced the death in action of one of its senior commanders, Rahmtalla al-Mahdi, also known as “Jalha”, along with his brother. The two were reportedly killed in an airstrike east of Khartoum.[53]

29 January

The SAF made further gains in Khartoum Bahri and advanced towards the El Mek Nimr Bridge, forcing the RSF out of almost the entire city except in Hillet Hamad.[54]

Renewed fighting in El Fasher killed seven people and injured 12 others. The SAF claimed that the deaths were caused by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk camp. The SAF also claimed to have repelled an RSF attack on the city.[55]

30 January

The SAF retook the city of Umm Ruwaba in North Kordofan, advancing towards El Obeid.[56] It shot down ten drones over El Obeid[57] and retook Al-Azba and the eastern part of the Kafouri neighbourhood of Khartoum Bahri.[58]

February

1 February

At least 60 people were killed while 250 others were injured in an RSF attack on the Sabreen Market in Omdurman.[59] Two others were killed in an SAF airstrike in Khartoum,[60] while at least seven were killed by RSF shelling in El Obeid.[61] Eleven people were killed by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk camp, while 13 others were killed during clashes in Nyala.[62]

The SAF claimed to have retaken the cities of Tambul, Rufaa and Al-Hasahisa in Gezira State.[63]

2 February

The JDF claimed to have repelled an RSF attack on El Fasher, killing 140 fighters and mercenaries, destroying 43 vehicles and capturing 12 more. The JDF also said that RSF fighters were appearing more on foot and on camels and horses, and also appeared to be under the influence of drugs.[64]

The SAF retook Wad Rawah and al-Nabati in Gezira State.[65]

Renewed fighting and airstrikes in Darfur left at least 248 people dead or wounded. Health authorities believe the death toll is much higher than recorded due to the ongoing fighting preventing bodies from being recovered and counted.[62]

3 February

Abdallah Hussein, a senior RSF commander was killed by an SAF airstrike in al-Kamelin in Gezira State.[66]

The SAF claimed to have broke the siege of its Corps of Engineers garrison in the Al ‘Aylafun area, and retook the al-Asaylat, Um Daw Ban, and Al ‘Aylafun areas of the East Nile locality. The SAF said it plans to continue advances to recapture the Soba Bridge.[67]

According to the state health minister of South Kordofan, the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) killed 44 people after shelling the main market, residential neighborhoods, and temporary shelters in schools in Kadugli.[68]

Twenty-five people were killed in an SAF airstrike in Nyala.[69]

4 February

At least six people were killed by RSF shelling on the al-Nao hospital in Omdurman.[70]

The SAF claimed to have retaken al-Kamelin[71] and laid siege to the town of Naima in White Nile State.[72]

Engineers from the Khartoum State Water Authority were fired at by RSF snipers stationed at the Kuwaiti building while they were assessing the damage to the Bahri Water Plant.[73]

5 February

The SAF claimed to have retaken the al-Rumaila district of Khartoum as well as the central mint.[74]

Five people were killed in SAF airstrikes in Nyala.[75]

6 February

The SAF claimed to have retaken the El Tekeina, El Maseed and El Noba areas south of Giad, the Saria Industrial Complex near Abu Hamama in Khartoum, and Wadi El Akhdar in the Sharg El Nil area of Khartoum Bahri.[76]

7 February

The SAF claimed to have retaken the Traffic Signs and License Plates Factory along with the entire industrial area of Khartoum. They also claimed to have retaken Al-Masoudiya in Khartoum state[77] and Abu Quta in northwestern Gezira State.[78]

The SAF claimed to have shot down seven RSF drones over Debba, Northern State.[79]

Three people were killed in an RSF attack on the Zamzam IDP camp.[80] Five others were killed in an RSF attack on Saloma, southeast of El Fasher.[81]

8 February

The SAF claimed to have retaken the Kafouri district of Khartoum Bahri.[82]

The SLM and the GSLF launched an incursion into Chad from Darfur, resulting in clashes with the Chadian Army in the vicinity of the tri-border area with Sudan and Libya. Six Sudanese soldiers were killed while 13 others were injured. Three vehicles were also destroyed while two Sudanese commanders were captured and detained at Amdjarass.[83]

10 February

The Transitional Sovereignty Council announced that a civilian-led transitional government would be formed once the SAF takes full control of Khartoum.[84][85]

12 February

At least 31 people were killed following two days of RSF attacks on the Zamzam IDP camp.[86]

13 February

At least 30 people were reported killed in RSF attacks on al-Jamalab and Na’ima in White Nile State. Fifteen others drowned on the White Nile river while they were boarding a boat to escape the attacks.[87]

15 February

A 100-member RSF unit stationed in Al-Muzmum, Sennar State, surrendered to the SAF in Singa after previously fleeing to South Sudan.[88]

The SAF claimed to have retaken the El Nour Islamic Complex and the Bahri Thermal Power Plant in Khartoum.[89]

16 February

Ten people were killed in RSF attacks in Mellit Station in El Fasher. The SAF claimed to have destroyed an RSF base in the east of the city.[90]

17 February

The SAF took control of the Kafouri area, the last RSF stronghold in Khartoum North, and the city of Er Rahad in North Kordofan.[91] It also retook the Ministry of Animal Resources, the Tax Tower, the Malaysian Tower, and the Medical Supply Department headquarters near central Khartoum.[92]

The Sudanese government extended the opening of the Adre border crossing with Chad until 16 May to allow humanitarian aid to reach Darfur.[93]

18 February

The SAF retook the Kober Bridge connecting Khartoum with Khartoum Bahri, as well as large parts of El Sajana and El Hilla El Jadeeda in southeastern Khartoum.[94]

The RSF announced plans to form a parallel government in exile, the Government of Peace and Unity, in Nairobi, Kenya.[95]

More than 200 people were killed following three days of RSF attacks in the El Geteina area of White Nile State.[96]

An RSF assault on the Zamzam camp forced thousands to flee to Tawila.[97]

19 February

Six people were killed by RSF shelling in Omdurman.[98]

The SAF claimed to have retaken the El Hurriya Bridge in central Khartoum, as well as Sidra in North Kordofan.[99]

The United Nations confirmed a state of famine in the Zamzam, Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps in North Darfur, as well as in two locations in the Western Nuba Mountains.[100]

20 February

Ten people were killed in an airstrike in El Khazan Jadeed, East Darfur.[99]

The Sudanese government recalled its ambassador to Kenya over the latter’s hosting of meetings by the RSF and allied groups.[101] It also imposed a ban on the Saudi-owned Asharq News news channel, which was lifted on 24 March.[102]

22 February

The SAF and the Sudan Shield Forces claimed to have forced the RSF to retreat from the Soba neighbourhood of eastern Khartoum and retook the Al-Lulua and Al-Samra neighbourhoods southeast of the Soba Bridge connecting Khartoum’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods with the rural areas of East Nile, adding that the 17 RSF militants were killed while nine vehicles were destroyed or captured.[103]

23 February

The RSF, the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and allied groups signed a charter to establish the Government of Peace and Unity following a meeting in Nairobi.[104][105]

The SAF’s Sayyad Force lifted the two-year siege of El Obeid.[106] The SAF also recaptured El Geteina.[107]

24 February

The SAF claimed to have taken the eastern part of the Soba Bridge.[108]

The SAF said that it had partially broken the siege of Dalang and captured the Al-Karkal, Koli, and Kiqa regions north of Kadugli and Hajar Al-Jawad and Karkariya to the south.[109]

The RSF claimed to have shot down an Ilyushin fighter jet over Nyala, killing its crew.[110] The pilot was later identified as Major General Abulgasem Ali.[111]

The National Umma Party removed Fadlallah Burma Nasir as its acting leader following his cosigning of the Government of Peace and Unity agreement with the RSF.[112] In response, Nasir ordered the dissolution of the party’s Presidential Institution.[113]

25 February

An SAF Antonov An-26 transport aircraft crashed into a residential area of Karari, Omdurman, during takeoff from Wadi Seidna Air Base, killing at least 46 people including Major-General Bahr Ahmed, a senior commander in Khartoum.[114][115]

The SAF recaptured Al-Khiwai, advancing closer to relieve the siege of El-Khiwai.[116]

26 February

Food aid was halted due to continued attacks on the Zamzam camp.[117]

Russia called on the UN to support the Sudanese government’s peace efforts and warned against the parallel RSF government that could halt efforts to support stability in Sudan.[118]

28 February

The RSF launched a drone strike on the Merowe Power Station, leading to a power outage in the city.[119]

The JDF claimed to have intercepted an RSF supply shipment in North Darfur and “neutralized” foreign mercenaries, demanding apologies from Colombia. The claims were denied by the RSF.[120]

March

1 March

The SAF claimed to have dismantled a cell based in the Marabi’ al-Sharif area of Soba Sharq, east of Khartoum, that counterfeited currency for the RSF and included foreign nationals.[121]

2 March

The SAF retook Station 13 and parts of the El Nasr and El Huda neighbourhoods in Khartoum.[122]

3 March

The SAF reached the eastern edge of the al-Manshia bridge in East Nile, Khartoum and retook the headquarters of the East Nile Central Reserve Forces.[123]

Seven people were killed in an SAF airstrike on Umm Kuraydim, north of El Obeid.[124]

4 March

More than 80 people were killed or injured by RSF shelling on Abu Shouk IDP camp.[125]

5 March

The SAF retook El Dali and El Mazmum, the RSF’s last strongholds in Sennar State, as well as Al-Jabalain in White Nile state.[126]

6 March

Canada imposed sanctions on al-Burhan and Hemedti, citing in part “an unwillingness on the part of the leaders to negotiate an end to the war”.[127]

7 March

A detention centre operated by the RSF near Khartoum was discovered, revealing evidence of torture and a nearby mass grave containing over 500 unmarked graves.[128][129]

9 March

Seven people were killed in an RSF attack on Al Khiwai, West Kordofan,[130] while two others were killed in RSF drone strikes in Al-Maliha, North Darfur.[131]

10 March

The SAF claimed to have destroyed 47 vehicles and 100 drones belonging to the RSF in El Fasher over the course of 10 days. They also claimed that local forces killed 15 fighters and that they recaptured the whole Al-Salam neighborhood and the Lafat Taqro buildings in the south of the city.[132]

12 March

Ten people were killed by RSF shelling in El Fasher,[133] while two children were killed and eight more were injured by RSF shelling in El Obeid.[134]

13 March

RSF shelling on El Obeid killed one woman and injured four others, bringing the death toll from RSF attacks on the city to 32.[135]

14 March

The Sudanese government ordered a ban on imports from Kenya, citing national security concerns amid criticism over the latter’s hosting of the RSF.[136]

The SAF claimed to have shot down a drone squadron targeting Atbara.[135] Eight civilians were killed in RSF raids on eastern Khartoum.[137]

15 March

Hemedti vowed to carry out new offensives on March 17, the anniversary of the RSF’s founding, claiming the RSF had undergone several changes and had made alliances with other groups such as the SPLM-N. He threatened to invade Port Sudan and attack Atbara, Shendi, Merowe, Al Dabbah, and Dongola. He also said that countries supporting the SAF would “pay the price”.[138]

The bodies of 11 people suspected to have been killed by the RSF were recovered from a well in the Fayhaa neighborhood of Khartoum.[139]

16 March

Government buildings used by the RSF in Ed Daein and Nyala were destroyed by missiles.[140] The SAF also claimed to have taken control of the Family Club, Khartoum 3, and part of Khartoum 2 and cut off the last RSF supply route to the Presidential Palace.[141]

Four people were killed and 30 people were injured including 18 children from RSF shelling in Karari, Omdurman.[142]

The SAF said that its Armoured Corps had linked up with SAF forces at the General Command headquarters in Khartoum after clearing the People’s Teaching Hospital from the RSF.[143]

17 March

The United Nations said the RSF detained more than 60 peacekeepers, abducted eight civilian staff, and seized eight vehicles and 280,000 litres of fuel from a United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) logistics convoy heading from a refueling mission in Kadugli.[144]

19 March

The Sudanese government suspended development projects funded by Arab and international lenders, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, citing in part concerns over addressing arrears and resuming funding flows due to the ongoing conflict.[145]

The SAF claimed to have killed an RSF commander and 15 other fighters in an airstrike in El Fasher.[146]

20 March

The RSF claimed to have taken Al-Maliha, which the JDF denied, adding that eight senior RSF officers, including field commander Colonel Ayoub Ahimer, had been killed.[147]

21 March

The SAF retook the Republican Palace in Khartoum from the RSF.[148][149] An RSF drone strike on the palace that same day killed six journalists including two military reporters and four members of a Sudan TV crew.[150]

22 March

The SAF retook the Corinthia Hotel and the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan and the General Intelligence Service in Khartoum from the RSF.[151] It also retook Tuti Island, situated at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, after advancing through the Tuti Bridge.[152]

Forty-eight people were killed in ethnically-motivated attacks by the RSF in Al-Maliha.[153]

23 March

Eleven people were killed in an RSF drone strike on the Radwan Mosque in Hilat Kuko in East Nile area of Khartoum. Eight people were killed by RSF shelling in El Fasher,[154] while three others were killed by RSF shelling in Omdurman.[152]

Eighteen people were killed following three days of RSF attacks on villages in Gezira State northwest of Wad Madani.[155]

The RSF claimed to have taken Lagawa in West Kordofan.[154]

24 March

The RSF launched a series of attacks in eastern Khartoum, killing at least five people and injuring dozens.[156] At the same time, the group retreated from the Salama, Azhari, Ad Hussein, Mayo, Gereif West, Burri, Sahafat and Kalakla neighbourhoods of Khartoum and were seen moving south towards Jebel Aulia.[157]

The Darfur Initiative for Justice and Peace said that hundreds of civilians were killed in an SAF airstrike on the Tur’rah market near El Fasher.[158]

26 March

The SAF retook Khartoum International Airport and the Manshiya Bridge over the Blue Nile in Khartoum. It also retook the Tiba al-Hassanab camp in Jabal Aulia, which is described as the RSF’s last stronghold in Khartoum and its main base in central Sudan.[159]

Al-Burhan visited the presidential palace in Khartoum and announced the liberation of the city, proclaiming that “Khartoum is free”.[160]

27 March

The SAF reportedly cleared the last pockets of RSF control south of Khartoum and captured Jabal Awliya. They also claimed to have neutralized 23 RSF personnel and captured an artillery piece.[161]

A swarm of drones attacked the city of Ad-Damazin in Blue Nile State, with some explosions and smoke being reported. The SAF claimed to have shot down five drones over the armored corps base, 4th infantry division headquarters, and the city’s airport.[162]

29 March

The SAF retook the Souq Libya market west of Omdurman.[163]

30 March

The SAF and allied fighters repelled an RSF assault on El Fasher and attacked a supply convoy, destroying 16 vehicles and killing dozens of RSF fighters. Nine civilians were killed and 17 more were injured in RSF shelling.[164]

31 March

Seven people were killed by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk camp.[165]

April

2 April

Two people were killed by RSF shelling on the Abu Shouk camp.[166]

At least 96 people were killed following four days of attacks on the RSF on Al-Jumu’iya, south of Omdurman.[167]

References

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Timeline_of_the_Sudanese_civil_war_(2025)&oldid=1283755568”

Deaths in 2025

The following notable deaths occurred in 2025. Names are reported under the date of death, in alphabetical order. A typical entry reports information in the following sequence:

- Name, age, country of citizenship at birth, subsequent nationality (if applicable), what subject was noted for, cause of death (if known), and a reference.

April

4

- Manoj Kumar, 87, Indian actor (Kranti, Upkar, Shaheed, Purab Aur Paschim, Roti Kapada Aur Makaan).[1]

3

- Julie Alipala, 58, Filipino journalist (Philippine Daily Inquirer).[2]

- Andreas, Prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, 82, German landowner and nobleman, head of the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (since 1998).[3]

- Gordon Faith, 94, British actor (Doctor Who, Adam Adamant Lives!, War & Peace).[4] (death announced on this date)

- Farooq Hamid, 80, Pakistani cricketer (Lahore, PIA, national team).[5]

- Michael Hurley, 83, American folk singer-songwriter.[6] (death announced on this date)

- Ivan Kley, 66, Brazilian tennis player and coach.[7]

- Daniel Kluger, 73, Israeli writer.[8]

- Jiří Kochta, 78, Czech ice hockey player (Jihlava, Sparta Praha), Olympic silver medallist (1968).[9]

- Hossein-Ali Nayeri [fa], 69, Iranian judge.[10]

- Mick O’Dwyer, 88, Irish Gaelic football player (Waterville, South Kerry) and manager (Kerry).[11]

- Juan Andrés Ramírez, 77, Uruguayan politician, minister of the interior (1990–1993), cancer.[12]

- Amália Sterbinszky, 74, Hungarian handball player, Olympic bronze medallist (1976).[13]

- Dean Wells, 54, American football player (Seattle Seahawks, Carolina Panthers, New England Patriots), cancer.[14]

- Andy Wharton, 63, English footballer (Burnley, Torquay United, Chester City).[15] (death announced on this date)

- Margarita Xhepa, 93, Albanian actress (People’s Artist of Albania).[16]

2

- Bill Cottrell, 80, American football player (Detroit Lions, Denver Broncos).[17] (death announced on this date)

- Matt Hassett, 93, Irish hurler (Toomevara, Tiperrary).[18]

- Johnny King, 92, English footballer (Crewe Alexandra, Stoke City, Cardiff City).[19]

- Petra Krause, 86, German-Italian communist militant and weapons smuggler.[20] (death announced on this date)

- Khamtai Siphandone, 101, Laotian politician, president (1998–2006), prime minister (1991–1998), and chairman of the Revolutionary Party (1992–2006).[21]

- Alois Švehlík, 85, Czech actor (Forbidden Dreams, Alois Nebel, On the Roof) and theater pedagogue.[22]

- John Vella, 74, American football player (Oakland Raiders, Minnesota Vikings).[23]

1

- Miguel Ángel Aguilar Miranda [es], 81, Ecuadorian Roman Catholic prelate, bishop of Guaranda (1991–2004) and Military Ordinariate of Ecuador (2004–2014).[24]

- Hassan Bdeir, Lebanese militant (Hezbollah), airstrike.[25]

- Deepak Bohara, 74, Nepalese politician, MP (since 2022).[26]

- Arsenio Campos, 79, Mexican actor.[27]

- Toti Ciliberto [es], 63, Argentinian comedian and actor (Videomatch, Showmatch), complications from a heart attack.[28]

- Leandro Domingues, 41, Brazilian footballer (Vitória, Kashiwa Reysol, Yokohama FC), testicular cancer.[29]

- George Freeman, 97, American jazz guitarist (Birth Sign, New Improved Funk, Man & Woman).[30]

- Stanley O. Ikenberry, 90, American academic, president of the University of Illinois System (1979–1995, 2010).[31]

- Alfi Kabiljo, 89, Croatian composer and musician.[32]

- Dean T. Kashiwagi, 72, American economist.[33]

- Val Kilmer, 65, American actor (Top Gun, Tombstone, Batman Forever), pneumonia.[34]

- Mark Laforest, 62, Canadian ice hockey player (Philadelphia Flyers, Detroit Red Wings, Toronto Maple Leafs).[35]

- Sergey Mavrin, 73, Russian jurist, judge (since 2005) and deputy president (since 2009) of the Constitutional Court.[36]

- Yahyah Michot, 72, Belgian Islamologist and academic.[37]

- María del Carmen Pinete Vargas, 64, Mexican politician, four-term deputy, serving vice president of the Chamber.[38]

- Alfred Recours, 80, French politician, mayor of Conches-en-Ouche (1984–2020) and deputy (1988–1993, 1997–2002).[39]

- Ray Sahetapy [id], 68, Indonesian actor (The Raid), complications from diabetes, lungs, stroke.[40]

- Johnny Tillotson, 86, American singer-songwriter (“Poetry in Motion“, “It Keeps Right On a-Hurtin’“, “Without You“), complications from Parkinson’s disease.[41]

- Faramarz Zelli, 82, Iranian footballer (Kian Tehran, PAS Tehran, national team).[42]

March

31

- Sian Barbara Allen, 78, American actress (Scream, Pretty Peggy, The Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, You’ll Like My Mother), complications from Alzheimer’s disease.[43]

- Richard Bernstein, 80, American journalist (The New York Times, Time) and author, pancreatic cancer.[44]

- Yves Boisset, 86, French film director (L’Attentat, The Common Man, Le Juge Fayard dit Le Shériff) and screenwriter.[45]

- Chang Je-won, 57, South Korean politician, member of the National Assembly (2008–2012, 2016–2024), suicide.[46]

- Janric Craig, 3rd Viscount Craigavon, 80, British hereditary peer and member of the House of Lords (since 1974).[47]

- Jacques Elong Elong, 40, Cameroonian footballer (Persepolis, Natf Maysan, national team), traffic collision.[48]

- Silvina Fabars, 81, Cuban folk dancer.[49]

- J Nyi Nyi, 71, Burmese singer and musician.[50]

- Mario Joseph, 62, Haitian human rights lawyer, traffic collision.[51]

- Volkan Konak, 58, Turkish folk singer, heart attack.[52]

- Frank Laidlaw, 84, Scottish rugby union player (Melrose, national team, British & Irish Lions).[53]

- Patty Maloney, 89, American actress (Star Wars Holiday Special, Far Out Space Nuts, The Little Rascals), complications from multiple strokes.[54]

- Tim Mohr, 55, German-American writer and editor, pancreatic cancer.[55]

- Willy Naessens, 86, Belgian industrialist, complications from a fall.[56]

- Inas al-Najjar [ar], 41, Tunisian actress, sepsis.[57]

- Bill O’Neill, 68, American politician, member of the New Mexico Senate (2013–2024), prostate cancer.[58]

- Jean-Louis Porchet [fr], 76, Swiss film producer.[59]

- Mikhail Rabinovich, 83, Russian physicist and neuroscientist.[60]

- Betty Webb, 101, English code breaker.[61]

30

- Tarun Agarwal, 69, Indian jurist, chief justice of the Meghalaya High Court (2018–2021), heart attack.[62]

- Enrique Bátiz, 82, Mexican pianist and conductor.[63]

- Ágota Bujdosó, 81, Hungarian handball player (Vasas, national team), Olympic bronze medallist (1976).[64] (death announced on this date)

- Giacomo Caliendo [it], 82, Italian politician, senator (2008–2022), undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice (2008–2011).[65]

- Marinko Colnago [hr], 83, Croatian musician (Novi fosili).[66]

- Eloína Echevarría, 63, Cuban long jumper and triple jumper.[67]

- Barbara Frischmuth, 83, Austrian writer.[68]

- Stanley Kalms, Baron Kalms, 93, British businessman, chairman of Currys plc, and life peer, member of the House of Lords (2004–2024).[69]

- Andrew Krakouer, 42, Australian footballer (Richmond, Collingwood), heart attack.[70]

- Leandro Lima, 23, Brazilian footballer (São Bernardo FC, FK Pardubice).[71]

- Trevor Lock, 85, British policeman (Iranian Embassy siege), George Medal recipient.[72]

- María Maristany, 95, Argentine actress.[73]

- Mark McCormick, 91, American judge, justice of the Iowa Supreme Court (1972–1986).[74]

- Lee Montague, 97, English actor (The Camp on Blood Island, Deadlier Than the Male, Jesus of Nazareth).[75]

- Pachomius, 89, Egyptian Coptic Orthodox prelate, metropolitan bishop of Beheira (since 1971).[76]

- Prem Parkash, 92, Indian writer.[77]

- Jim Quinn, 82, American radio personality (The War Room with Quinn and Rose).[78]

- Nusyirwan Soejono [id], 67, Indonesian politician, MP (2009–2014).[79]

- Roselore Sonntag, 91, German Olympic artistic gymnast (1960) and gymnastics coach.[80]

- Issei Tanaka, 92, Japanese scholar.[81]

29

- Ken Bruen, 74, Irish crime fiction writer.[82]

- Richard Chamberlain, 90, American actor (Dr. Kildare, The Thorn Birds, Shōgun), complications from a stroke.[83]

- Dick Damron, 91, Canadian country singer and songwriter.[84]

- Virgilio Garcillano, 87, Filipino civil servant.[85]

- Nancy Bea Hefley, 89, American stadium organist (Dodger Stadium).[86]

- Stefan Hula Sr., 77, Polish Olympic Nordic combined skier (1972, 1976).[87]

- Robert E. Jones, 97, American jurist, judge of the U.S. District Court for Oregon (since 1990) and Oregon Supreme Court (1983–1990).[88]

- Erwin Lanc, 94, Austrian politician and sport administrator, president of the International Handball Federation (1984–2000) and minister of foreign affairs (1983–1984).[89]

- Álvaro Mangino, 72, Uruguayan rugby union player (national team) and businessman, survivor of the Andes tragedy.[90]

- Norman Charles Miller, 90, American journalist, COPD.[91]

- László Miske, 89, Hungarian actor.[92] (death announced on this date)

- Don Oakes, 86, American football player (Boston Patriots, Philadelphia Eagles).[93]

- Gerd Poppe, 84, German politician, MP (1990–1998).[94]

- Ángel del Pozo, 90, Spanish actor (Horror Express, The Big Gundown, Treasure Island).[95]

- Marcos Vilaça [pt], 85, Brazilian lawyer and auditor, president of the Academia Brasileira de Letras.[96]

28

- Alfredo, 78, Brazilian footballer (Palmeiras, Cruzeiro, national team).[97]

- Kogan Ashiya [ja], 91, Japanese actor.[98]

- Alexandru Bantoș, 74, Moldovian writer and journalist (Limba Română).[99]

- Eurico da Silva, 91, Indian judge of the Bombay High Court.[100]

- Johann Eigenstiller, 81, Austrian footballer (SSW Innsbruck, SK Rapid Wien, national team).[101]

- Hamza Feghouli, 86, Algerian actor (Le Clandestin).[102]

- Hennadiy Horbenko, 49, Ukrainian Olympic hurdler (2000).[103]

- Alfredo Montoya Melgar [es], 87, Spanish jurist and academic, justice of the Constitutional Court (2017–2022).[104]

- Juma Mwapachu, 82, Tanzanian politician, secretary-general of the East African Community (2006–2011).[105]

- Richard Norton, 75, Australian actor (Gymkata, Equalizer 2000, Mr. Nice Guy), bodyguard, and fight choreographer.[106]

- Vittorio Orsenigo, 98, Italian novelist.[107]

- Armando Osma, 63, Colombian football player (Deportivo Cali, Deportes Tolima) and manager (Manta), heart attack.[108]

- Susan Owens, 75, American jurist, associate justice of the Washington Supreme Court (2001–2024).[109]

- Najmuddin Shaikh, 85, Pakistani diplomat, foreign secretary (1994–1997).[110]

- Bjørn Simensen, 77, Norwegian cultural administrator, director of the Norwegian National Opera and Ballet (1984–1990, 1997–2009).[111]

- Heloísa Teixeira, 85, Brazilian writer, member of the Academia Brasileira de Letras.[112]

- Evgeny Tertyshny, 90, Russian politician, people’s deputy of the USSR (1989–1991).[113]

- Olegario Vázquez Raña, 89, Mexican sports shooter and entrepreneur, four-time Olympic competitor (1964–1976).[114]

- Young Scooter, 39, American rapper, complications from a leg injury.[115]

27

- Günter Benser, 94, German historian.[116]

- Kazimierz Dąbrowski, 89, Polish Olympic field hockey player (1960).[117]

- Hy Eisman, 98, American comic artist and writer (The Katzenjammer Kids, Little Lulu, Popeye).[118]

- Michel Fontaine, 72, French politician, mayor of Saint-Pierre, Réunion (since 2001) and senator (2011–2017).[119]

- Hans-Josef Klauck, 78, German Franciscan theologian and religious historian (University of Würzburg, University of Chicago Divinity School).[120]

- Johann de Lange, 65, South African poet, short story writer, and critic.[121]

- Peter Lever, 84, English cricketer (Lancashire, Tasmania, national team).[122]

- Marcia Marcus, 97, American figurative artist.[123]

- Christina McKelvie, 57, Scottish politician, MSP (since 2007), minister for culture (2023–2024) and drugs and alcohol policy (since 2024), breast cancer.[124]

- Motleb bin Abdullah Al-Nafisah, 87–88, Saudi Arabian politician.[125]

- Harikrishna Pathak, 86, Indian poet, short story writer, and editor.[126]

- Abdel-Latif al-Qanoua, Palestinian militant, spokesperson for Hamas, airstrike.[127]

- Raymundus Sau Fernandes, 52, Indonesian politician, regent of North Central Timor Regency (2010–2021), drowned.[128] (death announced on this date)

- Loretta Schrijver, 68, Dutch newsreader and television presenter, colon cancer.[129]

- Shaka Ssali, 71, Ugandan-born American journalist (Voice of America).[130]

- Ottó Tolnai, 84, Serbo-Hungarian writer, poet, and translator.[131]

- Berkin Usta, 24, Turkish Olympic alpine skier (2022), injuries sustained in a fire.[132]

26

- Ray Barra, 95, American ballet dancer (Stuttgart Ballet) and choreographer (Berlin State Ballet, Spanish National Dance Company).[133]

- Manuel Hilario de Céspedes y García Menocal, 81, Cuban Roman Catholic prelate, bishop of Matanzas (2005–2022).[134]

- David Childs, 83, American architect (One World Trade Center), complications from Lewy body dementia.[135]

- Shushama Das, 94, Bangladeshi folk singer.[136]

- Donald Dewsbury, 85, American psychologist and historian.[137] [better source needed]

- Rolf Groven, 82, Norwegian painter.[138]

- John Herrick, 78, Irish football player (Cork Hibernians, national team) and manager (Galway United).[139]

- Howie Hughes, 85, Canadian ice hockey player (Los Angeles Kings), congestive heart failure.[140]

- László Jakabházy, 86, Hungarian Olympic ice hockey player (1964) and coach.[141] (death announced on this date)

- Carole Keeton Strayhorn, 85, American politician, mayor of Austin (1977–1983), railroad commissioner (1994–1999) and comptroller of Texas (1999–2007).[142]

- Nick Lalich, 79, Australian politician, New South Wales MP (2008–2023) and mayor of Fairfield (2002–2012).[143]

- Fafa Edrissa M’Bai, 82, Gambian lawyer and politician, attorney general (1982–1984, 1994–1995).[144]

- Estelito Mendoza, 95, Filipino politician, minister of justice (1984–1986), governor of Pampanga (1980–1986), and solicitor general (1972–1986).[145]

- Gheorghe Negru, Moldovan painter.[146]

- Fuad Noman, 77, Brazilian politician, mayor of Belo Horizonte (since 2022), cardiopulmonary arrest.[147]

- Karuppasamy Pandian, 76, Indian politician, Tamil Nadu MLA (1977–1984, 2006–2011).[148]

- Jeff Potter, 83, Australian footballer (Port Adelaide).[149]

- Christa L. Deeleman-Reinhold, 94, Dutch arachnologist.[150]

- Thomas F. Schutte, 89, American academic administrator, president of Pratt Institute (1993–2017), the Rhode Island School of Design (1983–1992), and the Philadelphia College of Art (1975–1982).[151]

- Charles Spiteri, 81, Maltese footballer (Valletta, Lija Athletic, national team).[152]

- Ferenc Szabó, 76, Hungarian Olympic judoka (1972).[153]

- Masami Tanabu, 90, Japanese politician, MP (1979–1996, 1998–2010), minister of agriculture (1991–1993) and Olympic ice hockey player (1960, 1964), sepsis.[154]

- Settimio Todisco, 100, Italian Roman Catholic prelate, archbishop of Brindisi-Ostuni (1975–2000).[155]

- Antoni Trzaskowski, 83, Polish footballer (Legia Warsaw, Rochester Lancers, national team).[156]

- Aleksei Veselkin, 63, Russian actor (Armavir) and media presenter.[157]

- Tamás Wachsler, 59, Hungarian architect and politician, MP (1990–1998).[158] (death announced on this date)

- Wes Watkins, 86, American politician, member of the Oklahoma Senate (1974–1976) and U.S. House of Representatives (1977–1991, 1997–2003), cardiac arrest.[159]

- Stef Wertheimer, 98, German-born Israeli industrialist and politician, MK (1977–1981).[160]

25

- Rahim Abdullah, 77, Malaysian footballer (Selangor, national team, 1972 Olympic team).[161]

- Juan Aguilera, 63, Spanish tennis player.[162]

- Denis Arndt, 86, American actor (Heisenberg, Basic Instinct, S.W.A.T.).[163]

- Edith Ballantyne, 102, Czechoslovak-born Canadian peace activist, infection.[164]

- Andrew Cohen, 69, American spiritual teacher and author.[165]

- Donald Crombie, 82, Australian film and television director (Caddie, Selkie, Tales of the South Seas).[166]

- Han Jong-hee [ko], 63, South Korean tech executive, co-CEO of Samsung, heart attack.[167]

- Shihan Hussaini, 60, Indian actor (Punnagai Mannan, Velaikkaran, Unnai Solli Kutramillai) and karateka, leukemia.[168]

- J. Bennett Johnston, 92, American politician, member of the U.S. Senate (1972–1997), complications from COVID-19.[169]

- Tapani Kansa, 76, Finnish singer, complications from gallbladder surgery.[170]

- Sanjida Khatun, 91, Bangladeshi musicologist.[171]

- Kim Hyuk-kyu, 85, South Korean politician, governor of South Gyeongsang Province (1993–2003) and member of the National Assembly (2004–2007).[172]

- Gene Mangan, 88, Irish road racing cyclist.[173]

- Terry Manning, 77, American recording engineer (Led Zeppelin III, Let’s Stay Together, Eliminator), record producer, and musician, fall.[174]

- Andrei Martemyanov, 61, Russian ice hockey player (HC CSKA Moscow, Soviet Union national team) and coach (Amur).[175]

- Visvaldas Mažonas, 83, Lithuanian politician.[176]

- Robert W. McChesney, 72, American media theorist and author.[177]

- Paul McDonough, 84, American photographer, complications from Alzheimer’s disease.[178]

- Eric Minkin, 74, American-Israeli basketball player (Maccabi Tel Aviv, Hapoel Galil Elyon, Israeli national team).[179]

- Gananath Obeyesekere, 95, Sri Lankan anthropologist (Sahlins–Obeyesekere debate).[180] (death announced on this date)

- Alexander Ollongren, 96, Dutch scientist (METI International, Lincos language, Yale University).[181]

- Abdul Karim Al-Orrayed, 90–91, Bahraini artist.[182]

- Cyrill Ramkisor, 91, Surinamese politician.[183]

- Masahiro Shinoda, 94, Japanese film director (MacArthur’s Children, Childhood Days, Moonlight Serenade) and screenwriter, pneumonia.[184]

- Julio Simón, 84, Argentine police officer and convicted criminal.[185]

- Hank Steinbrecher, 77, American soccer coach and executive, heart disease.[186]

- François Trucy, 93, French politician, mayor of Toulon (1985–1995) and senator (1986–2014).[187]

- Radu Țuculescu, 76, Romanian novelist, playwright, and theatre director.[188]

- Andrei Yermash [ru], 68, Russian film director and screenwriter.[189]

24

- Vladimir Andreyev, 83, Russian military officer, commander of Air Defence Aviation of the Soviet and Russian Air Defence Forces (1987–1998), head of the Federal Air Transport Agency (1999–2000).[190]

- Michael Boudin, 85, American jurist, judge (1992–2021) and chief judge (2001–2008) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (1990–1992), complications from dementia and Parkinson’s disease.[191]

- Dick Carlson, 84, American journalist (Voice of America) and diplomat, ambassador to Seychelles (1991–1992).[192]

- Eugene Claypole, 86, American politician, member of the West Virginia Senate (1990–1994) and House of Delegates (1996–1998).[193]

- Éric Eydoux, 85, French writer, academic, and cultural activist.[194]

- David Kristol, 86, American chemist and academic.[195]

- Kuo Yao-chi, 69, Taiwanese politician, minister of transportation (2006), aortic dissection.[196]

- Roe Messner, 89, American building contractor (Heritage USA, World Harvest Church, Calvary Church).[197]

- Hossam Shabat, 23, Palestinian journalist, airstrike.[198]

- Rozik Boedioro Soetjipto, 81, Indonesian politician, minister of public works (1999–2000).[199]

- Susan Tose Spencer, 83, American businesswoman and football executive (Philadelphia Eagles), complications from Alzheimer’s disease.[200]

- Fritz Streletz, 98, German army general.[201]

- Kane Tologanak, 72–73, Canadian Inuk politician, Northwest Territories MLA (1979–1983).[202]

- Maria Țărnă, Moldovan singer.[203]

- Huey Williams, 86, American gospel singer (Jackson Southernaires).[204]

23

- Salah al-Bardawil, 65, Palestinian politician, member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (2006–2018), airstrike.[205]

- Ismail Barhoum, Palestinian politician, member of the Political Bureau of Hamas, airstrike.[206]

- Ed Barker, 90, American politician, member of the Georgia State Senate (1973–1991).[207]

- Gianfranco Barra, 84, Italian actor (Banana Joe, I nuovi mostri, Bread and Chocolate).[208]

- Bram Biesterveld [nl], 86, Dutch actor.[209]

- Franciszek Bunsch, 98, Polish painter and graphic artist.[210]

- Krishna Lal Chadha, 88, Indian horticultural scientist.[211]

- Steve Charnovitz, 71, American legal scholar.[212]

- Bogdan Daras, 64, Polish Olympic wrestler (1988).[213]

- Nilmar Filho, 52, Brazilian footballer (Bahia), heart attack.[214]

- Max Frankel, 94, American journalist (The New York Times).[215]

- Marcel Glesener, 87, Luxembourgish politician and trade unionist, deputy (1989–2004).[216]

- Maria Gustafsson, 78, Swedish actress, television producer, and author (Un, dos, tres… responda otra vez).[217]

- Valerie Howarth, Baroness Howarth of Breckland, 84, British social worker and life peer, member of the House of Lords (since 2001).[218]

- Dean L. Hubbard, 85, American academic administrator, president of Northwest Missouri State University (1984–2009), kidney disease.[219]

- Khaled Al-Jarallah [ar], 78, Kuwaiti politician.[220]

- Sam Keen, 93, American author and philosopher.[221]

- Karl-Ludwig Kratz, 83, German nuclear chemist and astrophysicist.[222]

- Lora Lamm, 97, Swiss illustrator and graphic designer.[223]

- Eugeniusz Lewacki, 99, Polish Olympic ice hockey player (1948, 1952).[224]

- Henri Le More, 83, French sociologist and editor.[225]

- Mia Love, 49, American politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (2015–2019), glioblastoma.[226]

- Pierre Mariétan, 89, Swiss composer.[227]

- Barbara Neski, 97, American architect.[228]

- Geoffrey Nyarota, 74, Zimbabwean journalist, founder of Daily News, colon cancer.[229]

- Charles Strachey, 4th Baron O’Hagan, 79, British politician, MEP (1973–1975, 1979–1994), subdural hematoma.[230]

- Dave Pelz, 85, American golf coach.[231]

- Jean-Marius Raapoto, 82, French Polynesian educator, academic, and politician, member of the Assembly of French Polynesia (1986–1991, 2001–2013).[232]

- Alexandr Rabotnitskii, 31, Russian athlete, Paralympic silver medalist (2020).[233]

- Jesús Santos, 43, Spanish politician and trade unionist, member of the Assembly of Madrid (2021–2023), cancer.[234]

- Manoj Santoshi, Indian television writer.[235]

- Hubert Schmalix, 72, Austrian painter.[236]

- Kevan Staples, 74, Canadian musician (Rough Trade) and songwriter (“High School Confidential“).[237]

- Toru Terasawa, 90, Japanese Olympic distance runner (1964), heart failure.[238]

22

- Jessica Aber, 43, American lawyer, U.S. attorney for Eastern District of Virginia (2021–2025).[239]

- Gillian Baxter, 87, British author.[240]

- Gary Bellenfant, 74, American Hall of Fame horse cutter and trainer.[241]

- Francesco Benozzo, 56, Italian poet and musician.[242]

- Livingstone Bramble, 64, Saint Kitts and Nevis professional boxer, WBA lightweight champion (1984–1986).[243]

- Svetlana Broz, 69, Bosnian author and physician.[244]

- Frank Chopp, 71, American politician, member of the Washington House of Representatives (1995–2025).[245]

- Alan Cuckston, 85, English harpsichordist, pianist and organist (BBC).[246]

- Larisa Golubkina, 85, Russian actress (Hussar Ballad, Give Me a Book of Complaints, The Tale of Tsar Saltan).[247]

- Joe Goode, 87, American painter.[248]

- Iván García Guerra, 87, Dominican theatre actor and playwright.[249]

- David Hartsough, 84, American Quaker peace activist, co-founder of Nonviolent Peaceforce.[250]

- Sergey Kryuchek, 61, Russian politician, MP (2016–2021).[251]

- James Laube, 73, American wine connoisseur and critic (Wine Spectator).[252]

- Asaf Lifshitz, 82, Israeli sculptor.[253]

- Martin Loeb, 66, French actor (My Little Loves, Maladolescenza).[254]

- Alexander Mashkevitch, 71, Israeli-Kazakh businessman and investor.[255]

- Dennis McDougal, 77, American author (Angel of Darkness) and newspaper journalist, traffic collision.[256]

- Bruce McGaw, 89, American painter.[257]

- Bill Mercer, 99, American sportscaster (North Texas Mean Green, WCCW) and news reporter (assassination of John F. Kennedy).[258]

- Djamel Menad, 64, Algerian football player (Nîmes, national team) and manager (USM Annaba).[259]

- Andy Peebles, 76, English radio DJ (BBC Radio 1), television presenter (Top of the Pops) and cricket commentator.[260]

- Xavier Le Pichon, 87, French geophysicist.[261]

- Rolf Schimpf, 100, German actor (Smuglere, Mensch Bachmann, Der Alte).[262]

- Xavier Serrat [es], 78, Spanish actor (La granja) and theatre director.[263]

- D. R. Fraser Taylor, 87–88, Scottish-born Canadian cartographer, geographer, and academic.[264]

- Angelo Todaro, 79, Italian comic book artist (Mandrake the Magician, Turok, Phantom).[265]

- Paul Wagstaff, British guitarist (Paris Angels, Black Grape).[266] (death announced on this date)

- Alex Wyllie, 80, New Zealand rugby union player (Canterbury, national team) and coach (national team).[267]

21

- Shmuel Agmon, 103, Israeli mathematician (Agmon’s inequality).[268]

- Youssef Ahmed, 17, Egyptian karate athlete, injuries sustained in a match.[269]

- Filiz Akın, 82, Turkish actress (Birds of Exile, Tatlı Dillim, Karateci Kız).[270]

- Émile Blessig, 77, French politician, MP (1998–2012).[271]

- Giuliano Boffardi, 79, Italian politician, senator (1992–1994), deputy (1994–1996).[272]

- Robert D’Andrea, 91, American politician, member of the New York State Assembly (1975–2003), complications from cardiac amyloidosis.[273]

- Walt Davis, 87, American politician, member of the Georgia House of Representatives (1967–1977).[274]

- Fabrizio Di Somma, 54, Italian cyclist, Paralympic silver medallist (2000).[275]

- Kitty Dukakis, 88, American author and political figure, first lady of Massachusetts (1975–1979, 1983–1991), complications from dementia.[276]

- Parvaneh Etemadi, 77, Iranian visual artist.[277]

- George Foreman, 76, American boxer (two-time world heavyweight champion), Olympic champion (1968) and businessman (George Foreman Grill).[278]

- Giancarlo Guerrini, 85, Italian water polo player, Olympic champion (1960).[279]

- Vernon Hatton, 89, American basketball player (Cincinnati Royals, Philadelphia Warriors, St. Louis Hawks).[280]

- Štefan Kvietik, 90, Slovak actor (The Boxer and Death, The Millennial Bee, Sitting on a Branch, Enjoying Myself).[281]

- Tom Lowenstein, 83–84, English poet.[282]

- Rakesh Pandey, 76, Indian actor (Sara Aakash, Chotti Bahu), cardiac arrest.[283]

- Filippo Maria Pandolfi, 97, Italian politician, deputy (1968–1988), minister of agriculture (1983–1988) and finance (1976–1978).[284]

- Florin Popa, 71, Romanian politician, deputy (2016–2020).[285]

- Terry Reilly, 77, Australian Olympic archer (1972, 1976).[286]

- Devendra Sharma, 66, Indian politician, Odisha MLA (2014–2019).[287]

- Kenneth Sims, 65, American football player (Texas Longhorns, New England Patriots, Buffalo Bills).[288]

- Jonathan Sterne, 54, American communications scholar, professor at McGill University.[289] (death announced on this date)

- Suyanto [id], 63, Indonesian politician, regent of Jombang Regency (2003–2013), kidney failure.[290]

- Larry Tamblyn, 82, American singer and keyboardist (The Standells).[291]

- Cirilo Tirado Delgado, 89, Puerto Rican politician, member of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico (1973–1985), member of the senate (1988–1996).[292]

- Kalimanto Tulus Widodo, 59, Indonesian Olympic cyclist (1992), heart attack.[293]

20

- Constantin Adam, 73, Moldovan actor.[294]

- Eddie Adcock, 86, American bluegrass banjo player (The Country Gentlemen).[295]

- Oleg Baranov, 57, Russian guitarist (Tequilajazzz).[296]

- Norm Clarke, 82, American journalist (Las Vegas Review-Journal), cancer.[297]

- Leanne Cowie, Australian garage rock drummer (The Scientists).[298]

- Bob Davis, 80, American sportscaster (Kansas Jayhawks, Kansas City Royals).[299]

- Patrick Dineen, 87, Irish cricketer (Cork County, national team) and businessman.[300]

- Nona Faustine, 48, American photographer and visual artist.[301]

- Vitold Fokin, 92, Ukrainian politician, prime minister (1990–1992).[302]

- Afdera Franchetti, 93, Italian socialite.[303]

- Eddie James, 63, American convicted murderer and rapist, execution by lethal injection.[304]

- Eddie Jordan, 76, Irish Formula One team owner (Jordan Grand Prix) and television presenter (Top Gear), prostate and bladder cancer.[305]

- François Labande, 83, French mountaineer, ecologist, and writer.[306]

- Francis Matthey, 82, Swiss politician, mayor of La Chaux-de-Fonds (1980–1988) and member of the Swiss National Council (1987–1995).[307]

- Ralph Munro, 81, American politician, secretary of state of Washington (1981–2001).[308]

- Pat Murphy, 62, Canadian politician, mayor of Alberton (2004–2006) and Prince Edward Island MLA (2007–2019).[309]

- A. T. Raghu, 75, Indian film director (Ajay Vijay, Mysore Jaana).[310]

- Osman Sınav, 68, Turkish film director (Uzun Hikâye), producer and screenwriter, cancer.[311]

- Matt Stevens, 51, American football player (Buffalo Bills, Philadelphia Eagles, New England Patriots), Super Bowl champion (2002).[312]

- Rico Suave, 54, Puerto Rican wrestler and manager (World Wrestling Council), heart failure.[313]

- Vadim Zhuk [ru], 78, Russian actor (The Parrot Speaking Yiddish), screenwriter and poet.[314]

19

- Hafiz Hussain Ahmed, 73–74, Pakistani Islamic scholar and politician, MP (1988–1990, 2002–2007).[315]

- Luis Barone [es], 69, Argentine film director, producer and screenwriter (Buenos Aires plateada).[316]

- George Bell, 67, American basketball player (Harlem Wizards, Harlem Globetrotters), tallest man in the United States.[317]

- Calistrat Cuțov, 76, Romanian boxer, Olympic bronze medallist (1968).[318] (body discovered on this date)

- Andrija Delibašić, 43, Montenegrin footballer (Partizan, Rayo Vallecano, national team), cancer.[319]

- Costa Gazi, 88, South African anti-apartheid activist.[320]

- Hernán Godoy, 83, Chilean football player (Deportes La Serena) and manager (Audax Italiano, Santiago Morning), liver cancer.[321]

- Carlos González Cepeda, 75–76, Spanish businessman and politician, member of the Corts Valencianes (1991–1996).[322]

- Aaron Gunches, 53, American convicted murderer, execution by lethal injection.[323]

- Cláudio Lembo, 90, Brazilian lawyer, politician and university professor, governor of São Paulo (2006–2007).[324]

- Jack Lilley, 91, American actor (Little House on the Prairie) and stuntman.[325]

- Athanase Matti Shaba Matoka [de], 94, Iraqi Syriac Catholic prelate, auxiliary bishop (1979-1983) and archbishop of Baghdad (1983–2010).[326]

- Sir Torquil Norman, 91, British businessman and arts philanthropist.[327]

- Michael O’Neil, 84, American politician, member of the New Hampshire House of Representatives (1998–2000, 2001–2006).[328]

- Werner Otto, 96, German footballer (1. FC Saarbrücken, Saarland national team).[329]

- Tommie Reynolds, 83, American baseball player (Kansas City/Oakland Athletics, California Angels, New York Mets).[330]

- Ellen Ringier, 73, Swiss publisher.[331]

- Eisaku Satō, 85, Japanese politician, governor of Fukushima Prefecture (1988–2006) and member of the House of Councillors (1983–1998).[332]

- Kazi Shahidullah, 72, Bangladeshi academic administrator, vice-chancellor of NU (2009–2013) and chairman of the UGC (2019–2024), cancer.[333]

- Vasile Simionaș, 74, Romanian football player (Politehnica Iași, national team) and manager (Oțelul Galați).[334] (death announced on this date)

- Anna Turbau, 75, Spanish photojournalist.[335]

- Zhao Yanxia, 97, Chinese opera singer.[336]

18

- Nels Ackerson, 80, American lawyer and policy advocate.[337]

- Denise Boucher, 89, Canadian writer.[338]

- Edward D. Brown, 89, American politician, member of the Utah House of Representatives (1975–1979).[339]

- Nadia Cassini, 76, American-Italian actress (Il dio serpente, Starcrash, La dottoressa ci sta col colonnello).[340]

- John T. Casteen III, 81, American academic administrator, president of the University of Connecticut (1985–1990) and the University of Virginia (1990–2010), Virginia secretary of education (1982–1985).[341]

- Paul Cremona, 79, Maltese Roman Catholic prelate, archbishop of Malta (2007–2014).[342]

- Issam al-Da’alis, 58, Palestinian politician, airstrike.[343]

- Ara Deghtrikyan [hy], 60, Armenian actor, reciter and television presenter.[344]

- Sonia Garmers, 92, Curaçaoan writer.[345]

- Antonio Gasalla, 84, Argentine actor (Waiting for the Hearse, The Truce), comedian, and theatre director.[346]

- Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi, 84, Iranian Kurdish politician.[347]

- Abu Hamza, Palestinian militant, spokesperson for the Al-Quds Brigades (since 2019), airstrike.[348]

- Bob Harvey, 90, American bassist (Jefferson Airplane).[349]

- Jessie Hoffman Jr., 46, American convicted murderer, execution by nitrogen hypoxia.[350]

- Kanzi, 44, American bonobo.[351]

- Hannu Karpo, 83, Finnish reporter and TV presenter.[352]

- Yôko Kawanami [ja], 67, Japanese voice actress (Dragon Ball Z, Powerpuff Girls Z, Armored Trooper Votoms), complications from peritoneal cancer.[353]

- Bedros Kirkorov, 92, Bulgarian-Russian singer.[354]

- Jacob Korevaar, 102, Dutch mathematician.[355]

- Fedor Malykhin, 34, Russian ice hockey player (Avtomobilist Yekaterinburg, Traktor Chelyabinsk, Spartak Moscow).[356]

- Wlamir Marques, 87, Brazilian basketball player, Olympic bronze medallist (1960, 1964).[357]

- Jean Michel, 76, French politician, MP (1997–2012).[358]

- Édouard Niankoye Lamah, 79, Guinean politician, minister of foreign affairs (2010–2012) and of health (2018–2019).[359]

- Marshall Rauch, 102, American politician, member of the North Carolina Senate (1967–1990).[360]

- John E. Rooney, 85, American politician, member of the New Jersey General Assembly (1983–2010).[361]

- Jaroslav Vostrý, 94, Czech playwright, theatre director and manager (The Drama Club).[362]

- Don Wesely, 70, American politician, member of the Nebraska Legislature (1979–1999), mayor of Lincoln (1999–2003).[363]

17

- Armando Aguirre, 92, Spanish actor (El Cor de la Ciutat).[364]

- AnNa R., 55, German singer (Rosenstolz, Gleis 8).[365] (death announced on this date)

- Oscar M. Babauta, 70, Northern Mariana Islander politician, speaker of the House of Representatives (2006–2008).[366]

- Marty Callner, 78, American television director (Hard Knocks).[367]

- Nicholas Costello, 89, American politician, member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives (1979–1983) and Senate (1983–1991).[368]

- César di Candia, 95, Uruguayan journalist and writer.[369]

- E. Lawrence Davis III, 87, American politician, member of the North Carolina House of Representatives (1971–1975) and Senate (1975–1979).[370]

- Monique Andréas Esoavelomandroso, 79, Malagasy politician, secretary general of the Indian Ocean Commission (2004–2008).[371]

- Peter Farrelly, 76, Northern Irish musician (Fruupp).[372] (death announced on this date)

- Ger FitzGerald, 60, Irish hurler (Midleton, Cork).[373]

- John Fraser, 88, Scottish footballer (Hibernian, Stenhousemuir).[374] (death announced on this date)

- Derrick Gaffney, 69, American football player (New York Jets).[375]

- Mankombu Gopalakrishnan, 77, Indian lyricist, heart attack.[376]

- John “Paddy” Hemingway, 105, Irish RAF pilot (Battle of Britain).[377]

- Abu Ishaq al-Houweny, 68, Egyptian Islamic cleric, stroke.[378]

- Lee Shau-kee, 97, Hong Kong real estate investor, founder of Henderson Land Development.[379]

- Aurelio Martínez, 55, Honduran musician and politician, plane crash.[380]

- Colin McFadyean, 82, English rugby union player (Moseley, national team, British Lions).[381] (death announced on this date)

- Woody McKay, 84, American politician, member of the South Carolina House of Representatives (1979–2001).[382]

- Branislava Peruničić, 88, Bosnian engineer.[383]

- Debendra Pradhan, 83, Indian politician, MP (1999–2004).[384]

- Peter Sedgley, 94, English visual artist, co-founder of Space Studios.[385]

- Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, 83, Indian lawyer.[386]

- Shu Shengyou, 88, Chinese politician, governor of Jiangxi (1995–2001).[387]

- Mat Solar [id], 62, Indonesian actor and comedian (Tukang Bubur Naik Haji).[388]

- Naseer Soomro, 55, Pakistani airline employee, tallest man in Pakistan, chronic lung disease.[389]

- Hannes Tretter, 73, Austrian lawyer and human rights expert.[390]

- Gheorghe Vărzaru, 64, Romanian rugby union player (Steaua București, national team).[391]

- Hocine Zehouane, 89, Algerian politician.[392]

16

- Dandy Bestia [it], 72, Italian guitarist (Skiantos).[393]

- Gavrilă Birău, 79, Romanian football player (UTA Arad, Aurul Brad) and manager (UTA Arad).[394]

- Darwin L. Booher, 82, American politician, member of the Michigan House of Representatives (2005–2010) and Senate (2011–2018).[395]

- Gordon H. Brown, 93, New Zealand art historian and curator.[396]

- Thomas V. Chema, 78, American academic administrator, president of Hiram College (2003–2013).[397]

- Émilie Dequenne, 43, Belgian actress (Rosetta, Our Children, Not My Type), adrenocortical carcinoma.[398]

- Jon Durham, 59, English footballer (Torquay United, Rotherham United).[399] (death announced on this date)

- Fang Weizhong, 97, Chinese politician, chairman of the Committee for Economic Affairs (1993–2003).[400]

- Paul Flores [es], 40, Peruvian singer and musician, shot.[401]

- Bindu Ghosh, 76, Indian actress (Kozhi Koovuthu, Uruvangal Maralam, Thoongathey Thambi Thoongathey) and choreographer.[402]

- Anvar Hasanov [az], 74, Azerbaijani actor (The Last Night of Childhood, My Seven Sons, Babek).[403]

- William Hayes, 94, British physicist and academic administrator, president of St. John’s College, Oxford (1987–2001).[404]

- Antoine Kerbaj [ar], 89, Lebanese actor.[405]

- Don Kitchenbrand, 91, South African footballer (Rangers, Sunderland).[406]

- Tomáš Klouček, 45, Czech ice hockey player (New York Rangers, Nashville Predators, Atlanta Thrashers), skiing accident.[407]

- Milorad Komrakov [sr], 69, Serbian journalist.[408]

- Lawrence L. Koontz Jr., 85, American jurist, justice of the Virginia Supreme Court (1995–2011).[409]

- Doug Laughton, 80, English rugby league player (Widnes, Lancashire, Great Britain national team) and coach.[410]

- Andrej Lazarov, 25, Macedonian footballer (GFK Tikvesh, NK Rudeš, KF Shkupi), smoke inhalation.[411]

- Bob Long, 83, American football player (Green Bay Packers, Washington Redskins, Atlanta Falcons).[412]

- Greg Makowski, 68, American soccer player (Atlanta Chiefs, St. Louis Steamers, national team).[413]

- Arvind Singh Mewar, 80, Indian royal and hotelier, chairman of HRH Group of Hotels (since 1984).[414]

- Jean Mongrédien, 92, French musicologist.[415]

- Rob de Nijs, 82, Dutch singer and actor (Hamelen), complications from Parkinson’s disease.[416]

- Ramakanta Rath, 90, Indian modernist poet.[417]

- Fernando Sátiro, 87, Brazilian footballer (São Paulo, Fortaleza).[418]

- Lenny Schultz, 91, American stand-up comedian.[419]

- Samuel Sommers, 49, American psychologist.[420]

- Burton Tansky, 87, American retail executive (Bergdorf Goodman), president and CEO of Neiman Marcus (2001–2010), cancer.[421]

- Alex Wheatle, 62, British novelist, prostate cancer.[422]

- Dik Wolfson, 91, Dutch economist (International Monetary Fund, International Institute of Social Studies), civil servant and politician, senator (1999–2003).[423]

- Jesse Colin Young, 83, American singer (The Youngbloods) and songwriter (“Darkness, Darkness“).[424]

15

- Wataru Asō, 85, Japanese politician, governor of Fukuoka Prefecture (1995–2011).[425]

- Anatol Borș, 77, Moldovan football player (Zimbru Chișinău) and coach.[426]

- Peter Bichsel, 89, Swiss writer and journalist.[427]

- David Steven Cohen, 58, American television writer (Courage the Cowardly Dog, Parker Lewis Can’t Lose) and screenwriter (Balto), cancer.[428]

- Alex Daoud, 81, American attorney, politician and convicted felon, mayor of Miami Beach, Florida (1985–1991).[429]

- Bruce Dombolo, 39, French footballer (Pro Vasto, Marignane, Ancona) and actor.[430]

- Miljenko Domijan [hr], 78, Croatian historian and photographer.[431] (death announced on this date)

- Bernie Fedderly, 83, Canadian drag racing crew chief.[432]

- Saul Fenster, 91, American academic administrator, president of the New Jersey Institute of Technology (1978–2002).[433]

- Doris Fitschen, 56, German footballer (TSV Siegen, Philadelphia Charge, national team).[434]

- Paul Flatley, 84, American football player (Minnesota Vikings, Atlanta Falcons), sepsis.[435]

- Wings Hauser, 77, American actor (Tough Guys Don’t Dance, The Siege of Firebase Gloria, Vice Squad).[436]

- Anita Huffington, 90, American sculptor.[437]

- Filemona F. Indire, 95, Kenyan diplomat and politician, MP (1983–1988).[438]

- Alain Jaubert, 84, French journalist, film director, and producer.[439]

- Kamran Katouzian [fa], 83, Iranian graphic designer and painter.[440]

- Hernán Lara Zavala, 79, Mexican novelist and literary critic.[441]

- Nita Lowey, 87, American politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (1989–2021), breast cancer.[442]

- Malcolm F. Marsh, 96, American jurist, judge of the U.S. District Court for Oregon (since 1987).[443]

- James Murphy, 88, American soccer player (St. Louis Kutis, national team) and sheriff of St. Louis (1988–2016).[444]

- Delia Razon, 94, Filipino actress (Rodrigo de Villa, Gaano Kadalas ang Minsan?, Ipagpatawad Mo).[445]

- Basil Rigg, 99, Australian cricketer (Western Australia).[446]

- Munir Shakir, 55, Pakistani Islamic cleric, founder of Lashkar-e-Islam, injuries sustained in bomb blast.[447]

- Barbara Skrzypek, 66, Polish civil servant.[448]

- Ihsan Al-Turk [ar], 71, Egyptian actor.[449]

- Slick Watts, 73, American basketball player (Seattle SuperSonics, New Orleans Jazz, Houston Rockets).[450]

14

- Claude Dhinnin, 90, French politician, mayor of La Madeleine (1977–2008), deputy (1973–1981, 1986–1997).[451]

- Fred Eversley, 83, American sculptor.[452]

- Pietro Genuardi [it], 62, Italian actor (CentoVetrine, Killer Crocodile, Paganini Horror).[453]

- Abdul Ghani Kasuba, 73, Indonesian politician, governor of North Maluku (2019–2023).[454]

- Bogusław Gierajewski, 87, Polish Olympic sprinter (1960).[455]

- Ken Hall, 89, American football player (Edmonton Eskimos, Chicago Cardinals, Houston Oilers).[456] (death announced on this date)

- Demyan Hanul, 31, Ukrainian activist (Right Sector), shot.[457]

- Panchakshari Hiremath, 92, Indian writer, critic and translator.[458]

- Peter Hric, 59, Slovak Olympic cyclist (1996).[459]

- Broyce Jacobs, 84, Canadian politician, Alberta MLA (2001–2004, 2008–2012).[460]

- Lothar John, 91, German motorcycle road racer.[461]

- Red Lerille, 88, American bodybuilder.[462]

- Lin Tsan-ting, 94, Taiwanese cinematographer.[463]

- Liu Hongru, 94, Chinese economist and banker.[464]

- Deb Mukherjee, 83, Indian actor (Aansoo Ban Gaye Phool, Karate, Gudgudee).[465]

- Virginia Newell, 107, American academic, author and politician.[466]

- P2istheName, 26, American YouTuber.[467] (body discovered on this date)

- Bruno Romani, 65, Italian saxophonist.[468]

- Manfred Schukowski, 97, German academic teacher and author of works on astronomical clocks.[469]

- Alan Simpson, 93, American politician, member of the U.S. Senate (1979–1997) and the Wyoming House of Representatives (1965–1977), complications from a broken hip.[470]

- Dag Solstad, 83, Norwegian author (Gymnaslærer Pedersens beretning om den store politiske vekkelse som har hjemsøkt vårt land) and dramatist.[471]

13

- Jim Breazeale, 75, American baseball player (Atlanta Braves, Chicago White Sox).[472]

- Lil Bahadur Chettri, 92, Indian novelist (Basain).[473]

- John Feinstein, 69, American Hall of Fame sportswriter (The Washington Post, The Sporting News) and author (A Season on the Brink).[474]

- Vincent Gillespie, 71, British scholar.[475]

- Raúl Grijalva, 77, American politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (since 2003), lung cancer.[476]

- Sofia Gubaidulina, 93, Russian composer (Offertorium, The Canticle of the Sun, Concerto for violin, cello and bayan), cancer.[477]

- Mark Holder, 52, American blues musician (Black Diamond Heavies).[478]

- Radiša Ilić, 47, Serbian footballer (Partizan, OFK Beograd, national team).[479]

- Jeffrey Bruce Klein, 77, American journalist (Mother Jones).[480]

- K. K. Kochu, 76, Indian writer and social activist, cancer.[481]

- Miguel Macedo, 65, Portuguese politician, MP (1987–2002, 2005–2015) and minister of internal administration (2011–2015), heart attack.[482]

- Brian McMahon, 95, New Zealand venereologist and army officer.[483]

- J. B. Moore, 81, American music producer.[484]

- Edgar Oehler, 83, Swiss politician, MP (1971–1995).[485]

- Valeriy Oseledets, 84, Russian mathematician.[486]

- Mario Ramírez Treviño, 63, Mexican suspected drug trafficker.[487]

- Pierluigi Sangalli, 83, Italian comic book artist (Geppo, Nonna Abelarda).[488]

- David Schmittlein, 69, American academic administrator, dean of the MIT Sloan School of Management (2007–2024).[489]

- A. A. M. S. Arefin Siddique, 71, Bangladeshi academic administrator, vice-chancellor of the University of Dhaka (2009–2017), stroke.[490]

- Maria Grazia Spina, 88, Italian actress (Samson and the Slave Queen, Toto vs. the Black Pirate, Rugantino).[491]

- Pamela Spitzmueller, 74, American conservator and book artist.[492]

- Claude Verret, 61, Canadian ice hockey player (Buffalo Sabres, Trois-Rivières Draveurs, Rochester Americans).[493]

- Clive Wilmer, 80, British poet.[494]

- Yallunder, 30, South African singer.[495]

- Şinasi Yurtsever [tr], 51, Turkish actor (Vavien).[496]

12

- Syed Abid Ali, 83, Indian cricketer (Hyderabad, national team).[497]

- Khalid Anwer, 86, Pakistani lawyer and jurist, minister of law and justice (1997–1999).[498]

- Michel Arrignon, 76, French clarinetist.[499]

- Aleksandr Baranov, 78, Russian military officer.[500]

- Thomas Cahir, 72, American politician, member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives (1985–1999).[501]

- Emilio Cárdenas [es], 80–81, Argentine diplomat, permanent representative to the United Nations (1993–1996).[502]

- Mary Cirelli, 85, American politician, member of the Ohio House of Representatives (2001–2004), heart failure and kidney disease.[503]

- Norbert Cyffer, 81, German-Austrian linguist.[504]

- Syed Manzur Elahi, 83, Bangladeshi businessman.[505]

- Mahmoud Farshidi, 73, Iranian politician, minister of education (2005–2007).[506]

- Steve Fleet, 87, English football player (Wrexham, Stockport County) and manager (ÍBV).[507] (death announced on this date)

- John French, 94, Australian racing driver.[508]

- Bruce Glover, 92, American actor (Diamonds Are Forever, Walking Tall, Chinatown).[509]

- Ralph Holloway, 90, American anthropologist.[510]

- Takashi Inagaki, 87, Japanese voice actor (Soul Eater, A Spirit of the Sun, Kingdom Hearts) and actor, pneumonia.[511]

- Eduardo Nonato Joson, 74, Filipino politician, governor of Nueva Ecija (1995–1998) and member of the House of Representatives (1987–1992, 2007–2010).[512]

- Billy Joyce, 75, Irish Gaelic footballer (Killererin, Galway).[513]

- Klaus Kobusch, 83, German track cyclist, Olympic bronze medalist (1964).[514]

- Einar Kringlen, 93, Norwegian psychiatrist.[515]

- Godfrey Lawrence, 92, Rhodesian cricketer (Rhodesia, South Africa).[516]

- Billy McCombe, 76, Irish rugby union player (Bangor, Dublin University, national team).[517]

- Fiona McHugh, 57, Irish journalist (The Sunday Times) and editor, cancer.[518]

- Oliver Miller, 54, American basketball player (Phoenix Suns, Detroit Pistons, Toronto Raptors), cancer.[519]

- Ron Nessen, 90, American government official and journalist, White House press secretary (1974–1977).[520]

- Peggy Parnass, 97, German-Swedish actress (Nobody Loves Me), columnist and writer.[521]

- Felice Picano, 81, American author (Ambidextrous), lymphoma.[522]

- Walter Schwimmer, 82, Austrian politician and diplomat, secretary general of the Council of Europe (1999–2004).[523]

- Tamilla Shiraliyeva, 78, Azerbaijani ballerina and ballet master, brain hemorrhage.[524]

- Maisie Trollette, 91, British drag queen.[525]

- Linda Williams, 79, American film scholar.[526]

- Witold-K, 92, Polish-American artist.[527]

11

- Alekos Alexiadis, 79, Greek footballer (Aris, Panetolikos, national team).[528]

- Judy Bethel, 81, Canadian politician, MP (1993–1997).[529]

- Diccon Bewes, 57, British-Swiss author, cancer.[530]

- Junior Bridgeman, 71, American basketball player (Milwaukee Bucks, Los Angeles Clippers) and businessman.[531]

- Cocoa Tea, 65, Jamaican reggae singer and songwriter, cardiac arrest.[532]

- Blanca Castilla de Cortázar Larrea [es], 73, Spanish philosopher and anthropologist, cancer.[533]

- Francesco Cuccarese, 95, Italian Roman Catholic prelate, archbishop of Acerenza (1979–1987) and Pescara-Penne (1990–2005), bishop of Caserta (1987–1990).[534]

- Carole D’Andrea, 87, American dancer and actress (West Side Story).[535]

- Mark Dobies, 65, American actor (One Life to Live, Guiding Light).[536]

- Billie Jean Floyd, 95, American politician, member of the Oklahoma Senate (1984–1988).[537]

- Subarkah Hadisarjana [id], 66, Indonesian artist and actor, cancer.[538]

- Ayumi Ishida, 76, Japanese actress (Yaju-deka, Tokei – Adieu l’hiver, House on Fire) and singer, hypothyroidism.[539]

- Kazuo Ishikawa, 86, Japanese convicted murderer (Sayama incident).[540]

- Dave Mallow, 76, American voice actor (Mighty Morphin Power Rangers, Digimon, World of Warcraft).[541]

- Janet Metcalf, 89, American politician, member of the Iowa House of Representatives (1985–2003).[542]

- Norair Nurikyan, 76, Bulgarian weightlifter, Olympic champion (1972, 1976), cancer.[543]

- Horst Paulmann, 89, German-born Chilean retailer, founder of Cencosud.[544]

- Anthony Phelps, 96, Haitian-born Canadian writer.[545]

- Clive Revill, 94, New Zealand actor (The Empire Strikes Back, Irma La Douce, Oliver!).[546]

- Bob Rivers, 68, American Hall of Fame radio personality (KISW, KJR) and parody musician (Twisted Christmas), esophageal cancer.[547]

- John Stasik, 82, American politician, member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives (1997–2001).[548]

- Witold Tomczak, 67, Polish politician, MP (1997–2004) and MEP (2004–2009).[549]

- Ayako Yoshikawa, 92, Japanese Olympic long jumper (1952).[550]

10

- Sven Coomer, 84, Australian Olympic pentathlete (1956) and ski boot designer.[551]

- Anthony R. Dolan, 77, American journalist and political speechwriter.[552]

- Sir Francis Billy Hilly, 76, Solomon Islands politician, prime minister (1993–1994).[553]

- Stanley R. Jaffe, 84, American film producer (Kramer vs. Kramer, Fatal Attraction, The Accused), Oscar winner (1980).[554]

- Ljubomir Katić, 90, Serbian basketball player (Proleter Zrenjanin, Yugoslavia national team) and coach (Čelik Zenica).[555]

- Jesús Antonio Lerma Nolasco, 79, Mexican Roman Catholic prelate, auxiliary bishop of Mexico (2009–2019) and bishop of Iztapalapa (2019–2021).[556]

- Carl Lundström, 64, Swedish businessman and political activist, plane crash.[557]

- Thomas V. McComb, 88, American politician, member of the Indiana House of Representatives (1966–1970) and Senate (1970–1974).[558]

- Robert McGinnis, 99, American illustrator.[559]

- Marc Neil-Jones, 67, British-born Vanuatuan journalist.[560]

- Stedman Pearson, 60, British singer (Five Star), complications from diabetes.[561]

- Ali Rahman [id], 54, Indonesian politician.[562]

- B. Subbayya Shetty, 91, Indian politician, Karnataka MLA (1972–1983).[563]

- Alfredo Stranieri, 68, Italian-French serial killer.[564]

- John Taffin, 85, American author.[565]

- Paul Wheeler, 90, British screenwriter (Caravan to Vaccarès) and novelist.[566]

- Wheesung, 43, South Korean singer, cardiac arrest.[567] (body discovered on this date)

- Andy Wolfe, 99, American basketball player (California Golden Bears).[568]

- Craig Wolfley, 66, American football player (Pittsburgh Steelers), cancer.[569]

9

- George Battle, 77, American Methodist bishop.[570]

- Eileen Bennett, 105, British actress (Thursday’s Child, Much Too Shy, Trunk Crime).[571]

- Narve Bjørgo, 88, Norwegian historian.[572]

- Larry Buendorf, 87, American security officer (United States Olympic Committee) and Secret Service agent (attempted assassination of Gerald Ford in Sacramento).[573]

- Simon Fisher-Becker, 63, British actor (Puppy Love, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, Doctor Who).[574]

- Alexander Forger, 102, American civil rights lawyer.[575]

- Tatyana Govorova [ru], 84, Russian actress (A Strange Woman).[576]

- Rodney John Francis Henderson, 87, Australian botanist.[577]

- Renata Kodadová [cs], 83, Czech harpist (Czech Philharmonic) and academic.[578]

- Hans Peter Korff, 82, German actor (Diese Drombuschs, Pappa Ante Portas, Beresina, or the Last Days of Switzerland).[579]

- Taras Levkiv, 84, Ukrainian ceramic artist.[580]

- Dick McTaggart, 89, Scottish boxer, Olympic lightweight champion (1956), complications from dementia.[581]

- Akinori Nakayama, 82, Japanese Hall of Fame gymnast, Olympic champion (1968, 1972), stomach cancer.[582]

- Garimella Balakrishna Prasad, 76, Indian classical musician and composer.[583]

- Yola Ramírez, 90, Mexican tennis player.[584]

8

- Junaedi Abdillah [id], 77, Indonesian footballer (Persija Jakarta, Persebaya Surabaya, national team).[585]

- Pavel Androsov, 70, Russian military officer, major general, commander of the 37th Air Army (2007–2009), cardiac arrest.[586]

- Michael Armacost, 87, American diplomat, ambassador to Japan (1989–1993) and the Philippines (1982–1984), acting secretary of state (1989).[587]

- Bill Ashton, 88, British jazz musician and composer.[588]

- Ayo-Maria Atoyebi, 80, Nigerian Roman Catholic prelate, bishop of Ilorin (1992–2019).[589]

- Khasan Bakayev, 66, Russian historian.[590]

- Philippe Bär, 96, Dutch Roman Catholic prelate, bishop of Rotterdam (1983–1993).[591]

- A. H. M. Touhidul Anowar Chowdhury, 87, Bangladeshi gynaecologist and obstetrician.[592]

- Simonne Creyf, 78, Belgian politician, senator (1991–1995), MP (1995–2007).[593]

- Beau Dozier, 45, American songwriter and record producer.[594] (death announced on this date)

- Athol Fugard, 92, South African playwright (The Road to Mecca, Blood Knot, “Master Harold”…and the Boys) and political activist.[595]

- Donald Hazelwood, 95, Australian violinist.[596]

- Harbans Jandu, Indian lyricist.[597]

- Mark Klein, 79, American technician and whistleblower, pancreatic cancer.[598]

- K. W. Lee, 96, American journalist, founding president of the Korean American Journalists Association.[599]

- Al Matthews, 77, American football player (Green Bay Packers).[600]

- Isabel Miranda de Wallace, 73, Mexican social activist.[601]

- Attila Monostori, 54, Hungarian Olympic water polo player (1996).[602]

- Giles Paxman, 73, British diplomat, ambassador to Mexico (2005–2009) and Spain (2009–2013), lung cancer.[603]

- V. Ramaswami, 96, Indian jurist, judge of the Supreme Court (1989–1994) and chief justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court (1987–1989), cardiac arrest.[604]

- Naima Samih, 71, Moroccan singer.[605]

- Nota Schiller, 88, American-born Israeli rabbi.[606]

- L. J. Smith, 66, American author (The Vampire Diaries, Night World, The Secret Circle), complications from granulomatosis with polyangiitis.[607]

- Brian Waites, 85, English golfer, complications from Parkinson’s disease.[608]

- Ella Zeller, 91, Romanian table tennis player.[609]

7

- Akpovi Akoègninou, 74–75, Beninese botanist and academic.[610]

- Oumarou Malam Alma, 73, Nigerien politician, MP (since 2021).[611]

- Robert Bender, 88, American politician, member of the Michigan House of Representatives (1983–1995).[612]

- Danny Cox, 81, American singer and songwriter.[613]

- Kevin Drum, 66, American journalist and blogger (Mother Jones), cancer.[614]

- Richard Fortey, 79, British palaeontologist (Life: A Natural History of the First Four Billion Years of Life on Earth), natural historian and television presenter.[615]

- Luís Carlos Galter, 77, Brazilian footballer (Corinthians, Flamengo, national team), kidney disease.[616]

- Joan Dye Gussow, 96, American food writer and academic, heart failure.[617]

- Edward F. Harrington, 91, American lawyer, judge of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts (since 1988).[618]

- Brûni Heinke [nl], 84, Dutch actress (Goede tijden, slechte tijden, Soldier of Orange, Spetters), cancer.[619]

- Rifaat Hussain, 72, Pakistani political scientist and defence analyst.[620]

- Răzvan Ionilă, 43, Romanian football player (CF Braila, Petrolul Ploiești, Fortuna Covaci) and manager.[621]

- Stephen Jessel, 81, British newsreader and reporter.[622]

- Armand LaMontagne, 87, American sculptor.[623]

- Doyin Okupe, 72, Nigerian physician and politician, cancer.[624]

- Jürgen Piepenburg, 83, German football player (1. FC Frankfurt) and manager.[625]

- Oleksiy Shubin, 49, Ukrainian footballer (Vedrich Rechitsa, Torpedo Zaporizhzhia, Cherkasy), drone strike.[626] (death announced on this date)

- Brad Sigmon, 67, American convicted murderer, execution by firing squad.[627]

- Norris Thomas, 70, American football player (Miami Dolphins, Tampa Bay Buccaneers).[628]

- Wally Ursuliak, 95, Canadian curler, world champion (1961).[629]

- Sergei Vostokov, 79, Russian mathematician.[630]

- Sir David Vunagi, 74, Solomon Islands Anglican prelate and politician, governor-general (2019–2024) and archbishop and primate of Melanesia (2009–2017).[631]

- D’Wayne Wiggins, 64, American musician (Tony! Toni! Toné!) and songwriter (“Feels Good“), bladder cancer.[632]

6

- Australian Suicide, 32, Australian professional wrestler (AAA), cardiac arrest.[633]

- Mike Battle, 78, American football player (New York Jets) and actor (C.C. and Company).[634]

- Meredith Belbin, 98, British researcher (Team Role Inventories) and management consultant.[635]

- Walter Bucher, 98, Swiss Olympic cyclist (1948).[636]

- Dušan Čaplovič, 78, Slovak politician, minister of education (2012–2014), MP (2002–2020).[637]

- Dick Cherry, 87, Canadian ice hockey player (Philadelphia Flyers, Boston Bruins).[638]

- Henri Duez, 87, French Olympic cyclist (1960).[639]

- Lee Grodzins, 98, American physicist.[640]

- Brian James, 70, English punk rock guitarist (The Damned, The Lords of the New Church) and songwriter (“New Rose“).[641]

- Fikri Jufri [id], 88, Indonesian journalist (Tempo).[642]

- Krzysztof Kononowicz, 62, Polish political activist.[643]

- Domingo Massaro, 97, Chilean Olympic footballer (1952).[644]

- Daniel Pearl, 65, Brazilian journalist.[645]

- Klaus Richtzenhain, 90, German athlete, Olympic silver medalist (1956).[646] (death announced on this date)

- Crystal-Donna Roberts, 40, South African actress (Arendsvlei, The Endless River, Chronicle), breast cancer.[647]

- Olavi Salonen, 91, Finnish Olympic middle-distance runner (1960, 1964).[648]

- Art Schallock, 100, American baseball player (New York Yankees, Baltimore Orioles).[649]

- Ricardo Scofidio, 89, American architect.[650]

- Troy Seals, 86, American singer-songwriter.[651]

- Mabel Segun, 95, Nigerian writer and poet.[652]

- Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, 89–90, Pakistani admiral, chief of the naval staff (1986–1988) and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee (1988–1991).[653]

- Ray Snowball, 92, English footballer (Darlington).[654]

- Árpád Sopsits, 72, Hungarian film director (Strangled).[655]

- Josef Zíma [cs], 92, Czech actor (The Princess with the Golden Star, The Sinful People of Prague) and singer (Starci na chmelu).[656]

5

- Edesio Alejandro, 66, Cuban singer, guitarist and composer (Clandestinos, Hello Hemingway), cancer.[657]

- Pamela Bach, 61, American actress (Baywatch), suicide by gunshot.[658]

- S. K. Bagga, 71, Indian politician, Delhi MLA (since 2015).[659]

- Jean-Claude Barreau, 91, French essayist and writer.[660]

- Eduardo Cruickshank Smith, 67, Costa Rican politician, member (since 2018) and president (2020–2021) of the Legislative Assembly, heart disease.[661]

- Altin Çuko, 50, Albanian footballer (KS Lushnja, FK Tomori, KF Laçi).[662]

- DJ Funk, 53, American musician and producer, cancer.[663] (death announced on this date)

- Sandra Harding, 89, American philosopher.[664]

- Ewald Heer, 94, American aerospace engineer.[665]

- Norberto Huezo, 68, Salvadoran footballer (Atlético Marte, Palencia, national team), complications from a stroke.[666]

- Zoya Kornilova, 85, Russian politician, MP (1995–1999).[667]

- Bruno Pizzul, 86, Italian footballer (Catania, Cremonese) and journalist (RAI).[668]

- Daniel Rovero, 87, American politician, member of the Connecticut House of Representatives (2011–2019).[669]

- Fred Stolle, 86, Australian Hall of Fame tennis player, cancer.[670]

- Charles Tart, 87, American psychologist and parapsychologist.[671]

- Sylvester Turner, 70, American politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (since 2025), mayor of Houston (2016–2024).[672]

- Terry Wilson, 83, Canadian football player (Calgary Stampeders, Edmonton Eskimos).[673]

- Haruo Yoshimuta, 85, Japanese Olympic swimmer (1960, 1964), heart failure.[674]

4

- Roy Ayers, 84, American musician and composer (Everybody Loves the Sunshine).[675]

- Margaret Brazier, 74, British academic.[676]

- Robert G. Clark Jr., 96, American politician, member of the Mississippi House of Representatives (1968–2003).[677]

- Stephen Custer, 81, American classical cellist (Los Angeles Philharmonic).[678]

- Jean-Louis Debré, 80, French judge and politician, president of the Constitutional Council (2007–2016) and of the National Assembly (2002–2007), minister of the interior (1995–1997).[679]

- Peter Engel, 88, American television producer (Saved by the Bell, City Guys, Hang Time).[680]

- Dave Gillespie, 90, New Zealand rugby union player (Otago, Wellington, national team).[681] (death announced on this date)

- Oleg Gordievsky, 86, Russian-British double agent.[682]

- Mickey Harmon, 40, American visual artist, graphic designer and queer activist, blunt force trauma to the head.[683]

- Cássio de Jesus, 35, Brazilian footballer (Semen Padang, Kelantan, Barito Putera), aplastic anemia.[684]

- Jack Kibbie, 95, American politician, member of the Iowa Senate (1965–1969, 1989–2013) and House of Representatives (1960–1964).[685]

- Joe Nickell, 80, American skeptic (The Bondwoman’s Narrative) and paranormal investigator.[686]

- Jerzy Pasiński, 77, Polish politician, mayor of Gdańsk (1989–1990).[687]

- Jean-Louis Pichon, 76, French theatre director.[688] (body discovered on this date)

- Selwyn Raab, 90, American journalist (The New York Times) and author, inspiration for Kojak, intestinal complications.[689]

- Ciclón Ramirez, 64, Mexican professional wrestler (CMLL, IWRG), heart attack.[690]

- Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna, 87, Brazilian writer.[691]

- Roses In May, 25, American racehorse.[692]

- Mario Trabucco, 73, Italian violinist.[693]

- José Valdivielso, 89, Cuban-American baseball player (Washington Senators / Minnesota Twins).[694]

- Gene Winfield, 97, American automotive customizer (Blade Runner, RoboCop, The Last Starfighter), cancer.[695]

- Serhiy Zhuravlyov, 65, Ukrainian footballer (Dynamo Kyiv, Zorya Luhansk, national team).[696] (death announced on this date)

3

- Kathryn Apanowicz, 64, British actress (Angels, EastEnders) and television presenter (Calendar).[697]

- Sonny Arguinzoni, 85, American author and pastor.[698]

- Sir John Ashworth, 86, British scientist.[699]

- Peter Bevilacqua, 91, Italian-born Australian footballer (Carlton).[700]

- Henryk Bielski, 90, Polish film director (Pastorale heroica).[701]

- Randy Brown, 72, American R&B singer.[702]

- Victor Cicansky, 90, Canadian sculptor.[703]

- Carl Dean, 82, American businessman.[704]

- Lincoln Díaz-Balart, 70, Cuban-American politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (1993–2011), cancer.[705]

- Peter Eyre, 85, English cricketer (Derbyshire).[706]

- Walter Fahrer, 85, Argentine comic book writer.[707]

- Dan Gawrecki, 81, Czech historian.[708]

- Eleonora Giorgi, 71, Italian actress (Talcum Powder, To Forget Venice, Inferno) and film director, pancreatic cancer.[709]

- Dore Gold, 71, American-Israeli political scientist and diplomat, permanent representative of Israel to the UN (1997–1999).[710]

- Herb Greene, 82, American photographer.[711]

- Geraint Jarman, 74, Welsh musician, poet and television producer.[712]

- Sébastien Lepetit, 55, French crime fiction writer, colorectal cancer.[713]

- Jean-Marie Londeix, 92, French saxophonist.[714]

- Jozef Markuš, 80, Slovak politician, deputy prime minister (1989–1990), president of Matica slovenská (1990–2010).[715]

- Carol McNicoll, 81, English studio potter.[716]

- John McTavish, 93, Scottish footballer (Manchester City, St Mirren, Stranraer).[717]

- Craig Richard Nelson, 77, American actor (The Paper Chase, 3 Women, Friends and Lovers).[718]

- Antoine Saad, 87, Lebanese politician, MP (2005–2018).[719]

- Sunil Satpal Sangwan, 77, Indian politician, Haryana MLA (1996–2001, 2009–2014, since 2024), liver cancer.[720]

- Frank Saucier, 98, American baseball player (St. Louis Browns).[721]

- Padmakar Shivalkar, 84, Indian cricketer (Bombay).[722]

- Felicia Țilea-Moldovan, 57, Romanian four-time Olympic javelin thrower.[723]

- Woo Chia-wei, 87, Hong Kong physicist and academic administrator, president of HKUST (1991–2001) and SFSU (1983–1988).[724]

2

- Edip Akbayram, 74, Turkish singer, multiple organ failure.[725]

- Felicia Minei Behr, 83, American television producer (All My Children).[726]

- Dieuwertje Blok, 67, Dutch actress, writer, and television presenter (Het Sinterklaasjournaal), cancer.[727]

- Dennis Bond, 77, English footballer (Watford, Charlton Athletic, Tottenham Hotspur).[728]

- Gérard Bourgoin, 85, French sports executive, president of AJ Auxerre (2011–2013) and Ligue de Football Professionnel (2000–2002).[729]

- Marc Boutte, 55, American football player (Los Angeles Rams, Washington Redskins).[730]

- Colin Burdett, 94, Australian Olympic basketball player (1956).[731]

- John Cummins, 82, Canadian politician, MP (1993–2011).[732]

- Ray De Gruchy, 92, British footballer (Grimsby Town, Chesterfield).[733]

- Flo Fox, 79, American street photographer.[734]

- Roger Gyles, 86, Australian judge (Federal Court of Australia).[735]

- Herbert Léonard, 80, French singer, lung cancer.[736]

- George Lowe, 67, American voice actor (Space Ghost Coast to Coast, Aqua Teen Hunger Force, Robot Chicken), complications following heart surgery.[737]

- Frank Maher, 90, Canadian musician.[738]

- Kee Malesky, 74, American author and research librarian.[739]

- Juan Margallo, 84, Spanish actor (Dragon Rapide, Solitary Fragments) and theatre director, complications from a fall.[740]

- Marysa Navarro, 90, Spanish-American historian.[741]

- Buvaisar Saitiev, 49, Russian freestyle wrestler and politician, Olympic champion (1996, 2004, 2008), MP (2016–2021), fall.[742]

- Bruno Souza, 99, Indian architect.[743]

- Bernhard Vogel, 92, German politician, minister-president of Rhineland-Palatinate (1976–1988) and of Thuringia (1992–2003), twice president of the Bundesrat.[744]

- Peter Wall, 87, Ukrainian-born Canadian real estate developer.[745]

1

- Paula Alvarellos, 62, Spanish politician and lawyer, mayor of Lugo (since 2024), heart attack.[746]

- Nugzar Bagration-Gruzinsky, 74, Georgian prince, throne claimant and theatre director, head of the House of Gruzinsky (since 1984).[747]

- Asoma Banda, 92, Ghanaian businessman and philanthropist.[748]

- Susantha Chandramali, 61, Sri Lankan actress (Gamane Yaa), cancer.[749]

- Rosemary Crowley, 86, Australian politician, minister assisting the prime minister for the status of women (1993) and senator (1983–2002).[750]

- Bill Dare, 64, English television producer and writer (Dead Ringers, The Now Show, Spitting Image), traffic collision.[751]

- Merrill Douglas, 88, American football player (Chicago Bears, New York Jets, Philadelphia Eagles).[752]

- Hazel Nell Dukes, 92, American civil rights activist, president of the NAACP (1990–1992).[753]

- Marged Esli, 75, Welsh actress (Pobol y Cwm).[754]

- Bunky Green, 91, American jazz alto saxophonist.[755]

- Elvi Hale, 94, British actress (The Six Wives of Henry VIII, True as a Turtle, The Heroes of Telemark).[756]

- Nico Hidalgo, 32, Spanish footballer (Recreativo Granada, Cádiz, Racing de Santander), lung cancer.[757]

- Pat Ingoldsby, 82, Irish poet and television presenter, subject of The Peculiar Sensation of Being Pat Ingoldsby.[758]

- Vladimir Krpan, 87, Croatian pianist.[759]

- Robert T. Kuhn, 87, American publicist and church leader.[760]

- Tim Kruger, 44, German pornographic film actor and director, domestic accident.[761]

- Tullio Lanese, 78, Italian football referee.[762]

- Jiří Liška, 75, Czech politician, member (1996–2010) and vice-president (2004–2010) of the Senate.[763]

- Monta Mino, 80, Japanese television presenter (Quiz $ Millionaire).[764]

- Joey Molland, 77, English guitarist (Badfinger) and songwriter (“Love Is Easy“, “Love Is Gonna Come at Last“).[765]

- Miguel Otero Lathrop, 94, Chilean politician and diplomat, senator (1991–1998).[766]

- Paulito FG, 63, Cuban salsa and timba musician, traffic collision.[767]

- John Curtis Perry, 94, American historian and scholar.[768]

- Fulco Pratesi, 90, Italian environmentalist, journalist and politician, deputy (1992–1994).[769]

- Flor Procuna, 72, Mexican actress (Los ricos también lloran).[770]

- Alan Self, 80, Australian footballer (South Melbourne).[771]

- Angie Stone, 63, American singer (“No More Rain (In This Cloud)“, “Wish I Didn’t Miss You“) and rapper (The Sequence), traffic collision.[772]

- Amadu Sulley, Ghanaian civil servant, deputy chairman of the Electoral Commission (2012–2018).[773]

- Jack Vettriano, 73, Scottish painter (The Singing Butler).[774]

- Pedro Zarraluki, 70, Spanish writer.[775]

Previous months

- Deaths in January 2025

- Deaths in February 2025

References

External links

- The Guardian (UK) obituaries

- The Telegraph (UK) obituaries

- Obituaries, Chicago Tribune

- Obituaries, Los Angeles Times

- The New York Times, obituaries

- The Washington Post obituaries

- The Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) obituaries

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Deaths_in_2025&oldid=1283874073”

Khamtai Siphandone

Khamtai Siphandone (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; 8 February 1924 – 2 April 2025) was a Laotian politician who served as the chairman of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party from 1992 to 2006 and as the fourth president of Laos[1] from 1998 to 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He joined the Indochinese Communist Party in 1954 and became a member of the Central Committee of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party in 1956.

Early life

Siphandone was born on 8 February 1924[2] in the village of Huakhongphayai in Khong district to Ny Nilaxay and Saybua Nilaxay, and was among six siblings. He came from a peasant family from the far south of Laos in present-day Champasak province. In 1931, at the age of seven, he was among several children selected by an officer of the department of religious affairs in Vientiane to study in the city, thus beginning his primary education. He later attended the College PAVIE for his secondary education, but left in 1941 after his sponsor’s death led to a reduction in Siphandone’s financial capacity.[3]

His first job was as a postman. After taking a specialized course in Saigon, he became a telegrapher in Phongsaly province in 1944.[3] He joined the national liberation movement Lao Issara, which stood for the independence of Laos and against the return of the French protectorate administration, after the end of the Second World War.

Before the French regained control of Savannakhet in March 1946, Siphandone seized the entire provincial fund (150,000 piastres). He became an officer of the armed wing of the movement and in 1948 their representative for southern Laos. After the split of Lao Issara in 1950 he joined the Viet Minh-backed Pathet Lao.[4]

In 1954, Siphandone became a member of the Communist Party of Indochina, and in 1955 the Lao People’s Party, on whose central committee he served from 1957. He was considered a close confidant of the first Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane. In 1962 he became his successor as chief of staff of the armed units of the Pathet Lao. In 1966 he became commander-in-chief of the resulting “Lao People’s Liberation Army”, which fought, with North Vietnamese support, in the Laotian Civil War against the royal troops. In 1972 he rose to membership in the Politburo of the LPRP.[4]

Political career

Siphandone was the military commander of the Pathet Lao rebellion.[5] After the successful Communist takeover in 1975, he became the Minister of Defense and a Deputy Prime Minister of Laos.[5] During the 5th Party Congress in 1991, Siphandone was the third highest-ranking member of the party leadership, after Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phoumsavanh.[6] On 15 August 1991, he succeeded Kaysone, who had left office to become president, as Prime Minister of Laos. After the death of longtime party leader Kaysone in 1992, Siphandone became Chairman of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.[5]

Siphandone succeeded Nouhak Phoumsavanh as president in 1998.[7] At the 8th Party Congress in 2006, he became an advisor to the LPRP Central Committee.

Siphandone remained as party leader until 21 March 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly.[8] He stepped down as president in June,[9] following the 2006 Laotian parliamentary election.

Family and personal life

Siphandone was married to Thongvanh Siphandone.[10] His son Sonexay joined the LPRP Politburo in 2016[11] and became Prime Minister of Laos in 2022.[12] His daughter Viengthong currently serves as President of the State Audit Organization.[13]

On 8 February 2024, he turned 100, and was sent congratulatory messages by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng and President of Vietnam Võ Văn Thưởng. The Vietnamese ambassador to Laos Nguyen Ba Hung presented a birthday gift to Siphandone to his son Sonexay.[14][15]

Death

Siphandone died in his residence in Vientiane, aged 101, on 2 April 2025. The Laotian government declared a period of mourning lasting from 3 to 7 April.[3] General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping, Prime Minister of Thailand Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Prime Minister of Cambodia Hun Manet issued messages of condolences upon Siphondone’s death.[16][17][18][19] On 3 April, Lâm led a high-ranking Vietnamese delegation to Vientiane to pay respects to Siphandone.[20] Vietnam also announced a period of mourning for 2 days starting on 4 April.[21]

Awards and honours

- Laos:

- National Gold Medal

- Order of Phoxay Lane Xang

- Brunei:

- Family Order of Laila Utama (2004)[22]

- Cuba:

- Order of José Martí[23]

- Vietnam:

- Gold Star Order

- Soviet Union:

- Order of the Red Banner (1984)[24]

References

Party political offices

Preceded by
Phoumi Vongvichit

President of the Lao Front for National Construction

1991–2001

Succeeded by
Sisavath Keobounphanh

Preceded by
Kaysone Phomvihane

Chairman of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party

1992–2006

Succeeded by
Choummaly Sayasone

(General Secretary)

Political offices

Preceded by
None

Minister of Defense

1975–1991

Succeeded by
Choummaly Sayasone

Preceded by
Kaysone Phomvihane

Prime Minister of Laos

1991–1998

Succeeded by
Sisavath Keobounphanh

Preceded by
Nouhak Phoumsavanh

President of Laos

1998–2006

Succeeded by
Choummaly Sayasone

Diplomatic posts

Preceded by
Megawati Sukarnoputri

Chairperson of ASEAN

2004

Succeeded by
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Khamtai_Siphandone&oldid=1283858349”

Hans-Josef Klauck

Hans-Josef Klauck OFM (4 June 1946 – 27 March 2025) was a German theologian, Franciscan priest, and historian. After teaching New Testament as professor at the universities of Bonn, Würzburg and Munich, he was Naomi Shenstone Donnelley Professor Emeritus of New Testament and Early Christian Literature at the University of Chicago Divinity School from 2001 to 2016.

Life and career

Klauck was born in Hermeskeil on 4 June 1946.[1] The first child of his mother, Anna-Maria Meier, he grew up with two younger half-brothers.[2] He attended the boarding school of the Franciscan Cologne region in Exaten near Roermond from 1960 where he achieved the Abitur in 1966. He then joined the Franciscan Rietberg Abbey [de] on 21 April 1966.[2] He made his vows on 5 October 1970.[1][2] Klauck studied philosophy and theology in Münster and Bonn. He was ordained a priest on 15 July 1972 by Bishop Heinrich Tenhumberg [de] in Münster.[1][2]

Klauck worked in the St. Pankratius [de] parish in Buldern and studied further in Münster, focused on Bible and Jewish studies.[3] He worked as an assistant to Joachim Gnilka at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich and achieved the doctorate of theology in 1977; his dissertation was titled “Allegorie und Allegorese in synoptischen Gleichnistexten”.[1] He was habilitated in 1980,[2][3] writing about “Herrenmahl und hellenistischer Kult. Eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum ersten Korintherbrief”.[1]

Klauck was appointed professor in Bonn in 1981. He received an offer from the University of Würzburg the following year to succeed Rudolf Schnackenburg.[1] In 1994 he lectured in South Africa for several weeks. He served as dean of the faculty in Würzburg from 1995 to 1997. In 1998, he moved to the faculty of Catholic theology in Munich,[1] succeeding his former teacher Gnilka.[2][3]

Klauck received an offer to teach New Testament at the University of Chicago Divinity School in 2001,[2][3] a private institution independent of denominations and churches.[2] Klauck was president of the Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas in 2003/04.[4] He received an honorary doctorate from the University of Zurich in 2008, for his studies of Early Christianity.[1][5] He retired from the Divinity School in Summer 2016 as emeritus.[2][3]

Klauck returned to Germany in 2022 and settled in a convent in Munich.[1][2]

Klauck died in Munich on 27 March 2025, at the age of 78.[1][2]

Research

Hans-Josef Klauck was a prolific New Testament scholar of his time[1] who worked on topics such as the parables of Jesus, Paul’s Epistles to the Corinthians, and the Johannine epistles. He also focused on the social and religious history of the Greco-Roman world for context.[1][3] He explored the apocrypha of the New Testament, writing introductions in several languages, and collected essays and articles in monographies.[1]

Klauck was the editor of Herders Biblische Studien[6] and Stuttgarter Biblische Studien;[7] coeditor of Hermeneia, Evangelische-Katholische Kommentar zum Neuen Testament[8] and Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament;[9] New Testament area editor for the new edition of Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart;[10] and the main New Testament editor of the Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception.[11]

Books

Klauck authored over thirty books and over 250 articles. His books, several of them in English, include:[3]

- Klauck, Hans-Josef (2000). The Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions. Studies of the New Testament and its World. Edinburgh: T & T Clark. ISBN 978-0-567-08693-8. OCLC 59430516.

- ——— (2000). Magic and Paganism in Early Christianity: The World of the Acts of the Apostles. Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark. ISBN 978-0-567-08749-2. OCLC 44737102.

- ——— (2000). Dion von Prusa: Olympische Rede oder über die erste Erkenntnis Gottes. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. ISBN 9783534149476. OCLC 45541463.

- ——— (2002). Apokryphe Evangelien: Eine Einführung. Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk. ISBN 978-3-460-33022-1. OCLC 50994826.

- ——— (2002). Anknüpfung und Widerspruch. Das frühe Christentum in der multireligiösen Welt der Antike. Munich: Katholische Akademie in Bayern. ISBN 9783926512994. OCLC 52299722.

- ——— (2003). Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum. Neutestamentliche Studien. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament. Vol. 152. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 978-3-16-147899-4. OCLC 51770649.

- ——— (2003). Apocryphal gospels : an introduction. New York: T & T Clark International. ISBN 978-0-567-08390-6. OCLC 727069158.

- ——— (2006). Ancient Letter Writing and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. ISBN 978-1-4294-1839-3. OCLC 77011211.

- ——— (2008). Die apokryphe Bibel. Ein anderer Zugang zum frühen Christentum. Tria corda. Vol. 4. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 978-3-16-149686-8. OCLC 939245533.

References

External links

- “Preliminary Inventory to the Hans-Josef Klauck Papers 1977–2005”. The University of Chicago Library. Retrieved 1 April 2025.

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hans-Josef_Klauck&oldid=1283841305”

Betty Webb (code breaker)

Charlotte Elizabeth Webb (née Vine-Stevens; 13 May 1923 – 31 March 2025)[1][2] was an English code breaker[3] who worked at Bletchley Park during World War II at the age of 18.[4][5][6] In 1941 she joined the British Auxiliary Territorial Service.[7] She said, of joining the top-secret mission at Bletchley, “I wanted to do something more for the war effort than bake sausage rolls.”[6]

Early life

Webb was named after her mother, Charlotte, but was commonly referred to as “Betty”.[8] She described her childhood as ‘idyllic’, having grown up on the Herefordshire side of Richard’s Castle, in Ryeford. She was home-schooled for a significant portion of her youth. Her mother gave her and her brother home-school lessons.[8] She was studying Domestic Science at Radbrook College in Shrewsbury at the start of World War II.[9] She signed up to join the Auxiliary Territorial Service as soon as she turned 18 in May 1941, and did basic training at the Royal Welch Fusiliers‘ Hightown Barracks in Wrexham. From there she was taken to an interview in London at Devonshire House and then sent immediately to Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire.[9][6]

World War II and Bletchley Park

Upon arrival at Bletchley Park, she was tasked with cataloguing encrypted German radio messages intercepted by the British, contributing to the breaking of the German cipher Enigma.[3][6] While a bulk of Bletchley Park workers were assigned to one of the huts, such as Hut 3, Hut 11, Webb was mainly situated in the Mansion belonging to Major Tester‘s department and Block F, the Japanese section.[10] In Major Tester’s department, some tasks performed include registering messages on little cards, which Webb believes totalled 10,000 a day in the whole park, and organizing the cards into shoeboxes according to a strict order so they could be retrieved efficiently when called for.[10] In Block F, she worked on intercepted Japanese messages, something she excelled at so much that she was later sent to Washington to support the American war effort.[6]

The Official Secrets Act

Every person recruited to Bletchley Park was taken into a room and given the Official Secrets Act to read and then sign before they could begin their work at Bletchley Park.[10] The intense secrecy meant workers could not share what they did with their families, friends, or even talk among their fellow Bletchley workers.[10] Only after the veil of secrecy was lifted were Betty Webb, and others who had worked at Bletchley, finally able to understand what had really been going on at the site.[10]

Honours

Webb was appointed a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) in the 2015 Birthday Honours “for services to remembering and promoting the work of Bletchley Park”.[11][12] In 2021, Webb’s work at Bletchley Park was recognized by the government of France, with her appointment as Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur (Knight of the Legion of Honour).[13]

From 2020, she was an ambassador of Operation Bletchley, a series of walking and codebreaking challenges, raising money for the Army Benevolent Fund.[9] As of February 2021, Webb lived in Worcestershire, England.[14] In 2023, she was invited to King Charles’s coronation on 6 May and sat in the front row.[15] She turned 100 in May 2023 and celebrated her birthday with a party at Bletchley Park, which involved a flypast by an Avro Lancaster bomber.[16] She died on 31 March 2025, aged 101.[1]

Works

- Webb, Betty (2023). No More Secrets: My Part in Codebreaking at Bletchley Park and the Pentagon. Ad Lib Publishers Limited. ISBN 978-1837-7002-19.

- Webb, Charlotte (2014). Secret Postings: Bletchley Park to the Pentagon. BookTower Publishing. ISBN 978-0955-7164-78.

See also

- Women in Bletchley Park

References

External links

- Betty Webb at IMDb

- “The Last Voices of World War II: Betty Webb, British Intelligence” at nationalgeographic.com

- “Episode 12—Betty Webb (Code-Breaker at Bletchley Park)” at Walk Among Heroes podcast

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Betty_Webb_(code_breaker)&oldid=1283853579”

Wes Watkins

Wesley Wade Watkins (December 15, 1938 – March 26, 2025)[1] was an American politician from the state of Oklahoma. Watkins was a member of the United States House of Representatives where he represented Oklahoma’s 3rd congressional district for 14 years as a Democrat and then for six years as a Republican.

Early life and career

Watkins was born in De Queen, Arkansas, on December 15, 1938, but grew up in Bryan County. He graduated from Oklahoma State University in 1960, receiving a Master’s degree from that same school in 1961. While at OSU, he was the president of the student body and student senate.[2]

After a brief stint working for the United States Department of Agriculture, he worked as an administrator at his alma mater from 1963 to 1966. During that time, he was initiated into Tau Kappa Epsilon fraternity as an honorary member while serving as their faculty advisor.[3] From 1960 to 1967, he served in the Oklahoma National Guard.[2]

Entry into politics

Watkins was elected to the Oklahoma State Senate in 1974.[2] Two years later, U.S. House Speaker Carl Albert announced his retirement after 30 years representing the 3rd District.[4] Based in the southeastern part of the state, an area known as Little Dixie, the 3rd was heavily Democratic in both local and national elections.[5]

Watkins faced a formidable opponent in Albert’s popular longtime Chief of Staff and Administrative Assistant, Charles Ward. However, Watkins had closer local ties in the district, while Ward had spent decades in Washington. Watkins prevailed in the Democratic primary runoff and he then gained Albert’s endorsement and won the general election with 82% of the vote.[6]

He was later reelected six more times, always by close to 80% of the vote.[4] For most of this time, he served on the Budget or Appropriations Committees.[2]

Gubernatorial campaigns

1990 campaign for governor as a Democrat

Watkins did not seek an eighth term in 1990, instead running for the Democratic nomination for governor to succeed Republican Henry Bellmon.[2] He raised nearly $3 million for his campaign, at one point outspending his opponents by nearly $1.4 million dollars in June 1990.[7] In the Democratic primary, he ran ahead of House Speaker Steve Lewis, yet lost to eventual winner David Walters, who had been the Democratic Gubernatorial nominee four years earlier in 1986.[8][9]

1994 campaign for governor as an independent

Watkins was openly disappointed in the lack of support from the state Democratic hierarchy, and by 1994 began referring to the Oklahoma Democratic Party as an organization run by “arrogant political bosses”.[10] By later in 1994, Watkins ran for governor again, this time as an Independent. He only won 23% of the vote.[4] However, his independent candidacy siphoned off enough votes from Lieutenant Governor Jack Mildren, the Democratic candidate, to allow Frank Keating, a Reagan administration official, to become only the third Republican governor in Oklahoma history at that point. Watkins tallied over 233,000 votes, far more than Keating’s 171,000-vote margin over Mildren. He won by heavy margins in rural areas, particularly his former congressional district, winning many of the counties there by large margins.[11]

Return to Congress

1996 Congressional campaign

In 1996, Brewster decided to retire from Congress as it became known that Watkins wanted his seat back. The Republican House leadership persuaded Watkins to run as a Republican, seeing a chance to win a seat where they had never made a serious bid since Oklahoma joined the Union in 1907. They promised Watkins a seat on the Ways and Means Committee with full seniority if he ran as a Republican and won. He went on to vote with the Republican majority 97% of the time, which was far more often than when he was a Democrat in prior years, usually voting with the Democratic caucus only 50% of the time from 1974 to 1990.[12]

Watkins initially planned to retire from office in 1998 after undergoing back surgery, but was persuaded to run again, shocking many Democratic insiders who had expected him to retire.[13] He was handily re-elected that year, defeating Walt Roberts. He faced no major-party opposition when he ran for his third term in 2000.[14]

Watkins’s voting record in his first period in Congress had been characterized as somewhat moderate. During his second period, however, his voting record was strongly conservative, usually receiving ratings in the high 90s from the American Conservative Union.[12]

Retirement from Congress

Oklahoma lost a congressional seat after the 2000 census due to slower than expected population growth. The final map saw Watkins’s district dismantled, with its territory split between three nearby districts, creating initial uncertainty as to which Republican incumbents would run again.[15] His home in Stillwater (where he had lived since 1990) was drawn into the western Oklahoma-based 3rd district (the former 6th district), represented by fellow Republican Frank Lucas. Most of his old base in Little Dixie was merged into the Muskogee-based 2nd district. The western portion, including Watkins’s former home in Ada, was drawn into the Norman-based 4th district. Watkins therefore announced he would resign, in hopes that this would help prevent his fellow Republican incumbents from having to run against each other.[16] In an indication of how much his politics had changed since leaving the House for the first time, Watkins served as honorary chairman for conservative Senator Jim Inhofe‘s bid for a second full term.[17]

Post-congressional career

After leaving Congress, he was hired as a senior legislative analyst at the Washington, D.C.–based lobbying and public relations firm Fleishman-Hillard.[18]

He died on March 26, 2025, from cardiac arrest in Stillwater, Oklahoma.[4][19]

Legacy

After retirement, Wes Watkins continued to focus on issues of economic development, global hunger, global trade, and utilizing innovative technologies to address these issues. He founded a non-profit ministry, Matthew 24.40 Foundation, to provide scholarships for students to install hydroponics systems in diverse global locations to address issues of hunger.[20]

- The Wes Watkins Center for International Trade Development at Oklahoma State University was established in 1990 to increase the economic competitiveness of the state of Oklahoma and to assist Oklahoma-based businesses to engage in global trade. It is an extension unit within the School of Global Studies and Partnerships at Oklahoma State University.[21]

- Wes Watkins Technology Center.[22]

- Inducted into Oklahoma CareerTech Hall of Fame in 1991.[22]

- Wes Watkins Reservoir in central Oklahoma was named in honor of him.[23]

See also

- Little Dixie

- Oklahoma Democratic Party

- Oklahoma Republican Party

- Oklahoma’s congressional districts

- Party switching in the United States

- Politics of Oklahoma

- Wes Watkins Reservoir

References

External links

- Wes Watkins at Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress

- Wes Watkins CareerTech Hall of Fame Bio

- Appearances on C-SPAN

- Voices of Oklahoma interview. First person interview conducted on March 1, 2017, with Wes Watkins.

U.S. House of Representatives

Preceded by
Carl Albert

Member of the U.S. House of Representatives

from Oklahoma’s 3rd congressional district

1977–1991

Succeeded by
Bill Brewster

Preceded by
Bill Brewster

Member of the U.S. House of Representatives

from Oklahoma’s 3rd congressional district

1997–2003

Succeeded by
Frank Lucas

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wes_Watkins&oldid=1283619321”

Young Scooter

Kenneth Edward Rashaad Bailey (March 28, 1986 – March 28, 2025),[1] better known by his stage name Young Scooter, was an American rapper.[2][3][4] He was among the first artists to sign with fellow Atlanta rapper Future‘s record label, Freebandz, in 2012. In 2013, he jointly signed with Waka Flocka Flame‘s Brick Squad Monopoly, an imprint of Gucci Mane‘s 1017 Records.[5][6]

He first gained regional recognition for his collaborations with the rappers, as well as his mixtape Street Lottery (2012) and its lead single, “Colombia”.[7] His guest appearance on Future and Juice Wrld‘s 2018 song “Jet Lag” marked his sole entry on the Billboard Hot 100. [8]

On March 28, 2025, Young Scooter died in Atlanta, Georgia, after jumping over a fence and injuring his right thigh due to a penetrating injury from wooden fencing or debris, which resulted in significant blood loss.

Life and career

Bailey was born in Walterboro, South Carolina, on March 28, 1986.[9] When he was nine, his family moved to the Kirkwood Community (also known as “Lil Mexico”) of Atlanta, Georgia. In 2008, after he was charged with drug trafficking, he decided to start pursuing a career in music. Scooter was a childhood friend with fellow Atlanta rapper Future.[10][11]

While his first mixtape Plug Talkin did not receive much attention, with his second release Finessin and Flexin’ he made a name for himself, already collaborating with Future.[6]

Scooter’s real breakthrough came in January 2013, when he released his mixtape Street Lottery. SPIN named it “Rap release of the week”[12] and XXL featured it on its “Best mixtapes of January” list.[13] Eric Diep of XXL called Scooter “one of the hottest street rappers coming out of Atlanta” and wrote that tracks like the single “Colombia” and “Street Lottery” (featuring Bun B) are “proof of his undeniable talent”.[13] The tape was also a viral success gaining over 100,000 downloads on DatPiff.[7]

The official video for “Colombia”, directed by Decatur Dan, premiered on MTV on January 31. The song became a hit in the south, especially in Scooter’s hometown Atlanta.[4] Brandon Soderberg of SPIN classified it as a mix of Rick Ross‘ “Hustlin’” and Future’s “Tony Montana“.[12] By the end of the month, an official remix with rappers Rick Ross, Birdman and Gucci Mane was released.[14] Lil Wayne also covered the song for his mixtape Dedication 5.[15] The rapper’s recent success prompted OnSmash to state “the buzz for Scooter is at an all-time high.”[16] On April 8, Scooter was arrested for violation of parole.[17]

Musical style

Scooter was known for his freestyle type of rapping, without writing down his lyrics, similarly to Gucci Mane. He defined his style as “count music”, and explained it in an interview with Complex: “I don’t really care what I say on a beat as long as it’s about some money. When you try to think hard and write it out, that’s when it’s gonna be fucked up.”[6]

Scooter’s lyrical themes were largely about money and drugs. David Drake of Complex compared his “populist, kingpin rapping” to that of Young Jeezy, although he noted that Scooter doesn’t have the “all-encompassing grandiosity” of his fellow Atlanta rapper.[6]

Scooter listed his influences as Jay-Z, 50 Cent and Sean Combs.[10]

Legal issues

On April 8, 2013, Bailey was arrested for probation violation during a traffic stop in DeKalb County, Georgia. According to HipHopDX, Bailey shared a jail cell with frequent collaborator Gucci Mane, who was arrested for probation violation on April 12, 2013.[18] Bailey spent six months in custody before being released in mid-October 2013.[19] On March 2, 2015, he was released off probation.[20]

Death

Bailey died on March 28, 2025, his 39th birthday. Police in southeast Atlanta responded to a 911 call reporting a dispute involving gunfire and a woman whom Bailey had forcibly brought back into a house. When officers arrived on the scene, they attempted to make contact, but Bailey and another man fled. While trying to escape, Bailey injured his leg after jumping over two fences. He was later taken to the hospital, where he ultimately died.[21][22] The Fulton County Medical Examiner reported that no gunshot wound was found on Bailey’s body, but he sustained a penetrating injury to his right thigh. The manner of death is classified as accidental.

Discography

Mixtapes

List of mixtapes, with year released

Title

Album details

Peak chart positions

US

Ind.

[23]

US

Heat.

[24]

Finessin’ & Flexin’[25]

- Released: September 26, 2011

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo & The Empire

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Married To The Streets[26]

- Released: January 21, 2012

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo, DJ Green Lantern & DJ Smallz

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Plug Brothers[27]

(with Cartel MGM)

- Released: June 27, 2012

- Hosted by Trap-A-Holics, DJ Swamp Izzo & DJ Spinz

- Label: Brick Squad Monopoly, Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Voice of The Streetz[28]

- Released: November 2, 2012

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Street Lottery[29]

- Released: January 1, 2013

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo & DJ Scream

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Free Bricks 2[30]

(with Gucci Mane)

- Released: February 28, 2013

- Hosted by DJ Scream & DJ Spinz

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz, 1017 Records

- Format: Digital download

—

—

From The Cell Block To Your Block[31]

- Released: August 29, 2013

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Street Lottery 2[32]

- Released: January 1, 2014

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

80’s Baby[33]

- Released: July 5, 2014

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Jug Season[34]

- Released: January 27, 2015

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo & OG Double D

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Juggathon

(with Zaytoven)

- Released: May 27, 2015

- Label: Familiar Territory, Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Married To The Streets 2[35]

- Released: November 3, 2015

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Street Lottery 3[36]

- Released: April 27, 2016

- Hosted by DJ Swamp Izzo

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download

—

—

The Dream Team[37]

(with Ralo)

- Released: May 27, 2016

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz, Famerica

- Format: Digital download

—

—

Jugg King[38]

- Released: July 13, 2017

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

36

15

Trippple Cross[39]

- Released: February 23, 2018

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

19

7

The Recipe[40]

- Released: December 21, 2018

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Trap Hero[41]

- Released: November 8, 2019

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

17

Street Lottery Reloaded[42]

- Released: February 18, 2020

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Zaystreet

(with Zaytoven)[43]

- Released: December 11, 2020

- Label: Familiar Territory, Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Streetz Krazy[42]

- Released: October 20, 2023

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Trap’s Last Hope[44]

- Released: March 21, 2024

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Fast Lane Juugin[45]

- Released: February 4, 2025

- Label: Black Migo Gang, Freebandz

- Format: Digital download, streaming

—

—

Singles

As lead artist

Title

Year

Album

“Colombia”[46]

2012

Street Lottery

“DI$Function”

(featuring Future, Juicy J and Young Thug)[47]

2014

Count Music

“Dope Boys & Trap Gods”

(with Zaytoven featuring 2 Chainz and Rick Ross)[48]

2020

Zaystreet

As featured artist

Title

Year

Peak chart positions

Certifications

Album

US

[49]

US

R&B/HH

[50]

CAN

[51]

NZ

Hot

[52]

“Jet Lag”

(Future and Juice Wrld featuring Young Scooter)

2018

72

45

87

29

- RIAA: Gold[53]

Wrld on Drugs

Other charted songs

Title

Year

Peak chart positions

Certifications

Album

US

Bub.

[54]

US

R&B/HH

[50]

“Guwop”

(Young Thug featuring Quavo, Offset and Young Scooter)

2016

10

45

- RIAA: Platinum[53]

- MC: Gold[55]

Jeffery

“Doh Doh”

(Future featuring Young Scooter)[56]

2018

12

—

Beast Mode 2

Guest appearances

List of non-single guest appearances, with other performing artists, showing year released and album name

Title

Year

Other artist(s)

Album

“Birds Take a Bath”[57]

2012

Future, Jeezy

Astronaut Status

“Anything You Want”[58]

Dose, Future

Foreign Dreams

“All We Do”[59]

Yung Ralph

Juugman Reloaded

“Plug Relation”[60]

Cartel MGM

Hood Azz Mexikan

“Smoke Alarm”[60]

“Money Habits”[61]

Gucci Mane

Trap God

“Don’t Trust”[61]

“Rolly Up”[61]

Gucci Mane, Waka Flocka Flame

“Shooter”[61]

Gucci Mane, Yung Fresh

“Dead Man”[61]

Gucci Mane, Trae tha Truth

“Fuck Something”[61]

Gucci Mane, Kirko Bangz, Waka Flocka Flame

“Sky Diving”[62]

OG Boo Dirty, Gucci Mane

Definition Of A G

“On It”[63]

Mike WiLL Made It, Chief Keef

Est. In 1989 2.5

“Muphucka”[64]

2013

Mexico Rann

F.B.G: The Movie

“Missing”[64]

Future, Big Bank Blank

“Everything Ours”[64]

Future

“Appeal”[64]

—

“Murda She Wrote”[65]

Waka Flocka Flame, Cartel MGM

Duflocka Rant 2

“Fuck With It”

Young Thug

1017 Thug

“Big Guwap”[66]

Gucci Mane

Trap God 2

“Bullet Wound”[66]

Gucci Mane, Lil Wayne

“I Need More”[67]

Fredo Santana

Fredo Kruger

“I’m Good”[68]

Future

The Mission

“New Money”[69]

Shawty Lo, Cash Out

I’m Da Man 4

“Plug Prices”[70]

OJ da Juiceman

6 Ringz Vol. 2

“Holmes”[71]

Migos, Gucci Mane

—

“Who U Wit”[72]

Verse Simmonds, Yo Gotti, Trouble

“Can’t Handle Me”[73]

Gucci Mane, Young Dolph

EastAtlantaMemphis

“Investigation”[73]

Gucci Mane, Young Dolph, Big Bank Black

“Play No Games” (Remix)[74]

Frenchie

Long Overdue

“Done It All”[75]

Casino

Ex Drug Dealer

“Short Fuse”[76]

Waka Flocka Flame, Eldorado Red

DuFlocka Rant: Halftime Show

“Grew Up”[77]

Young Dolph, Project Pat

High Class Street Music 3: Trappin Out A Mansion

“Muddy”[78]

Gucci Mane, Young Dolph

Trap House III

“Money Counter”[79]

Alley Boy

War Cry

“Topside”[80]

Gunplay, Young Breed

Acquitted

“Maserati”[81]

Philthy Rich, Gucci Mane

N.E.R.N.L. 2

“Ea$tside”[82]

Trinidad James, Gucci Mane, Alley Boy, Childish Gambino

10 PC Mild

“Faces”[83]

Gucci Mane

World War 3: Lean

“Cali”[84]

Diary of a Trap God

“Recognize”[84]

Gucci Mane, Akon

“Pickup and Dropoffs”[85]

Chevy Woods

Gang Land 2

“Convict”[86]

Donkey

Loyalty Means Everything

“Project Building”[87]

E-40, Gucci Mane

The Block Brochure: Welcome To The Soil 5

“Big Plays”[88]

2014

Taylor J

—

“What You Said”[89]

Project Pat

Cheez N Dope 3: Street God

“Guwop”[90]

2016

Young Thug, Quavo, Offset

Jeffery

“Rain”[91]

2017

VL Deck

The Appetizer

“Back On It”[92]

2018

Zaytoven, Offset

Trapholizay

“Never Too Late”[93]

Ralo

Conspiracy

“DOH DOH”[56]

Future, Zaytoven

Beast Mode 2

“Jet Lag”[94]

Future, Juice Wrld

Wrld on Drugs

“Patek Watch”[95]

VL Deck

Project Music Vol. 1

“Crops”[96]

2019

Project Music Vol. 2

“Wave”[97]

Trap Pastor

“Millions”[98]

Cassius Jay, OJ da Juiceman

God Bless Da 6

“Stayed Down”[99]

2022

Future

I Never Liked You

Music videos

As lead artist

List of music videos, with directors, showing year released

Title

Year

Director(s)

“77 Birds”

(featuring Gucci Mane)

2012

G Visuals[100]

“Cash Money”

Cricket[101][102]

“The Corner”

“Down Bad”

G Visuals[103]

“Hardest Thing In Life”

G Rank[104]

“Flying Packs”

(featuring Cartel MGM)

GT Films[105]

“Colombia”

2013

Decatur Dan[106]

“Street Lights”

(featuring Gucci Mane and OJ da Juiceman)

Mr. Boomtown[107]

“Streets Talking”

(featuring Shyst Red)

Cam Kirk[108]

“Colombia” (Remix)

(featuring Rick Ross, Birdman and Gucci Mane)

Gabriel Hart[109]

As featured artist

List of music videos, with directors, showing year released

Title

Year

Director(s)

“Anything You Want”

(Dose featuring Future and Young Scooter)

2012

G. Visuals[58]

“All We Do”

(Yung Ralph featuring Young Scooter)

Cricket[59][110]

“Money Habits”

(Gucci Mane featuring Young Scooter)

“Dead Man”

(Gucci Mane featuring Young Scooter and Trae tha Truth)

Philly Fly Boy[111]

“New Money”

(Shawty Lo featuring Cash Out and Young Scooter)

2013

GT Films[112]

“Shooter”

(Gucci Mane featuring Young Scooter and Yung Fresh)

Mr. Boomtown[113]

“Holmes”

(Migos featuring Young Scooter and Gucci Mane)

Mike Ryan[71]

References

External links

- Young Scooter on Twitter

- Young Scooter at IMDb

- Trick Scooter[permanent dead link]

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Young_Scooter&oldid=1283862956”

Heloísa Teixeira

For the singer whose birthname is Heloísa Maria Buarque de Hollanda, see Miúcha.

Heloísa Teixeira (26 July 1939 – 28 March 2025),[1] formerly known as Heloísa Buarque de Hollanda, was a Brazilian writer, essayist, editor and literary critic whose research activity focused on the relationship between culture and development, particularly with regard to poetry, feminism, gender and ethnic relations, marginalized cultures, and digital culture.[2][3]

Life and career

Teixeira was born in Ribeirão Preto. She graduated in classic literature at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, had a master’s degree and a doctorate in Brazilian literature from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, where she was professor emerita of theory of culture, and a postgrad at Columbia University.[4] In the 80s she was named director of Museu da Imagem e do Som do Rio de Janeiro by Darcy Ribeiro.[5]

Among the works she wrote or edited are the books 26 poetas hoje (1975), an anthology of Brazilian underground poets from the mimeograph generation,[6] and As 29 poetas hoje (2021), an anthology of women poets;[7] the series Pensamento Feminista Hoje;[8] Asdrúbal trouxe o trombone – memórias de uma trupe solitária de comediantes que abalou os anos 70;[9] Rachel, Rachel;[10] Explosão Feminista;[9] Cultura e Participação nos anos 60;[9] and Pós-Modernismo e Política.[9]

On 20 April 2023, she was elected as the 30th chair of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, succeeding Nélida Piñon.[11] She was the 10th woman in the history of the Academy to be elected.[12]

Personal life and death

She was married twice – first to the lawyer and gallery owner Luiz Buarque de Hollanda, a relative of Chico Buarque; she had three sons with him. Her second husband was the photographer João Carlos Horta; they were married for over 50 years, until Horta’s death in 2020.[13] In July 2023, Heloísa announced that she would reject the surname Buarque de Hollanda, and return to her maiden name Teixeira.[14][15]

In 2024, Teixeira was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer.[5]

Teixeira died on 28 March 2025, aged 85, in Rio de Janeiro.[16] She had been hospitalized with pneumonia. President Lula da Silva expressed his condolences upon her death.[5] Actress Fernanda Torres also paid her respects to Teixeira.[13]

References

External links

- Personal page (in Portuguese)

Retrieved from “https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Heloísa_Teixeira&oldid=1283637674”

Table of Contents

Constitutional Court of Korea

Impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol

Yoon Suk Yeol

President of South Korea

2024 South Korean martial law crisis

Donald Trump

Tariffs in the second Trump administration

Marine Le Pen

2017 French presidential election

2022 French presidential election

National Front assistants affair

2025 Myanmar earthquake

Gaza war

M23 campaign (2022–present)

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (1 January 2025 – present)

Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2025)

Deaths in 2025

Khamtai Siphandone

Hans-Josef Klauck

Betty Webb (code breaker)

Wes Watkins

Young Scooter

Heloísa Teixeira